Cryptanalysis of Haraka
Keywords: Hash Function, Preimage Attack, Collision Attack, Haraka
AbstractIn this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash
functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256
in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about
216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for
Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about 2192 function
evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state
that are preserved over several rounds.
How to Cite
Jean, J. (2016). Cryptanalysis of Haraka. IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2016(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2016.i1.1-12
Copyright (c) 2016 Jérémy Jean
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.