



Invertible Quadratic Non-Linear Layers for MPC-/FHE-/ZK-Friendly Schemes over \mathbb{F}_p^n

Application to Poseidon

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Motivation



New applications including

- ▶ secure multi-party computation (MPC),
- ▶ fully homomorphic encryption (FHE),
- zero-knowledge proofs (ZK),

require symmetric-key primitives that

- (1) are naturally defined over $(\mathbb{F}_p)^n$ for a large prime integer p (usually, $p \approx 2^{128}$ or 2^{256});
- (2) minimize their multiplicative complexity, that is, the number of multiplications (= non-linear operations) required to compute and/or verify them.

Invertible Non-Linear Operations over \mathbb{F}_p^n

Due to the size of p, the non-linear operations

- cannot be pre-computed and stored (no look-up tables);
- ▶ they must admit a simple algebraic expression.

Current known invertible non-linear operations:

- ▶ power map $x \mapsto x^d$ over \mathbb{F}_p where gcd(d, p-1) = 1
- ► Dickson polynomial $x \mapsto D_{d,\alpha}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\lfloor d/2 \rfloor} \frac{d}{d-i} {d-i \choose i} \cdot (-\alpha)^i \cdot x^{d-2i} \text{ over } \mathbb{F}_p \text{ where}$ $gcd(d, p^2 - 1) = 1;$
- ▶ non-linear functions over \mathbb{F}_p via Legendre function $x \mapsto L_p(x) = x^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ or/and $x \mapsto (-1)^x$ operator
- ▶ non-linear layers over \mathbb{F}_p^n instantiated via Feistel and/or Lai-Massey schemes, e.g., $(x_0, x_1) \mapsto (x_1, x_1^2 + x_0)$.

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- ▶ non-linear layers over 𝔽ⁿ_p instantiated via Feistel and/or Lai-Massey schemes, e.g., (x₀, x₁) → (x₁, x₁² + x₀).

Goals

- ► Changing d in base of p (e.g., gcd(d, p − 1) = 1) is not desirable:
 - potentially harder (algebraic) security analysis which must be adapted depending on p and so on d (e.g., density of the polynomial representation);
 - efficiency could depend on the choice of *d*.
- Feistel and/or Lai-Massey schemes are "partially linear" (do not provide "full non-linearity").

Goal: construct new *invertible "full" non-linear layers* over \mathbb{F}_p^n that

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Shift Invariant Lifting Functions S_F over \mathbb{F}_p^n Induced by a Local Map $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$

Let $\mathcal{S}: \mathbb{F}_p^n \to \mathbb{F}_p^n$ be a generic non-linear function:

 $S(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) = y_0 ||y_1|| \dots ||y_{n-1} \quad \text{where}$ $\forall i \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}: \qquad y_i := F_i(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1})$

for certain $F_i : \mathbb{F}_p^n \to \mathbb{F}_p$.

➡ Too many possible cases to analyze!

Idea: define S as a Cellular Automata (CA), that is, a shift-invariant transformation over a \mathbb{F}_p^n -array of cells defined by a single local update rule $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$ for $1 \le m \le n$.

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SI-Lifting Functions S_F (2/2)

The Shift Invariant (SI) lifting function $\mathcal{S}_F : \mathbb{F}_p^n \to \mathbb{F}_p^n$ induced by $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$ is defined as

$$\mathcal{S}_{F}(x_{0}, x_{1}, \dots, x_{n-1}) = y_{0} \|y_{1}\| \dots \|y_{n-1} \quad \text{where}$$

$$\forall i \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}: \qquad y_{i} := F(x_{i}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_{i+m-1}).$$

"Shift Invariant" property due to the fact that:

 $\Pi_i \circ \mathcal{S}_F = \mathcal{S}_F \circ \Pi_i$

for each shift function Π_i over \mathbb{F}_p^n defined as

 $\prod_{i}(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) = x_i \|x_{i+1}\| \dots \|x_{i+n-1}\|$

for $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$.

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Example of SI-Lifting Functions over \mathbb{F}_2^n

See Joan Daemen's PhD Thesis ("Cipher and Hash Function Design Strategies based on linear and differential cryptanalysis"):

• given the chi function $\chi : \mathbb{F}_2^3 \to \mathbb{F}_2$:

$$\chi(x_0, x_1, x_2) = x_0 \oplus (x_1 \oplus 1) \cdot x_2,$$

then S_{χ} over \mathbb{F}_2^n is invertible if and only if gcd(n, 2) = 1; given the function

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then S_F over \mathbb{F}_2^n is invertible if and only if gcd(n, 3) given the function

 $F(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_5) = x_1 \oplus (x_0 \oplus 1) \cdot (x_2 \oplus 1) \cdot x_3 \cdot (x_5 \oplus 2),$ then \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_2^n is invertible for each $n \ge 6$.

