Cryptanalysis of Reduced round SKINNY Block Cipher

Authors

  • Sadegh Sadeghi Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematical Sciences and Computer, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
  • Tahereh Mohammadi Electrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran
  • Nasour Bagheri Electrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran; School of Computer Science, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, iran

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2018.i3.124-162

Keywords:

SKINNY, Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, Related-tweakey impossible differential cryptanalysis, MILP

Abstract

SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers designed to have the smallest hardware footprint. In this paper, we present zero-correlation linear approximations and the related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics for different versions of SKINNY .We utilize Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to search all zero-correlation linear distinguishers for all variants of SKINNY, where the longest distinguisher found reaches 10 rounds. Using a 9-round characteristic, we present 14 and 18-round zero correlation attacks on SKINNY-64-64 and SKINNY- 64-128, respectively. Also, for SKINNY-n-n and SKINNY-n-2n, we construct 13 and 15-round related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics, respectively. Utilizing these characteristics, we propose 23-round related-tweakey impossible differential cryptanalysis by applying the key recovery attack for SKINNY-n-2n and 19-round attack for SKINNY-n-n. To the best of our knowledge, the presented zero-correlation characteristics in this paper are the first attempt to investigate the security of SKINNY against this attack and the results on the related-tweakey impossible differential attack are the best reported ones.

Published

2018-09-04

How to Cite

Sadeghi, S., Mohammadi, T., & Bagheri, N. (2018). Cryptanalysis of Reduced round SKINNY Block Cipher. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2018(3), 124–162. https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2018.i3.124-162

Issue

Section

Articles