



Indifferentiability of the Sponge Construction with a Restricted Number of Message Blocks

Charlotte Lefevre


Radboud University (The Netherlands)

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


The Sponge Construction [Bertoni et al., 2007]




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


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- $m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_l$ is the message padded into r_a -bit blocks
- Absorb rate and squeeze rate different [Guo et al., 2011, Naito and Ohta, 2014]


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- Absorb rate and squeeze rate different [Guo et al., 2011, Naito and Ohta, 2014]
- Graph notation: $0^b \xrightarrow{m_1} A \xrightarrow{m_2} B \longrightarrow \dots \xrightarrow{m_l} C \longrightarrow D$




- $(\mathcal{H}^{\mathcal{P}}, \mathcal{P})$ for a **random** primitive \mathcal{P} should behave like a random oracle \mathcal{RO} paired with a simulator \mathcal{S} that maintains construction-primitive consistency
- \mathcal{H} is **indifferentiable** from \mathcal{RO} **for some** simulator \mathcal{S} whenever any \mathcal{D} can distinguish the two worlds only with a negligible probability
- This probability is usually expressed as a function of the number of queries made



- Indifferentiability advantage:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{Sponge}}^{\text{iff}}(q) = \max_{\mathcal{D} \text{ with } q \text{ queries}} \left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{\text{Real}} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{\text{Ideal}} = 1) \right|$$




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- Consider the following restriction:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{Sponge}}^{\text{R-iff}}(q, \ell) = \max_{\substack{\mathcal{D} \text{ with } q \text{ queries,} \\ \text{pad}(M) \leq r_a \times \ell}} \left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{\text{Real}} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{\text{Ideal}} = 1) \right|$$




- All construction queries are public \implies helps the simulator to keep \mathcal{RO} -consistency
- Weaker model than (plain) indifferentiability: e.g., (plain) Merkle-Damgård is not indifferentiable but publicly indifferentiable [Dodis et al., 2009]
- Useful in practice, e.g., digital signature schemes

- Sponge indifferentiable with bound $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2}{2^c}\right)$ [Bertoni et al., 2008]
- Generalized sponge indifferentiable with bound $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q}{2^{c_a/2}}\right)$ as long as $c_s \geq c_a/2 + \log_2(c_a)$ [Naito and Ohta, 2014]

\implies At least $2^{c_a/2}$ queries to differentiate with high probability


- Tight bound: inner collisions while absorbing allow to differentiate

Collision Attack with $q \approx 2^{c_a/2}$ queries [Bertoni et al., 2011]



- Query $\mathcal{P}(m_1 || 0^{c_a})$ for $2^{c_a/2}$ different m_1 's and store them in a list L
- With high probability there exist $Y \neq Y' \in L$ s.t., $\text{inner}_{c_a}(Y) = \text{inner}_{c_a}(Y')$

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


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\implies Take $m_2 = \text{outer}_{r_a}(Y)$ and $m'_2 = \text{outer}_{r_a}(Y')$

\implies It gives $0^b \xrightarrow[m_1 \| m_2]{m'_1 \| m'_2} Z$

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
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- Requires $r_a \geq c_a/2$ and **two** absorb calls


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General case:

- Let $k = \lceil \frac{c_a}{2r_a} \rceil$
- One absorb round gives 2^{r_a} different states: not enough for an inner collision
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- Need also the compensation absorb call to have a full-state collision

\implies Requires $k + 1$ absorb calls

- Consider a sponge where at most ℓ absorb calls are allowed (but an arbitrary number of blocks can be squeezed)
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- When $\ell < k + 1$, the collision (thus differentiability) attack on the sponge does not apply anymore
- One full-state collision attack in $2^{b-\ell \times r_a}$ queries:
 - ① Make all $\ell - 1$ first absorb call queries to obtain $\left(0^b \xrightarrow{M_i} Y_i\right)_i$
 - ② Compute with primitive queries $0^b \xrightarrow{M_1} Y_1 \rightarrow N_1 \cdots \rightarrow N_{2^{b-\ell \times r_a}}$
 - ③ $2^{(\ell-1) \times r_a} Y_i$ states and $2^{b-\ell \times r_a} N_j$ states \implies inner collision between some Y_i and N_j happens with high probability
 - ④ Use the last absorb call on Y_i to obtain a full state collision

