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Unwelcome Participation: Ostracizing Public Protest in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

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Content

Bernhard Gotto and Sabine Mecking

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Special Issue: Introduction

In recent years, public protests in the Federal Republic of Germany have been connected to two very basic, yet telling, notions: good and evil. The *Black Lives Matter* campaign was met with great approval, and the *Fridays for Future* activists have gained renown as the ostensible rescuers of the entire planet. On the other hand, those protesting against COVID-19 restrictions have been met with misgivings and distrust. While the former serve as a model of civic engagement, the latter are considered the "bad guys" of democracy. This distinction was summarized, for example, in a commentary on the resumption of the *Fridays for Future* demonstrations in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: "In view of the irresponsibility of the resistance against COVID-19 policies, one almost longs for those young people again and for next Friday."[1]

The protests against the government's preventative measures were glossed as irresponsible, because the demonstrators openly disregarded current safety rules: They neither wore face masks, nor maintained the minimum distance requirements. Such calculated taboo-breaking has been part of the protest repertoire for decades. But due to the vital importance of COVID-19 protection measures for the safety of society as a whole, these particular violations appeared to signal a revocation of the civic consensus. Similarly, the protesters were identified with violent extremists, conspiracy theorists and right-wing populists. "Germany is experiencing a new Pegida moment,"[2] commented the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, alluding to the right-wing populist and xenophobic protests of the *Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West* (PEGIDA) that briefly gained steam in 2015 in response to the European migration crisis.[3]

1 Jasper von Altenbockum: Sehnsucht der Jugend, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 26 September 2020, p. 1.

2 Antonie Rietzschel: Demos und Dämonen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 18 May 2020, p. 4.

3 Originating in Dresden in the autumn of 2014, the PEGIDA protests quickly mobilized thousands of participants. In May 2021, the state Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Saxony classified PEGIDA to be an "extremist movement." Although PEGIDA did

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In sum, the protests against the pandemic containment measures were understood as harmful to society because of their stated purpose, the form they took on, and the participants who joined in.

This special issue deals with the kind of protests that do not fit the conventions of non-electoral participation in democracy and are therefore marginalized. A considerable number of protest actors are excluded from the landscape of political communication because their demands are unacceptable to the majority of society, because they are not recognized as politically equal due to social stigmatization, or because their protest behaviour blatantly violates the participation rules of the respective political order. Nevertheless, we understand these unconventional protests as part of the political communications in public spaces that convey specific messages and aim to encourage specific changes to society. Accordingly, there is no currently imaginable publicly articulated protest that would not contribute to the democratic formation of opinion and public will. Participation research, in particular, has developed various taxonomies to distinguish the various forms of political participation.[4] By differentiating between conventional and unconventional participation, it becomes possible to highlight the degree of public recognition. Whereas, in earlier classifications, conventional participation primarily comprised institutionalized forms of opinion-formation and expression (i. e., primarily through elections and membership in political parties), a wide variety of forms of articulation beyond these possibilities—as, for example, calls for boycott, forms of civil disobedience, flash mobs or social media campaigns—have gained broad acceptance since then.[5] In what follows, we define as "conventional" all forms of political participation that were accepted by the majority of political actors as a contribution to democratic decision-making. Unconventional participation, on the other hand, means that a majority of actors excluded certain expressions of opinion from political communication. The boundary between conventional and unconventional participation was notoriously blurred and contested. We conceive it to be a pattern of political culture that changed significantly in the decades after 1945.

However, as the introductory example shows, the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation is still crucial in the evaluation of protest behaviour itself. As the particularly well-researched example of the twentieth-century student movement, known colloquially as "1968" shows, this was also the case in ear-

not have a lasting impact, it was "paradigmatic for a process of political outrage, polarisation and disinhibition": Hans Voränder/Maik Herold/Steven Schäller, PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany, Basingstoke 2016, p. XIII.

4 Beate Hoecker: Politische Partizipation: systematische Einführung, in: Idem (ed.): Politische Beteiligung zwischen Konvention und Protest. Eine studienorientierte Einführung, Opladen 2006, pp. 3–20, 10–12.

5 Toralf Stark: Demokratische Bürgerbeteiligung außerhalb des Wahllokals. Umbrüche in der politischen Partizipation seit den 1970er-Jahren, Wiesbaden 2019, pp. 67–76.

lier decades: Television reports classified the student protests as "unrest"; it was highly controversial whether this unrest was beneficial or harmful to democracy.[6] These controversies continued long after the protests had ended and underpinned the perception of the era for decades, leaving deep traces in the historiographical evaluation of "1968."[7]

Other major protest waves—such as the peace movement in the early 1980s—were followed by similar controversies, as well as the subsequent re-evaluation in the historiography of contemporary scepticism and rejection.[8] Although, in retrospect, the protests against nuclear rearmament at the beginning of the 1980s, the demonstrations against § 218 StGB (which penalized abortion) and the campaigns of the gay liberation movement, can be regarded as breakthroughs toward a more liberal, open society, such a reading also conceals that part of the protest spectrum that arose from the counterculture and targeted the dominant political order. Vital currents—such as the autonomous and communist-oriented groups within the peace movement—thus disappeared from the historiography as part of the re-evaluation of protest as a whole. While the 1968 student protests now occupy an honoured place in the history of German democracy, significant segments of the peace movement, such as the women's peace movement or the transnationally organized International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), have fallen into oblivion because their demands, forms of protest or social basis did not fit the now standard interpretation of the mass protest as a "catalyst for reflecting on political and social key issues" within West German society.[9]

The approval or disapproval of particular protest behaviour has serious consequences for the later perception and historical classification of the protests themselves. Furthermore, certain social groups are dropped from the historical narrative entirely. Among the most prominent examples are migrants (both first and later-generation)

6 Meike Vogel: Unruhe im Fernsehen. Protestbewegung und öffentlich-rechtliche Berichterstattung in den 1960er Jahren, Göttingen 2010.

7 Silja Behre: Bewegte Erinnerung. Deutungskämpfe um „1968" in deutsch-französischer Perspektive, Tübingen 2016; Martin Stallmann: Die Erfindung von „1968". Der studentische Protest im bundesdeutschen Fernsehen 1977–1998, Göttingen 2017.

8 Kathrin Fahlenbrach/Laura Stapane: Mediale und visuelle Strategien der Friedensbewegung, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.): „Entrüstet Euch!" Nuklearkrise, NATO- Doppelbeschluss und Friedensbewegung, Paderborn 2012, pp. 229–246.

9 Philipp Gassert: Viel Lärm um nichts? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss als Katalysator gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung in der Bundesrepublik, in: Idem/Tim Geiger/Hermann Wentker (eds.): Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, München 2011, pp. 175–202, 176; Claudia Kemper: Medizin gegen den Kalten Krieg. Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre, Göttingen 2016; Anne Bieschke: Die unerhörte Friedensbewegung. Frauen, Krieg und Frieden in der Nuklearkrise (1979–1983), Essen 2018.

who, in the historiography of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after 1945, appear primarily as objects of political and social action instead of as politically autonomous subjects. For example, the Kurdish community's demonstrations in West Germany in the 1980s were not regarded as a self-determined political act, but as evidence of their instrumentalization by the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).[10] It is also important to rediscover forgotten protests, such as those that marked the immediate postwar period in Germany—namely the sometimes violent demonstrations engaged in by displaced persons, the protests against the agencies of the military government or against the 1948 currency reform[11]—or the xenophobic protests of the 1990s in reunified Germany. The assaults and arson attacks on asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda, the violent riots in Rostock-Lichtenhagen and the murders in Mölln and Solingen are only the most striking examples of the violent protests that marked that moment without being adequately remembered after the fact.[12]

A look at "unwelcome participation" thus reveals actors, political positions and behavioural patterns to which historiography ought to pay greater attention. While it is inherently necessary to address these blind spots, this perspective also allows for an examination of the changes in democratic culture over time. Such an analysis of the shifts in the criteria for "appropriate" protest thus highlights the rules for participation in democratic negotiation processes and, contrary to existing classifications along the lines of protest waves, reveals different caesuras in changing conditions for approval or disapproval of protests. Moreover, the notion of unwelcome participation offers the chance to contribute to a nuanced history of democracy in postwar Germany. Indeed, protest activities did not lead to a straightforward increase in democratic participation, but contributed to both increases and decreases in opportunities for participation that correspond to a history of democracy that avoids simple narratives of success and teleological accounts of a "successful democracy" or a "long road West."[13]

10 Ilja Mertens: Von einer „Inneren Angelegenheit", die auszog, Europa das Fürchten zu lehren. Transstaatliche politische Mobilisierung und das „Kurdenproblem", in: Thomas Faist (ed.): Transstaatliche Räume. Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur in und zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei, Bielefeld 2000, pp. 159–199; Alynna J. Lyon/Emek M. Uçarer: Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict. Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK, in: Rey Koslowski (ed.): International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics, London/New York 2005, pp. 62–82.

11 See Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft. Deutsche Protestgeschichte seit 1945, Stuttgart 2018, pp. 35–51.

12 Christoph Wowtscherk: Was wird, wenn die Zeitbombe hochgeht? Eine sozialgeschichtliche Analyse der fremdenfeindlichen Ausschreitungen in Hoyerswerda im September 1991, Göttingen 2014; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 259–260.

13 Edgar Wolfrum: Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2006; Heinrich August Winkler: The Long Road West. Vol. 2: Germany 1933–1990, Oxford/New York 2000.

Unwelcome Participation and the Research on Protest

How do the phenomena discussed in this special issue relate to theories that explain protest? Considering the three "classic" strains of movement research—rational choice, resource mobilization, and collective identity—the latter are certainly the most suitable for explaining inclusion and exclusion through protest activities.[14] Approaches aimed at analyzing the process of collective identity construction, in the sense of "shared meanings, experiences and reciprocal emotional ties as experienced by movement actors themselves through their interaction with each other,"[15] are particularly vital to explaining how the demands, forms and actors embedded in contentious politics shift the dynamics of belonging and othering. The main focus of such approaches is to model the mobilization, cohesion, and demobilization of protest movements. A major advantage of these approaches is that they attach great importance to emotional bonding. Protest thus appears as a collective experience that evokes strong feelings among the participants. Protest groups can thus be described as emotional communities which regulate affiliation by having their members all acknowledge a common set of emotional rules and express the "right" feelings. Emotional expressiveness thus becomes the yardstick for experiencing and enacting protest in the correct way.

Nonetheless, researchers of social movements have questioned the theoretical assumptions of identity and community constructions, in particular the notion of multiple and fluid identities, which poses a challenge to older models based on a coherent set of shared values and worldviews.[16] Newer approaches therefore attempt to explain protest movements not through a static commonality, but by tracing their logics of difference.[17] In this respect, a look at unconventional protest can help to illuminate the mechanisms through which difference becomes visible.

14 As an overview: see Cristina Flesher Fominaya: Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates, in: Sociology Compass 4 (2010), pp. 393–404; Stephan Wulf/Mary Bernstein/Verta Taylor: New Directions from the Study of Gender and Sexuality Movements: Collective Identity, Multi-Institutional Politics, and Emotions, in: Donatella Della Porta/Mario Diani (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, Oxford 2015, pp. 108–130, esp. pp. 108–113.

15 Cristina Flesher Fominaya: Collective Identity in Social Movements, p. 397.

16 See Donatella della Porta/Mario Diani: Social Movements: An Introduction (third edition), Oxford 2020, pp. 90–112.

17 Johanna Leinius/Judith Vey/Ingmar Hagemann: Poststrukturalistische Perspektiven auf soziale Bewegungen. Plädoyer für eine notwendige Blickverschiebung, in: FJSB 30:4 (2017), pp. 6–20; Sabrina Schenk: Das „Wir" der Proteste. Zum Verhältnis von Identität und Differenz in einer poststrukturalistischen Empirie, in: Alfred Schäfer/Christiane Thompson (eds.): Gemeinschaft, Paderborn 2018, pp. 149–171.

A re-orientation towards "unwelcome" participation not only allows for an analysis of the formation or maintenance of social movements, but also for a historicization of the shifts in the perception of protest behaviour and the consequences thereof on the development of democratic culture in the Federal Republic since 1945. Such a re-evaluation is necessary for two reasons: Firstly, the force of the mobilization, forms of action and repercussions of right-wing populist movements such as PEGIDA fundamentally call into question some of the most basic assumptions of movement research. In particular, the assumption that protest movements in postwar West Germany generally sought to advance democratization seems obsolete.[18] Since the 1960s, scholars have credited protest movements—not least because of their transatlantic ties—with the ability to drive forward the political and cultural modernization of the Federal Republic. In contrast, contemporary protest activities are interpreted as indicators of "post-democratic" decay. Secondly, and relatedly, the long dominant master narratives about the Federal Republic after 1945 as a "successful democracy," emphasizing the achievements of West German democracy and postulating a steady upward trend, have lost much of their credibility as certain blind spots—ongoing gender inequality, xenophobia, and racism, as well as the effects of immigration on German society—have become exposed. For these (and other) reasons, historians in and outside the Federal Republic of Germany have put the quest for alternative explanatory models on the agenda. From a historical perspective, these necessary irritations are an invitation to look for developments that go back further in time, in the sense of a "historical genealogy of contemporary problems" (Hans Günter Hockerts) designed to circumvent an uncritical view of the past.[19]

In this regard, the articles in this special issue take up this invitation by examining inclusion and exclusion processes within social movements and by analyzing the changing circumstances under which protest was deemed legitimate from the outside. On the one hand, our view on unconventional protest demands a consideration of the behaviours, issues and features of actors that led to their exclusion from protest communities, while also centring the communalising power of the unconventional itself. Disassociation from a widely accepted protest style or a political majority consensus can serve as a strategy of exclusivity that strengthens internal cohesion. On the other

18 Roland Roth: Neue soziale Bewegungen und liberale Demokratie. Herausforderungen, Innovationen und paradoxe Konsequenzen, in: Ansgar Klein/Hans-Josef Legrand/Thomas Leif (eds.): Neue soziale Bewegungen. Impulse, Bilanzen und Perspektiven, Opladen 1999, pp. 47–63. Much more sceptical now: Dieter Rucht: Demokratisierung durch Bewegungen? Demokratisierung der Bewegungen?, in: FJSB 31 (2018), pp. 40–51.

19 See Andreas Wirsching: Von der Lügenpresse zur Lügenwissenschaft? Zur Relevanz der Zeitgeschichte als Wissenschaft heute, Zeitgeschichte-online, April 2018, https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/geschichtskultur/von-der-luegenpresse-zur-luegenwissenschaft (accessed on 1 October 2021).

hand, in line with Judith Butler's performative theory of assemblance, protest actions must be regarded as acts of media production, because the visual communication of protest movements goes beyond their representation.[20] Butler does not relate protest actions primarily to processes of identity construction, but focuses entirely on the fact that bodies gather together. In her understanding, the messages of demonstrations are not first discursively produced and then "translated," but the protest action as a staged arrangement of bodies in public space is the message in and of itself. The central question of this special issue is thus: Who gains access to public space as a medium for protest actions, and who is prevented from doing so, and why? If it is true that protest movements become visible through performance and media, then the act of producing and sharing the imaginary of a movement is a powerful way of modelling the political. In that sense, Michaele Ferguson interprets protest itself as "democratic imaginary."[21] Accordingly, inclusion and containment through unconventional protest behaviour can be understood as negotiations over democracy as a whole.

Drawing Boundaries Between and Within Protest Movements

Protest is invariably directed against something or someone. All protest actions draw a line between the protesters and some more or less defined "other." The differences in protest movements arise through their varying political demands, cultural practices, and models of democratic participation. A symbolically expressed opposition is therefore a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of any protest, since, as a form of political communication, protest always needs a counterpart.[22] Challenge and transgression are thus an inherent characteristic of protest behaviour.

Public protests as a form of antagonistic political communication developed on the basis of inherited patterns.[23] Although the long tradition of protest forms such as demonstrations or strikes, as well as the longstanding recognition of protest demands within mainstream political discourses and the integration of protest events into na-

20 See Kathrin Fahlenbrach: Protest-Inszenierungen: Visuelle Kommunikation und kollektive Identitäten in Protestbewegungen, Wiesbaden 2002; Nicole Doerr/Alice Mattoni/Simon Teune: Visuals in Social Movements, in: Donatella della Porta/Mario Diani (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, Oxford 2015, pp. 557–566.

21 Michaele Ferguson: Sharing Democracy, Oxford/New York 2012, p. 154.

22 See Kathrin Fahlenbrach et. al. (eds.): The Establishment Responds: Power, Politics, and Protest since 1945, New York 2012; Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren. Staatliches Handeln, Neue Soziale Bewegungen und linke Organisationen in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Essen 2017.

23 See Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, p. 16.

tional cultures of remembrance in functional democracies have all normalized the act of protest as part of a wider catalogue of democratic articulation, street protests could nonetheless stir up offence and mistrust. In the 1950s and 1960s, a period during which the Cold War, a conservative government and a formal understanding of democracy dominated political culture, street protests were "synonymous with tumult, riot and uproar; it was considered a manifestation of the mob, the troublemakers, the notoriously dissatisfied and unrestrained."[24] Indeed, a general appreciation and recognition of public protest has not made discursive techniques of exclusion and devaluation disappear, in so far as the label "chaotic" continues to be an established means of denying protesters their legitimacy and branding them as a threat to the social order.[25] Other terms, such as "extremists" and "radicals," also mark those who act beyond accepted boundaries.[26]

While such exclusionary semantics primarily refer to certain groups of actors, they can also target protest demands themselves. One example of a permanent exclusion from the landscape of legitimate protest is the sexual abuse of children. After the uncovering of child abuse in the Catholic Church and various educational institutions, the advocates of sexual contact between adults and young people that had sprung up in the left-wing alternative milieu of the 1960s and 1970s began to be viewed in a different light—a rejection that quickly manifested itself on a semantic level. Researchers use the terminology of criminal law or speak of the so-called paedophile movement.[27]

24 Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einleitung: Das Protestgeschehen in der Bundesrepublik seit den 1980er Jahren zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Leviathan 45 (2017), Sonderband 33, pp. 9–33, p. 9.

25 Dolores L. Augustine: Whyl, Brokdorf, Seabrook. Die Bekämpfung von Anti-AKW-Protesten zwischen Reform und Remilitarisierung der Polizei, in: Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren, pp. 155–179, p. 173; Reinhild Kreis: Handwerken als Protest. Instandbesetzer und Wohnungsbaupolitik in West-Berlin während der 1980er-Jahre, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 14 (2017), pp. 41–67, p. 57; Janine Gaumer: Wackersdorf: Atomkraft und Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik 1980–1989, München 2018, p. 183; Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einführung, in: Ibid. (eds.): Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2008, p. 7–14, p. 10; Moritz Sommer/Simon Teune: Sichtweisen auf Protest—Die Demonstrationen gegen den G20-Gipfel in Hamburg 2017 im Spiegel der Medienöffentlichkeit, in: FJSB 32 (2019), pp. 149–162, p. 160.

26 Alexandra Jaeger: Auf der Suche nach „Verfassungsfeinden". Der Radikalenbeschluss in Hamburg 1971–1987, Göttingen 2019; Janine Gaumer: Wackersdorf, p. 181.

27 Claudia Buntschuh: Die sogenannte Pädophilenbewegung in Deutschland, in: Meike Sophia Baader et al. (eds.): Tabubruch und Entgrenzung. Kindheit und Sexualität nach 1968, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2017, pp. 85–100. Another author consistently speaks of "pederasts" and "child pornography": Christian Füller: Die Revolution missbraucht ihre Kinder. Sexuelle Gewalt in deutschen Protestbewegungen, München 2015. Regarding the turnaround of

In a similar way, Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune distinguish between a "progressive movement spectrum" consisting of "left-wing groups" and a "right-wing protest spectrum" to which only "right-wing extremist actors" belong.[28] Although other authors affirm that right-wing groups form a full-fledged movement regardless of their goals,[29] many refuse to include the demands of right-wing actors within categories that are fundamentally linked to a liberal understandings of democracy. Nonetheless, diversity and plurality are hallmarks of social movements. In this special issue, we argue that social movements are

> inherently contested: their boundaries, identities, languages, frames, theories, issues, philosophies, purposes, strategies, goals, tactics, allies, participants and so on, are always to some degree the subject of arguments—in fact it is often these kinds of complex, internal struggles that define different behavioural tendencies, factions, parties, and coalitions within a movement.[30]

It is for this reason that "infighting" is not an accidental, but necessary process within all social movements. "Infighting" involves "the expression of a dissenting opinion, a discrepant view, or a debate among activists that attempts to redefine past struggles, frame the present movement, or shape future trajectories of activism," concerning "political ethos, collective identity, perceived moral order, strategy and tactics, or leadership."[31]

"Unwelcome participation" can thus also refer to processes within protest groups, making mechanisms of integration and exclusion relevant to a specific milieu visible. The contributions in this special issue also shed light on the demarcation strate-

public opinion, see Ulrike Heider: Sexueller Missbrauch, Pädophilie und die Unschuld der Kinder, in: Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 29 (2016), pp. 255–265. The reference handbook for Germany does not contain a chapter on paedophiles as a "movement": Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch, Frankfurt/New York 2008.

28 Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einleitung, p. 18, p. 22.

29 Thomas Grumke: Die rechtsextremistische Bewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht: Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 475–491; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 263–268; John D. Kincaid: Theorizing the Radical Right: Directions for Social Movements Research on the Right-Wing Social Movements, in: Sociology Compass 11:5 (2017), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12469.

30 Cal Andrews/Laurence Cox/Lesley Wood: Movement Practice(s): How Do We "do" Social Movements?, in: Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 7 (2015), pp. 1–7, p. 1; Janet M. Conway: Identity, Place, Knowledge: Social Movements Contesting Globalization, Winnipeg 2004.

31 Amin Ghazani/Kelsy Kretschmer: Infighting and Insurrection, in: David A. Snow et al. (ed.): The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (second edition), Hoboken 2019, pp. 220–235, p. 221.

gies that strengthened the cohesion of countercultural groups, an aspect of particular importance within the spectrum of right-wing protests. By considering the ways in which protests in the public sphere and within protest groups are recognized, the significance of the "connectivity" of protests to prevailing mainstream conventions becomes visible, and a further facet of the interaction between protest and the public can be grasped: Beyond provocation and confrontation, protesters participate in shaping political culture in the public sphere—even in their partial adaptation and deliberate infringement of the democratic rules of engagement.

Too Bad for Participation?

Discussions about riots, "angry citizens," (Wutbürger) and security measures at major events, point to a continuing concern that the functioning and integrative power of democracy can be damaged by "false" protest. This ambivalence characterized participation and protest actions in the Federal Republic of Germany throughout the second half of the twentieth century. While participation and protest manifest in numerous ways and must be considered in their respective temporal and spatial contexts, there do seem to be acts of protest in public spaces that are classified as "bad" and rejected by large segments of the population, raising the question of what characterises these protests. In the search for answers, the focus in the following will be on the forms, supporters, and demands of unwelcome protest.

Obviously, the question of the use of force is of crucial importance here. A look at the history of protest in the Federal Republic of Germany reveals that there has always been violent protest action. In addition to the peaceful engagement within the "Außerparlamentarische Opposition" (APO, extra-parliamentary opposition), an integral component of the 1960s West German student movement, there was also a radicalization of individual splinter groups up to and including left-wing terrorism. Although the majority of the demonstrators within the environmental and anti-nuclear power movement distanced themselves from the exercise of violence, violent riots repeatedly occurred at the fences surrounding nuclear power plants, nuclear reprocessing plants and storage sites.[32] Against the backdrop of anticommunism and the Cold War, violent acts up to and including terrorism were ideologically or politically associated with left-wing protest movements. The clashes over squatters and the annual May

32 See Philipp Gassert: Die Bewegte Gesellschaft; Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren; Sabine Mecking: Vom Protest zur Protestkultur? Träger, Formen und Ziele gesellschaftlichen Aufbegehrens, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64:9/10 (2013), pp. 517–529.

