Understanding RUP Integrity of COLM
Keywords:Integrity, Release of unverified plaintext, COLM, COPA, ELmD, ELmE
AbstractThe authenticated encryption scheme COLM is a third-round candidate in the CAESAR competition. Much like its antecedents COPA, ELmE, and ELmD, COLM consists of two parallelizable encryption layers connected by a linear mixing function. While COPA uses plain XOR mixing, ELmE, ELmD, and COLM use a more involved invertible mixing function. In this work, we investigate the integrity of the COLM structure when unverified plaintext is released, and demonstrate that its security highly depends on the choice of mixing function. Our results are threefold. First, we discuss the practical nonce-respecting forgery by Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) against COPA’s XOR mixing. Then we present a noncemisusing forgery against arbitrary mixing functions with practical time complexity. Finally, by using significantly larger queries, we can extend the previous forgery to be nonce-respecting.
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Copyright (c) 2017 Nilanjan Datta, Atul Luykx, Bart Mennink, Mridul Nandi
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.