Abstract
Few topics in the philosophy of perception have received more attention than Molyneux’s question: would a person with congenital blindness, able to identify cubes and spheres by touch, immediately or even eventually identify these shapes by sight alone, if made to see? This special issue focuses on the new developments concerning the answers to this question, as well as on the new questions in the light of the results of the results from the sciences of the mind.
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