Day riots underscored the potential for violence in the "scene."[33] Yet, protest from the right could also lead to violence—such as during the open outbreaks of racist violence in the early 1990s.[34] In the more recent past, the "*Hooligans gegen Salafisten*" (HoGeSa) brawls in Bonn in 2015 or the G20 riots in Hamburg in 2017 also showed how protest events by different groups could reflect militancy, violence, and terror.

Ascribed or perceived violence functions as a distinguishing feature of the limits of acceptable political participation. The use of violence as part of civil disobedience acts as a polarizing force not only within society, but within protest movements themselves. For example, members of the peace, environmental, and anti-nuclear movements all intensely discussed whether violent acts were compatible with the basic demands of their movement, and if so against what or whom it should be directed—for example, against objects or individuals. The controversial issue marked the dividing line, not least for the police and security authorities, between political extremes on the one hand and angry citizens and the political system on the other. On the whole, it seems fundamental to the increasingly positive reception of protest in the second half of the twentieth century that aggression and violence were rejected by participants. Unlike the "radicals" and "anarchists," for example, who sought subcultural spaces of action beyond the state and mass society, the new social movements generally distanced themselves from violent actions. They emphasized not only the legitimacy, but above all the legality of their protest.[35]

In general, taboo breaches were met with disapproval. The use of symbols and gestures hostile to democracy—such as demonstrations and events with speakers who made use of National Socialist and racist vocabulary, or the Hitler or German salute—usually triggered wider outrage.[36] In a more limited fashion, other forbidden

33 See Swen Hutter/Simon Teune: Politik auf der Straße: Deutschlands Protestprofil im Wandel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 62:25-26 (2012), pp. 9–17; Hanno Balz/Jan-Henrik Friedrichs (eds.): "All We ever Wanted…": Eine Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre, Berlin 2012. See also Sven Reichardt: Authentizität und Gemeinschaft: Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, Frankfurt/Main 2014; Klaus Weinhauer/Jörg Requate/Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.): Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik: Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren, Frankfurt/New York 2006.

34 See more Gideon Botsch: ‚Nationale Opposition' in der demokratischen Gesellschaft: Zur Geschichte der extremen Rechten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 43–83; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 257–263.

35 See also Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945; Sabine Mecking (ed.): Polizei und Protest in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden 2020.

36 See Hans-Gerd Jaschke: Strategien der extremen Rechten in Deutschland nach 1945, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusle (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus,

symbols, such as the PKK flag, classified as a terrorist group, at Kurdish demonstrations have also engendered a public outcry.[37] Since these radical provocations stood out from the moderate programme of standard participation, they did increase the news value of the protest and led to greater media attention. At the same time, however, political and social taboo breaks, such as the strict rejection of the so-called paedophile movement, deterred the majority of the population from participating in these protest movements.

The general reception of a given protest seemingly depends on an assessment of who is involved and who already supports the protest. The history of protest reveals that societies are not uniformly affected by political mobilization, and that the demand for direct participation is often highly socially segmented. However, by the "1968s" at the latest, protest initiatives related less and less to individual social or political interest groups or specific social strata,[38] reducing the publicly demonstrated will to have a say in society to a more and more limited protest milieu. Nevertheless, it was (still) often members of the bourgeois middle class who made their voices heard through unconventional in addition to conventional forms of expression—even if they were not always able to assert their demands. While the bourgeoisie as a social group with its own living environment had also weakened considerably, this was less true of the associated value horizon and habitus.[39]

Thus, while inappropriate or rebellious behaviour in society and in political decision-making processes seems to have gained new acceptance in the second half of the

pp. 115–134; Heiko Klare/Michael Sturm: Aktionsformen und Handlungsangebote der extremen Rechten, in: Ibid., pp. 181–203.

37 See Ilja Mertens: Von einer "Inneren Angelegenheit," pp. 159–199; Alynna J. Lyon/Emek M. Uçarer: Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict, pp. 62–82.

38 See Wolfgang Kraushaar: Die 68er-Bewegung: Eine illustrierte Chronik 1960–1969 (4 volumes), Stuttgart 2018; Detlef Siegfried: 1968: Protest, Revolte, Gegenkultur, Ditzingen 2018; Christina von Hodenberg: Das andere Achtundsechzig: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Revolte, München 2018; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.): "1968"—eine Wahrnehmungsrevolution, München 2013; Martin Klimke/Joachim Scharloth (eds.): 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977, Houndmills/Basingstoke 2008.

39 See Klaus Tenfelde: Stadt und Bürgertum im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Idem./Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.): Stadt und Bürgertum im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1994, pp. 317–353, p. 327, pp. 331–335; see Jürgen Kocka: Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Wandel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 58:9-10 (2008), pp. 3–9; Manfred Hettling: Bürgerlichkeit im Nachkriegsdeutschland, in: Idem./Bernd Ulrich (eds.): Bürgertum nach 1945, Hamburg 2005, pp. 7–37; Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik? Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2004), pp. 527–542. See, for example, Wolfgang Kraushaar: Der Aufruhr der Ausgebildeten: Vom Arabischen Frühling zu den weltweiten Anti-Banken-Protesten, Hamburg 2012; Holger Nehring: Anti-Atomwaffenproteste und Nachkrieg in der frühen Bundesrepublik, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64 (2013), pp. 555–570, p. 562.

twentieth century, this did not imply that every protester and every protest demand was equally welcome. The reservations towards and rejection of the political and social "fringes" associated with "bourgeois ways of life and behaviour"[40] were also reflected in discussions within protest initiatives themselves. Both within the protest groups against municipal amalgamations (Gebietsreform) in the 1970s and the 1980s peace movement, the question of whether communist-oriented groups should be tolerated within their ranks was divisive.[41] As a rule, certain political and social groups were, from the outset, not accorded a voice of their own, as evinced by the fading out of protests organized by the unemployed or the stigmatization and criminalization of protests staged by migrant workers and asylum seekers.[42]

In response to a society increasingly perceived as pluralistic, the decriminalization of certain ways of life, such as the abolishment of the so-called "gay" paragraph (§ 175 StGB), took place. At the same time, the growing acceptance within society of the gay and lesbian movement was likely also encouraged by the fact that, in addition to its growing visibility through the so-called Berlin queer dispute and the annual Christopher Street Day parades, it also oriented its demands more strongly toward civic values such as marriage and family.[43] Ultimately, there is some indication that gaining widespread acceptance for concrete demands or for the rejection of individual state interventions in traditional or socially bound (bourgeois) life worlds was much easier than for abstract conflicts of values between individuals and state. "Radical" protests that fundamentally questioned the social order and its normative values instead of merely criticizing existing political or social forms and airing grievances through dialogue, were almost inevitably meet with criticism in the "bourgeois republic."[44] Only with the de-ideologization and abandonment of politically revolutionary goals did

40 Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik?, p. 542.

41 See Anne Bieschke: Die unerhörte Friedensbewegung; Andreas Buro: Friedensbewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 267–291; Sabine Mecking: Bürgerwille und Gebietsreform: Demokratieentwicklung und Reform von Staat und Gesellschaft in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1965–2000, München 2012.

42 See here Harald Rein (ed.): Dreißig Jahre Erwerbslosenprotest 1982–2013: Dokumentation, Analyse und Perspektive (second edition), Neu-Ulm 2014; Dieter Rucht/Wilhelm Heitmeyer: Mobilisierung von und für Migranten, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 573–592; Jörg Huwer: "Gastarbeiter" im Streik: Die spontane Arbeitsniederlegung bei Ford Köln im August 1973, in: Geschichte im Westen 22 (2007), pp. 223–249.

43 See Craig Griffiths: Konkurrierende Pfade der Emanzipation: Der Tuntenstreit (1973–1975) und die Frage des "respektablen Auftretens," in: Andreas Pretzel/Volker Weiß (eds.): Rosa Radikale: Die Schwulenbewegung der 1970er Jahre, Hamburg 2012, pp. 143–159; Jens Dobler/Harald Rimmele: Schwulenbewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht: Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 541–556.

44 Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik?, pp. 541f.

the new forms of protest tested by the "68ers" become acceptable to larger segments of the population in the decades that followed, as a distinction was increasingly being made—at least in written policies—between "good" and "bad" protest initiatives. Political engagement that drew attention to shortcomings in the public sphere and seemed concerned with constructively solving problems was generally welcomed by society at large, whereas the ostensibly destructive initiatives of the "chaots" (anarchists) or troublemakers were rejected and excluded from compromise.[45]

In conclusion, the more a given protest presented its demands and supporters as bourgeois, the more it could expect widespread acceptance. Actors and groups that did not sufficiently distance themselves from acts of violence or political extremism, and continued to engage in taboo breaks had—at least during the second half of the twentieth century—no chance of being accepted or even tolerated by the majority—although this certainty seems to be increasingly softening in the twenty-first century.

The Examples[46]

This special issue aims not only to identify groups, forms of action, and issues that have been excluded from the political communication landscape in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also to shed light on the processes of fraternization and solidarity in the groups associated with them. In the assembled articles, protest actions are understood as demarcations. These are snapshots that will be examined in their historical dynamics. Two articles of this special issue treat protest practices as a distinguishing feature of acceptable political participation. Through the themes of "violence" and "doing nothing," they expand the performative spectrum of protest actions as broadly as possible to determine the limits of tolerable political communication. The other two essays, on right-wing extremists and migrant protesters, look at social groups and demands that were perceived as minoritarian and marginal in the Federal Republic for decades. Within these intersections, this issue is dedicated to unwelcome protest in contemporary German history from a comparative perspective.

First, Jacco Pekelder examines the violent protest of the left in the long 1960s, which was identified, performatively staged and communicated in the media as an in-

45 See Martin Löhnig/Mareike Preisner/Thomas Schlemmer (eds.): Ordnung und Protest: Gesamtdeutsche Protestgeschichte von 1949 bis heute, Tübingen 2015.

46 The articles in this special issue were originally presented as part of a panel on "Unwelcome Participation: Exclusion and Containment through Unconventional Protest Behavior" at the 52nd Historikertag in Münster, Germany, on 28 September 2018. See www.historikertag.de/Muenster2018/sektionen/verpoente-partizipation-aus-und-eingrenzungen-durch-unkonventionelles-protestverhalten-in-der-zweiten-haelfte-des-20-jahrhunderts/index.html (accessed on 3 October 2020).

strument of political-social struggle. As positions hardened and a struggle between the "left" and established, state-sponsored politics was born (alongside the rise of leftist terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF)), the article asks to what extent the violent quality of the protests influenced the reactions to the protest movement and its further development. How did these developments promote or weaken the function of violence as a means of distinction within the neo-left "movement family"? And what role did media representations of the protests play in this process? To discuss right-wing extremist protest movements from the perspective of unwelcome participation is a delicate undertaking. Gideon Botsch asks to what extent can and do extreme right-wing forces (namely forces opposed to democracy that reject a culturally diverse society) "participate" in the political system and in a plural society, through a discussion of the historical development of anti-immigration and anti-refugee protest events and movements in Germany. At a bare minimum, these protest activities have an effect, and they are designed to have an effect. Right-wing extremist protest actors engage in political life and in society in many different ways. In doing so, they are influenced by social developments as much as they react to them. In Maria Alexopoulou's essay, migrant protests are addressed as a protest of non-citizens, namely those individuals whose status does not include any right to vote or official representation within society and political decision-making. For a long time, asylum seekers, but also migrant workers, were not considered part of the public sphere. Of interest here are protests that address the spatial level, which ranges from a demand to improve housing conditions, to the right to be present at all, to the right to move freely in space. In her essay, Yvonne Robel uses the catchwords "*Tunix*," "*sick leave*" and "*Null Bock*" to consider the increasing public declarations of inactivity in the 1970s and 1980s. As different as their relationship to practices of doing nothing is, these terms refer quite fundamentally to forms of political protest. Based on this, the article discusses the extent to which practices of inaction had a provocative potential around 1980.

Through these articles, this special issue underscores the meaningful and communalising power of performative protest actions. It shows how the value horizons of protest actors are integrated into the convictions of their protest communities and explains how and why a common orientation is formed and maintained in contrast to the norms binding wider society.

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Jacco Pekelder

Dealing with Violent Protest in West Germany and the Netherlands

Societal Dynamics of Left-Wing Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s

Abstract

Political violence is a specific category of participation that is frowned upon in most societies. This article compares how two western-style post war democracies, West Germany and the Netherlands, dealt with violent politics from the left in the 1960s and 1970s. On the macro level, a lack of integrative mechanisms in the West German political system fostered a radicalization that the Netherlands was able to avoid. On the meso level of intra-movement dynamics, this also produced different outcomes. While West German radicals such as the founders of the left-wing terrorist Red Army Faction were able to enhance their reputations and find sympathy and support within the broad new left movement family through an embrace of the idea and practice of armed struggle, similar Dutch groups found no footing. Still, it would be a foregone conclusion to deem the Netherlands immune to the kinds of counter-productive policies towards unwelcome forms of political participation that befell West Germany. When the Netherlands was put to the ultimate stress test in 1977–1978 during a direct confrontation with the RAF, its police, justice system and political apparatus proved nearly as vulnerable to the negative societal dynamics of political violence as their counterparts to the East.

Keywords: *1968; 1960s; 1970s; Political Violence; Terrorism; New Left; RAF; Baader Meinhof; West Germany; The Netherlands*

Looking for violent forms of political participation, western eyes automatically turn their gaze towards the 1960s and 1970s, the two decades that in combination count as the exemplary protest era of the last century. With the rise of heterogeneous and transnationalist new social movements and the new left in many countries in Western Europe and the Americas, these were times of great societal upheaval; some even speak of a global protest era.[1] In many of the societies involved, protest bred violence on the part of the

1 See Martin Klimke/Jacco Pekelder/Joachim Scharloth (eds.): Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980, New York/Oxford 2011.

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state and the establishment, and on the part of protesters as well—some of these even specialized in violent politics and organized terrorist campaigns. Of course, this violence should not overshadow one of the most significant enduring effects of the protest era: that relations between citizens and state institutions and figures of authority underwent fundamental changes with lasting implications until today.[2] Nonetheless, it is interesting to see how societies during this period dealt with violent politics, both as an idea and as an actual way of waging politics or, as it was called at the time, the "armed struggle." In most democracies, political violence is considered taboo, but the ways in which their political and legal systems deal with it can be very different all the same; these dealings can reveal a lot about the inner workings of these democracies.

This article compares two such democracies in terms of how they dealt with left-wing political violence, both as an idea and a form of political practice, in the 1960s and 1970s: West Germany and the Netherlands, neighbours in the Northwestern corner of Europe, with the crucial similarity of both being postwar Western-style open societies. As a first step, it looks to the structure of both societies and their political system, including their capacity to peaceably integrate new voices and groups. In what ways did their capacity (or the lack of it) to integrate the new left movement in established political structures influence the emergence of political violence from the left, and what can be considered the crucial differences between West Germany and the Netherlands in this respect? Sociologists and historians have grown accustomed to building a comparison on national characteristics like these and even in the under-researched field of German-Dutch studies it is the common denominator. This article can for this reason build the macro level analysis mostly on existing literature.

In a second step, the article looks at the role of meso level processes within the new left movement in the rise of violent protest. Did intra-movement dynamics between various factions, including the violent few, around the ideas and practices of violent protest foster or delay their spread and popularity? How did government agencies and other institutions of established society react and influence these dynamics? And, finally, what can be considered the main differences between the two countries? On these questions, this article offers a new approach, drawing in part from original research into what, in cooperation with my Leiden colleague Joost Augusteijn, we call "terrorist constituencies": the broad segment of society that terrorists or violent activists consider to be their first audience. It encompasses everyone they believe to be susceptible to the political messages inherent to their statements and acts of violence.[3]

2 Jacco Pekelder: Towards Another Concept of the State: Historiography of the 1970s in the USA and Western Europe, in: Cordia Baumann/Sebastian Gehrig/Nicolas Büchse (eds.), Linksalternative Milieus und Neue Soziale Bewegungen in den 1970er Jahren, Heidelberg 2011, pp. 61–83.

3 Joost Augusteijn/Jacco Pekelder: Terrorist Constituencies in Terrorist–State Conflicts: The Debate on the Use of Violence Among Irish Nationalists and West Germany"s Radical Left

Recent historiography and modern social science research on political violence, terrorism and the protest movement and the left alternative milieu of the 1960s and 1970s inspired Augusteijn and me to delve deeper into these meso level dynamics. The sociologist and historian Donatella della Porta, for one, while leaning towards a macro level analysis, has for some time now argued that, in the 1960s and 1970s, meso level formations—ranging from the *groupuscules* typical of both the terrorist cells and the era's omnipresent action committees to the broad so-called "new social movements" in which all of these groups cohabitated—played a pivotal role. From this perspective, della Porta points out that it is important to account for the heterogeneity of a social movement and to understand that they are generally "movement families," encompassing a plurality of pluriform organizations that, while sharing strong ideological connections—at a minimum, the notion that the state is their common enemy—and subcultural lifestyles, they simultaneously consider one another rivals in the struggle over members, new recruits, finances, ideological building blocks, and other limited resources.[4]

In this struggle, one group can acquire an edge over another within a movement family by self-associating with violent politics. Often even a *flirt* with violence will already help in the process of creating an attractive "brand": a group's ideas, leaders, and actions thereby gain the attention of more people within the movement family and possibly pull a certain number of them towards supporting or even joining them. In the 1960s, this mechanism pushed some groups within, for instance, West Germany's *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition) towards ever more extreme forms of militancy. As will be shown, the emergence of the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF, or Red Army Faction) as the most prominent left-wing terrorist organization can indeed be traced to this intra-movement struggle for resources and attention. Taking a cue from della Porta, sociologists Peter Waldmann and Stefan Malthaner maintain that terrorists not only use violence to frighten large swaths of the population, they also aim to seduce the part of the population they consider their reference group to side with them through their threats and atrocities.[5] As terrorism expert Louise Richardson has pointed out, this is the *Umfeld* or milieu, the "societal surround" without which no terrorist group can survive and thrive.[6]

in the Mid-1970s, in: Joost Augusteijn/ Constant Hijzen/Mark Leon de Vries (eds.): Historical Perspectives on Democracies and their Adversaries, Houndsmills 2019, pp. 101–136, 103–106.

4 Donatella della Porta: Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge 1995, pp. 11–12.

5 Stefan Malthaner/Peter Waldmann: The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups," in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37 (2014), no. 12, pp. 979–998, 981–982.

6 Louise Richardson: What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy: Containing the threat, New York 2006, p. 69.

In our work on "terrorist constituencies," Augusteijn and I have expanded on these ideas to understand how individuals on the receiving end actually process the efforts by their violent comrades to attract them. Moreover, we also aim to take into account that, beyond the violent comrades, state authorities and representatives of the established social system (such as political parties and the media) also play a crucial role in influencing the debates and actions of these constituencies in the face of violence propagated and committed on their behalf. In fact, the reactions of state authorities, established political elites, and the media to debates about violence within the constituencies had a deep impact on their attitudes towards their violent comrades. As will be explained below, West German reactions to discussions with left-wing alternative circles suggest that state functionaries and the media already regarded these as unwelcome forms of political participation. They were frowned upon (or in German: *verpönt*) and considered detrimental to democracy.

As a result, not only voices in support of militant or terrorist groups, but also voices of criticism and rejection were suppressed in West Germany.[7] This offers a striking contrast to the Netherlands, where the government developed a far more subtle approach to the spectre of left-wing violence and where intra-movements dynamics were far less beneficial to violent politics. Still, it is a foregone conclusion to consider the Netherlands immune from the negative societal spiral around violent protest that marked West German politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, in a third and final step, this article investigates the moment when the Netherlands faced a challenge that was directly related to the situation in West Germany, when, in the Autumn of 1977, three shoot-outs with Dutch police resulted in the capture and imprisonment of three German RAF members. Until they were handed over to West German authorities in October 1978, a series of prison and courtroom confrontations and related mobilizations of left-wing sympathy and support that was very similar to the RAF solidarity campaign in West Germany since the early 1970s unfolded. The final part of this article thus asks: How did the macro level integrative mechanisms of Dutch society and the meso level intra-movement dynamics there hold up to the ultimate stress test of a direct confrontation with the RAF on Dutch soil?[8] Do indicators still point to a cer-

7 In her comparison of the counterterrorist policies of West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United States in the 1970s, Dutch historian Beatrice de Graaf says as much, without however extensively dealing with terrorist constituencies: idem, Evaluating Counterterrorism performance: A Comparative Study, London/New York 2011, pp. 241–243. Another ambitious comparative study of West German, Austrian and Dutch counterterrorist policies pays even less attention to this constituency: Matthias Dahlke: Demokratischer Staat und transnationaler Terrorismus: Drei Wege zur Unnachgiebigkeit in Westeuropa 1972–1975, Munich 2011.

8 Surprising as it may seem, the 1977–1978 confrontation with the RAF can indeed be considered the Netherlands' ultimate terrorism stress test. It put the rule of law under greater pressure than at any other time, including the 1970s' attacks linked to the Palestinian liber-

tain advantage as compared to the Federal Republic or do we see the country drifting towards similar patterns of downward spiralling? As this question mostly relates to the Netherlands, this part focuses on a source-based analysis of the developments there.[9]

Integration of Protest Movements

It presents a challenge to compare the Federal Republic of Germany—even before the 1989 reunification one of Europe's largest countries in terms of territory, population, and economy—with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, one of its smaller states. This difference in size can relativized however by their comparable wealth, and by their close bilateral relations, with age-old cultural and linguistic bonds and intensely entangled economies in terms of interstate trade and cross-border capital investments.[10] Of course, towards the protest era under scrutiny here, both countries had taken dramatically different trajectories. While the Netherlands in the 1960s was a well-established and territorially well-defined body politic that still fit the description enshrined in its 1848 constitution, West Germany, with a Basic Law that was more than a century younger,[11] was still somewhat of an experiment in state-building—with the added challenge of the unfulfilled aspirations to reunite the German nation. Still, after 1945, both countries had returned from the abyss of the Nazi era as parliamentary democracies and social market economies. In addition, both were key members of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European communities, and cooperated closely to uphold their external security and economic prosperity and fend off the threat of the Soviet bloc.

ation movement or the train hijackings and other acts of violence emanating from second generation South Moluccans between 1970 and 1978. Although this Moluccan terrorism was unique to the Netherlands, it did not come with a strong mobilization of public opinion akin to the RAF's (See A. P. Schmid/J. F. A. de Graaf/F. Bovenkerk/L. M. Bovenkerk-Teerink/L.Brunt: Zuidmoluks terrorisme, de media en de publieke opinie, Amsterdam 1982). This can be explained in part by the fact that, unlike the RAF, the other terrorists did not espouse a left-wing revolutionary agenda that triggered the authorities' anxieties. Also, they lacked the RAF's image of ostensibly fighting against a return of German fascism and the related appeal to left-wing fears of Dutch authorities copying presumed German police state methods (See Jacco Pekelder: Ich liebe Ulrike. Die RAF und die Niederlande 1970–1980, Münster 2012).

9 There is an abundance of literature on German dealings with the RAF. See for example, Wolfgang Kraushaar (ed.): Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus, Hamburg 2006.

10 See Jacco Pekelder: Neue Nachbarschaft. Deutschland und die Niederlande: Bildformung und Beziehungen seit 1990, Münster 2013.

11 Intriguingly, the Dutch call their constitution *grondwet*, which basically equates to the German *Grundgesetz* (or Basic Law), but in contrast to West Germany's founders, they have never considered it a provisional solution.

