Cryptanalysis of Haraka

Authors

  • Jérémy Jean ANSSI Crypto Lab, Paris, France

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2016.i1.1-12

Keywords:

Hash Function, Preimage Attack, Collision Attack, Haraka

Abstract

In this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash
functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256
in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about
216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for
Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about 2192 function
evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state
that are preserved over several rounds.

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Published

2016-12-01

How to Cite

Jean, J. (2016). Cryptanalysis of Haraka. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2016(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2016.i1.1-12

Issue

Section

Articles