Impossible Boomerang Attacks Revisited

Applications to Deoxys-BC, Joltik-BC and SKINNY


  • Jianing Zhang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
  • Haoyang Wang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
  • Deng Tang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China



Impossible Boomerang Attack, MIQCP, Deoxys-BC, Joltik-BC, SKINNY


The impossible boomerang (IB) attack was first introduced by Lu in his doctoral thesis and subsequently published at DCC in 2011. The IB attack is a variant of the impossible differential (ID) attack by incorporating the idea of the boomerang attack. In this paper, we revisit the IB attack, and introduce the incompatibility of two characteristics in boomerang to the construction of an IB distinguisher. With our methodology, all the constructions of IB distinguisher are represented in a unified manner. Moreover, we show that the related-(twea)key IB distinguishers possess more freedom than the ones of ID so that it can cover more rounds.
We also propose a new tool based on Mixed-Integer Quadratically-Constrained Programming (MIQCP) to search for IB attacks. To illustrate the power of the IB attack, we mount attacks against three tweakable block ciphers: Deoxys-BC, Joltik-BC and SKINNY. For Deoxys-BC, we propose a related-tweakey IB attack on 14-round Deoxys-BC-384, which improves the best previous related-tweakey ID attack by 2 rounds, and we improve the data complexity of the best previous related-tweakey ID attack on 10-round Deoxys-BC-256. For Joltik-BC, we propose the best attacks against 10-round Joltik-BC-128 and 14-round Joltik-BC-192 with related-tweakey B attack. For SKINNY-n-3n, we propose a 27-round related-tweakey IB attack, which improves both the time and the memory complexities of the best previous ID attack. We also propose the first related-tweakey IB attack on 28-round SKINNY-n-3n, which improves the previous best ID attack by one round.







How to Cite

Impossible Boomerang Attacks Revisited: Applications to Deoxys-BC, Joltik-BC and SKINNY. (2024). IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2024(2), 254-295.