Tightness of Indifferentiability With a Restricted Sponge

- Attack has a cost of $2^{b-\ell \times r_a}$ while indifferentiability of the sponge guarantees security up to $\approx 2^{c_a/2}$ queries

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
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- Contribution of this work:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{Sponge}}^{\text{R-iff}}(q, \ell) = \mathcal{O} \left(\frac{q}{2^{c_s}} + \frac{q^2}{2^b} + \min \left\{ \frac{q^2}{2^{c_a}}, \frac{q}{2^{b-\ell \times r_a}} \right\} \right)$$

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- When $\ell = 1$ the bound is already captured by an indifferentiability result from Naito and Ohta: set $r = 0, r' = r_s, r'' = r_a$
- New results whenever $1 < \ell < \lceil \frac{c_a}{2r_a} \rceil + 1$

- Define AbsorbPath as

$$\text{AbsorbPath} = \{0^b\} \cup \left\{ Y \mid \exists 0^b \xrightarrow{m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_l} Y \text{ with } l < \ell \right\}$$

\implies AbsorbPath contains the rooted nodes where absorption of a message block is still possible

- Remark: $|\text{AbsorbPath}| \leq \min \{q + 1, 2 \times 2^{(\ell-1) \times r_a}\}$

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- Remark: $|\text{AbsorbPath}| \leq \min \{q + 1, 2 \times 2^{(\ell-1) \times r_a}\}$
- $0^b \xrightarrow{m_1} A_1 \xrightarrow{m_2} \dots \xrightarrow{m_l} A_l \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow S_n$ is a **valid** path whenever $l \leq \ell$

$\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{S}_{\text{fwd}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{inv}})$, similar to the one used in indistinguishability of sponge proof [Bertoni et al., 2008]:

- \mathcal{S} keeps track of the graph construction
- \mathcal{S}_{inv} returns random elements
- On query with input X , \mathcal{S}_{fwd} keeps \mathcal{RO} -consistency whenever X appears in a valid path
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- \mathcal{S} behaves like a two-sided RF
- For public indifferenciability: build \mathcal{S}' which additionally relays to \mathcal{S} all primitive queries associated to the construction queries

World Decomposition


Ideal World




Real World



\mathcal{D}




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
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- Intermediate versus Real: construction queries can be transformed into primitive queries \implies PRP/PRF switching lemma
- Ideal versus Intermediate: consistency of the simulator with respect to \mathcal{RO} and extra queries to \mathcal{S} in Intermediate World \implies identical until **BAD**

Ideal versus Intermediate: Bad Events


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- **GUESS**: (only in Intermediate World) adversary guesses an intermediate state generated from construction queries without having made the primitive queries

To do that, it can guess:

- 1 Either the full state of any rooted node
- 2 Either the inner part of a node in AbsorbPath

GUESS does not apply in public indifferentiability



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- **INNER**: inner collisions with AbsorbPath
- **COL**: $X_i = X_j$ or $Y_i = Y_j$ for some $j < i$
- **CONNECT**: $Y_i = X_j$ or $X_i = Y_j$ for some $j < i$

- Remember that

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- Inner collision attack has a cost of $\approx \max \{2^{c_a/2}; 2^{b-\ell \times r_a}\}$ queries
- What about the others terms?
 - 2^{c_s} queries: adversary can try all inner parts
 - $2^{b/2}$ queries: adversary can set **CONNECT**



- Ascon-hash
 - $b = 320, c = 256, r = 64$
 - Unrestricted sponge: 128 bits of security
 - Sponge with input messages of at most 127 bits: 160 bits of security
- Photon Beetle-Hash or T-Quark
 - $b = 256, c = 224, r = 32$
 - Unrestricted sponge: 112 bits of security
 - Sponge with input messages of at most 127 bits: 128 bits of security
- To maximize security and absorbing rate, the best parameter choice is
 $\ell = 1, c_a = r_a = b/2$



- Proved a tight indistinguishability bound for the sponge construction when the number of message blocks is restricted
- It gives a better security bound when less than $\lceil \frac{c_a}{2r_a} \rceil + 1$ blocks are absorbed


Thank you for your attention!

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