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Our Goal

Let

▶ $p \ge 3$; ▶ $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$ quadratic.

Given $\mathcal{S}_F: \mathbb{F}_p^n \to \mathbb{F}_p^n$ defined as before, that is,

$$S_F(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) = y_0 ||y_1|| \dots ||y_{n-1} \quad \text{where}$$

$$\forall i \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}: \qquad y_i := F(x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_{i+m-1}),$$

then

- ▶ is it possible to find *F* for which S_F is invertible?
- ▶ if yes, for any value of *n* and/or *m*?

SI-Lifting Functions \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_p^n via Quadratic $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$: Results for $m \in \{2,3\}$

Necessary Conditions for Inveritibility

Let $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$ be a quadratic function: $F(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{m-1}) := \sum \alpha_{i_0, i_1, \dots, i_{m-1}} \cdot x_0^{i_0} \cdot x_1^{i_1} \cdot \dots \cdot x_{m-1}^{i_{m-1}}.$ $0 \le i_0 + i_1 + \ldots + i_{m-1} \le 2$ Let $\alpha^{(d)}$ be the sum of the coefficients of the degree-d monomials: $\alpha^{(d)} := \sum \alpha_{i_0, i_1, \dots, i_{m-1}}.$ $i_0 + i_1 + \ldots + i_{m-1} = d$

▶ If $\alpha^{(2)} \neq 0$: $F(x, x, ..., x) = \alpha^{(2)} \cdot x^2 + \alpha^{(1)} \cdot x + \alpha_{0,0,...,0}$, hence collisions $S_F(x', x', ..., x') = S_F(\hat{x}, \hat{x}, ..., \hat{x})$.

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Let $\alpha^{(d)}$ be the sum of the coefficients of the degree-d monomials:

$$\alpha^{(d)} := \sum_{i_0+i_1+\ldots+i_{m-1}=d} \alpha_{i_0,i_1,\ldots,i_{m-1}} \, .$$

Necessary requirements for invertibility of S_F :

$$\alpha^{(2)} = 0$$
 and $\alpha^{(1)} \neq 0$

- If $\alpha^{(2)} = \alpha^{(1)} = 0$: $F(x, x, \dots, x) = F(0, 0, \dots, 0)$;
- ► If $\alpha^{(2)} \neq 0$: $F(x, x, ..., x) = \alpha^{(2)} \cdot x^2 + \alpha^{(1)} \cdot x + \alpha_{0,0,...,0}$, hence collisions $\mathcal{S}_F(x', x', ..., x') = \mathcal{S}_F(\hat{x}, \hat{x}, ..., \hat{x})$.

Theorem

Let $p \ge 3$ be a prime, let m = 2, and let $n \ge 2$. Let $F : \mathbb{F}_p^2 \to \mathbb{F}_p$ be a quadratic function:

$$F(x_0, x_1) = \alpha_{2,0} \cdot x_0^2 + \alpha_{1,1} \cdot x_0 \cdot x_1 + \alpha_{0,2} \cdot x_1^2 + \alpha_{1,0} \cdot x_0 + \alpha_{0,1} \cdot x_1.$$
Given S_F over \mathbb{F}_p^n :

• if $n = 2$, then S_F is invertible if and only if
$$F(x_0, x_1) = \gamma_0 \cdot x_0 + \gamma_1 \cdot x_1 + \gamma_2 \cdot (x_0 - x_1)^2$$
for $\gamma_0 \neq \pm \gamma_1$;

• if $n \ge 3$, then S_F is never invertible.

Collisions over \mathbb{F}_p^3 of the form

$$S_F(0, x_0, x_1) = S_F(0, x'_0, x'_1),$$

imply collisions over \mathbb{F}_{p}^{n} for each $n \geq 3$ of the form

$$\mathcal{S}_F(0, x_0, x_1, 0, 0, \dots, 0) = \mathcal{S}_F(0, x_0', x_1', 0, 0, \dots, 0)$$

Indeed, both are satisfied by

 $F(0, x_0) = F(0, x'_0), \quad F(x_0, x_1) = F(x'_0, x'_1), \quad F(x_1, 0) = F(x'_1, 0).$

 \implies We limit ourselves to n = 3 and $S_F(0, x_0, x_1) = S_F(0, x_0, x_1)$.