On the topic of political violence, especially in early years of the protest movement, there were similarities between West Germany and the Netherlands as well: Although they both had their share of right-wing demonstrations and at times saw right-wing extremist mobs take to the streets, in the long "Red Decade" between 1960 and 1980,[12] most protest was clearly situated ideologically on the left of the political spectrum. On either side of the border, this protest was initially shouldered by a cultural and often bohemian avantgarde and by groups of radical students. They put the Western, capitalist model of consumer society and the perceived hypocrisy of political and moral institutions on the pillory and criticized a Western alliance that closed its eyes to the Vietnam War and the exploitation of oppressed peoples in the Global South. In both countries, the protest movement posed as anti-authoritarian and demanded true democracy, participation, and, later on, autonomy.[13] Moreover, in both countries, discussions about the Third Reich and the Second World War fertilized protest on the left. Psychologically and rhetorically, this coming to terms with the past and "mastering" it (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) was a defining aspect of protest. And just like in Germany, Dutch protesters gradually began to believe that their rhetoric was indeed a fitting description of actual societal circumstances. The result was sometimes counter-productive, as it lowered the threshold for the use of political violence—understood as counterviolence to a violent state.

In the literature on the 1960s, instances of young German protesters equating certain features of West German society, and their clashes with the police, with the Third Reich abound.[14] Less well known, but just as commonplace were the many instances in the Netherlands when authoritarianism, in political life and within the police, was also interpreted as a prefiguration of a return to fascism. Just like in Germany, Nazi comparisons were often used as a moral club. Dutch protesters, for instance, were eager to portray the police as Nazi paramilitary, sometimes calling them the "Orange SS." It was significant that they did not hesitate to accuse a conservative newspaper of working towards the "*Endlösung* of the Provo question"—a grim play of words on the Nazi "final solution" of the so-called Jewish question.[15] The background and permutations of protest were thus rather similar, although a remarkable difference lay

12 The use of the term "Red Decade" of course slightly differs from its original use in: Gerd Koenen: Das rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967–1977, Cologne 2001.

13 A good general portrayal of the 1960s in the Netherlands is: Hans Righart: De eindeloze jaren zestig. Geschiedenis van een generatieconflict, Amsterdam/Antwerp 1995. For Germany, see: Nick Thomas: Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy, Oxford 2003.

14 See Jacco Pekelder, Links slachtofferschap: De RAF als afrekening met de Duitse schuld, in: Patrick Dassen/Ton Nijhuis/Krijn Thijs (eds.): Duitsers als slachtoffers: Het einde van een taboe?, Amsterdam 2007, pp. 305–335.

15 Chris van der Heijden: Dat nooit meer: de nasleep van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Neder-

in the quantity and quality of violent incidents. Violent protest reared its terrifying head far more often in the Federal Republic, and far more often its consequences were deadly. The number of deaths that can be associated with German left-wing political violence might be as high as ninety individuals.[16] Thirty-three or thirty-four of these were killed by the RAF, a number that includes a Dutch policeman and two Dutch customs officers.[17] The small number of Dutch activists emanating from the protest movement and involved in armed struggle mostly refrained from planned attacks on human life, and in the end never caused deadly harm during this period.

Few have attempted to compare German and Dutch occasions of violent protest in the 1960s and 1970s. At best, general overviews of Dutch history by German historians contain one or two hints, as do a few of the broader comparisons of the protest movements in both countries—mostly in an effort to find an explanation for the difference between Germany and the Netherlands in societal structures, especially in state-citizen relations. The authors in question often concentrate on the interactions between the way the police handled protest and the use of violence by (members of) protest movements.[18] Ernest Zahn, a Czech-Dutch sociologist and economist at the University of Amsterdam, for instance, published a book in 1984 for the German market about what he called *Das unbekannte Holland* (The Unknown Netherlands) in which he wrote: "Where there [in contrast to Germany] was no reification of the state, there cannot be a turn to despisal of the state. Riots therefore have [in the Netherlands] been met by more relaxed reactions, because they have not been regarded instantly as threats to the state and the rule of law."[19] Willem Melching, a Dutch expert on German history, also argues that reactions to protest by state institutions are crucial to explaining the differences in the dynamics of political violence in both neighbouring countries:

> Initially, in the Netherlands as well, police behaviour […] was characterized by repressive severity. From the mid 1960s, each country then [however] followed its own course. In the Netherlands, this new course led to de-escalation, in Germany, in contrast, a long period of escalation into massive violence began.[20]

land, Amsterdam/Antwerp 2011, pp. 398–399 (in the original *Endlösung* is misspelled as *Entlösung*).

16 Hans-Peter Feldmann: 1967–1993. Die Toten: Studentenbewegung, APO, Baader-Meinhof, Bewegung 2. Juni, Revolutionäre Zellen, RAF, …, Düsseldorf 1998.

17 Butz Peters: Tödlicher Irrtum: Die Geschichte der RAF, Berlin 2004, p. 28.

18 See della Porta: Social Movements, p. 14.

19 Ernest Zahn: Das unbekannte Holland: Regenten, Rebellen und Reformatoren, Munich 1993, p. 27. (Translation by the author.)

20 Willem Melching: Deutscher Herbst—holländischer Frühling? Protestbewegung und politische Kultur 1960–1980, in: Friso Wielenga (ed.): Politische Kulturen im Vergleich: Beiträ-

In both countries, the decisive turn in the development of left-wing political violence took place from 1965 to 1968. In West Berlin and elsewhere in West Germany, this period was marked by a series of ever more violent confrontations during which a first batch of left-wing groups escalated towards a strategy of armed struggle. Clearly, the killing (and initial denial of this by the authorities) of Benno Ohnesorg, a student demonstrator, by a West Berlin policeman on 2 June 1967 and the attempted murder of West Berlin student leader Rudi Dutschke on 11 April 1968 were important escalating events. These acts of violence against the left took place amid an aggressive anti-student campaign by the Springer tabloid press group, which fed into the anxieties of many who believed they were facing an existential threat from the establishment. Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin were among the first of the often rather haphazardly formed groups to embrace armed struggle. In April 1968, just before the attempt on Dutschke's life, they planned and committed the simultaneous firebombing of two Frankfurt department stores with two other men—the seminal act of what two years later would become the Red Army Faction. In sum, in West Germany, confrontation and polarization dominated the situation.

From 1965 onwards, the Netherlands also experienced a similar escalation of violent confrontations between the police and protest groups like the Provos, especially in Amsterdam, the "epicentre" of Dutch protest. Events threatened to spiral out of control when, on 13–14 June 1966, the death of a protesting worker during violent clashes with Amsterdam police sparked a confrontation between protesters linked to Provo, militant youngsters, and workers on one side and the vehemently anti-new left *Telegraaf* tabloid newspaper on the other.[21] In contrast to the events in Germany after the slaying of Ohnesorg a year later, a remarkably effective de-escalation occurred in the Netherlands as early as mid-1966, which began with a critical self-reflection among political elites.[22] It helped that, lacking a strong tradition of radical activism, students tended to keep their lines of communication to the elites open, in spite of occasional bouts of extremist actions.[23] Spectacular electoral successes by new initiatives, on the local and national level—with the Provos wining seats in Amsterdam's city council; *Nieuw Links*, a new left group gaining ground within the Dutch Labour Party; and D66, a Liberal Democrat upstart party, entering parliament—likely helped as well. Confrontation was thus followed by a relatively swift integration of protest voices into established politics.

ge über die Niederlande und Deutschland seit 1945, Bonn 2002, pp. 80–98, 86. (Translation by the author.)

21 Hans Righart: De eindeloze jaren zestig: Geschiedenis van een generatieconflict, Amsterdam/Antwerp 1995, pp. 225, 247.

22 Guus Meershoek: De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse politie: De Gemeentepolitie in een veranderende samenleving, Amsterdam 2007, pp. 383–388.

23 Righart: De eindeloze jaren zestig, pp. 261–262.

In his brilliant book *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw* (New Babylon under Construction, 1996), historian James Kennedy states that it was especially the self-reflection of Dutch elites that led to this rather successful integration of the protest movement into the existing political system and thus prevented more extreme forms of political violence on the left. In this, these elites were motivated by an especially open mind towards innovation and modernization, an attitude that sprang from the existential crisis provoked by the German occupation during the Second World War and the loss of Indonesia as a Dutch colony between 1945 and 1949.[24] In his central argument, Kennedy posits that, as early as the 1950s, Dutch elites in their search for a new national identity—after their traditional self-image as a liberal-conservative, ethically Christian-inspired nation, with a foreign policy guided by straightforward commercial interests and a neutralist tendency on security—had come to embrace a somewhat blind belief in progress. In the 1960s, after the first confrontations, this belief had then led them to the conviction that the young innovators of the protest movement were the true carriers of the zeitgeist. Elites saw it as their duty to make room for the iconoclasts, and, in a sense, transformed the country into something like a laboratory of "repressive tolerance" (Herbert Marcuse). In plastering over the inter-generational conflict and reinterpreting the Netherlands as a model of modernity and progress to the world, they found pride in their country again.

In contrast, the attitudes of West German elites from the late 1960s onwards had a more tragic quality, particularly among politicians within the ruling social-liberal coalition. In a wonderfully careful analysis, historian Karrin Hanshew has convincingly demonstrated how a political culture and legal system of "militant democracy," informed by the lessons of the Weimar and Nazi eras, led to severe counter-productive effects as elites' dealt with the fundamental opposition on the left.[25] In their efforts to save West Germany's young, rules-based democracy, they largely overreacted not only to the left-wing terrorism to come, but also to the rather playful provocations of earlier new left protest. Only after 1977's "German Autumn" did social-liberal politicians succeed in moving their country towards measured de-escalation—more than a decade, mind you, after the Netherlands had taken a similar turn.

24 James Kennedy: Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw: Nederland in de jaren zestig, Amsterdam 1995. A German summary is on offer in: James Kennedy: Management der Modernität: Die niederländischen Eliten und der Protest in den 1960er Jahren, in: Hanco Jürgens et al. (eds.): Eine Welt zu gewinnen! Formen und Folgen der 68er Bewegung in Ost- und Westeuropa, Leipzig 2009, pp.19–28.

25 Karrin Hanshew, Terror and Democracy in West Germany, Cambridge 2012.

Violent Protest and Intra-Movement Dynamics

As discussed above, propagating and practicing political violence is often a successful way for a group within a broad social movement family to distinguish itself. We have to remember that the RAF was, to a large extent, the result of a widespread fragmentation of the radical left in a multitude of action committees and initiatives after the APO had failed to fulfil its over-ambitious goals during the summer of 1968. Many of the student-activists began to focus on their studies and careers again, at best aiming to realize the revolution by way of the "long march through the institutions," as their leader Dutschke had proclaimed. Others began working towards the long-term goal of uniting with the working classes and joined one of several *K-Gruppen*, the orthodox, often Maoist, "communist groups" that focused on a combination of factory work and schooling themselves and others in Marxist theory.[26] Likely the smallest number of activists chose to circumvent this rigid life and hung on to 1960s hedonist lifestyles and revolutionary spontaneity. Gradually, these *Spontis* came to put their stamp on local activism in several of Germany's cities, especially Frankfurt, West Berlin, and various university towns, where they initiated and supported the up-and-coming squatters' movement. It was this *Sponti* subculture that became the core of what both the RAF and the establishment considered to be its constituency. They were the first audience of the RAF's brochures and communications, and they bore the brunt of the broad surveillance and repression measures on the part of West German's police, lawmakers, and justice system.[27] Sandwiched between the two, *Sponti* groups produced a wide range of responses, with a miniscule minority joining the violent few, while many others sympathized with the RAF to various degrees. Still, from the start, leading voices also existed, who objected to the armed struggle and condemned it on moral or strategic grounds; especially from 1976–1977 onwards, they gradually seem to have gained the upper hand.[28] Conversely, starting from the premise that it was high time to substitute the APO's strategy of peaceful mass protest with violence, the RAF set out to outcompete others with similar plans. In fact, the RAF came about through a

26 Wolfgang Kraushaar: Achtundsechzig: Eine Bilanz, Berlin 2008, p. 185.

27 Jacco Pekelder: The RAF and the Left in West Germany: Communication Processes between Terrorists and Their Constituency in the Early 1970s, in: Klaus Weinhauer/Jörg Requate (eds.): Gewalt ohne Ausweg? Terrorismus als Kommunikationsprozess in Europa seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 203–222. See Sebastian Gehrig: Sympathizing Subcultures? The Milieus of West German Terrorism, in: Martin Klimke/Jacco Pekelder/Joachim Scharloth (eds.), Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980, New York/Oxford 2011, pp. 233–250.

28 Jacco Pekelder, From Militancy to Democracy? The Radical Left in West Germany in the 1970s, in: Joris Gijsenbergh/Saskia Hollander/Tim Houwen/Wim de Jong (eds.), Creative Crises of Democracy, Bruxelles etc. 2012, 309–330.

conscious effort by the APO's frustrated lawyer Horst Mahler to unite his efforts to build an armed group with the incoherent ambitions of famed Frankfurt arsonists Baader and Ensslin. Visiting them in Italy, where they were hiding from the German police, he persuaded them to return to West Berlin, where they then made the smart move to recruit star journalist of the left Ulrike Meinhof. The RAF's spectacular start, Baader's liberation from prison on 14 May 1970, and the spectacular bank raids later that year thus immediately made a lasting impression.

Although they managed to occasionally step into the limelight, both in the early years as well as later on in the 1970s, other armed groups on the left could not keep up with the RAF and its hold on the imagination of both the left-wing alternative milieu and the establishment. The final ingredient in this successful branding exercise were the declarations and semi-intellectual brochures, including the lengthy essays *The Urban Guerrilla Concept* and *About the Armed Struggle in Western Europe* published in 1971. Through these, the Baader-Meinhof group consciously proclaimed itself to be the vanguard in West Germany for all radical left-wing groups, action committees, and projects, and emphatically demanded their solidarity and support. Especially after shoot-outs with the police had led to the first fatalities, many on the left felt bound to declare solidarity with the group. Not even the first series of political bombings in May 1972, in which the RAF killed four and wounded seventy-four, could cut that emotional tie; a left-wing activist, Oskar Negt, was booed out of the room at a Frankfurt rally when he dared criticize them.[29] A reason for this was that, from a very early stage, the RAF caused great upheaval throughout West Germany. On the one hand, there were waves of "moral panic" in mainstream society, driven by anxious press commentaries and politicians demanding tougher anti-terrorist policies. On the other hand, several public opinion surveys in 1971 found that the RAF enjoyed some sympathy among a number of left-wing intellectuals and youngsters.[30]

After the leadership and many members of the RAF were arrested in June 1972, events took an unexpected turn. Instead of passively enduring their detainment, most members of the RAF (excluding Mahler who left the organization) began a prison struggle that would eventually also involve collective hunger strikes that put pressure on both the authorities and their supporters and sympathizers.[31] In addition, they began to instrumentalize the legal proceedings and trials against them as dramatic events. In line with what activists of the 1960s protest movement had done before,

29 Oskar Negt: Sozialistische Politik und Terrorismus. Erweiterte und veränderte Fassung der Kundgebungsrede am 3. Juni 1972 zum Kongreß 'Am Beispiel Angela Davis,' in: Links, July/August 1972, and Interview with Oskar Negt, Hanover, 19 March 2012.

30 See Hanno Balz: Von Terroristen, Sympathisanten und dem starken Staat: Die öffentliche Debatte über die RAF in den 70er Jahren, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2008.

31 Leith Passmore, The Art of Hunger: Self-Starvation in the Red Army Faction, in: German History 27 (2009), no. 1, pp. 32–59.

they tried to use the courtroom as a stage from which they could broadcast their ideology. Between 1975 and 1977, both the RAF and the state saw the Stammheim trial against the RAF leadership as their most important battleground.[32]

In combination with massive scrutiny by the police and justice system of the whole constituency, these RAF campaigns produced strong solidarity reflexes, which—time and again—re-actualized the "negative alliance" (Karrin Hanshew) that was the foundation of the left-wing alternative movement family; sympathy for the RAF thus functioned as the integrationist glue of the anti-state left.[33] New terrorist cells within the left-wing radical milieu ultimately sprang from the RAF solidarity movement to commit attacks and abductions in order to force the German government to release the prisoners. During the "German Autumn" of 1977, these actions drove West German society to the brink of a socio-political crisis, after which the RAF seemed to have reached its end—although it proved a long goodbye. Until 1991, a third "generation" mounted attacks against NATO-related targets, German business leaders, and political functionaries. Nonetheless, the still active cells did not declare their disbandment until 1998.[34] Still, he perception of the RAF as a fundamental threat to German society had already faded away long before, as civic attitudes towards the state changed over time. Whereas, in 1977, extreme measures by the police and the state against the terrorists and their prospective "sympathizers" had been met with the consent of most quarters of German society, a period of critical reflection had already begun by 1978, as criticism of the police grew markedly, especially of measures to electronically collect and process large quantities of personal data.[35] Trust in state institutions began to erode and state officials were subject to rising democratic scrutiny. In view of the traditional focus on the state in German political culture, these were remarkable developments.[36]

32 Jacco Pekelder/Klaus Weinhauer: Germany Confronts the Baader-Meinhof Group: The Stammheim Trial (1975–1977) and Its Legacies, in: Beatrice de Graaf/Alex Schmid (eds.): Terrorists on Trial: A Performative Perspective, Leiden 2016, pp. 231–309.

33 Jacco Pekelder: The RAF and the Left in West Germany.

34 Jacco Pekelder: The end of the Baader Meinhof Group: The Long Goodbye of the RAF Between 1977 and 1998, 2010, https://www.fundacionmgimenezabad.es/es/documentacion/end-baader-meinhof-group-long-goodbye-raf-between-1977-and-1998 (last visited on 30 October 2020).

35 Klaus Weinhauer was one of the first to describe this shift in: ibid.: Zwischen 'Partisanenkampf' und 'Kommissar Computer': Polizei und Linksterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre, in: Klaus Weinhauer/Jörg Requate/Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.): Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik: Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2006, pp. 244–270.

36 Nicolas Büchse: Von Staatsbürgern und Protestbürgern: Der Deutsche Herbst und die Veränderung der politischen Kultur in Deutschland, in: Habbo Knoch (ed.): Bürgersinn und Weltgefühl: Politische Moral und solidarischer Protest in den sechziger und siebziger

While West Germany thus experienced a highly challenging period after the fragmentation of the broad protest movement in the late 1960s, the Dutch left processed the frustration of their revolution postponed in less extreme ways. Inspired by the RAF, some small groups, such as the *Rode Jeugd* (Red Youth), active around 1970, and the *Rood Verzetsfront* (Red Resistance Front), with a tendency towards violent politics emerged in late 1976, but their efforts to outcompete their rivals on the left, whom they decried as cowardly wordsmiths, by posing as "polder guerrillas" largely failed to attract more than a few followers. One of the reasons for this was that left-wing violence in the Netherlands was remarkably often directed against foreign, in fact often German, targets. In the end, this orientation away from their own society did not make a strategy of violence more attractive, but endowed aspiring Dutch urban guerrillas with the devasting image of being unserious "Zaterdagmiddagrevolutionairen" (literally: Saturday afternoon revolutionaries, i. e. hobbyists).[37] Because of the integrative mechanism within the Dutch political system, the adaptive attitudes of the elites when confronted with the demand for societal innovation, and the de-escalation strategy of the police, hardly anyone on the left really believed in the necessity of armed struggle.[38] Still, at certain moments, the similarities between West Germany and the Netherlands were greater than the above suggests. This was especially clear in 1977, when the Netherlands was suddenly confronted with a domestic crisis involving the Red Army Faction. Similar to the situation east of the border, the Dutch police experienced violent confrontations with German members of the RAF, who after their arrests, practiced the same solidarity campaigns from Dutch courthouses and prisons as they had done from Stammheim and other "theatres of justice" to mobilize sympathy and support in the Netherlands.[39] Confronted with these, the integrative mechanisms of Dutch society were less successful, and elites struggled to hold on to the flexible and somewhat phlegmatic attitude they had previously developed.

Jahren, Göttingen 2007, pp. 311–32; see Jacco Pekelder: Towards Another Concept of the State.

37 Maarten van Riel: Zaterdagmiddagrevolutie: Portret van de Rode Jeugd, Amsterdam 2010.

38 See Jacco Pekelder: Ich liebe Ulrike: Die RAF und die Niederlande 1970–1980, Münster 2012, pp. 112–115.

39 A first attempt of the author to build a Dutch-German comparison on this case was published as: Jacco Pekelder: Dynamiken des Terrorismus in Deutschland und den Niederlanden, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 35 (2009), pp. 402–428.

The Dutch Integrative Mechanism Under Stress

Against the backdrop of the German Autumn, three shoot-outs occurred between Dutch police and German members of the RAF within a six week-period from 19 September to 10 November 1977, in The Hague, Utrecht, and Amsterdam. In all three cases, attempts at arrest resulted in the RAF firing handguns and, in one case, using a hand grenade against policemen. RAF members Christof Wackernagel and Gert Schneider and five officers were wounded, and, on 22 September 1977, Knut Folkerts fatally shot Utrecht brigadier Arie Kranenburg. The shock waves triggered in the Netherlands were in many ways similar to earlier outrage against the RAF in West Germany. Moreover, the events that unfolded in the Netherlands in the months to come showed striking similarities to the script of West Germany's confrontation with the RAF. Just like on the German side of the equation, from their arrests in late 1977 until their extradition to West Germany in late 1978, a tense, mediated struggle developed on the Dutch side between the three "terrorists," their legal defenders and sympathizers on the one hand and various representatives of state institutions and leading politicians on the other.

As had been the case in the Federal Republic, this confrontation focused on the legal proceedings against RAF members and their situation in prison. In the Netherlands, there was nothing similar to the anti-terrorist legislation that West Germany introduced to counter the RAF in the aftermath of the violence: nothing like the new paragraph in West Germany's Criminal Code against "terrorist associations" (§129a), nor anything resembling the new restrictions written into its Code of Criminal Procedure against lawyers cooperating in cases related to terrorism or colluding with their clients.[40] Instead, Dutch politicians explicitly subscribed to existing laws and the rule of law in general, as social democrat Minister President Joop den Uyl explained on television in the immediate aftermath of the deadly Utrecht shooting:

> It can and must not be, that we will use police state methods. This is to say that we try to solve this problem by breaking existing legal prescriptions. Because if we would do that, we'd do exactly what the terrorists aim at, we'd become a state where power rules, a police state. That mustn't be.[41]

40 Pekelder/Weinhauer: Germany Confronts the Baader-Meinhof Group, pp. 239–41 and 244–48.

41 Cees Labeur a. o.: Interview with Den Uyl, in the NCRV broadcasting association news show "Hier en Nu," 24 September 1977, Nationaal Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid, Hilversum (NIBG), Inv. Nr. M58499. (Translation by the author.)

Nonetheless, in other respects, Dutch politicians, police and prosecutors approached the proceedings against the three RAF members in broadly similar ways, In essence this was because Dutch authorities viewed their cases—a murder trial against Folkerts at the Utrecht Court of Justice on 6 and 7 December 1977 and trials about political asylum or extradition to West Germany for all three RAF members—in much the same terms as their German colleagues.[42] For one, outside of the courthouses, security issues reigned supreme: rows of armed policemen blocked a wide perimeter around the courthouses; all visitors were frisked upon entering; the defendants were sometimes transported in armoured cars; and police photo- and videographers registered all those who participated in demonstrations.[43] It was all very much like the trial days at Stammheim, including the fact that, at times, court hearings in the Netherlands also took place in a prison setting, which, as critics remarked, ran counter to the presumption of innocence. Inside the courts, Dutch prosecutors seemed to have taken their cue from Germany as well. In the case against Folkerts, using a similarly broad interpretation of penal law, they accused him of murder instead of manslaughter in spite of the chaotic circumstances of his violent arrest. Only the judges in the Netherlands generally handled the situation differently than their German counterparts. Instead of reacting fiercely when confronted by the efforts of the accused and their lawyers to politicize the trials, they behaved with the patience and sovereignty befitting a magistrate. The verdicts were nevertheless equally harsh: twenty years for Folkerts, who was found guilty of murder after an efficiently run trial in December 1977, and extraditions for all three. Mid-October 1978 they were sent by helicopter to West Germany to face more trials and long prison sentences.

