Isap v2.0

  • Christoph Dobraunig Digital Security Group, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands; Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
  • Maria Eichlseder Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
  • Stefan Mangard Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
  • Florian Mendel Infineon Technologies AG, Neubiberg, Germany
  • Bart Mennink Digital Security Group, Radboud University, Nijmegen Netherlands
  • Robert Primas Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
  • Thomas Unterluggauer Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria
Keywords: Authenticated encryption, NIST LWC, Leakage resilience, Sponges

Abstract

We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST’s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.

https://isap.iaik.tugraz.at

Published
2020-06-22
How to Cite
Dobraunig, C., Eichlseder, M., Mangard, S., Mendel, F., Mennink, B., Primas, R., & Unterluggauer, T. (2020). Isap v2.0. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2020(S1), 390-416. https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416
Section
Articles