Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV

  • Tetsu Iwata Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
  • Yannick Seurin Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI), Paris, France
Keywords: authenticated encryption, AEAD, GCM-SIV, AES-GCM-SIV, CAESAR competition


We make a number of remarks about the AES-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme currently considered for standardization by the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). First, we point out that the security analysis proposed in the ePrint report 2017/168 is incorrect, leading to overly optimistic security claims. We correct the bound and re-assess the security guarantees offered by the scheme for various parameters. Second, we suggest a simple modification to the key derivation function which would improve the security of the scheme with virtually no efficiency penalty.
How to Cite
Iwata, T., & Seurin, Y. (2017). Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(4), 240-267.