It was the RAF's legal team, consisting of five lawyers of whom only two already had some experience with left-wing militants, that provoked the most controversy. They found themselves dealing with a trio of suspects who, inspired by the recently deceased RAF leadership, were determined to continue their political struggle from behind bars. At his trial, for example, Folkerts refused to discuss the circumstances of the Utrecht shooting and instead only spoke at length about his political beliefs. This attitude forced his lawyers, especially Pieter Herman Bakker Schut, Arnoud Willems and Gerard Spong, to embrace a style of "political legal defence" that some of their West German colleagues had already practiced since the late 1960s. Such lawyers often worked as a collective, identified strongly with their defendants and their ideology, and viewed it as their primary task to help them continue their struggle from captivity. Instead of engaging in a straightforward legal defence, they tried to undermine

42 Dutch authorities agreed to include the Amsterdam shooting in a broader criminal case against Wackernagel and Schneider before a West German court.

43 Zaak-Folkerts: sfeer in gerechtsgebouw ontspannen, and Incidentje aan slot van het proces tegen Folkerts, in: Utrechts Nieuwsblad, 6 and 8 December 1977 respectively.

the legitimacy of the court and the powers that be and were often willing to set aside legal norms on the demand of their clients or the organization they belonged to.[44] The informal leader of this group of lawyers was Bakker Schut, who had become involved with the RAF in 1974, when he was part of the legal defence team of a Dutch member of the organization, Ronald Augustin, facing trial in West Germany. In late 1974, Bakker Schut had taken care of founding the International Committee in Defence of Political Prisoners, an international solidarity committee of lawyers, medical doctors and concerned intellectuals, in Utrecht. In April 1975, he founded its Dutch chapter, the Medical-Juridical Committee, that tried to mobilize public support for the RAF in the Netherlands during and after the Stammheim trial. From the autumn of 1977 onwards, this Dutch committee and its publication immediately became welcome tools of the defence team to distribute the declarations of Folkerts and his lawyers.[45]

The other four lawyers were more sceptical of RAF ideology. Their main motivation was their colletive concern about both a possible return to fascism in West Germany and the undermining of the rule of law in the Netherlands. Willems, for instance, condemned the RAF's violence, but—very much aware of Germany's Nazi past—simultaneously saw why Germans on the left felt the need for armed resistance.[46] Van Bennekom saw the treatment of his clients as a testcase for the Dutch legal system, but, in contrast to Bakker Schut, tried to keep his clients and their ideology at a distance. For that reason, he objected to the use of certain phrases to describe the prison situation that were directly imported from German solidarity campaigns, such as "isolation torture," "death tract" and "sensory deprivation."[47] More of a left-liberal, Josephine Dubois-Brinkmann, the only female member of the team, was simply shocked by the scale of security measures at a hearing where Folkerts' terms of imprisonment were up for debate.[48]

As far as the Dutch media was concerned, the message of the RAF's legal defence team was met with reservations. Until the shootings in the Netherlands, even many

44 See the PhD dissertation on the theme defended by Bakker Schut at Utrecht University in 1986: Pieter Herman Bakker Schut: Politische Verteidigung in Strafsachen: Eine Fallstudie des von 1972–1977 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geführten Strafverfahrens gegen Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, Holger Meins, Jan Carl Raspe, Kiel 1986, and Hellmut Brunn/Thomas Kirn: Rechtsanwälte, Linksanwälte: 1971–1981—das Rote Jahrzehnt vor Gericht, Frankfurt am Main 2004.

45 Jacco Pekelder: The RAF Solidarity Movement from a European Perspective, in: Klimke/Pekelder/Scharloth (eds.): Between Prague Spring and French May, pp. 251–266: 257–260.

46 Interview with Arnoud Willems, Amsterdam, 22 June and 3 July 2006.

47 Interview with Willem van Bennekom, Amsterdam, 9 January 2007. See Willem van Bennekom: Was bleibt von der RAF? Reflexionen eines niederländischen Rechtsanwalts, in: Nicole Colin et al. (eds.): Der 'Deutsche Herbst' und die RAF in Politik, Medien und Kunst: Nationale und internationale Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2008, pp. 216–228.

48 Interview with Josephine Dubois-Brinkmann, Maastricht, 3 May 2006.

politically centrist newspapers and television programmes had been quite welcoming to narratives that portrayed the RAF as martyrs in a struggle to prevent a return to fascism in West Germany and its imprisoned members as the first victims of a counter-revolutionary campaign by a West German police state against the entirety of the political left.[49] Now, criticism of the RAF received more attention, in part because journalists for the first time really made the effort to understand what the RAF's ideology actually meant. Some, for instance, listened to Folkerts' lengthy speech at his Utrecht trial in full, but were puzzled by his disjointed ramblings on the Federal Republic as a vasal state of the United States and his attacks on West German social democracy. Moreover, they were clearly angered by his failure to properly explain why this struggle against Bonn and Washington had taken the life of a policeman in Utrecht.[50] Others also charged at the lawyers, calling them "terrorists in robes" and demanding their expulsion from the bar.[51]

Just like in Germany, prisons in the Netherlands became a second venue for the confrontation between the RAF and the authorities. In part, the West German prisoners' understanding of their detention as an attempt to "annihilate" them—they talked about *Vernichtungshaft* (extermination detention)—was to blame. In part, it was certainly also a result of the actually very severe conditions in which many, if not all, members of the RAF were detained. Although it remains somewhat controversial in the historiography, it is clear that West German authorities, citing security risks, chose to keep them in "strict solitary confinement," allowing them, at best, to only meet other imprisoned RAF members, their lawyers and their closest family members. Moreover, some of the detainees were held in isolated cells (on isolated wards) for lengthier periods of up to six months and more, which added to their visual and acoustic isolation.[52] The situation in the Dutch penitentiaries of Maastricht and Scheveningen was very similar and fostered similar reactions by the prisoners. Prison personnel—having read about the disorder in the cells at Stammheim and how this had enabled the RAF leadership to hide weapons there—chose to organize regular searches and controls,

49 See Janneke Martens, 'Polizei und Justiz drehen völlig durch': Die Rote Armee Fraktion in den niederländischen Medien," in: Colin et al. (eds.): Der 'Deutsche Herbst,' pp. 91–105.

50 Advocaat Willems: 'Folkerts voor mishandeling veroordelen,' in: Utrechts Nieuwsblad, 7 December 1977.

51 The weekly Accent was probably the first to use the term in a portrait of Bakker Schut by Hans Knoop, a journalist who had won fame as a Nazi hunter: Weekbladen, in: de Volkskrant, 6 October 1977.

52 Martin Jander: Isolation: Zu den Haftbedingungen der RAF-Gefangenen, in: Wolfgang Kraushaar (ed.): Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus, vol. 2, Hamburg 2006, pp. 973–993, 973 and 980–985; Christoph Riederer: Die RAF und die Folterdebatte der 1970er Jahre, Wiesbaden 2014; and Sabine Bergstermann: Stammheim: Eine moderne Haftanstalt als Ort der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Staat und RAF, Berlin/Boston 2016.

which really got under the prisoners' skin.[53] They and their lawyers protested these severe conditions, and, just like in Germany, the authorities initially did not concede, which then, within months, led to a severe escalation of the situation.

A particularly revelatory stress test for traditional Dutch attitudes towards forms of unwelcome participation was the collective hunger strike that Folkerts, Wackernagel and Schneider started on 1 February 1978. It was carefully modelled on the previous hunger strikes of the RAF in German prisons and, just like these, functioned as the starting point of a solidarity campaign carried by their lawyers, a group of medical doctors who spoke out in their support, and activists of the Dutch radical left. Confronted with this morally charged challenge to the norms and customs of Dutch politics and society, both the authorities and the media proved less welcoming and integrative than had been common practice before, as prison authorities stuck to their very strict rules, with the backing of the Ministry of Justice, despite the real threat of one or more prisoners starving to death. This was reminiscent of how German wardens had reacted—the only difference being that force-feeding was out of the question, since it was generally understood that all individuals have a right to decide about their own lives in the Netherlands, even if they are in the custody of the state. This at least was the consensus within the medical profession, which was respected by the state. In West Germany, the consensus went just the other way and held the state accountable for a prisoner's life, even if they do not seem to care for it.

Immediately after the start of the hunger strike, the lawyers bombarded the authorities with protests and demands to improve prison conditions. This was more or less to be expected, but the lawyers also took the remarkable step of approaching five medical doctors to join them in a working group to coordinate the support for the prisoners. Most of these doctors were (or were studying to become) psychiatrists; one of them was in fact Frank van Ree, a well-known proponent of critical psychiatry and an opponent of isolation as a means of controlling patients. This working group now began to demand that the state allow its "trusted medical doctors" to visit and examine the hunger strikers. At first, the authorities refused, but after almost a month, they were allowed to pay regular visits to the imprisoned RAF members to check on their health. These visits then provided a platform for a carefully staged publicity stunt: On 9 March 1978, the working group had already published a report on the medical condition of the prisoners, which concluded that "from a medical perspective" their isolation "was an unacceptable form of incarceration […] that already within a short amount of time would likely have a negative impact on mental and bodily functions." To counter this, the doctors demanded that the prisoners be integrated into the general prison population, or, if that was impossible, to allow them to have "normal human contact" with each other. The lawyers, for their part, warned the Ministry of

53 Interview and tour with former prison warden Hans Brinkhof, Maastricht, 19 January 2007.

Justice that the burden of responsibility for the lives of their clients was on them.[54] Four days later, a press conference in Amsterdam by the working group led to a surge of media attention. Simultaneously, the Dutch High Court held a hearing about the government's intention to extradite the three RAF members to West Germany. Under pressure, the ministry granted the prisoners greater leeway, and, in response, they started to eat again. In the run-up to this seemingly smooth ending, however, Dutch authorities demonstrated that they had, to some extent, lost their patience with those challenging the political hierarchy in unusual ways. Especially state secretary Elbarta (Bert) Haars, the highest political figure involved, who had positioned herself as "hard on crime," had not refrained, in response to questions from parliamentarians and journalists, from ridiculing the working group and its politically "naïve" doctors, seemingly indifferent to the risks of the hunger strike. In a meeting with them, she had spoken from on high with an attitude that seemed out of touch with the mentality of the political elite since the late 1960s.[55]

In doing so, Haars seemed to forget the rationale behind the toleration of unwelcome participation that had become a custom of Dutch politics a decade earlier: managing societal conflicts by defusing them. Instead, she risked further escalation, both in the short and the long run. In the immediate confrontation in early 1978, her stubbornness only strengthened the doctors' resolve, at a time when there were serious differences of opinion within the quintet. Parallel to the lawyers, they too felt torn between their professional ethics, centred on the health of their patients, and the demand to fully identify with the RAF's political programme. On one side of the argument, van Ree cried out in a working group meeting that, "sorry, that I will not throw hand grenades to help them!," [56] and later explained that he reproached himself for not having the same kind of courage as the RAF and its armed struggle against oppression.[57] On the other side, there were doctors with serious reservations about the politics of their imprisoned patients. In the immediate confrontation with state authorities, and certainly with Haars, they chose however to present a solid front.

A long-term effect of the hunger strike was that it also raised awareness of the plight of the prisoners amongst circles within the Dutch radical left. For one, it had the counter-productive effect of triggering activists on the left to form action committees in various Dutch cities in solidarity with the RAF trio and "political prison-

54 Pekelder: Ich liebe Ulrike, p. 169.

55 Ibid., p. 170.

56 The internal discussions in the working group are well documented in a 'Voortgangsrapportage' (VGR, progress report) made at van Ree's behest, see: International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, RAF in the Netherlands collection, inv. nr. 22 and 23, pages. 168–171. See Frank van Ree: Vrijheidsstrijd, verzet, terrorisme: Verslag van een RAF-vertrouwensarts, Lisse 2000.

57 Interview with Frank van Ree, Bennebroek, 8 January 2017.

ers" more widely. Moreover, it contributed to the radicalization of a small group of activists, who were already preparing to wage armed struggle against the Dutch state. Prodded by Bakker Schut, the Red Resistance Front had already begun to assist with the printing and distributing of propaganda materials. Now, they took to the streets to demonstrate and fight the police, at one time also occupying the offices of the minister president in The Hague. In addition, it seems that members from their ranks also waged a campaign of fire-bombing German targets in the Netherlands such as diplomatic missions and dealerships of car manufacturers.[58]

These acts of violence by the Red Resistance Front were probably triggered by the seeming intransigence of Dutch authorities. They signalled that state secretary Haars and others in power had played a dangerous game with their harsh political stance and their polemics against the prisoners, who seemed so obviously to be the underdogs in the confrontation. The intransigence of these state representatives was a far cry from the flexibility Dutch elites had developed in the 1960s in reaction to new forms of participation that, as initial harsh confrontations with the police indicated, had initially been as unwelcome in the Netherlands as in West Germany. This article has tried to establish why the tactics deployed in either country subsequently bifurcated and ultimately, after a decade, might have rejoined more parallel pathways again.

On a macro level it has become clear, that the Netherlands were primed towards a greater toleration of protest in the 1960s and 1970s than West Germany. The reification of the state was less of a trait of Dutch political culture, with its more gradual and stable itinerary towards a social market democracy. That the police and justice systems were also quicker to adapt to a modern society with more conscious citizens, had much to do with how Dutch elites after the Second World War reimagined the Netherlands. Their vision of the country as an essentially modern nation allowed them to engage in a mindset of self-assured openness towards new societal and political movements. In West Germany, in contrast, elites' aversion to putting the country's post war rules-based democracy at risk hindered a similar welcoming attitude towards new forms of participation.

On the meso level of intra-movement dynamics, West Germany's cautious and at times inimical elites involuntarily contributed to the notion among some on the radical left—with the RAF its most prominent example—that violence, or armed struggle, was a viable solution. As a consequence, left-wing political violence played out a dystopian script in which the authorities unwillingly added to the attraction of violent politics within the RAF's constituency, and thus lengthened its lifespan. In the Netherlands, in contrast, the violent few were never so lucky as to experience a similar helping hand by the state and the media in their efforts to attract the support of large

58 Paul Moussault/Jan Lust: Rood Verzetsfront: Aanzetten tot stadsguerrilla in Nederland, Breda 2009.

segments of their constituency. For the most part, they simply did not receive any attention at all.

That is, until the confrontation with the RAF from late 1977. In the security-dominated atmosphere after the shootings, the authorities and the media in the Netherlands lost some of their good sense. In many—not all—respects, their behaviour was in fact very similar to the way their West German counterparts had met the challenge of left-wing political violence and the sympathy and support it seemed to generate from parts of the population. Especially the harsh and unwelcoming attitude towards the lawyers, medical doctors and activists who sided with the imprisoned members of the RAF contained the risk of a return to the mid-1960s and the initial blunt rejection of the radical left by the Dutch establishment. In the end, things did not escalate in the extreme way they had in West Germany. Still, the basic fact that the Netherlands, under acute pressure, was as unable to avoid the kind of counter-productive policies towards unwelcome forms of political participation is telling, insofar as it shows that the Netherlands and West Germany were not so fundamentally different after all. Neither had found an effective way to defuse the societal dynamics of political violence, especially the triangular relationship between the state (and established society), terrorists and terrorist constituencies. It is a structural feature of Western-style democracies such as these two neighbours in Europe's Northwest, both in the more formative decades of the post war era and in our own day and age.

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Gideon Botsch

Taking Nativism to the Streets

Historical Perspectives on Right-Wing Extremist Protest Campaigns against Immigration in Germany

Abstract

In this article, I give an overview on nativist street protests in Germany from the early nineteenth century to the present from an historical perspective. In a preliminary remark, I will reflect on some recent developments in Germany, where nativist protest campaigns against immigration took place in the streets when voters were turning towards the populist radical right party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD). In the first section, I will outline an older tradition of anti-immigration protest in nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany, which is closely connected to modern antisemitism. In sections two and three, I will retrace how, from the late 1960s onward, the far right in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) discovered concerns about immigration in the German population, addressed them in protest campaigns and developed narratives to integrate such sentiments into a broader right-wing extremist ideology, itself deeply rooted in antisemitism. Studying nativism and the radical right from an actor-oriented perspective, I will focus on traditionalist movements, including the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) and neo-Nazi groups.

Keywords: *Antisemitism*; *racism*; *nativism*; *radical right parties and movements*; *protest*; *violence*; *terrorism*; *Germany*; *nineteenth and twentieth century*; *history*

In the last decade, different newly formed actors of the radical right surfaced in Germany.[1] Most notable is the rise of the *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Ger-

1 See Helmut Kellershohn/Wolfgang Kastrup (eds.): Kulturkampf von rechts. AfD, Pegida und die Neue Rechte Münster 2016. I will not use the terms 'radical right' and 'extreme right' with the sharp distinction Cas Mudde has introduced in his recent works (see for example: Cas Mudde: The Far Right Today, Cambridge 2019). In this essay, 'radical right' refers to a broader spectrum of the far right, covering both extremist and non-extremist varieties. See: Michael Minkenberg: Demokratie und Desintegration. Der politikwissenschaftliche Forschungsstand zu Rechtsradikalismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Gewalt, Berlin 2005; idem: The radical right in Europe. An Overview, Gütersloh 2008; idem: Was ist Rechtspopulismus? In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS) 59 (2018), pp. 337–352. See

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many, or AfD). Up to the foundation of this political party in 2013, radical right parties frequently failed to establish themselves as a political factor in Germany, but already in 2015, observers asked if there is "finally a right-wing populist movement in Germany."[2] In earlier times, Germany followed more or less a Western European pattern of "interaction between radical right parties and movements":

> Movements endure where radical right parties remain marginal. In other words, to the extent that radical right parties maintain their movement qualities and become electorally successful, movement mobilization on the far right is inhibited.[3]

This pattern is contrasted with an Eastern European one, where "more porous borders between radical right parties and movements exist along with symbiotic interactions."[4] But the AfD established, from 2015 up to 2018, a specific relationship to other manifestations of the new radical right movement, including street campaigns, activism, and a media scene with both classical print- and new online-formats. This relationship can be analyzed as a form of division of labour and "strategic policy of alliances."[5] In particular, the campaigning platform *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlands* (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident, or PEGIDA) from Dresden attracted a considerable amount of attention, and its name soon became emblematic.[6] The multi-facetted movement, of which AfD and

also Jens Rydgren: The Sociology of the Radical Right, in: Annual Review of Sociology 33:1 (2007), pp. 241–262.

2 Nicole Berbuir/Marcel Lewandowsky/Jasmin Siri: The AfD and its Sympathisers. Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany? In: German Politics 24:2 (2015), pp. 154–178. See Kai Arzheimer/Carl C. Berning: How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013–2017, in: Electoral Studies 60 (2019), pp. 1–10. For comparative perspectives on populist radical right parties, see: Cas Mudde: Populist radical right parties in Europe, Cambridge 2007.

3 Michael Minkenberg: Between Party and Movement: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations of the Radical Right's Organizational Boundaries and Mobilization Processes, in: European Societies 21:4 (2019), pp. 463–486, p. 464. See also: Swen Hutter/Endre Borbáth: Challenges from left and right. The long-term dynamics of protest and electoral politics in Western Europe, in: European Societies 21:4 (2019), pp. 487–512, who conclude for Western Europe that the more successful a populist radical right party is "in electoral terms, the less its related positions are promoted by protest activities" (p. 508).

4 Michael Minkenberg: Between Party and Movement, p. 464.

5 Michael Minkenberg/Teresa Sündermann: Das Verhältnis von AfD und rechtsradikalen Bewegungen in Brandenburg. Der Fall Zukunft Heimat in Cottbus, in: Gideon Botsch/Christoph Schulze (eds.): Rechtsparteien in Brandenburg. Zwischen Wahlalternative und Neonazismus 1990–2020, Berlin 2021, pp. 245–269, p. 263: „strategische Bündnispolitik".

6 With regard to its role in the public discourse on immigration in Germany, PEGIDA has even been called an "empty signifier." See: Timo Heim (ed.): Pegida als Spiegel und Pro-

PEGIDA were parts, mobilized its followers by addressing widespread sentiments against immigrants, *Asylanten*,[7] and people with a background in Islamic cultures. Therefore, the movement can, to a certain extent, be labelled as nativist. According to Cas Mudde, nativism is defined as an ideology "which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state."[8]

While these substantial changes of the German radical right in the last decade must be noted and understood, this should not lead historians to a preoccupation with the current events. For a better historical understanding, it is advisable to look back on the longer history of the interconnection between right-wing extremist activism and nativist street campaigns against immigration in modern German history. By doing so, I will focus on agency and on organized actors in different arenas.[9] This does not mean that other aspects are irrelevant. On the "demand side," changing public opinion is of particular interest. Also of relevance is the influence of opportunity structures, i. e. the "set of opportunities and constraints that are offered by the institutional structure and political culture of the political system" in which the radical right groups operate.[10] However, it is not possible to give a full picture within the limited space of this essay. In the first section, I will outline an older tradition of anti-immigration protest in Germany, starting in the early nineteenth century and stretching up to the years after the First World War, which is closely connected to the development of modern antisemitism at that time. In sections two and three, I will retrace how the far right in the FRG discovered, well before 2013, concerns about immigration in the

jektionsfläche. Wechselwirkungen und Abgrenzungen zwischen Pegida, Politik, Medien, Zivilgesellschaft und Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2017, p. 5. See: Lars Geiges/Stine Marg/Franz Walter: Pegida. Die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft? Bielefeld/Berlin 2015; Fabian Virchow: PEGIDA: Understanding the Emergence and Essence of Nativist Protest in Dresden, in: Journal of Intercultural Studies 37:5 (2016), pp. 541–555; Maik Herold: Fremdenfeindlichkeit im rechtspopulistischen Protest: das Beispiel Pegida, in: Totalitaritarismus & Demokratie 15 (2018), pp. 13–25.

7 *Asylant* is a pejorative German word referring to refugees and asylum-seekers.

8 Cas Mudde: The Populist Radical Right. A Pathological Normalcy, in: West European Politics 33:6 (2010), pp. 1167–1186, p. 1173.

9 See on actor-oriented approaches: Matthew J. Goodwin: The Rise and Faults of the Internalist Perspective in Extreme Right Studies, in: Representation 42:4 (2006), pp. 347–364; Jens Rydgren: The Sociology of the Radical Right; Gideon Botsch: Rechtsextremismus als politische Praxis. Umrisse akteursorientierter Rechtsextremismusforschung, in: Christoph Kopke/Wolfgang Kühnel (eds.): Demokratie, Freiheit und Sicherheit. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Hans-Gerd Jaschke, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 131–146.

10 Manuela Caiani/Donatella della Porta: The Radical Right as Social Movement Organizations, in: Jens Rydgren (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, New York 2018, pp. 327–347, p. 330. See also: Cas Mudde: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

German population, addressed them in protest campaigns and developed narratives to integrate such nativist sentiments into a broader right-wing extremist ideology, itself deeply rooted in antisemitism.

Antisemitic Campaigning and Nativism: The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century

In the one hundred years between the Hep-Hep riots of 1819 and the pogrom in the Berlin *Scheunenviertel* of 1923, labelling Jews as foreigners, strangers and immigrants was a strong element in antisemitic street mobilizations. It was during that period of time when traditional anti-Judaism underwent a process of transformation, resulting in what Klaus Holz identifies as "national antisemitism."[11] While antisemitism meant much more than nativism or xenophobia, an anti-immigration stance was one important feature of the antisemitic complex, at least throughout nineteenth century Germany.