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Necessary requirements for invertibility of S_F :

▶
$$\alpha_{1,0} + \alpha_{0,1} \neq 0.$$

In the paper, collisions are proposed in order to cover all the cases just given. E.g., if $\alpha_{2,0}, \alpha_{1,1} \neq 0$ with $\alpha_{2,0} + \alpha_{1,1} + \alpha_{0,2} = 0$:

$$\mathcal{S}_{F}\left(0,\frac{\alpha_{0,2}\cdot\alpha_{1,0}}{\alpha_{1,1}\cdot\alpha_{2,0}}-\frac{\alpha_{0,1}}{\alpha_{1,1}},x\right)=\mathcal{S}_{F}\left(0,\frac{\alpha_{0,2}\cdot\alpha_{1,0}}{\alpha_{1,1}\cdot\alpha_{2,0}}-\frac{\alpha_{0,1}}{\alpha_{1,1}},-x-\frac{\alpha_{1,0}}{\alpha_{2,0}}\right)$$
for each $x\in\mathbb{F}_{p}$.

Examples of Invertible SI-Lifting Functions S_F for m = 3 and $n \in \{3, 4\}$

• Case
$$n = m = 3$$
: given

$$F(x_0, x_1, x_2) = \sum_{i=0}^{2} \mu_i \cdot x_i + (x_0 - x_1)^2 + (x_1 - x_2)^2 + (x_0 - x_2)^2,$$
such that $\operatorname{circ}(\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2) \in \mathbb{F}_0^{3 \times 3}$ is invertible, then \mathcal{S}_F over

such that circ $(\mu_0, \mu_1, \mu_2) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{3 \times 3}$ is invertible, then \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_p^3 is invertible.

• Case n = 3 and m = 4: given

$$F(x_0, x_1, x_2) = \alpha \cdot (x_0 + x_2) + \beta \cdot x_1 + (x_0 - x_2)^2,$$

such that $\alpha \neq \pm \beta/2$, then \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_p^4 is invertible.

Other examples given in the paper.

Theorem

Let $p \ge 3$ be a prime, let m = 3, and let $n \ge 5$. Let $F : \mathbb{F}_p^3 \to \mathbb{F}_p$ be **any** quadratic function. The SI-lifting function \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_p^n induced by F is **never** invertible.

- Strategy of the proof similar to the one just proposed for m = 2 and n ≥ 3.
- Different from the binary case, for which S_F over 𝔽ⁿ₂ can be invertible depending on F : 𝔽³₂ → 𝔽₂ and on n (e.g., χ).

The Sponge Hash Function Neptune

Poseidon Permutation over \mathbb{F}_{p}^{t}



- $S(x) = x^d$ where $d \ge 3$ s.t. gcd(d, p - 1) = 1;
- Linear layer: multiplication with a MDS matrix in F^{t×t}_p (that prevents infinitely long subspace trails);
- Random constants addition in F^t_p.
- Number of rounds $(\kappa \approx \log_2(p))$:

 $R_F = 2 \cdot R_f = 8$, $R_P pprox \log_d(p)$

From Poseidon to Neptune

Internal partial rounds are crucial for increasing the degree of the permutation, and so preventing algebraic attacks. Cost of

$$\underbrace{(\mathsf{Hw}(d) + \lfloor \log_2(d) \rfloor - 1)}_{\geq 2} \cdot \underbrace{\mathsf{R}_{\mathsf{P}}}_{\approx \log_d(p)}$$

multiplications, which is independent of t;

 External full rounds guarantee security against statistical attacks, including differential, linear, and so on. Cost of

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Goal: modify the external rounds for reducing the total number of multiplications (= factor that multiplies t) without NG decreasing the security.

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► Goal: modify the external rounds for reducing the total number of multiplications (= factor that multiplies t) without decreasing the security.

Neptune's External Rounds: Non-Linear Layer

• Given any quadratic $F : \mathbb{F}_p^{\leq 3} \to \mathbb{F}_p$, then \mathcal{S}_F over $\mathbb{F}_p^{\geq 5}$ is **not** invertible.

▶ Let t = 2 · t' even. Non-linear layer of NEPTUNE's external rounds via concatenation of S-Boxes S over F²_p, defined as

$$\mathcal{S}(x_0, x_1) = \mathcal{S}' \circ \mathcal{A} \circ \mathcal{S}'(x_0, x_1)$$

where (for $\gamma \neq 0$):

$$S'(x_0, x_1) = x_0 + (x_0 - x_1)^2 ||x_1 + (x_0 - x_1)^2||x_1 + (x_0 -$$

- ▶ Differential property of S: DP_{max} = p^{-1} ;
- ► Cost of t multiplications for computing S (versus ≥ 2 · t for INE power maps).

