# SymSum: <br> Symmetric-Sum Distinguishers Against Round Reduced SHA3 

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## Basics

## SHA3/KECCAK

- Follows SPONGE construction
- Internal permutation called Keccak- - / Кессак- $p$
- Internal state
- Array of $5 \times 5$ slices
- Biggest size $\rightarrow 1600$ bits
- Total 24 rounds
- 1 Round $=5$ sub-operations

$$
\mathcal{R}=\iota \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta
$$

Note:
Position of $\iota$ in the round function
Round-constants added at the end of a round

## Basics

- SHA3 Family

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { Fixed-Length } & \rightarrow \text { SHA3-224/256/384/512 } \\
\text { XOF } & \rightarrow \text { SHAKE128/256 }
\end{aligned}
$$

- Main difference with Keccak Family:
- Introduction of the domain separation bits prior to $10 * 1$ padding

$$
M \xrightarrow{\text { Add Suffix }} \begin{cases}M \| 01 & \text { Fixed-Length } \\ M \| 1111 & \text { XOF }\end{cases}
$$

## Distinguishing Attacks on Keccak-f

Towards exhibiting non-random behaviour

## Distinguishers on Keccak- $f$

## Target the Hermetic Sponge Strategy

Internal permutation of Sponge based hash function should be designed such that they cannot be distinguished from a randomly-chosen permutation.

- Maximum results on Keccak- $f$ during SHA-3 competition
- e.g., Zero-Sum, Rotational among others


## Particular Attention <br> Zero-Sum Distinguisher

- Based on higher-order derivatives of forward/inverse rounds
- Only distinguisher to reach full 24 -rounds
- Uses inside-out strategy


# What about distinguishers on Keccak? 

Distinguishing the hash-function itself

## Distinguishers on Keccak

Distinguishers on Keccak- $f$ may not directly extend to Keccak

- Due to restrictions imposed by SPONGE
- e.g. Zero-Sum applies
- But looses number of penetrable rounds
- Inside-out technique invalidated

Few results on distinguishers on Keccak hash function

- 4-round Keccak
- Due to Naya-Plasencia, Röck, and Meier
- Using low weight differential path
- Complexity: $2^{24}$
- 6-round Keccak
- Due to Das and Meier
- Based on biased output bits
- Complexity: $2^{52}$


# An Experiment on SHA3 

Based on self-symmetry

## Self-Symmetry

## Internal State

- A restriction on the internal state of Keccak-f
- 1600-bit State $(\mathcal{S})$ visualized as two 800-bit Substates
$\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}\right)$

$$
\mathcal{S}=\sigma_{1} \| \sigma_{2}
$$

- $\sigma_{i}=5 \times 5 \times 32$ bits


The Restriction: Equal Substates

$$
\sigma_{1}=\sigma_{2}
$$

## Self-Symmetric State

## An Example

- A self-symmetric state
- Represented in standard lane $\times$ sheet format
- Look at individual lanes
- The first Substate is highlighted
$0934258 C 0934258 \mathrm{C}$ 24B83B0524B83B05 74F1384174F13841 8030F1308030F130
36FB572A36FB572A

```
62C05E2462C05E24 0934258C0934258C 49DA0D3D49DA0D3D 2923A54B2923A54B 8817062C8817062C
B6C808B2B6C808B2 24B83B0524B83B05 2026890020268900 738E1141738E1141 3886D76A3886D76A
94BA023194BA0231 74F1384174F13841 ADE17841ADE17841 411E023D411E023D 98C34C6798C34C67
64010A3264010A32 8030F1308030F130 E383F57AE383F57A 35388C8235388C82 61F7231161F72311
68DD183C68DD183C 36FB572A36FB572A 120A313A120A313A 1C6E105D1C6E105D B50D7CA2B50D7CA2
```


## Experiment

## Message Set (SHA3-512)

## Pad(AddSuffix(Message)) $\rightarrow$ Self-Symmetric Internal State

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 8 \mathrm{~cd} 812 \mathrm{~d} 28 \mathrm{~cd} 812 \mathrm{~d} 2 \\
& \hline \star * * * 0 * 9 \mathrm{~b} * * * * 0 * 9 \mathrm{~b} \\
& \hline 0000000000000000
\end{aligned}
$$