The Hep-Hep riots[12] refer to a series of pogroms and loosely organized attacks against Jews and Jewish-owned shops which took place in 1819 in different regions of Germany. The starting point was the Franconian city of Würzburg. This diocesan town used to have a strict ban on Jewish settlement since the seventeenth century, but with the beginning of the nineteenth century, and especially after it became part of the Kingdom of Bavaria, some Jewish families settled and opened businesses. On 2 August 1819, rioting began, and the odd (and until now unexplained) antisemitic battle cry "Hep Hep" was probably heard for the first time. An early report in a contemporary newspaper, dated 7 August 1819, provided the following xenophobic interpretation of the Würzburg incident:

> For a long time already a dull dissatisfaction has prevailed here regarding the considerable increase in the number of local Jews. In the past, none were tolerated here, until finally, like a volcanic eruption, a full popular outrage burst out.[13]

11 See: Klaus Holz: Nationaler Antisemitismus. Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung, Hamburg 2001. See also: Shulamit Volkov: Antisemitism as a Cultural Code, in: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 23:1 (1978), pp. 25–46.

12 See: Eleonore Sterling: Anti-Jewish Riots in Germany in 1819. A Displacement of Social Protest, in: Historia Judaica 12 (1950), pp. 105–142; Rainer Erb/Werner Bergmann: Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation. Der Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland 1780–1860, Berlin 1989, pp. 218–241; Stefan Rohrbacher: The "Hep Hep" Riots of 1819. Anti-Jewish Ideology, Agitation and Violence, in: Christhard Hoffmann/Werner Bergmann/Helmut Walser Smith (eds.): Exclusionary violence. Antisemitic riots in modern German history. Ann Arbor 2002, pp. 23–42.

13 „Schon lange herrschte hier eine dumpfe Unzufriedenheit über die bedeutende Vermehrung der hiesigen Juden, von welchen in der Vorzeit gar keine hier geduldet waren, die endlich,

The metaphor of a natural catastrophe—here: a volcanic eruption—is characteristic. A local native population is portrayed by this anonymous author having a "dull dissatisfaction," which from a certain point on becomes unbearable, thus turning spontaneously into condemnable yet understandable, if not unavoidable, violence. According to this argumentation, antisemitism was justified as a sort of instinctive behaviour. This is exactly how Heinrich von Treitschke argued in his infamous essay *Unsere Aussichten* (Our Prospects) in November 1879. The historian called the growing hostilities against Jews in the German *Kaiserreich* "a brutal and vicious, but natural reaction by the Teutonic national sentiment against an alien element."[14] Hence, he framed the Jewish-German confrontation as a problem of immigration:

> Year after year a flock of eager trouser selling young men penetrates our Eastern border from the inexhaustible Polish cradle whose children and children's children shall once rule Germany's stock markets and newspapers; immigration is growing visibly, and the question of how we can melt this alien nationality with ours becomes ever more serious.[15]

A remarkable aspect of this re-framing of the "Jewish question" as a question of immigration and integration is the fact that the number of Jewish immigrants from abroad was rising in total modestly, yet by a consistent percentage at the end of the nineteenth century, and was by no means very high.[16] An interesting detail is the reference to the "Polish cradle," since the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth had been destroyed and partitioned already a century ago with the help and to the profit of the Prussian State.

wie der Ausbruch eines Vulkans, in eine volle Empörung gegen dieselben ausbrach", quoted in Jacob Katz: Die Hep-Hep-Verfolgungen des Jahres 1819. Berlin 1994, p. 15 (translated by the author).

14 "[E]ine brutale und gehässige, aber natürliche Reaktion des germanischen Volksgefühls gegen ein fremdes Element," quoted in: Karsten Krieger (ed.): Der "Berliner Antisemitismusstreit" 1879–1881. Eine Kontroverse um die Zugehörigkeit der deutschen Juden zur Nation. Kommentierte Quellenedition, München 2003, pp. 6–16, p. 14 (translated by the author).

15 "[Ü]ber unsere Ostgrenze […] dringt Jahr für Jahr aus der unerschöpflichen polnischen Wiege eine Schar strebsamer hosenverkaufender Jünglinge herein, deren Kinder und Kindeskinder dereinst Deutschlands Börsen und Zeitungen beherrschen sollen; die Einwanderung wächst zusehends, und immer ernster wird die Frage, wie wir dies fremde Volksthum mit dem unseren verschmelzen können," quoted in: ibid, p. 11 (translated by the author).

16 See: Trude Maurer: Ost-, ostmittel- und südosteuropäische Juden in Berlin vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis in die 1930er Jahre, in: Klaus J. Bade/Pieter C. Emmer/Leo Lucassen/Jochen Oltmer (eds.): Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn 2008, pp. 825–828; Massimo Ferrari Zumbini: Große Migration und Antislawismus. Negative Ostjudenbilder im Kaiserreich, in: Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 3 (1994), pp. 194–226. Besides the Jews, nativist anti-immigration campaigns in the Kaiserreich targeted Slavic immigrants, especially those of Polish origin.

So if Eastern European Jews moved West, they were in many cases not "penetrating" the Eastern border, but just crossing the river Oder, hence domestic German territory. Treitschke coined, in the context of this essay, the well-known phrase "*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*" ("The Jews are our misfortune"), but like the anonymous newspaper reporter sixty years before, he distanced himself from the rough and brutal language by using the sentence as if it was an indirect quote. He pretended that this parole was being uttered in unison ("*wie aus einem Munde*"[17]) by a broad public in the centre of the society. By doing so, the most prominent historian of Prussia legitimized the antisemitic campaigns of the following years, sometimes referred to as the *Berliner Bewegung* (Berlin Movement), which included street rallies and anti-Jewish mobs and lead to a series of pogroms in Pomerania and Western Prussia in 1881.

Another important protagonist in those "foundation years of antisemitism"[18] was the orientalist Paul de Lagarde. Like Treitschke, he spoke of an instinctive reaction by the German people against the Jews. He fiercely avowed these hostile feelings, pretending that the Germans saw the Jews as

> antipathetic guests with whom one cannot come to terms since one consistently wishes to get rid of them. We Germans know that we are of Indo-German, Aryan ancestry […]. If we […] all of us reject the Jews not as Jews, but as Semites […], the expression [antisemitism] implies the reason why we are doing so: the instinct of the nation has, without knowing what it achieved, coined the word, and therefore the assumption behind the word is correct: it emerged from the psyche of the people.[19]

This manifestation of antisemitism is clearly an expression of the new, racist worldview, since Lagarde saw the root cause of their antagonism in the ancestries of Aryans and Semites. It is, however, at the same time an expression of nativism since in the

17 Quoted in: Karsten Krieger (ed.): Der „Berliner Antisemitismusstreit" 1879–1881, p. 14 (translated by the author).

18 See: Massimo Ferrari Zumbini: Die Wurzeln des Bösen. Gründerjahre des Antisemitismus: von der Bismarckzeit zu Hitler, Frankfurt a. M. 2003.

19 "[Sie wirken auf uns wie] antipathische Gäste, mit denen man nicht zu einem Benehmen kommt, weil man fortwährend sie los zu sein wünscht. Wir Deutsche wissen, daß wir indogermanischer, arischer Abstammung sind […]. Wenn wir […] alle mit einander die Juden nicht als Juden, sondern als Semiten […] ablehnen, so liegt in diesem Ausdrucke zugleich der Grund angegeben, warum wir es thun: der Instinkt des Volkes hat, ohne zu wissen was ihm gelang, das Wort geprägt, und darum ist auch die dem Worte zu Grunde liegende Anschauung richtig: sie ist aus der Psyche der Nation hervorgegangen." Quoted in: Paul de Lagarde: Juden und Indogermanen: eine Studie nach dem Leben, Göttingen 1887, p. 330 (translated by the author).

same essay of 1887, Lagarde blames the Jews for "their addiction to install their fellow countrymen wherever possible."[20]

The antisemitic events of 1879–1881 were embedded in increased organizing and propaganda by antisemitic groups, who began producing a flood of printed matter including books, periodicals, brochures, leaflets and stickers. On the organizational side, antisemitic parties were formed. Although they had not been very successful in street campaigning, organizing or in the polls, they were the earliest forerunners of radical right parties and organizations in Germany, including the groupings of the *Völkische Bewegung*[21] and—decades later—the National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP).[22] In early documents, particularly in the Party Programme of 1920,[23] xenophobia and nativism are present.

After the First World War, the campaign against the immigration of *Ostjuden* (Jews from the East) escalated, but this time against the background of growing numbers of immigrants coming to a country shaken by turmoil, civil war and economic hardship.[24] Like in the 1880s, street activism, accompanied by an ever-growing flood of printed matter, was accompanied by violent assaults as well as by the foundation of new parties and organizations. The radical right in the early years of the Weimar Republic was successful in spreading their antisemitic message amongst broader parts of the German public by putting the '*Ostjudenfrage*' on the political agenda. The "Jewish Question" was thus successfully established as a general framework for the interpretation of current political and social developments.[25] A few days before Hitler attempted his Beerhall Putsch in Munich in 1923, a mob of destitute people in front of an employment office in central Berlin was agitated to storm the nearby *Scheunenviertel* area. Bordering the streets where most well-established Jewish institutions were situated, including the New Synagogue in the *Oranienburger Straße*, the *Scheunenviertel* quarter was in contrast notorious for prostitution and crime. In the aftermath of the

20 "[I]hre Sucht, Landsleute anzubringen, wo es irgend geht." Quoted in: Paul de Lagarde: Juden und Indogermanen, p. 335 (translated by the author).

21 See: Stefan Breuer: Die Völkischen in Deutschland. Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik, Darmstadt 2008; Uwe Puschner: Die völkische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich. Sprache—Rasse—Religion, Darmstadt 2001.

22 This has already been noted by Ernst Ottwalt in a remarkably perceptive chapter of his *history of National Socialism*, first published in 1932. See: Ernst Ottwalt: Deutschland erwache! Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (reprint), Berlin 1978, pp. 21–85.

23 For an English translation, see: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1708-ps.asp (last accessed on 12 June 2020).

24 See: Trude Maurer: Ostjuden in Deutschland. 1918–1933, Hamburg 1986; Trude Maurer: Ost-, ostmitteleuropäische und südosteuropäische Juden in Berlin.

25 See: Mike Schmeitzner: "Wühler," "Schieber" und "Putschisten"? Bolschewismusfurcht und "Ostjudengefahr" in Sachsen 1921. Eine Landtagsdebatte als Lehrstück, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG) 66:9 (2018), pp. 734–755.

First World War, a considerable number of *Ostjuden* found themselves constrained to live or trade in the poverty-stricken, run-down houses and shops of *Scheunenviertel*. During the pogrom of November 1923, radical right and ultra-nationalist agitation, antisemitism and a nativist anti-immigration stance culminated in violent and murderous rioting.[26]

With the rise of the Nazi movement, a more radical form of antisemitism dominated the right-wing radical campaigns. Of course the Nazi propaganda did utilize xenophobic and nativist anti-immigration stances in combination with its anti-Jewish campaigning whenever it seemed to be possible and opportune, but it did not rely on them. From the mid-1920s to the end of the Second World War, the combination of anti-immigration propaganda and antisemitism was much less important compared to the overall racist policy the Nazis envisioned and implemented first in Germany, then on the whole European continent.[27] The ultra-nationalist ideology of the Nazis cannot be labelled as nativist, since its aim was a European *Lebensraum* ruled by the Aryan or Teutonic race—an ideology labelled as "racial imperialism" by Franz L. Neumann.[28]

Immediately after the end of the war in 1945, the specific combination of nativism with modern antisemitism regained momentum for a few years, when some hundreds of thousands of Jewish Displaced Persons (DP) lived in camps all over Germany.[29] They had survived the concentration camps and forced labour camps, and a considerable number also had been through pogroms and hostilities in Eastern European countries. Occasional clashes between the German "native" population and the inmates of the DP camps occurred, and attacks were sometimes fought back by the Jews. When an antisemitic letter-to-the-editor was published by the liberal newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in 1949, between 1,000 and 2,000 Jewish DPs took to the streets of Munich. After heavy force was used by the authorities, rioting broke out, with police vehicles attacked and partly burned by enraged survivors of the Shoah.[30] Throughout the 1950s, the majority of DPs had been resettled to Israel and other countries and the remaining tried to integrate into the post-war German society.

26 See: David Clay Large: "Out with the Ostjuden": The Scheunenviertel Riots in Berlin, November 1923, in: Christhard Hoffmann/Werner Bergmann/Helmut Walser Smith (eds.): Exclusionary violence, pp. 123–140; Trude Maurer: Ostjuden in Deutschland.

27 See: Cornelia Essner: Die "Nürnberger Gesetze" oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933–1945, Paderborn 2002.

28 Franz L. Neumann: Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944, New York 1966 [reprint of the edition from 1944], p. 184.

29 See: Frank Caestecker: 'Displaced Persons' (DPs) in Europa seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, in: Klaus J. Bade et al. (eds.): Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa, pp. 529–535.

30 See: Ronen Steinke: Die Affäre Adolf Bleibtreu. Wie ein antisemitischer Leserbrief in der Süddeutschen Zeitung 1949 eine Straßenschlacht auslöste, in: Münchner Beiträge zur jüdischen Geschichte und Kultur 12:1 (2018), pp. 52–63.

While antisemitism remained an important, if not the basic element of right-wing extremist ideologies and politics, a specific connection with nativism, as outlined here from the nineteenth century up to 1923, faded into the background in the following years.[31] Only with the arrival of the so-called *Kontingentflüchtlinge*—Jewish migrants from the collapsing Soviet Union who started to arrive in Germany from 1990 on and were entitled to stay due to a regulation issued by the last government of the GDR,[32]—the right-wing extremist campaigning against immigration of the early 1990s (to be discussed later in this article) coalesced with post-Shoah antisemitism in some very specific settings and locations. From the 1950s on, and for almost two decades, right-wing extremist parties—including the *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (Socialist Reich-Party or SRP), banned in 1952, and the *Deutsche Reichspartei* (German Reich-Party or DRP)[33]—did not, in general, utilize nativist xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments.

Gastarbeiter and the Emergence of the Antisemitic *Volkstod* Narrative

When the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany or NPD)[34] was founded in 1964, it first acted as a party of the traditional German radical right. Its main concerns had been connected to the "German question": to re-establish a sovereign status for the country, to end German division and to regain the territories lost after two World Wars. In its successful election campaigns in seven German federal states, it attracted more and more followers to join party rallies and meetings. Throughout the 1960s, NPD campaigners—as well as critical onlookers—made the observation that two issues were of the highest concern for the party supporters: the compensation to Israel and the *Ausländer-Frage* (question of foreigners). When the speakers addressed negative sentiments against *Gastarbeiter* or *Fremdarbeiter*—as immigrants were called in those years—they received the most enthusiastic response from their audiences. By 1967, the party organ *Deutsche Nach-*

31 For right-wing extremism and ultra-nationalism in the early years of the FRG, see: Kurt P. Tauber: Beyond eagle and swastika. German nationalism since 1945 (2 vols.), Middletown 1967; Gideon Botsch: Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949 bis heute, Darmstadt 2012.

32 See: Paul A. Harris: Osteuropäische Juden in Deutschland seit 1990, in: Klaus J. Bade et al. (eds.): Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa, pp. 822–825.

33 See Gideon Botsch: Continuities within Germany's "National Opposition." From the Deutsche Reichspartei to the Nationalsdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 1949–2010, in: Nicola Kristin Karcher/Anders G. Kjostvedt (eds.): Movements and Ideas of the Extreme Right in Europe. Positions and Continuities, Frankfurt a. M. 2013, pp. 183–208.

34 See Botsch, Continuities.

richten had intensified the agitation against foreigners, who were blamed for being communists, a threat to German women, and criminals:

> The majority of the […] Italian foreign workers are organized communists. More and more frequently it can be noted that these red functionaries, who have become fluent in the German language, also try to influence their German co-workers and the foreign workers from other nations.[35]

The NPD also complained about the "danger to our national identity as a necessary result of the presence of too many, usually young, men of alien nationality."[36] The party paper pretended that

> ten per cent of the criminals investigated in Bavaria in 1967 were foreigners […]. Robbery, rape, homicide, procuration, sex crimes, trafficking of marihuana and of counterfeit money are the preferred fields of work of our 'guests.'[37]

And in the election campaign for Rhineland-Palatine in 1967, the NPD warned that the federal state should not become a European "hotspot for roaming international crime, procuration and prostitution."[38]

This was, by and large, the chorus of NPD election rallies when the topic of immigration was addressed.[39] Up to that point, the meetings were held mostly indoors. After their extremely successful election campaign in Baden-Württemberg in 1968, the NPD started its campaign for the national elections of 1969 and changed their mode of operation. Party leader Adolf von Thadden organized a well-planned and

35 "Ein Großteil der […] italienischen Gastarbeiter ist kommunistisch organisiert. Immer häufiger wird festgestellt, daß die inzwischen der deutschen Sprache mächtigen roten Funktionäre auch Einfluß auf ihre deutschen Arbeitskameraden und die Gastarbeiter anderer Nationen zu nehmen versuchen," quoted in: Reinhard Kühnl/Rainer Rilling/Christine Sager: Die NPD. Struktur, Ideologie und Funktion einer neofaschistischen Partei, Frankfurt a. M. 1969, p. 187 (translated by the author).

36 "Die Gefährdung unseres Volkstums, welche aus der Anwesenheit vieler, meist jüngerer Männer fremder Nationalität erwachsen muß", quoted in: Reinhard Kühnl/Rainer Rilling/Christine Sager: Die NPD, p. 187 (translated by the author).

37 "Zehn Prozent der ermittelten Verbrecher in Bayern waren 1967 Ausländer […] Raub, Notzucht, Totschlag, Zuhälterei, Sexualverbrechen, Haschisch-Handel und Falschgeldverbreitung sind bevorzugte Arbeitssparten unserer 'Gäste.'" Quoted in: Reinhard Kühnl/Rainer Rilling/Christine Sager: Die NPD, p. 187 (translated by the author).

38 "[Ein europäisches] Zentrum des nomadisierenden internationalen Verbrechertums, der Zuhälterei und der Prostitution." Quoted in: Reinhard Kühnl/Rainer Rilling/Christine Sager: Die NPD, p. 188 (translated by the author).

39 See: Hermann Bott: Die Volksfeind-Ideologie. Zur Kritik rechtsradikaler Propaganda, Stuttgart 1969.

precisely scheduled *Deutschlandfahrt* (tour of Germany), consisting of indoor as well as open-air gatherings. This tour spun out of control, as it attracted aggressive young supporters of the party and exposed them to an attentive public. Moreover, the party's security team turned out to consist of some of the most violent thugs among its supporters. When the rallies met with protests from a broad coalition of opponents, reaching from leftist student activists and other anti-fascists, trade-unionists, former concentration camp survivors both of Jewish and gentile origin, and many other concerned citizens, the NPD's security men went berserk. At the peak of the campaign, the chief of the squad fired at protesters with his pistol, injuring one severely. The tour had to be stopped, and on election day the party failed to enter the *Bundestag*.

The failure in the national election campaign of 1969 offered some lessons for the radical right in the Federal Republic, but it took its activists almost a decade to learn from them. One important lesson was that street activism had to be separated from party politics in order to achieve any support at the polls. The other lesson was that xenophobia was the best-selling product the extreme right had in stock. It was ideal for winning over support and, consequently, radicalizing the opinions of the constituency in order to spread racist, ultra-nationalist and authoritarian, anti-democratic ideology. Utilizing widespread nativist sentiments could open the hearts and minds for a more radical worldview—a worldview rooted in pre-national socialist and national socialist ideological traditions of the German extreme right.

In analyzing the history and development of Germany's post-war extreme right,[40] the 1970s and early 1980s can be regarded as critical years, but also as a sort of laboratory to experiment with new forms and content to gain momentum for the future. The nationalist activists had to assimilate to an environment in flux. A strain of the radical right which was later called the New Right[41] played an important role in this process. Even though the impact of this tendency should not be underestimated, it is worthwhile turning attention to the "Old Right." Being more traditionalist by definition, this strain also went through transformation processes, which have received far less scholarly attention. Their actors also discovered step by step the possibilities of a new cultural environment, like youth subcultures and new forms of non-violent or violent protest. No less important than the intellectual renewal by the New Right, which addressed itself to political and social elites, and maybe of an even greater impact, was the Old Right's turn towards proletarian milieus in transformation. The most effective key to reach new supporters was addressing nativist stances. As the

40 See: Gideon Botsch: 'Nationale Opposition' in der demokratischen Gesellschaft. Zur Geschichte der extremen Rechten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 43–82.

41 See: Volker Weiß: Die autoritäre Revolte. Die Neue Rechte und der Untergang des Abendlandes, Stuttgart 2017.

lower strata of German society became extremely volatile regarding the risks of social change, negative feelings against immigrants were widespread, especially in the younger generations. Supporters could be found in emerging masculine proletarian subcultures like football fans, motorcycle gangs or skinheads.

A discourse was developed to connect the nativist rejection of immigration with an overall worldview of authoritarian and racist ultra-nationalism and antisemitism. This was the narrative of the *Volkstod*, or "death of the nation" by *Überfremdung*.[42] For the latter word, there is no proper English term; it might be translated as "foreign infiltration," but the similarity to the word "alienation" in German (*Entfremdung*) should be noted. In 1971, the influential Franconian publisher Arthur Ehrhardt, a former member of the SS and now local politician of the NPD, wrote in his monthly journal *Nation Europa* shortly before his death:

> We have been observing the progress of foreign infiltration for years now. Today there is readiness for the final execution, for the extinction of the German nation—literally for genocide! Literally for the extermination of our gifted, brave, peace-loving, hard-working people, that is to be replaced by a mash even more susceptible to manipulation.[43]

The antisemitic idea of an overall plot, a worldwide conspiracy for the "replacement" of white European people with foreigners in order to gain better control over those masses was formulated in 1971. Thus, Ehrhardt had updated the connection of nativism and antisemitism. "The Jews" were no longer so much the foreign "infiltrators" themselves, but the evil power organizing immigration for the sake of their own profit. From the end of the 1960s on, one can find evidence for an ever more efficient spreading of this idea throughout the inner circles of the far right; for example, in closed lectures and seminars or in journals and other publications.[44] By the beginning of the 1980s, the public seemed to be ready for a massive campaign. In 1981, a text signed by a group of professors emeriti was published. This "Heidelberg Manifesto" opened with a statement of concern about "the infiltration of the German people by the influx of many millions of foreigners and their families," and about the "cultural alienation

42 For a detailed analysis, see: Gideon Botsch/Christoph Kopke: "Umvolkung" und "Volkstod." Zur Kontinuität einer extrem rechten Paranoia, Ulm 2019.

43 "Wir haben jahrelang die Fortschritte der Überfremdung verzeichnet. Heute ist man bereit zum letzten Vollzug, zur Auslöschung des deutschen Volkes—buchstäblich zum Genozid! Buchstäblich zur Austilgung unseres begabten, tüchtigen, friedliebenden, fleißigen Volkes, das durch einen noch leichter manipulierbaren Brei ersetzt werden soll," quoted in: Arthur Ehrhardt: Die Idee wird siegen! Die letzten Worte Arthur Ehrhardts, in: Nation Europa 20:6 (1971), pp. 3–7, p. 7 (translated by the author).