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where (for $\gamma \neq 0$):

$$\mathcal{S}'(x_0, x_1) = x_0 + (x_0 - x_1)^2 ||x_1 + (x_0 - x_1)^2$$

 $\mathcal{A}(x_0, x_1) = \begin{bmatrix} \gamma \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 1 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix};$

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Table: Comparison of POSEIDON and NEPTUNE – both instantiated with d = 5 – for the case $p \approx 2^{128}$ (or bigger), $\kappa = 128$, and several values of $t \in \{4, 8, 12, 16\}$.

	t	R _F	$R_P \& R_I$	Multiplicative Complexity
Poseidon $(d = 5)$	4	8	60	276 (+ 21.0 %)
Neptune $(d = 5)$	4	6	68	228
POSEIDON $(d = 5)$	8	8	60	372 (+ 40.1 %)
NEPTUNE $(d = 5)$	8	6	72	264
POSEIDON $(d = 5)$	12	8	61	471 (+ 53.9 %)
NEPTUNE $(d = 5)$	12	6	78	306
POSEIDON $(d = 5)$	16	8	61	567 (+ 64.3 %)
Neptune $(d = 5)$	16	6	83	345

(See the paper for more details about NEPTUNE' specification.)

Summary and Open Problems

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- Let p ≥ 3. Given any quadratic function F : 𝔽^m_p → 𝔽_p, then the SI-lifting function 𝔅_F over 𝔽ⁿ_p is **not** invertible if
 - $m = 1, n \ge 1;$
 - *m* = 2, *n* ≥ 3;
 - $m = 3, n \ge 5.$
- ▶ Open Conjecture: Given *F* as before, S_F is never invertible if $n \ge 2 \cdot m 1$;
- ▶ Open Problem: Construct invertible non-linear functions over ℝⁿ_p with minimal multiplicative complexity;
- Exploit them when designing future MPC-/ZK-/FHE-frendly symmetric schemes!

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Thanks for your attention!

Questions?

Comments?



Lai-Massey Schemes: Example of SI-Lifting Functions for m = n

Let circ $(\mu_0, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n \times n}$ be an invertible circulant matrix. Given an invertible even function $H : \mathbb{F}_p \to \mathbb{F}_p$ (i.e., H(z) = H(-z)), let

$$F(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \mu_i \cdot x_i + H\left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (-1)^i \cdot x_i\right)$$

If n = 2n' is even, then \mathcal{S}_F over \mathbb{F}_p^n is invertible.

Proof. Given
$$S_F(x_0, x_1, ..., x_{n-1}) = y_0 ||y_1|| ... ||y_{n-1}$$
:

- if circ $(\mu_0, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_{n-1})$ = circ $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$, then $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (-1)^i \cdot x_i = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (-1)^i \cdot y_i$;
- ▶ otherwise, work with $z \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ defined as $z = \operatorname{circ}^{-1}(\mu_0, \mu_1, \dots, \mu_{n-1}) \times y.$

(Other examples in the paper.)

Definition. A function $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \to \mathbb{F}_p$ is balanced if and only if

$$\forall y \in \mathbb{F}_p: \qquad |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_p^m \mid F(x) = y\}| = p^{m-1}$$

Lemma. If F is not balanced, then S_F is **not** invertible.

Example. Let $p \ge 2$ be a prime, and let $F : \mathbb{F}_p^2 \to \mathbb{F}_p$ be

 $F(x_0, x_1) = \alpha_{2,0} \cdot x_0^2 + \alpha_{1,1} \cdot x_0 \cdot x_1 + \alpha_{0,2} \cdot x_1^2 + \alpha_{1,0} \cdot x_0 + \alpha_{0,1} \cdot x_1.$

If $\alpha_{2,0} = \alpha_{0,2} = 0$, then F is **not** a balanced function.

Neptune's External Rounds: Linear Layer

Given $M', M'' \in \mathbb{F}_p^{t' \times t'}$ two MDS matrices, linear layer $M \in \mathbb{F}_p^{t \times t}$ of NEPTUNE's external rounds defined as

$$M_{i,j} = \begin{cases} M'_{i',j'} & \text{if } (i,j) = (2i',2j') \\ M''_{i'',j''} & \text{if } (i,j) = (2i''+1,2j''+1) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

that is,

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} M'_{0,0} & 0 & M'_{0,1} & 0 & \dots & M'_{0,t'-1} & 0 \\ 0 & M''_{0,0} & 0 & M''_{0,1} & \dots & 0 & M''_{0,t'-1} \\ M'_{1,0} & 0 & M'_{1,1} & 0 & \dots & M'_{1,t'-1} & 0 \\ 0 & M''_{1,0} & 0 & M''_{1,1} & \dots & 0 & M''_{1,t'-1} \\ \vdots & & \ddots & \vdots \\ M'_{t'-1,0} & 0 & M''_{t'-1,1} & 0 & \dots & M'_{t'-1,t'-1} & 0 \\ 0 & M''_{t'-1,0} & 0 & M''_{t'-1,1} & \dots & 0 & M''_{t'-1,t'-1} \end{bmatrix}.$$

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