- Single block messages
- Similar to ZeroSum computation
- But with additional restriction of preserving symmetry
- By construction, $\bigoplus_{\text {Msg } \in \text { MsgSet }} \mathrm{Msg}=\mathbf{0}$

4a36ea584a36ea58 8cd812d28cd812d2 88e61fc788e61fc7 f3372eaff3372eaf ea3f0b51ea3f0b51
ce $168 \mathrm{c} 02 \mathrm{ce} 168 \mathrm{c} 02 \pi * * * 0 * 9 \mathrm{~b} * * * * 0 * 9 \mathrm{~b}$ b934cb9fb934cb9f 866ac262866ac262 0000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Zeros at end indicate value of capacity bits

## Experiment

## 4-rounds SHA3 - 512

- Run SHA3 (Round-Reduced) over the Message Set
- Compute Output-Sum


What is the nature of the Output-Sum?

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br>  <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 0000000000000000000004000000040 | Symmetric-Sum |

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000004000000040 | Symmetric-Sum |
| $2^{14}$ | $243 f 4942243 f 4942528 c 98 d 5528 c 98 d 57300 b 0 d 17300 b 0 d 1$ <br> c0585999c0585999147b20a3147b20a3083a3900083a3900 <br> $09225588092255886302671 c 6302671 c$ | Symmetric-Sum |

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 | Symmetric-Sum |
| $2^{14}$ | 243f4942243f4942528c98d5528c98d57300b0d17300b0d1 <br> c0585999c0585999147b20a3147b20a3083a3900083a3900 <br> 09225588092255886302671c6302671c | Symmetric-Sum |
| $2^{13}$ | 81ed3fca81ed3dca15553dac15553dec25858e1125858e11 <br> 11c9af8b11c9af8b509927bf5099273f9276901992679019 <br> ca92a3d5ca9223d54ffce7974ffc6797 | Not Symmetric |

## Experimental Results

## The Output-Sum

| $\mid$ MsgSet $\mid$ | Output-Sum | Remark |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> $2^{14}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000004000000040 |
| c0585999c0585999147b20a3147b20a3083a3900083a3900 <br> 09225588092255886302671c6302671c | Symmetric-Sum |  |
| $2^{13}$ | 81ed3fca81ed3dca15553dac15553dec25858e1125858e11 <br> $11 c 9 a f 8 b 11 c 9 a f 8 b 509927 b f 5099273 f 9276901992679019$ <br> ca92a3d5ca9223d54ffce7974ffc6797 | Not Symmetric |
| $2^{12}$ | $78 f 523 d 01479 a 153802 f 16 a 4 c 8 b b b 67116 d 502 e a 0495823 a$ <br> $71057 d f b f 18 b 25 f 22 b b a 947 d 0 b a 094 f d 1240 e e 380 a 42 d f 38$ <br> 99eaa56698fa64e6a21ac1328138c126 | Not Symmetric |

## What to make of these results?

- Results
- Partly intuitive
- Partly inexplicable
- Definitely worth investigating (Our Motivation)


## First Question

What is the underlying operator in the experiment?

## Intuition

We must be computing some kind of higher order derivative.

- But not simple higher order derivatives (as in case of classical Zero-Sum)
- Recall: Multiple variables change values per call
- Also, the self-symmetry constraint


## The Operator

## $m$-fold vectorial derivatives

## So, What is the underlying operator?

Answer: $m$-fold vectorial derivatives ${ }^{1}$

- Slightly different notion of higher-order derivatives
- Analogous to computing derivatives over a subspace
- Partitions the inputs variables

The Experiment $\equiv$ Computing $m$ - fold vectorial derivatives with specially selected subspaces

Specially selected subspace $\rightarrow$ Self-Symmetry constraint

[^0]
## Why do we witness ZeroSum?

| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |

## ZeroSum

## Explained

## The Experiment

Corresponds to computing $17,16,15,14,13$-fold vectorial derivatives of SHA3-512 reduced to 4 -rounds.

| $2^{17}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $2^{16}$ | 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000000000000000 | Zero-Sum |

- Note: deg 4-Round SHA3-512 $\leq 16$
- So computing the 17 -fold vectorial derivative leads to a ZeroSum
- For 16 -fold case, highest degree could not be reached due to choice of constant partitions


## Why do we witness symmetry in the Output-Sum?

| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000004000000040 | Symmetric-Sum |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| $2^{14}$ | $243 f 4942243 f 4942528 c 98 d 5528 c 98 d 57300 b 0 d 17300 b 0 d 1$ <br> $c 0585999 c 0585999147 b 20 a 3147 b 20 a 3083 a 3900083 a 3900$ <br> $09225588092255886302671 c 6302671 c$ | Symmetric-Sum |

## A Generic Result

## SPN Round Function

## Lemma

For an iterated SPN round function $(\mathcal{G})$ if the ordering of the component transformations is such that the non-linear operation precedes the round constant addition, then highest-degree monomials are "not affected" by round-constants.

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{G}^{q} & =\left(\mathcal{C}_{q} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right) \circ\left(\mathcal{C}_{q-1} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right) \circ \cdots \circ\left(\mathcal{C}_{2} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right) \circ\left(\mathcal{C}_{1} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right) \\
& =\left[\left(\left(\mathcal{C}_{q} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right) \circ \cdots \circ\left(\mathcal{C}_{2} \circ \mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}\right)\right) \circ \mathcal{C}_{1}\right] \circ(\mathcal{N} \circ \mathcal{L}) \tag{1}
\end{align*}
$$

## Intuition

Notice effect of the first round non-linear operation

## Proof Idea

## By Induction

- Segregate monomials in ANF based on dependence on round-constants


## Example

$$
\begin{aligned}
f & =x_{1} x_{2} x_{3}+c_{1} c_{2} x_{2} x_{3}+x_{3} x_{4}+c_{2} c_{3} \\
& =\left(x_{1} x_{2} x_{3}+x_{3} x_{4}\right)+\left(c_{1} c_{2} x_{2} x_{3}+c_{2} c_{3}\right) \\
& =f_{s}+f_{s^{\prime}}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Show difference in highest-degree attained


## What does this mean for SHA3?

## Corollary

For $q$ rounds of the SHAЗ permutation Кессак-p, the maximum degree of a monomial involving a round-constant is $d^{\circ} \mathcal{K}^{q}-2$

- Recall the sequence of operations in Keccak-f

$$
\mathcal{R}=\iota \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta
$$

- Note $\iota$ after $\chi$, the non-linear operation
- First round $\chi$ has no effect on terms involving round-constants.
- Note: $\operatorname{deg} \chi=2$


## Further...

## A Round-Constant Independent Function

## Corollary

For $q$ rounds of КЕССак- $p$ the $\left(d^{\circ} \mathcal{K}^{q}-1\right)$-fold vectorial derivative is a round-constant independent function.

- Recall $\iota$ is the only operation that breaks symmetry
- And $\theta, \rho, \pi, \chi$ are translation invariant in the $z$-axis


## Implication

A Round-Constant Independent Function $\Longrightarrow$
A Translation Invariant Function

## The SymSum Proposition

## Proposition

The ( $d^{\circ}$ SHA3 - 1)-fold vectorial derivative of SHA3 evaluated using only self-symmetric input states will preserve the symmetric property.