44 For example, see: Gideon Botsch/Christoph Kopke: "Umvolkung" und "Volkstod."

of our language, our culture and our national identity." The professors pretended that the

> integration of great masses of non-German foreigners is not possible while preserving our people, and [it] will lead to the well-known ethnic catastrophes of multicultural societies. Every people, including the German people, has a natural right to preserve its identity and characteristic in its habitat. Respect for other people's demands their preservation, but not their meltdown.[45]

New about this manifesto was its appeal to the German constitution, the Basic Law:

> The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany does not emanate from the concept of 'nation' as the sum of all people within the state, [but] from the concept 'Volk,' in fact the German people […]. Thus, the Basic Law demands the preservation of the German people. […] The current immigration policy, which promotes the development towards a multiracial society, contradicts the Basic Law, which obliges all Germans […] to preserve and defend the birth right of our people.[46]

This was combined with a statement against "ideological nationalism," "racism" and "all extremisms, right and left"[47]—an odd enough statement, since the manifesto was printed in a journal from the core of the openly right-wing extremist milieu. The manifesto offered a clear strategical direction for future right-wing extremist campaigns:

45 "[Mit großer Sorge beobachten wir die] Unterwanderung des deutschen Volkes durch Zuzug von vielen Millionen von Ausländern und ihren Familien, die Überfremdung unserer Sprache, unserer Kultur und unseres Volkstums […]. Die Integration großer Massen nichtdeutscher Ausländer ist […] bei gleichzeitiger Erhaltung unseres Volkes nicht möglich und führt zu den bekannten ethnischen Katastrophen multikultureller Gesellschaften. Jedes Volk, auch das deutsche Volk, hat ein Naturrecht auf Erhaltung seiner Identität und Eigenart in seinem Wohngebiet. Die Achtung vor anderen Völkern gebietet ihre Erhaltung, nicht aber ihre Einschmelzung", quoted in: Das Heidelberger Manifest 1981, in: Nation Europa 31:12 (1981), pp. 29–30 (translated by the author).

46 "Das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geht nicht aus vom Begriff ‚Nation' als der Summe aller Völker innerhalb eines Staates. [Es geht vielmehr aus] vom Begriff 'Volk,' und zwar vom deutschen Volk […]. Die jetzt praktizierte Ausländerpolitik, welche die Entwicklung zu einer multirassischen Gesellschaft fördert, widerspricht dem Grundgesetz, das alle Deutschen […] zur Bewahrung und Verteidigung der Lebensrechte unseres Volkes verpflichtet," quoted in: Das Heidelberger Manifest 1981, in: Nation Europa 31:12 (1981), pp. 29–30 (translated by the author).

47 "Auf dem Boden des Grundgesetzes stehend wenden wir uns gegen ideologischen Nationalismus, gegen Rassismus und gegen jeden Rechts- und Linksextremismus", quoted in: Heidelberger Manifest 1981, p. 29 (translated by the author).

to combine a radical antisemitic and racial-nationalist ideology with the widespread xenophobia, rooted in "softer," but more accepted nativist sentiments and opinions.

Lessons Learned? Different Actors with Common Goals

Other activists of the extreme right used similar wordings in their agitation against foreigners, but promoted more radical means. Neo-Nazi leader Manfred Roeder stated that "every people uses violence when its birth rights are concerned."[48] Early in 1980, along with a small group of followers, Roeder started a terrorist campaign of arson attacks, first aimed at representatives and symbolic targets related to the culture of remembrance of the Shoah. From the summer of 1980 on, Roeder's underground gang *Deutsche Aktionsgruppen* (German action groups) firebombed three different accommodations for refugees, and when, in a fourth attack on 22 August 1980, a transitional shelter for Vietnamese "boat people" in Hamburg was set on fire, Nguyễn Ngọc Châu and Đỗ Anh Lân died in the flames. The two refugees were most likely the first victims of organized right-wing terrorism against immigrants in the FRG. To the shame of German society, they have not been the last by far.

A closer look at the different events exposes how violent acts, organizing, street campaigning, and the production and dissemination of propaganda—from leaflets, stickers, posters, brochures and books to lectures in closed circles or in public, graffiti, and threatening mail or phone calls—can work hand in hand. The different actors shared a common nativist goal: to close the borders for foreigners and to send back those who are already in the country. It cannot, however, be assumed, let alone proven, that those different actors have all been interconnected, cooperated with or even accepted the activities of each other, especially when it comes to violence. Still, the interactions between them should be carefully scrutinized.

In the case of Hamburg, a traditionally liberal-minded and international city with the largest sea port of Germany, it can be studied how a wave of racist violence was embedded in multi-facetted political activities. Besides neo-Nazi groupings, a new organization called *Hamburger Liste Ausländerstopp* (HLA) was formed. To understand this name, one has to look at an overall development in Germany in the 1970s. With new divides on the political agenda, citizens' initiatives and action committees known as *Bürgerinitiativen* became a common new form of participation and protest. For the larger part they were perceived as left-wing or centre-left, but especially in the field

48 "Jedes Volk wendet Gewalt an, wenn es um seine Lebensrechte geht," quote taken from: Klaus-Henning Rosen: Rechtsterrorismus. Gruppen—Täter—Hintergründe, in: Gerhard Paul (ed.): Hitlers Schatten verblaßt. Die Normalisierung des Rechtsextremismus, Bonn 1989, pp. 49–78, p. 63 (translated by the author).

of ecology, some can be rooted back in more conservative, right-wing or even racist traditions of German history. By and large, those groupings had been melted into the formation process of the Green Party. An important intermediate stage was the participation of some of them in local or regional elections throughout the 1970s. The groups normally transformed themselves into *Wählerinitiativen* (voters' initiatives), sometimes called *Wahllisten* or simply *Listen* (electoral list, or party ticket), which formed, in several cases, the first nuclei for future local or regional branches of the Green Party, founded in 1980.[49]

Amongst the first right-wing extremists to pick up this wording was Manfred Roeder, who called his group *Deutsche Bürgerinitiative* already in the 1970s, before introducing his *Deutsche Aktionsgruppen* when going underground in 1980. The same year a *Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp* (citizens' initiative for the stop of foreigners, BIA) had been constituted from the NPD's clientele. Shortly after, some of the local branches of the BIA transformed themselves into *Wahllisten*, who participated in local and regional elections. Most successful at this level was the *Kieler Liste für Ausländerbegrenzung* (KLA), winning over 3.8 per cent in the Baltic city of Kiel, the capital of the northern-most federal state Schleswig-Holstein. With regard to the further development of radical right nativist protest movements and their relationship to political party activities, the HLA in Hamburg is an interesting example. Even though its chairman, Michael Adrejewski, was not a formal member of the NPD at that time, the HLA was very close to the party. Thus, the NPD refrained from taking part in elections in Hamburg—itself a federal state of the FRG—for the following decade. Indeed, the HLA was able to achieve some attention and even a small percentage of voters' support (up to 0.7 per cent), which was, at least from the perspective of the NPD, a promising result. It seemingly paid off to step back behind a group of "concerned citizens" who pretended not to be racist at all, but simply afraid of "too many foreigners." However, the HLA shared and propagated a right-wing extremist, racist ideology in its leaflets and periodicals.

By the mid-1980s, the NPD drew some hope for a growing acceptance from voters and electoral success from events like the HLA's performance in Hamburg. At least, functionaries and rank-and-file-members felt as if a turning point was reached twenty years after the NPD's foundation, as the NPD went, with the newly discovered key issue of *Ausländerstopp*, into the election campaign for the European Parliament in 1984. Here the NPD polled at 0.8 per cent, which was slightly better than in elections of previous years. "You know," a party activist stated, "I believe it's finally going

49 See: Silke Mende: 'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn.' Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen, Munich 2011; Sven Reichardt: Authentizität und Gemeinschaft. Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, Berlin 2014.

upward with the party now."[50] However, the NPD's hopes had been betrayed again when in the mid-1980s, the *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People's Union, or DVU) a second right-wing extremist, nativist party ran in several elections in competition against the NPD. At the same time, a split-off of the Bavarian Christian Democrats, the newly formed populist radical right party *Die Republikaner* (The Republicans, or REP), also competed for votes from the xenophobic parts of the electorate. Throughout the 1980s, there was not a large enough constituency in the FRG for three nativist competitors to surpass the five per cent threshold.

In West Berlin, however, the allied authorities had banned the NPD to run in elections, and the DVU also refrained. In the mid-1980s, a *Bürgerinitiative Demokratie und Identität* (Citizens' Initiative for Democracy and Identity, or BDI), an action platform of different right-wing groupings, started campaigning against immigration into the Western part of the divided city. The BDI unified some scattered renegades from democratic parties along with longstanding right-wing extremist activists and violence-seeking young skinheads and football hooligans grouped around the neo-Nazis of the *Nationalistische Front* (Nationalist Front or NF). It functioned as a nucleus for the regional association of the REP, which went into the 1989 Berlin election campaign with an extremely racist agenda. A centrepiece was a TV advertisement of comparably high quality, showing Turkish families with many children—the women wearing headscarves—in a run-down street of Kreuzberg, underlined by Enrico Morricones melody to *Once Upon a Time in the West*. This was seen as particularly detestable by the REP's critics since the enigmatic German title of this well-known Spaghetti Western is *Spiel mir das Lied vom Tod* (Play me the song of death). Hence, the Berlin REP gained attention and, in its constituency, a reputation as a voice for nativism. Without a competitor at the polls, it was able to reach a triumphant result of 7.5 per cent in January 1989. A few months later, on 12 May 1989, Ufuk Sahin, a young man of Turkish origins, was stabbed to death by a native German in a Berlin suburb where the REP had won a particularly high percentage of votes.[51]

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the GDR collapsed and the path was laid for re-unification, and German right-wing extremist actors came across new opportunities to gain support and spread their message. In the early 1990s, unified Germany was confronted with a prolonged and extreme wave of anti-immigration pro-

50 "Du […], ich glaube jetzt gehts [sic!] wieder aufwärts mit der Partei," quoted in: Gerd Knabe (ed.): Zwanzig Jahre NPD. Porträt einer jungen Partei, Knüllwald-Nausis 1984, p. 7 (translated by the author).

51 See: Hajo Funke: "Republikaner." Rassismus, Judenfeindschaft, nationaler Größenwahn. Zu den Potentialen der Rechtsextremen am Beispiel der "Republikaner," Berlin 1989; Richard Stöss: Die "Republikaner." Woher sie kommen—Was sie wollen—Wer sie wählt—Was zu tun ist, Cologne 1990; Hans-Gerd Jaschke: Die "Republikaner." Profile einer Rechtsaußen-Partei, Bonn 1993.

test, including shocking events of violence, pogroms and terrorism. Even though the intensity was higher, fewer people protested against the nativist mobilization in the former GDR[52], yet the whole country had to face this problem. Interestingly enough, the success of traditional right-wing parties in the elections was first limited to the Western federal states, and it took until 1998/1999 that the populist radical right DVU entered the parliaments of the Eastern German federal states of Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg.

In the late 1980s, opinion polls by sociological institutes of the GDR which had been kept secret showed that a broad public in Eastern Germany shared right-wing extremist or nativist attitudes and many youths sympathized with the growing subcultures of so-called *Faschos* and *Skins.*[53] Almost all Western German right-wing groups, including the neo-Nazis, started to campaign in the East and utilized xenophobic sentiments for their propaganda. The neo-Nazi NF was particularly active, flooding the East with propaganda material. One leaflet spread en masse had a front-page headline in capital letters with the threatening and dramatic message: *They are coming! For decades and in masses* […]. *Without limitations!* The back side was headed with the slogan *Two thirds of our people demand: Out with the foreigners! The people's will is our mission!*[54] The line *Out with the foreigners!* was printed in bold letters. Another leaflet distributed by the NF was a *Nine item plan for repatriation*, written by the notorious neo-Nazi activist Jürgen Rieger from Hamburg. When more and more attacks on refugees took place and the number of atrocities grew, the NF issued a leaflet with the dubious headline *Enough is Enough*. It read:

> Germany must not become an immigration country, that's what we all are fighting for—but if we fight, then properly and purposefully. To set asylum seekers' shelters on fire isn't right politically or humanely. [It] doesn't solve the problem, but produces new ones: for each displaced asylum seeker new ones are coming; charred

52 See: David Begrich: Hoyerswerda und Lichtenhagen. Urszenen rassistischer Gewalt in Ostdeutschland, in: Heike Kleffner/Anna Spangenberg (eds.): Generation Hoyerswerda. Das Netzwerk militanter Neonazis in Brandenburg, Berlin 2016, pp. 32–44.

53 See Britta Bugiel: Rechtsextremismus Jugendlicher in der DDR und in den neuen Bundesländern von 1982 bis 1998, Münster 2002; Gideon Botsch: From Skinhead-Subculture to Radical Right Movement. The Development of a 'National Opposition' in East Germany, in: Contemporary European History 21:4 (2012), pp. 553–573.

54 "SIE KOMMEN! Seit Jahrzehnten und in Massen […] Ohne Einschränkung"; "Zwei Drittel unseres Volkes sind für Ausländer raus! Des Volkes Wille ist unser Auftrag," Antifaschistisches Pressearchiv Berlin (Apabiz), NF, folder 3. See Gideon Botsch: "Nationalismus—eine Idee sucht Handelnde." Die Nationalistische Front als Kaderschule für Neonazis, in: Heike Kleffner/Anna Spangenberg (eds.): Generation Hoyerswerda, pp. 74–97.

> children of asylum seekers, as victims of these attacks, are off putting and are used […] for anti-German agitation.[55]

Using a cynical and brutal language, even the NF saw the need for a political statement to put xenophobia into a broader ideological frame:

> The fight we have to lead as NATIONALISTS is in the first place a […] fight for the soul of our people. […] We have to make our deluded people understand that the asylum seekers problem is—like all other problems—caused by the FRG system, which preaches false values ('multi-cultural society'). The major enemy is, therefore, not the asylum seeker, but the inhumane ideology of liberalism/capitalism. The enemy is furthermore the liberal-democrat politician who cares more about the well-being of a Negro than the well-being of his own people.[56]

In fact, the NF was an ultra-violent group, and a considerable number of its adherents became involved in brutal attacks, including arson attacks, murder and homicide. When in August 1992 a pogrom was started in the Baltic coast city of Rostock, formerly the most important port of the GDR, one periodical of the NF carried the headline *Come Together in Rostock*, illustrated with a picture of rioters.[57] This pogrom in Rostock is another example of the interaction of different groups and networks. Shortly before it took place, Michael Andrejewski from the *Hamburger Liste Ausländerstopp* agitated local youth in the suburbs to spread leaflets with a call for action against a central drop-in centre for refugees in the district of Rostock-Lichtenhagen. With the numbers of refugees from South-Eastern Europe rising as result of the Yugoslav Wars and the extreme discrimination and persecution of the Roma people, the

55 "Es ist genug. Deutschland darf kein Einwanderungsland werden, dafür kämpfen wir alle—aber wenn wir kämpfen, dann richtig und zielgerichtet. Asylantenheime anzustecken ist politisch und menschlich völlig falsch, [es] löst das Problem nicht, sondern schafft nur neue: Für jeden verbrieben Asylanten kommen neue. Verkohlte Asylantenkinder, als Opfer dieser Anschläge schrecken ab und werden […] zur antideutschen Hetze benützt," Apabiz, NF, folder 3.

56 "Der Kampf, den wir NATIONALISTEN führen müssen, ist in erster Linie ein […] Kampf um die Seele unseres Volkes […]. Wir müssen unserem verblendeten Volk klarmachen, daß das Asylantenproblem—wie alle anderen Probleme auch—vom BRD-System verursacht wird, das falsche Werte ('multikulturelle Gesellschaft') predigt. Der Hauptfeind ist also nicht der Asylant, sondern die menschenverachtende Ideologie des Liberalismus/Kapitalismus. Der Feind ist ferner der liberaldemokratische Politiker, dem das Wohl eines Nege[r]s wichtiger ist als das Wohl seines eigenen Volkes," quoted in: Apabiz, NF, folder 3.

57 It is not finally clear if this issue, dated August 1992, was produced before the pogrom, while it still was going on, or afterwards. See: Gideon Botsch: "Nationalismus—eine Idee sucht Handelnde," footnote 64/p. 276.

refugee centre was overcrowded. For almost a week, a mob of protesters gathered in front of the building, which also hosted a home for Vietnamese workers, firebombed it and attacked the police. It was not the authorities who finally stopped the rioting, but a huge humanitarian and antifascist march through the neighbourhood.

After those events, the NF and other main neo-Nazis groups were banned by the state. From the mid-1990s on, the right-wing extremist movements reorganized themselves. Many of the young people who became active in the nativist street campaigns and protests in the late 1980s and early 1990s found new fields of activities. From the diffuse skinhead subculture, a clearly right-wing oriented subculture scene emerged as an environment which consistently bred violence. It was this subculture where the terrorists of the *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund* (National Socialist Underground or NSU) felt at home, and on which they could rely when committing three brutal bombings and executing nine "foreigners" and a female police officer during the first decade of the new millennium. At the same time, the NPD gathered the activists of the banned or disbanded neo-Nazi groupings, and thus won over its own constituency particularly amongst young voters in the East. They gained some success in the federal elections in Saxony (in 2004 and 2009) and Mecklenburg-Pomerania (in 2006 and 2011). In the latter federal state, where the city of Rostock is located, Michael Andrejeswki became a central figure of the regional NPD who even was elected to be a member of the state parliament. Until recently, he consistently organized rallies and campaigns against refugees and other "foreigners" on behalf of the NPD. To a certain extent, Michael Andrejewski embodies in his activism a 40-year-long history of organized nativist protest against immigration in Germany.

With the xenophobic wave of the early 1990s, social scientists in Germany started a controversial, but fruitful debate whether it is possible to define the contemporary radical right as a social movement and analyse it with the highly developed concepts and methods of related studies.[58] Its enmity towards immigration, rooted in a nativist ideology, was seen as the chasm which made it possible to speak of the radical right as a social movement. Some scholars argued—notwithstanding the fact that radical right actors frequently conceptualized themselves as "movements," with the most prominent example being the *nationalsozialistische Bewegung*—that this movement character was a novelty, at least in Germany.[59] However, as I have outlined in this

58 The debate started with Volume 5 (1992) of *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*; for an overview, see: Jan Schedler: Die extreme Rechte als soziale Bewegung. Theoretische Verortung, methodologische Anmerkungen und empirische Erkenntnisse, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, pp. 285–323; Manuela Caiani/Donatella della Porta: The Radical Right as Social Movement Organizations.

59 See for example: Andreas Klärner/Michael Kohlstruck: Rechtsextremismus—Thema der Öffentlichkeit und Gegenstand der Forschung, in: ibid. (eds.): Moderner Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland, Hamburg 2006, pp. 7–41.

essay, the movement character, in combination with the anti-immigration stance, can be traced back for a long time in the history of the radical right. Furthermore, the underlying antisemitism within the specific right-wing extremist variety of nativism has connections to older manifestations of modern antisemitism in German history.

Since about half a century, starting with the election campaigns of the NPD in the late 1960s, the radical right has discovered—or probably "rediscovered"—the topic of foreign immigration as a centrepiece for political campaigning. Migration is in this specific context framed as a systematic approach by, and for the profit of, elites to annihilate or "replace" the German people. These elites are either portrayed as "Jewish," as aliens or—at the very least—as alienated from the people. The German catchwords within this specific narrative are *Überfremdung*, *Volkstod* and more recently *Großer Austausch* (great replacement).

A cataclysmic scenario predicts the imminent danger of a civil war, even a racial civil war, caused by continued immigration of foreigners from alien cultures or ancestries. While this might be the true belief shared by the adherents of the radical right, it is at the same time a very powerful instrument in order to close ranks and mobilize protest. Since it does not limit the agenda of the movement to the demand of an "end on immigration," it is suitable to transform random prejudices into a closed and consolidated right-wing extremist ideology. Hostility towards immigrants can thus be converted into an overall ultra-nationalist agenda to turn over the "system." By attacking immigration not merely as an undesirable aspect of modernity, but as an evil plan by an alien or alienated elite against the native German people, the issue is framed in a way that it can integrate most aspects of right-wing extremist ideology, including antisemitism, nationalism, racism, authoritarianism, the rejection of democratic institutions and representative bodies, anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-left wing stances, classical sexist and anti-feminist positions, and a cult of violence.

An historical and actor-oriented analysis shows that the radical right can reach these strategic goals best within multi-facetted campaigns in which multiple actors work in different arenas, but share—all things considered—a common right-wing extremist understanding of immigration. It also hints to a tradition of nativist and radical right campaigning on immigration, in which collective actors apply the techniques of trial and error and thus learn their lessons from previous failures or successes.

For future studies, more in-depth analysis of specific examples should be combined with data and context information on the changes in public opinion as well as the opportunity structures radical right actors may utilize.

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Maria Alexopoulou

Non-Citizens Protests in Germany since the 1980s

Abstract

This article focuses on three specific episodes of non-citizen protests in the Federal Republic of Germany. The common characteristic of these protests, fought out by different groups in different contexts and at different times, was a "claim to the political," which were made visible through a demonstration of a precarious civil rights status. Embedded in a long history of racial knowledge about the German and its *Other*, these migrant protests indicate how essential "performative forms of power" are for individuals and groups without the specific political rights that remain the prerogative of nation-bound citizens. Special attention is paid to transgressions that delegitimized these non-citizen protests even in the eyes of some of their supporters and to actions that are considered illegal by established law, and are thus classified as unwelcome. Instead of providing a closed narrative or recounting the history of migrant protests, the goal here is to add more pieces to the unwritten history of the (ongoing) migrant civil rights movement in Germany.

Keywords: *Migration history, migrant agency, racism, political rights, migrant protest, civil rights movement; Germany; twentieth century; twenty-first century*

Surveying an Uncharted Field

Migrants as protesters are rare figures in the German historiography. They mostly appear as participants in union strikes or as perpetrators of unauthorized strike actions and even then, mostly as a special group within the workforce. Aside from a few specialized studies, migrant agency, subjectivity and even their overall contribution to the respective incidents are rarely examined. At the same time, some of those specialized studies, such as Simon Goeke's recent "We are all foreign workers!," have demonstrated just how pivotal the struggles of *guest workers* were for labour conflicts in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s and how they impregnated the overall political culture of the time.[1] In parallel, Quinn Slobodian's work has illuminated the triggering and

1 Simon Goeke: "Wir sind alle Fremdarbeiter!": Gewerkschaften, migrantische Kämpfe und soziale Bewegungen in Westdeutschland 1960–1980, Paderborn 2020.

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formative role of so-called third world activism on the German student protest movement since the 1960s, upending the established "all-Western" narrative.[2]

In short, migrant workers' struggles and the public actions of emigrees are the only issues that evoke at least some interest in the German historiography.[3] Conversely, German ethnographers and sociologists have widened the field with contributions on the protests by refugees that peaked in 2012.[4] Many understood themselves as scholar-activists accompanying the protest movement that spread from Germany to other European countries, as it took on a new urgency during the "Sommer der Migration" (the "summer of migration 2015"), and the "March of Hopes," the autonomous movement of refugees along the Balkan Routes to the "Global North of the EU"—as they were coined by these scholars, in clear distinction to the mainstream term "Flüchtlingskrise" (refugee crisis).

These relatively recent protests centred around basic rights in their interconnection to spatiality: the right to move, the right to be present, the right to an opinion and to express it in the specific locality one wishes to cohabitate with others. From a historical perspective, the question arises as to how novel these migrant protests really were. Their visibility in academic accounts surely is a consequence of their intensity and new organizational strength, enhanced by the widespread use of both the internet, including blogs and ad hoc websites announcing protest actions and releasing statements, and mobile phones, securing communication between protesters mostly

2 Quinn Slobodian: Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany, Durham 2012.

3 Or in the historiography on Germany, at least in terms of the political activity of migrants. See, for example: Alexander Clarkson: Fragmented Fatherland: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1980, New York 2015. Other English language literature displaying (work) migrants' overall agency outside of protest: Christopher A. Molnar: Memory, Politics, and Yugoslav Migrations to Postwar Germany. Bloomington 2018; Miller, Jennifer A.: Turkish Guest Workers in Germany: Hidden Lives and Contested Borders 1960s to 1980s, Toronto 2018.

