

Exponential S-Boxes: a Link Between the S-Boxes of BelT and Kuznyechik/Streebog

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<https://www.cryptolux.org>

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
Fast Software Encryption 2017





S-Box Design

■ Inverse ■ Exponential ■ Math (other) ■ SPN ■ Misty ■ Feistel
■ Lai-Massey ■ Pseudo-random ■ Hill climbing ■ Unknown


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

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

S-Box Reverse-Engineering



Results on Kuznyechik/Streebog



Results on Kuznyechik/Streebog




Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Reminder About π
- 3 A Detour Through Belarus
- 4 New Decompositions of π
- 5 Conclusion

Plan

- 1 Introduction
- 2 **Reminder About π**
 - Previous Decomposition of π
 - How Was It Found?
- 3 A Detour Through Belarus
- 4 New Decompositions of π
- 5 Conclusion

A First Decomposition of π



- From Eurocrypt'16
- α, ω : linear 8-bit permutations
- v_0, v_1, σ : 4-bit permutations
- ϕ : 4-bit function ($\phi(x) \neq 0$)
- \mathcal{I} multiplicative inverse in \mathbb{F}_{16}
- \odot multiplication in \mathbb{F}_{16}

How was it found?


Decomposition Procedure Overview

- 1 Identify patterns in LAT;

How was it found?

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
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- 2 Deduce linear layers μ, η such that π is decomposed as in right picture;



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
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- 3 Decompose U, T ;




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
- 1 Identify patterns in LAT;
- 2 Deduce linear layers μ, η such that π is decomposed as in right picture;
- 3 Decompose U, T ;
- 4 Put it all together.




Pollock to the Rescue



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What the Lines Mean




Variance of the absolute value of the coefficients in each column of the LAT of π .


Plan

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Reminder About π
- 3 A Detour Through Belarus
 - Quick Overview of BelT
 - Patterns in the LAT of H
 - The Actual Structure of H
- 4 New Decompositions of π
- 5 Conclusion

Round Function of BelT




The round function of BelT.




The 32-bit function G_r .

Properties of H



DDT



LAT

- $\max(\text{DDT}) = 8$
- $\max(\text{LAT}) = 26$
- $P[\text{random}] \leq 2^{-122}$

- Algebraic degree 7 (all coordinates)

Structure of H (1/3)


Is H structured?

Structure of H (1/3)

Is H structured?

Yes!

LAT Row Variance



Variance of the absolute value of the coefficients in each row of the LAT of H .

The Actual Structure

The BelT S-Box Construction (translated)

The look-up tables of the S-Box coordinate functions were chosen as different segments of length 255 of different linear recurrences defined by the irreducible polynomial $p(\lambda)$:

$$p(\lambda) = \lambda^8 + \lambda^6 + \lambda^5 + \lambda^2 + 1.$$

Additionally, a zero element was inserted in a fixed position of each segment.

¹<http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/024>

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Equivalent Pseudo-Exponential Representation

$$S := [w^i, i < z] + [0] + [w^i, z \leq i]$$

Exponential (case $z = 0$) studied in [AA04]¹

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Properties of (Pseudo-)Exponentials

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- For pseudo-exponentials, for all ℓ , for $r < \log_2(z)$:

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Paper in Управление защитой информации [*Information Security Management*] discloses design criteria:

- good nonlinearity,
- $\Pr [H(x \boxplus a) \oplus H(x) = b]$ and $\Pr [H(x \oplus a) \boxplus H(x) = b]$ are low
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Fair enough...

... but then what of π ?

Plan

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Reminder About π
- 3 A Detour Through Belarus
- 4 New Decompositions of π**
 - Hints of an Exponential
 - New Decompositions
 - Analysis of the New Decompositions
- 5 Conclusion

Exponential-Like Pattern

Observation

- $x \oplus 2^j = x \boxplus 2^j$ if $x_j = 0$ and $x \oplus 2^j = x \boxminus 2^j$ if $x_j = 1$
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In the case of π

Let $C = [0x12, 0x26, 0x24, 0x30]$. Then:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{cases} \pi^{-1}(x \oplus C[i]) / \pi^{-1}(x) = w^{2^i}, \text{ or} \\ \pi^{-1}(x \oplus C[i]) / \pi^{-1}(x) = w^{-2^i} \end{cases} \right] = \frac{240}{256}.$$

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- 5 Find linear patterns in $\tau \circ \alpha^{-1}$;
- 6 Deduce better linear layer β such that $\tau \circ \beta^{-1}$ is even more structured

Structure of π^{-1}

Algorithm 1 Computing the inverse of π : $y = \pi^{-1}(x)$.

$(l||r) \leftarrow \beta(x)$

$l \leftarrow q(l)$

if $l = 0$ **then**

$z \leftarrow 17 \times ((r + 1) \bmod 16)$

else

$z \leftarrow 17 \times l + r - 16$

end if


$y \leftarrow \exp_{w,0}(z)$

return y


β : 8-bit linear permutation ; q : 4-bit S-Box

$\exp_{w,0}(z) = w^z$, but $\exp_{w,0}(0) = 0$

First Decomposition of π




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
A is extremely weak...

First Decomposition of π



A is extremely weak... Can we simplify it even further using a pseudo-exponential?

A Second Decomposition of π



	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
T_0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
T_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
T_2	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	f	e
T_3	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	f	d	e
T_4	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	f	c	d	e
T_5	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	f	b	c	d	e
T_6	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	f	a	b	c	d	e
T_7	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	f	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_8	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	f	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	f	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_a	0	1	2	3	4	5	f	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_b	0	1	2	3	4	f	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_c	0	1	2	3	f	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_d	0	1	2	f	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_e	0	1	f	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e
T_f	0	f	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e

What now?

The structure inside π is stronger than expected

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
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- For random 8-bit permutation, $Pr[\max(\text{DDT})] = 128 \approx 2^{-346}$
- $\implies \pi$ is related to an exponential.


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
Conclusion




Conclusion



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Thank you!