- Explains the symmetry in the Output-Sum

| $2^{15}$ | 000001000000010000000000000000000000200000002000 <br> 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 <br> 00000000000000000000004000000040 | Symmetric-Sum |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| $2^{14}$ | $243 f 4942243 f 4942528 c 98 d 5528 c 98 d 57300 b 0 d 17300 b 0 d 1$ <br> c0585999c0585999147b20a3147b20a3083a3900083a3900 <br> $09225588092255886302671 c 6302671 c$ | Symmetric-Sum |

- Recall: Highest degree attained for this particular case was $<16$


## SymSum:

A new distinguishing property for SHA3

## SymSum

## Formally

## Definition (Symmetric Sum (SymSum))

Let us consider the SHA3 fixed-length hash functions SHA3-h : $\left(\mathbb{F}_{2}^{r}\right)^{*} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2}^{h}$ or XOFs SHAKE128/256: $\left(\mathbb{F}_{2}^{r}\right)^{*} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2}^{*}$. A Symmetric Sum or SymSum is defined as a set of inputs $\left\{x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{k}\right\} \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{r}$ for which the input-sum is zero while the 64-prefix of the output-sum is symmetric.

Step 1: Compute ( $d^{\circ}$ SHA3 - 1)-fold vectorial derivative of SHA3 by generating self-symmetric input states
Step 2: Check for the SymSum property in the Output-Sum

$$
\text { SymSum Advantage } \quad h=\text { hash-length }
$$

$$
\operatorname{Adv}_{\text {SymSum }}=1-2^{-32 \times\left\lfloor\frac{h}{64}\right\rfloor} \approx 1
$$

## Degrees of Freedom

## ZeroSum Vs SymSum

|  | Degrees of freedom |  | SHA3 variant XOFs | Degrees of freedom |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SHA3 variant <br> Fixed-Length | $\begin{gathered} \text { ZeroSum } \\ \left(2^{r-4}\right) \end{gathered}$ | SymSum $\left(2^{\frac{r-8}{2}}\right)$ |  | ZeroSum $\left(2^{r-6}\right)$ | SymSum $\left(2^{\frac{r-12}{2}}\right)$ |
| SHA3-224 | $2^{1148}$ | $2^{572}$ | SHAKE-128 | $2^{1338}$ | $2^{666}$ |
| SHA3-256 | $2^{1084}$ | $2^{540}$ |  |  |  |
| SHA3-384 | $2^{828}$ | $2^{412}$ | SHAKE-256 | $2^{1082}$ | $2^{538}$ |
| SHA3-512 | $2^{572}$ | $2^{284}$ |  |  |  |

- SymSum looses degrees of freedom

Does this have an adverse effect on its performance?
Actually, No (See next slide)

## Comparison with ZeroSum

|  |  | Complexity |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \#Rounds <br> $\left(n_{r}\right)$ | Bound on <br> $d^{\circ}$ SHA3 | ZeroSum <br> $\left(2^{d^{\circ} \text { SHA3 }+1}\right)$ | SymSum <br> $\left(2^{d^{\circ} \text { SHA3-1 }}\right)$ |
| 1 | 2 | $2^{3}$ | $2^{1}$ |
| 2 | 4 | $2^{5}$ | $2^{3}$ |
| 3 | 8 | $2^{9}$ | $2^{7}$ |
| 4 | 16 | $2^{17}$ | $2^{15}$ |
| 5 | 32 | $2^{33}$ | $2^{31}$ |
| 6 | 64 | $2^{65}$ | $2^{63}$ |
| 7 | 128 | $2^{129}$ | $2^{127}$ |
| 8 | 256 | $2^{257}$ | $2^{255}$ |
| 9 | 512 | $2^{513}$ | $2^{511^{\dagger}}$ |
| 10 | 1024 | $2^{1025 \dagger}$ | $\star$ |
| 11 | 1408 (Boura et al.) | $\star$ | $\star$ |

$\dagger$ Not applicable for SHA3-512 and SHA3-384
$\star$ Exceeds degrees of freedom

## Epilogue

- We investigated an interesting symmetric property exhibited by the sum of SHA3 message digests
- Put forward a mathematical framework to explain the property
- A operator that tries to select a specific subspace over which it computes higher order derivatives
- A relation that estimates the degree of round-constant dependent terms in ANF for SPN based functions.
- Capitalizing on this a new distinguisher SymSum is proposed
- Has high distinguishing advantage
- Better that ZeroSum by a factor of four
- First property that relies on round-constants but independent of their Hamming-weights


## Thanks!

Related info on http://de.ci.phe.red shortly.


## Queries

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Refer paper for mathematical form