4 There are several works that deal with these protests. A selection: Maurice Stierl: Migrant Resistance in Contemporary Europe, New York 2019; Daniel Bendix: Jenseits von Externalisierung und Integration—Refugee-Aktivismus und postkoloniale Dezentrierung der Kritik globaler Ungleichheit. Working Paper der DFG-Kollegforscher_innengruppe Postwachstumsgesellschaften, Nr. 3/2018, Jena 2018; Helge Schwiertz/Abimbola Odugbesan: 'We Are Here to Stay'—Refugee Struggles in Germany Between Unity and Division, in: Sieglinde Rosenberger/Verena Stern/Nina Merhaut (eds.): Protest Movements in Asylum and Deportation, 2018, pp. 185–203, at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74696-8 (accessed on 14 September 2020); Helge Schwiertz: 'Für uns existiert kein Blatt im Gesetzbuch.' Migrantische Kämpfe und der Einsatz der radikalen Demokratie, in: Stefan Rother/ Uwe Hunger/Roswitha Pioch (eds.): Migration und Demokratie, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 229–254; Christian Jakob: Die Bleibenden. Flüchtlinge verändern Deutschland, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 14-15 (2016), pp. 9–14.

living in transitional situations. Furthermore, the fact that these protests were widely noted at the time and continue to be remembered is also a result of the growing solidarity and activism of supporters, the broad media coverage, and the aforementioned interest of outspoken scholar-activists. These factors promoted public awareness and increased political pressure, reinforced by the protesters themselves. Nonetheless, the issues, the form, and even the radicality of these migrant protests were not unprecedented, but part of a longer history developing around the question of the migrant and their rights.

Two immigrant women, Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib, coined the phrases—and normative imperatives—the "right to have rights" and the "rights of the others" in order to elevate the issue of the political rights of migrants to one of the essential moral, philosophical and political theory-problems of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century.[5] This holds particularly true for the stateless and refugees who potentially have no (political) rights anywhere, and are, as Arendt herself experienced it, "worldless."[6] But it also applies to other migrants, who—temporarily, enduringly or even for their entire lives—do not enjoy full civil rights despite permanently residing in a democratic state. Arendt called citizenship the "grand leveller," the tool that transforms all individuals—who are per se different and unequal—into equals: According to Arendt, in 1949, we need a group to grant us the right to be equal. Without citizenship and consequently without the right of opinion and action in a given place on earth, we lack this equality. Arendt therefore considered this—being part of a political community as a kind of a "non-national citizenship"—to be the sole human right.[7] In other words, every individual should have "an equal claim to political activity," or as Seyla Benhabib has called it (following Étienne Balibar): a claim to "*equaliberty*—that is, the equality of speech partners and their equal freedom to say 'yes' or 'nay.'"[8] In her own work, Benhabib postulates "the right to membership and citizenship as a human right."[9]

Even belonging to the sovereign in a democracy, the "people"—an entity continuously in the process of being named and renamed—is no guarantee for being able to access power and thus having full rights. Various groups in a society struggle within social movements to expand what is meant "when we say 'we,'" (as per Judith Butler), so as to obtain sufficient power to grant or secure their own rights. Butler

5 Hannah Arendt: Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht, in: Die Wandlung 4 (1949), pp. 754–770; Seyla Benhabib: The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, New York 2004.

6 Seyla Benhabib: From the 'Right to have Rights' to the 'Critique of Humanitarian Reason,' in: Seyla Benhabib: Exile, Statelessness, and Migration, Princeton 2018, p. 110.

7 Hannah Arendt: Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht, p. 765.

8 Seyla Benhabib: Exile, Statelessness, and Migration, p. 108.

9 Ibid, p. 112.

splits Arendt's "right to have rights" into "plural rights" that de facto must be enacted for the sake of a liveable life for all groups contending to be part of this "we."[10] In Butler's view, public assembly is one way to at least try to do so. Public assembly is a "performative form of power," not necessarily consisting of speech acts, but of bodily enactment. Going out in the streets, demonstrating, occupying places and spaces are embodied forms of action that enact "a claim to the political."[11] This holds especially true for those living precarious lives, as public protests offer them "ways of expressing and demonstrating precarity."[12]

Non-citizens are precarious in various respects, and they are, by definition, outside of the "we." In this article, I will focus on three specific episodes of migrant protest in the Federal Republic of Germany that can be understood—or in the first case were even self-named—as non-citizen protests claiming the political by expressing publicly the precarious civil rights status of the respective group. Embedded in a long history of racial knowledge about the German and its *Other*, the *Ausländer*, the divide between citizens and non-citizens in the German migration regime, as well as these seemingly neutral legal definitions are far from innocent. Instead, their binary relationship is the foundation of a system structured along a hierarchy of origins mirrored in the legal status and social situation of the various groups in question. Non-citizen protests in the German context are thus manifestations of the entangled histories of migration, racism and democracy in Germany.

In this article, I will pay special attention to those transgressions that delegitimize non-citizen protests even in the eyes of their supporters or being, according to established law, illegal and in consequence unwelcome. In looking into these cases I do not claim to provide a closed narrative or to recount the history of migrant protests in Germany. Therefore, even prominent—though individual—radical protest actions as those of Semra Ertan and Cemal Kemal Altun are not included. This article also does not discuss the complex interdisciplinary issue of citizenship/non-citizenship. It is rather an attempt to add new facets to the yet to be written history of the migrant civil rights movement in Germany.

10 Judith Butler: Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Cambridge 2015, p. 66.
11 Ibid, p. 6, p. 18.
12 Ibid, p. 10.

Non-Citizens 2012/13

"With their presence alone, many participants are breaking current law," reported a digital journal in March 2013 about the "Refugee Struggle Congress" in Munich, where 300 activists had come together at the peak of the refugee protests.[13] In February, Houmer Hedayadzadeh, representative of one of the leading protest groups that had emerged approximately a year earlier, pointed out, in a feature on Nurnberg community radio, that this congress was self-organized by refugees from eleven German cities, who had been cooperating since the protest march to Berlin in the summer of 2012, which was followed by an ongoing occupation of Oranienburger Platz, a public square in Berlin, as well as various other locations in the city. Hedayadzadeh represented the "Independent Committee of Non-Citizens," a group of mainly Iranian refugees that split from the "O-Platz" protest camp. In October, they went on hunger strike by sewing their lips together and sitting in the vicinity of the Brandenburg Gate in midst of throngs of tourists, literally in the centre of the German capital. Their radicality played a decisive role in the successes achieved by the protest movement—the most significant of which was the partial abolition of the *Residenzpflicht* (residential obligation) in 2014—a regulation that was nonetheless re-instated for certain refugee groups who arrived in 2015 and later—but also in creating a target for the delegitimization of the movement as a whole.

The *Residenzpflicht*, a provision unique in Europe, forbade asylum seekers from leaving their arbitrarily assigned place of residence without a permit, meaning that they were not allowed to leave the *Landkreis* (district) or, in the most generous cases, the *Bundesland* (state) depending on the respective state regulations, without permission. In consequence, many refugees whose asylum claims were still pending and nonetheless attended the congress in March 2013 without being residents of Munich, were committing a criminal offence simply by being there. Some of the refugee protesters, mostly spokespeople or leading figures known to the media, paid the price for their public breach of law, which for some included marching the 600 kilometres from Würzburg to Berlin or, in some instances, demonstratively tearing their identification papers apart in front of the cameras. Patras Bwansi, a Ugandan asylum seeker who played a prominent role in the Berlin protests and was assigned to live in Passau, was one of the many activists who was either threatened with jail time or was actually detained for disregarding the *Residenzpflicht*.[14] The issue of the *Residenzpflicht* was just

13 Stefan Aigner: Der Gemeinsame Schmerz der Nichtbürger, in: regensburg-digital, 4 March 2013, at: www.regensburg-digital.de/der-schmerz-der-nichtburger/04032013/ (accessed on 3 September 2020).

14 Christian Jacob: Auf Konfrontationskurs. Der "Refugee Strike" geht weiter, doch innerhalb

one, albeit very substantial, difference between the various groups of protesters in the refugee movement—a sharp line dividing citizens from non-citizens, refugees from supporters. It also prompted the most radical group, which had sparked the protests in the first place, to declare the relationship between non-citizens and citizens as the main issue of the Munich gathering, as Hedayadzadeh emphasized in his radio interview.[15]

The protests had been motivated by the suicide of Mohammad Rashepar, an Iranian asylum seeker, in January 2012 in an Würzburg *Asylantenheim* (refugee centre), housed in a former military barrack once named the "Adolf-Hitler-Kaserne."[16] Rashepar ended his life out of despair in response to the terrible living conditions in the "Lager" (camp), as well as the uncertainty and interminability of the asylum process. His was a situation confronting thousands of asylum seekers in Germany, which was continually highlighted during the German wide refugee protests following of this suicide. In 2012, the number of asylum claims was relatively low—approximately 80.000—since Germany was, beginning with the establishment of so-called "Asylum Compromise" in 1993, effectively surrounded by a cordon sanitaire that made it nearly impossible for refugees even to reach German territory. Living conditions and the duration of the asylum process have been a major element of organized refugee protests since 1994, when a group of asylum seekers mainly from Africa formed The Voice, the first self-organization of refugees in Germany in a camp in Mühlhausen in Thuringia, near Jena. As their current iteration, The Voice Refugee Forum, states:

> We have been organizing in protest against criminalisation, racial profiling, police brutality (campaign for Oury Jalloh), discriminatory laws and social exclusion and we defend ourselves against institutional and societal racism. Central to our political activity have always been the protest against deportation, for the abolition of Residenzpflicht and for the closure of refugee isolation camps in Germany.[17]

der Bewegung gibt es Kritik, in: Jungle.World 13 (2013), 28 March 2013, at: https://jungle.world/artikel/2013/13/47409.html (accessed on 3 September 2020).

15 Refugee Struggle Congress: Feature in Stoffwechsel-Magazin, 6 February 2013, Radio Z Nürnberg, at: http://radio-z.net/de/radioprogramm/gesellschaft-%C2%ADbeitraege/topic/138345-%C2%ADrefugee-%C2%ADstruggle-%C2%ADcongress.html?%20lang=de (accessed on 3 September 2020).

16 Christian Jacob: Auf Konfrontationskurs. According to the WürzburgWiki, the complex has been used since 1992 as refugee camp; prior to that, the U. S. military used it as a barracks for its soldiers, at: https://wuerzburgwiki.de/wiki/Emery_Barracks (accessed on 3 September 2020).

17 The VOICE Refugee Forum—A Network of Refugee Community Initiatives in Germany, 13 July 2016, at: http://thevoiceforum.org/node/4201 (accessed on 8 September 2020). For a description of the Oury Jalloh case, see: Death of asylum-seeker Oury Jalloh: German

The "Lager system" produced precarious existences within one of the wealthiest countries on earth, although asylum seekers mainly were housed in the outskirts and preferably out of sight of the population. Asylum seekers themselves experienced this discrepancy, living in terrible conditions, with little to do (and barred from working), worrying about families left behind and even forbidden from trying to decorate their meagre spaces (by rescuing a chair from the bulk trash on the sidewalk, for example) or receiving a visitor.[18] In many cases, these living situations lasted for several years because of the complexities of the asylum process, as well as the ever-present dichotomy between the letter of the law and the political and societal will to actually apply it. This deliberately created precarity was part of a system inherent to the German asylum and refugee regime.

The actual application of its legal foundation, the asylum paragraph in the German Basic Law and the Geneva Convention, was more or less imposed on the new Federal Republic of Germany by the Allied High Command in 1951 after the near-complete repatriation and resettlement of Displaced Persons as a prerequisite for retaining sovereignty over its foreigners policy (Ausländerpolitik). As the number of so-called "Afro-Asians" or "non-European refugees" grew steadily in the 1970s and non-Europeans began to request asylum alongside the refugees from Eastern European and other communist countries, they were quickly framed as "Scheinasylanten" (bogus asylum seekers). The German asylum system has been restricted ever since, through legal measures such as the implementation of strict visa requirements and the definition of so-called "safe states of origin" (whereby an asylum claim can be more easily categorized as unfounded), as well as a restriction of the benefits available to asylum seekers, such as restrictions on the right to work and the replacement of cash benefit payments with support in kind. Simultaneously, certain refugee groups have been singled out as humanitarian quota refugees to be given preferential treatment.[19] The precarity of this system has its own long history, although each new arrival certainly experiences it individually again and again and possibly at various scales, depending on their respective context.

After the suicide of their friend in 2012, ten Iranian asylum seekers came together to form the core of the protest movement, announcing a hunger strike at a protest camp in the city-centre of Würzburg on their blog "GUstreik." They demanded their

investigators slam police, courts and politicians, at: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-asylum-seeker-dessau-oury-jalloh/a-54727651 (accessed on 26 August 2021).

18 Author's Interview with 'Mohammed' (pseudonym) from Somalia, as part of the Oral History Project "Alle Wege führen nach Mannheim," 10 July 2012, Transcript, p. 14, in: MARCHIVUM, Zug. 9/2014, Nr. 15.

19 Maria Alexopoulou: Zweierlei Übergang. Wohnen für "volksdeutsche" Aussiedler*innen und "asylsuchende Außereuropäer" in den 1970er Jahren, in: Werkstatt Geschichte 81 (2020), pp. 85–99; Patrice Poutrus: Umkämpftes Asyl. Vom Nachkriegsdeutschland bis in die Gegenwart, Berlin 2020.

immediate recognition as political refugees and the betterment of living conditions for all asylum seekers in Bavaria and in Germany through the dissolution of the communal accommodations they compared to prisons: "If a German state [i. e. Bavaria] approves such inhuman living conditions" — like the ones that led to Rashepar's suicide — "then we choose to go on the path to our deaths publicly."[20]

27 March 2012 marked the beginning of a long succession of alternating phases of hunger strikes, "dry" hunger strikes, and the sewing of lips by a growing group of asylum seekers, including an Iranian woman at the end, and negotiations with city officials and other political representatives, appeals to the courts to maintain the protest camp in the pedestrian mall and the fast-tracking and eventual granting of asylum to most of the protesters. At the same time, quite contradictory statements and interpretations of the events were disseminated by strikers, decisionmakers, and the mainstream and alternative leftist media. While the refugees understood their activities as the beginning of a struggle, the authorities assumed that when the core of the protesters had reached their goal, *Bleiberecht* (the right of residence), the protests would end.[21] After the protests intensified despite asylum decisions in favour of the protesting individuals, mainstream media increasingly painted a picture of a small group of extremists gambling away any sympathy the public might have had for the refugees and their cause.[22]

As the days and weeks passed, an ever-growing solidarity campaign evolved around the Würzburg protest camp, bringing together additional ad hoc protest groups, pre-existing refugee initiatives and local union, political party, and NGO branches. The number of demands also increased: An announcement for one of the many demonstrations in support of the protest camp in mid-May already listed ten points, including the call to end the *Residenzpflicht* and the allotment of food packages (instead of cash support), just to name a few.[23]

On 13 June, ten days after seven of the hunger strikers had sown their lips together, they explained their motivation in their twenty-seventh press release on the eighty-eighth day of the protest camp:

20 Erste Pressemitteilung seitens iranischer Asylbewerber der Stadt Würzburg (Bayern, Deutschland), 27 March 2012, at: http://gustreik.blogsport.eu/page/12/ (accessed on 3 September 2020), translated by the author.

21 Stefan Aigner: Würzburg: Falsche Eindrücke und dubiose Rathaus-Deals/ UPDATE: Stadt widerspricht Aussagen der Flüchtlinge, in: regensburg-digital, 25 July 2012, at: www.regensburg-digital.de/wurzburg-falsche-eindrucke-und-dubiose-rathaus-deals/25072012/ (accessed on 7 September 2020).

22 Olaf Przybilla: Asylbewerber nähen sich die Lippen zu, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 June 2012, at: www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/spektakulaerer-protest-in-wuerzburg-asylbewerber-naehen-sich-die-lippen-zu-1.1374149 (accessed on 5 September 2020).

23 Demo am 12.5.12 in Würzburg, 7 May 2012, at: http://gustreik.blogsport.eu/page/7/ (accessed on 3 September 2020).

> We are no masochists. Our movement cannot be easily dismissed as a folly. In stopping our protest alone, the problems inherent to the German asylum system will not be resolved. […] The government and the public must know that we are individuals, who struggled for freedom in our homeland. We will do so here and now, too. Political activity is no drug that we can give up, and freedom is something that we cannot forget. We will continue our protest—as announced.[24]

A few days later, their e-petition to the German *Bundestag* stating their demands was posted online.[25] Meanwhile, refugees in other locations also went on hunger strike, and in some communal accommodations, refugees refused to consume their food packages. Regensburg, Aub, Berlin and Düsseldorf were some of the new hotspots of refugee protest.[26] On 9 August, the blog announced a "Refugee Protest March from Würzburg to Berlin" coordinated in Frankfurt representatives of several ad hoc groups and organizations like the Caravan and The Voice to begin September 2012:

> We are organizing to break the isolation on a nationwide mobilizzation [sic] against deportation and Lager protest to close down the refugee camps and to break the Residenzpflicht restriction […] all over Germany.[27]

The various actions in Berlin, where the march arrived in October, attracted unprecedented media attention and led to the formation of novel self-organizations like the "International Women Space"[28] and continued until 2014. The original core group—that did not always consist of the same individuals, as several of them were granted political asylum during the protests—after their hunger strike at Pariser Platz, the square facing the Brandenburg Gate, subsequently focused on the next step: their congress in Munich. They wanted to discuss their new self-designation as non-citizens, a term they came up after their year-long experiences of massive, intense, illegal and often life-threatening protests alongside citizen-supporters.

24 27. Pressemitteilung der hungerstreikenden iranischen Flüchtlinge in Würzburg, 13 June 2012, at: http://gustreik.blogsport.eu/page/5/ (accessed on 3 September 2020).

25 28. Pressemitteilung seitens der hungerstreikenden iranischen Asylwerber in Würzburg, 18 June 2012, at: http://gustreik.blogsport.eu/page/4/ (accessed on 3 September 2020).

26 See, as example, the website of the Düsseldorf Protest: No Border Camp 2012, at: http://noborder.antira.info/de (accessed on 10 September 2020).

27 Press Release—Refugee Protest March from Würzburg to Berlin!, 9 August 2012, at: http://gustreik.blogsport.eu/ (accessed on 3 September 2020).

28 This self-organization consisting solely of women was founded during the occupation of the Gerhard-Hauptmann-Schule in Berlin, where women had claimed a whole floor as their own secure space. The organization still exists and has also published a number of books, including: International Women Space (ed.): We Exist, we Are Here. Refugee Women in Germany tell their Stories, Berlin 2018.

This congress was particular insofar as the organizers attempted to apply their concept of citizen/non-citizens during the proceedings themselves: on the third day, the plenum was divided in a section assigned to citizens—everyone with a residence permit or German citizenship—and a section assigned to non-citizens—refugees waiting on ongoing asylum claims or rejected refugees with a *Duldung* (a temporary suspension of an ostensibly legal deportation). This arrangement raised the ire and disgust of some citizen-supporters and caused disappointment in others. These critics were obviously unwilling to recognize either the method or the theory the organizers had chosen in their efforts to challenge the inherent problem in the relationship between supporter and supported: the often discussed and problematized imbalance of power between benevolent—and usually privileged—members of the majority and the marginalized minority they hope to support.[29] Especially those who had long been active in the migrant rights movement in Germany, among them also other immigrants, should have known better—far better than the newly arrived non-citizens—that a distinguishing feature of migrant political activity in Germany had always been the internal struggle against the paternalistic practices of non-migrant supporters. Since the 1970s, the *Ausländerfreunde* (friends of foreigners), and later the "*Multikulti*"-enthusiasts (multi-culturalism), often spoke for and decided for migrants, while churches and welfare organizations cared for them, and social-democratic institutions let them at least partly participate from the second row. As a whole, supporters were not prone to sharing privileges and power with those they hoped to support—an issue not confined to Germany. Correspondingly, The Voice's homepage cites aboriginal activist Lilla Watson's self-presentation of her political work: "If you've come to help me, you're wasting your time. But if you've come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together."[30]

Over the course of the year 2012, the non-citizens learned the hard way that even anti-racist and radical-left supporters were not immune to these paternalistic habits. Accordingly, they explicitly asked journalists on the first page of the congress's press kit to focus on the activities of the refugees and to mainly interview refugees instead of their supporters.[31] The paternalistic stance of certain supporters was eventually illustrated in various unfavourable reactions. In an article published in the alternative journal *Jungle.World*, two well-known scholars embedded in the academic German anti-racism discourse suggested that, through their dichotomization of citizen/

29 Maurice Stierl: Migrant Resistance in Contemporary Europe, pp. 41–45. Stierl was present at the conference and also cites from his notes.

30 The VOICE Refugee Forum—A Network of Refugee Community Initiatives in Germany (accessed on 8 September 2020).

31 Informationen für die Presse. Let's Push it Forward! Struggle! Unity! Resistance!, at: https://refugeecongress.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/pressemappe-kongress.pdf (accessed on 7 September 2020).

non-citizen, the non-citizens were simply reproducing the categories inherent to the German foreigners law. They thus did nor grasp the different categories of race, class and gender or understand the German history of antisemitism and colonialism—allegations that traditionally have the power to silence debate, as the authors should have been well aware of, in Germany.[32] Full of academic tropes and theory-laden innuendos, this critique was not only an altogether inappropriate answer, but also did not address the embodied form of action engaged in by this group, who as individuals had gone so far as to use their own bodies as weapons, having assessed them as the only political instruments at their disposal for enacting *their* "claim to the political" and for acquiring the right "to say yes or nay." In addition, the non-citizens were not concerned with racism; they acknowledged that all groups "not from here," even those who were German citizens—still "second class citizens"—or in possession of a residence permit as recognized asylum seekers, suffered from racist discrimination.[33] Their protest targeted the fact that, as non-citizens, they were restrained from entering the "space of rights" although they were already bodily present in that space and wanted to cohabitate it.

A further rupture occurred as the statements and phraseology of the non-citizens increasingly took on a clearly anticapitalistic and communist tone—leaving behind or even openly renouncing classic anti-racist stances—as their exegesis was mainly based on class. Many initiatives used the slogan "We are here, because you destroy our countries."[34] While non-citizens shared this belief, they emphasized the role of capitalism as the driving force behind colonialism and neo-colonialism, instead of racism as other self-organizations and supporters did.[35] In enacting *their* "claim to the political" they formed their own theorical foundations, applied their own ideological beliefs, and asked "citizens [to] respect the agency of non-citizens and the principles of self-organization."[36] In the end however, their protest was delegitimized altogether by the consequent enactment of this claim.

Before that point arrived, the non-citizens began their most controversial action in June 2013: a dry hunger strike with sewed lips, with many individuals transported by ambulance to hospital after they collapsed. The protest was staged at the *Rindermarkt*

32 Vassilis Tsianos/Bernd Kasparek: Too much love. Von "Non-Citizens" und ihren "Supportern." Über problematische neue Begriffe im deutschen antirassistischen Diskurs, in: Jungle. World 30 (2013), at: https://jungle.world/artikel/2013/30/too-much-love (accessed on 5 September 2020).

33 On the Position of "Asylum Seekers" and Asylum-Seekers' Struggles in Modern Societies, 18 March 2013, at: https://refugeecongress.wordpress.com/ (accessed on 5 September 2020).

34 Daniel Bendix: Jenseits von Externalisierung und Integration, p. 1.

35 Struggle Collective: Lessons from the Struggles. A Collage, in: movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung 1:1 (2015), pp. 1–23.

36 On the Position of "Asylum Seekers" and Asylum-Seekers' Struggles in Modern Societies (accessed on 7 September 2020).

in Munich, one of Germany's most affluent and chic cities, and displayed in public the extent to which non-citizens felt subjected to their "civil rights precarity" by using their bodies as political means. In announcing that they were ready to use their bodies like Holger Meins (the Red Army Faction member who died in a hunger strike in 1974), they sided with a political tradition West German society had more or less renounced.

Accordingly, after the police evicted the protesters' tent, the liberal *Zeit Online*—to cite but one example—portrayed one of the group's speakers, Ashkan Khorasani (by then a "citizen" as his asylum claim had been recognized, and who was in Munich supporting the non-citizens), as a fanatic. The article asked whether activists of the extreme left had instrumentalized the refugees for their abstract political aims. Many observers were surprised or even disgusted by the radicality displayed during the hunger strike. Anne Hahn, "an engaged refugee-helper from Passau, who for years had successfully fought for the residency rights of her fosterling, the young Afghan Ismail Afzali," was quoted as saying, "I am truly on the side of refugees in many instances. But the demands of this leader overstep the mark. More freedom for the asylum seekers and a higher quality of living are justified claims—but not through such radical conduct."[37] In an article published by the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the protest was portrayed as the actions of a radicalized communist.[38] After another occupation in Munich—this time in the offices of the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (German Federation of Trade Unions), the group was denounced as five radical Iranian activists who used other refugees for their sinister plans.[39]

Mainstream media did not discuss, and mainstream society possibly did not understand or simply ignored, the kind of precarity and the claim to the political these young people displayed publicly. In *Jungle.World*, Ashkan Khorasani stated: "In Munich, refugees coined the term non-citizen. Why? Non-citizens chose a designation for themselves that they want to be referred to as. This was the first step toward self-empowerment."[40]

37 Georg Etscheit: Radikaler als die Polizei erlaubt, in: Zeit Online, 30 June 2013, at: www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2013-06/muenchen-fluechtlinge-protest (accessed on 6 September 2020), translated by the author.

38 Albert Schäffer: "Der Rechtsstaat lässt sich nicht erpressen," in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 2 July 2013, at: www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/hungerstreikende-asylbewerber-der-rechtsstaat-laesst-sich-nicht-erpressen-12268491.html (accessed on 11 September 2020).

39 Justus Bender: Maximalprotest im Partykeller, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 11 September 2013, at: www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/asylbewerber-maximalprotest-im-partykeller-12569339-p2.html (accessed on 11 September 2020).

40 Sebastian Loschert: "Ein Hungerstreik ist kein Scherz." Ashkan Khorasani im Gespräch über den Hungerstreik der Flüchtlinge in München, in: Jungle.World 28 (2013), 11 July

An online proclamation of the group—which most likely no longer exists as a group—reads like a manifesto for this self-designation:

> We are those asylum seekers who, within the capitalist societies of European countries, position ourselves as non-citizens. Non-citizens who live in inequality to citizens, who live somewhere outside of Europe's citizen-based societies. Citizens, who because of their citizen-position and nothing else, enjoy all the basic rights, such as the right to work, the right to education, to freedom of movement, and the right to choose one's place of residence freely. We, non-citizens, are deprived of these fundamental rights, and hollow claims to upholding 'human rights' and slogans by the so-called 'democratic' governments of Europe don't hold true for us. They are non-existent for us because we are not citizens who fit into the ridiculous 'human rights' discourse, as fellow people who 'belong.' In order to transform our survival into actual living, in order to become 'human' and have the same rights as other humans, we must move from the position of non-citizens and become citizens.[41]

In this case however, "willing the impossible," as Judith Butler suggested at about the same time in another context,[42] was not only unsuccessful, but also proscribed.

"Save the election" 1998

The satirical protest action organized by a migrant self-organization in Mannheim in 1998 was nowhere near as tabooed or a product of "willing the impossible" as the actions of the non-citizens in 2012—although it was a criminal offence, and it was embedded in the divide between citizen and non-citizen. The vast majority of the former *guest workers* who had made Germany their permanent home were not German citizens by 1998. Instead of being accepted as immigrants (*Einwanderer*) since the 1980s, they were fixed as foreigners (*Ausländer*) and as a new, permanent societal group with a lesser civil rights status called *ausländische Mitbürger* (alien fellow-citizens) at least by well-meaning members of the majority society. This was also the case for their children, the "second generation," who had been born as *Ausländer* in Germany (as this status was hereditary) or had immigrated via a family reunification scheme. Im-

2013, at: https://jungle.world/artikel/2013/28/ein-hungerstreik-ist-kein-scherz (accessed on 6 September 2020).

41 Non-Citizens' big Demonstration: I rebel, therefore I exist, 31 May 2013, at: https://refugeecongress.wordpress.com (accessed on 5 September 2020).

42 Ray Filar: Willing the impossible: an interview with Judith Butler, in: openDemocracy, 23 July 2013, at: www.opendemocracy.net/en/transformation/willing-impossible-interview-with-judith-butler/ (accessed on 6 September 2020).

migrants and their offspring, partly including a third generation, often felt or referred to themselves as second-class citizens, although they were not citizens of Germany to begin with. While it was possible to acquire German citizenship, as some immigrants had done, the German government's active denial of its own reality as a "country of immigration" with all its attendant side-effects had created an anti-naturalization discourse and restrictive administrative practices that were often difficult to overcome. Accordingly, naturalization quotas were extremely low in Germany compared to other Western industrial nations with higher immigration rates.[43]

In 1992, a group of young migrants of various origins, several of them university students, established a self-organization to challenge the political reality of Germany's immigration society that caused a sensation with its simultaneously satirical and highly political actions. In two consecutive years, 1994 and 1995, they successfully conducted a "Feast of the German *Mitbürger*" (fellow-citizen) with German marching music, Bavarian dances and *Sauerkraut*.[44] In so doing, they caricatured the "feast of the foreign fellow-citizen," which had taken place annually since 1980, organized by churches, welfare organizations, municipalities and other professionals dealing with *Ausländer* in cooperation with migrant associations. The *Unmündigen*, the nonage (sometimes translated as the immature, since "unmündig" refers to the inability to legally speak and decide for oneself due to age or disability),[45] as the group called itself, disapproved of these events, as they cemented cultural essentialism and functioned as a distraction from the real problems of the German immigration society, namely racism and the denial of full civil rights. In particular, the *Unmündigen* criticized the *Ausländerfreunde* (friends of foreigners)—all those supportive groups, initiatives, institutions and professionals—who spoke and decided in a paternalistic manner on behalf of the *Ausländer*, instead of sharing power and rights.[46]

The group first gained attention and a mention in a local newspaper—which referred to them as "some young Turks"—with an action organized as part of a demonstration against racism. The demonstration had been called by a coalition of immi-

43 Maria Alexopoulou: "Wir sind auch das Volk!" Das deutsche Volk in der Transformation der Bundesrepublik zur Einwanderungsgesellschaft, in: Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 28 (2019), pp. 225–254. Generally on German migration history and systemic racism, see: Maria Alexopoulou: Deutschland und die Migration. Geschichte einer Einwanderungsgesellschaft wider Willen, Ditzingen 2020.

44 Flyer, 14 June 1994; Mannheimer Morgen: Fest für die deutschen Mitbürger, 22. June 1994, in: Private Archive of the *Unmündige*n (in possession of the author).

45 For the meaning of *Unmündige* as intended by the group: Maria Alexopoulou: Producing Ignorance: Racial Knowledge and Immigration in Germany, 25 July 2018, at: https://historyofknowledge.net/2018/07/25/producing-ignorance-racial-knowledge-and-immigration-in-germany/ (accessed on 6 September 2020).

46 Various documents, for example an invitation letter to a panel organized by the group, 20 October 1993, in: Private Archive of the *Unmündigen* (in possession of the author).

grant groups and politically interested German youths in Mannheim in June 1993 after the events in Solingen—a racist arson attack on a house inhabited by Turkish immigrants in which five people perished. Some of the prospective *Unmündige* wore sheets marked with "I am inflammable."[47] In addition to the satirical/sarcastic forms of protest, the group also developed a wide range of political actions, such as organizing lectures and panel discussions, collecting signatures, circulating petitions and even encouraging a member who had acquired German citizenship to run for the city council elections.[48] Moreover, they created a safe space, where they could speak for themselves and develop an identity away from the othering denomination as *Ausländer*, free from cultural attributions or the assertion of being caught between two worlds. The first step in defining themselves was choosing a name for the organization: When the initiative was registered as a charitable association in 1995, they declared: "We are no longer Ausländer, we are the Unmündigen."[49] This designation was in itself a sarcastic comment on their status as politically active non-citizens and a critique of a migration regime that deliberately discouraged or even prevented them from becoming full citizens.

The *Unmündige* also engaged in a continuous process of (re)defining the character of their migrant self-organization. In a protocol of an internal meeting in May 1996, they summarized their position by stating that their membership would be made up exclusively by *Ausländer* who renounced their status as an act of empowerment; as no one chooses the location they are born in, it was legitimate not to include members of the majority society, i. e. Germans: "There are plenty paternalistic (Christian and Ausländer-friendly leftist) examples deterring us from doing so." Yet, in the meantime, some of the members had been naturalized: "We—until now—'we' was the nonaged citizens, those not in possession of a German passport. But what of Aynur, who is a German citizen now?" The overall question became: "What's the difference between Theresa and Natalie? Or what ties the Unmündige together?" Natalie was German; she was a member by virtue of being friends with the others and she therefore should be an exception. Theresa, who was of Spanish origin, could pass for German—more so, if she got married and took on the surname Müller: "But Theresa has experienced the reality of being a Gastarbeiterkind (a guest worker child)." This constellation was at the core of her own experiences with racism—experiences Engin, a German citizen of Turkish descent and potentially a successful manager at a large company, will continue to have due to his name and physical appearance, "even if he had five German passports."[50] At the centre were issues of identity, rights, racial discrimination and their

47 Mannheimer Morgen: Die Trauer dämpfte die Wut, 7 June 1993.

48 According to various internal documents, flyers, posters and press clippings, in: Private Archive of the Unmündigen (in possession of the author).

49 Stadtmagazin Meier: Die Unmündigen, March 1995, p. 32.

50 Überlegung zur Sitzung, 14 May 1996, in: Private Archive of the *Unmündigen*.

interconnections that also highlighted other facets of the citizen/non-citizen divide that remain complicated for naturalized yet still othered immigrants. This ambiguity was also one of the main reasons that the *Unmündige* eventually chose not join *Kanak Attak* after several meetings between the two groups from 1997 to 1999. *Kanak Attak* later achieved national prominence through its cultural-political events and interventions and the fame of certain members, such as the writer Feridun Zaimoğlu and the film director Fatih Akın. That group not only did not differentiate between citizens/Germans and non-citizens/*Ausländer*—Germans were welcome to participate in the initiative –, but they also remained uninterested in actions that addressed the question of German citizenship or the absence of political rights.[51]

In 1998, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) won the German federal election, formed a coalition with the Green party, and finally reformed the 1913 German citizenship law. Since 2000, the children of permanent resident foreigners are born German citizens. Among immigrants to Germany, the vast majority did not gain citizenship through these reforms and are thus still unable to vote in German elections, cementing the continued relevance of the satirical protest staged by the *Unmündige* in 1998. That year, "Rettet die Wahl" (Save the election) ultimately became one of the last satirical protest actions of the group on the issue of citizenship. The action was not organized under the banner of the *Unmündige*, but by the "Action Committee by and for Citizens Without Voting Rights." There were also no names on the declaration, although three members posed on a fake election poster with an inverted SPD symbol and the inscription: "We are ready. Apply for a mail-in ballot and enable your favourite *Ausländer* to vote." This was quite dangerous, as it was an appeal to engage in election fraud, which can be punished with up to five years imprisonment.

> You can literally feel it: Germany is preparing to vote. Migrants dominate the German Stammtisch and the media debates as at no other time. Not because they actively have an impact on the formation of opinions, but in so far as the role of the "black Alis" is bestowed upon them, responsible for all kinds of social wrongs. […] As long as migrants' civil rights are denied, migrants will be at the disposal of political parties as scapegoats for failed economic and social policies. […] So, we also want to seize the opportunity to abuse the election for our purposes. We want to motivate German citizens to take part in a new form of solidarity, that also allows the alien population to experience the authentic feeling of democracy. […] Everybody is talking about who is going to win the election, […] but the fact that 8 % of the permanent population is not allowed to vote is barely mentioned. We want to appeal publicly to eligible voters to protest against this undemocratic

51 Manifest Kanak Attak, November 1998, at: www.kanak-attak.de/ka/down/pdf/manifest_d.pdf (accessed on 10 September 2020).

state of affairs. Eligible voters are prompted to apply for a mail-in ballot and let a non-eligible voter to fill out the ballot.

At the end of the declaration, the group even acknowledged that probably a majority might feel provoked by this action, but they did not mind.[52] On another flyer, they proposed that eligible voters go for a walk or have a barbecue on election day and let the *Ausländer* complete the task for them.[53] Indeed, a local paper reacted with a wagging finger, pointing out that it was not only undemocratic to call on people to commit election fraud, but that this action was simultaneously an open call to commit a crime. This action was beyond satire according to the head of the legal division of the city of Mannheim, who indirectly threatened to turn the case over to the public prosecutor.[54] Conversely, in an article published in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, one political analyst argued that the action was a clear act of political satire and commended it for its authenticity and credibility.[55]

While the *Unmündige* did not engage in bodily forms of protest or risk their lives in exposing the precarity of their civil rights status as *Ausländer*, they did use transgressive actions to create awareness around essential aspects of the citizen/non-citizen divide. They also demonstrated in quite creative ways what missing political rights—the right to say yay or nay in their space of cohabitation—meant for adult individuals in full possession of their minds: a self-imposed immaturity.

"Gelem Gelem"—the Long March 1989/1993

In 1973, the shooting of the Sintu Anton Lehmann by a policeman in Heidelberg sparked the civil rights movement of German Sinti that eventually led, with the vigorous support of the German Society of Endangered People, to the creation of the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, and to the official recognition of the German responsibility for the persecution of Sinti and Roma during the Holocaust by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982.[56] The Heidelberg based group *Verband Deutscher Sinti* had previously organized and attracted attention with

52 Rettet die Wahl, in: Private Archive of the *Unmündigen*, translated by the author.
53 Rettet die Wahl (short version), in: ibid, translated by the author.
54 Rheinpfalz: Geht über Satire hinaus, 19 August 1998.
55 Gabor Papp: Klare Worte reichen nicht, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 25 September 1998.
56 Daniela Gress: Sinti und Roma in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, at: www.romarchive.eu/de/roma-civil-rights-movement/sinti-and-roma-federal-republic-germany/ (accessed on 4 September 2020); Sebastian Lotto-Kusche: Spannungsfelder im Vorfeld der Anerkennung des Völkermords an den Sinti und Roma. Das Gespräch zwischen dem Zentralrat Deutscher

> public demonstrations such as the rally in Bergen-Belsen in 1979 or the hunger strike in Dachau in 1980. Here, the symbolism of sites of former concentration camps was for the first time exploited in order to address, in a deliberately provocative manner, the continuity of repression and discrimination. It thus challenged the self-image of the Federal Republic as a state and society which claimed to have broken with its Nazi past.[57]

Between 1989 and 1993, the Neuengamme concentration camp on the outskirts of Hamburg also turned into a site of Roma protests. There, Southeastern European Roma protested against the rejection of their asylum claims, which they believed unjustified in view of Germany's historical responsibility for the *Porajmos*—the Romani term for the Holocaust committed on German and non-German Roma—which had dispersed their families all over Europe. Many found themselves without papers and stateless after the war, mostly in communist countries that were now collapsing around them, exposing this most vulnerable minority to new waves of discrimination and persecution.

The German mainstream, in contrast, for the most part perceived these protests—especially when organized inside of concentration camps (including Dachau in 1993)—as a transgression. The claim of Roma to be victims of German genocidal practices during the Second World War was either ignored or, even if accepted in principle, remained unacknowledged as a reason to grant them *Bleiberecht*, residency rights. Quite the contrary: The massive access of Roma to Germany via the asylum regime was one of the decisive factors in the final phase of the German "asylum debate" that led to the so-called "asylum compromise" mentioned above in 1993, when the respective paragraph was changed in the German constitution. At that time, Roma embodied the *Scheinasylant*, the bogus asylum seeker, who ostensibly came to Germany only to receive social security benefits, unwilling to work for a living.[58] This aspect of the "asylum debate" unveils another rupture in the symbolic master narrative on the genesis and purpose of asylum rights in Germany as "learning from the Nazi past." When the Parliamentary Council formulated the asylum paragraph, they did not have refugee groups in mind, let alone Roma victims of the Holocaust. The case of Roma refugees and the German dealings with the *Porajmos* demonstrate that the moralistic superstructure that has been discursively constructed around the asylum paragraph since the 1970s in West Germany was not only hypocritical but a charade,

Sinti und Roma und der Bundesregierung am 17. März 1982, in: Marco Brenneisen et al. (eds.): Stigmatisierung. Marginalisierung. Verfolgung, Berlin 2015, pp. 224–243.

57 Yaron Matras: Development of the Romani Civil Rights Movement in Germany 1945–1996, in: Susan Tebbutt (ed.): Sinti and Roma: Gypsies in German-Speaking Society and Literature, New York 1998, pp. 49–63, pp. 54f.

58 Der Spiegel: Alle hassen die Zigeuner, 36 (1990), pp. 34–57.

since neither the German right to asylum that applies only to individuals, nor the Geneva Convention fit the situation of the Roma as a persecuted European Minority.[59] Nonetheless, this crack in the migration and refugee system did not dominate the public discourse in Germany. Instead, the discourse fuelled processes of othering and racializing that cemented the figure of "the Roma" as an anti-social, criminal and illegitimate figure and (re)produced racial knowledge that had survived the "zero hour" ever since 1945.

In February 1989, members of the Hamburg based "Rom and Cinti Union" began a hunger strike in the documentary centre of Neuengamme, as approximately 1500 Roma, mainly from Yugoslavia, faced imminent deportation after their asylum claims had been rejected. In a photograph, men wrapped in blankets sit on mats in front of a large picture of internees in the concentration camp, with real barbed wire behind them to which they had affixed a banner, "No detention! Right of asylum!"[60] Their spokesperson, Rudko Kawczynski, explained the location of the protest by pointing out that a concentration camp was the only place where "Z***"—a term he used as a provocation—were obviously welcome.[61] Kawczynski's family had immigrated to West Germany in the late 1950s from Poland, but his ancestors were from all over Europe, as he emphasized in several public statements; his own legal status was stateless. Kawczynski used his own biography as an illustration of the reality of Roma as literally stateless and homeless. Besides, most of the big families had ties all over Europe: "We Roma are Europeans, and it seems, we are the only Europeans."[62]

59 For certain aspects of the political struggle surrounding asylum in the 1980s, also pertaining to the Roma, but discussed in the context of other refugee groups and the German protest movement in favour of asylum rights, see: Juliane Kleinschmidt: Streit um das 'kleine Asyl.' 'De-Facto-Flüchtlinge' und Proteste gegen Abschiebungen als gesellschaftspolitische Herausforderung für Bund und Länder während der 1980er Jahre, in: Alexandra Jaeger/ Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren. Staatliches Handeln, neue soziale Bewegungen und linke Organisationen in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Essen 2018, pp. 231–258.

60 KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme: Die Gedenkstätte als Ort gesellschaftlicher Auseinandersetzungen, Hamburg n. d., p. 25, at: http://media.offenes-archiv.de/ha10_4_3_klb_1175.pdf (accessed on 28 September 2021).

61 I do not use the Z-Word aside from titles (as in footnote 58). See: Gianni Jovanovic: "Das Z-Wort macht Menschen zu Untermenschen," at: https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/rassismusdebatte-warum-wir-das-z-wort-nicht-mehr-benutzen-sollten (accessed on 24 October 2021); Jean-Philipp Baeck/Kathrin Herold: Ein langer Weg, in: Die Tageszeitung (taz), 18 July 2015, at: https://taz.de/!5213352/ (accessed on 4 September 2020).

62 Zeitung antirassistischer Gruppen 16 (1996): Roma können nicht nach Jugoslawien zurückkehren, weil es Jugoslawien nicht mehr gibt. Interview mit Rudko Kawczynski, p. 22, at: https://anti-ziganismus.de/artikel/roma-koennen-nicht-nach-jugoslawien-zurueckkehren/ (accessed on 11 September 2020).

The Hamburg based "Rom and Cinti Union," Kawczynski initiated in the 1970s and cofounded in 1981, took on a diametrically different stance from the *Zentralrat der Deutschen Sinti und Roma* (Central Council of German Sinti and Roma), which stressed that Sinti, in particular, were an ancient German minority. Their aim was recognition by the German state and German society of both the Holocaust committed against to them as Germans and their position as an indigenous minority group. Conversely, Kawczynski and other members of the Roma protest also claimed the impact of the *Porajmos* in Eastern and Southeastern Europe on non-German Roma families, and demanded that the Federal Republic assume responsibility. Hamburg state authorities had the chance to do so for those Roma who were currently present in Germany since the mid 1980s, when the situation started to worsen for them in the Eastern Block-countries, particularly in Yugoslavia, and not send them back, as Kawczynski argued in a printed verbal dispute with the Senator of the Interior Werner Hackmann (SPD) in November 1989.[63]

Although Hamburg-based Rudko Kawczynski was the most visible figure of the Roma strikes, the centre of the movement was North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), which witnessed such remarkable protest actions as the occupation of the Cologne Cathedral in January 1991 by 400 Roma— which, as with most actions during that period, was not confined to young and middle aged men, but included women, older people, families with small children, newborns and pregnant women. Other actions were the *Bettelmarsch* (begging march) from January to February 1991—during which approximately 1700 participants marched from Cologne to Düsseldorf to protest in front of the offices of NRW Ministry of the Interior—and the Roma camp under a bridge in front of that same ministry, which, according to the Roma magazine *Jekh Čhib*, was the longest "strike" in the history of NRW, running from June to December 1991.[64] The *Bettelmarsch* attained a partial success when Minister of the Interior Herbert Schnoor (SPD) offered a solution for those who could prove they were "de facto refugees"—a status that was used to grant asylum to groups not covered by existing legal provisions. When Schnoor did not keep his promise, the protest march continued. The protests had also spread to Baden Württemberg and Bavaria, which had the most restrictive state regulations for Roma asylum seekers. The marches and occupations reached the Dutch border, where Roma led by Kawczynski claimed asylum, but were prevented from crossing the border; in November 1990 Roma protested at the Swiss border at Weil am Rhein and demanded to be received by the High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. They handed in their petition without success.[65]

63 Der Spiegel 46 (1989): Sie haben mich reingelegt, 12 November 1989, pp. 82–98.

64 See particularly the text of Fatima Hartmann, one of the protesters, (without title) and other texts on the topic, in: Jekh Čhib 2 (1994), pp. 34–38.

65 Jekh Čhib 2 (1994): Chronologie des Bleiberechtkampfes, pp. 30–32; Rudzdija Sejdovic: Der Bettelmarsch und die illegalen Roma-Familien, p. 33; Monika Hielscher/Matthias

This latter action and the further course of the "Roma strike" demonstrate how these protests intended to encompass much more than the German *Bleiberecht*. On the organizational level, there were some accomplishments, such as the establishment of the Romani National Council (RNC), presided by Kawczynski, followed by the founding of the European Roma and Travellers Forum in Strasbourg in 2004, which serves as a link to the European Commission and other international bodies.[66] The overall problem nonetheless still remains: In response to the "refugee crisis" in 2015, Roma from Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia were hit with new restrictions as surplus refugees, who were not supposed to be in Germany since they were from "safe countries."[67]

As the documentary film *Gelem Gelem* that accompanied the Roma strike on a part of their long way during this protest movement vividly demonstrates, Kawczynski was very well-informed, articulate and rhetorically skilled, despite his lack of formal education.[68] He consequently became a classic target for public attacks and allegations of radicalism. He was also accused by the Hamburg Senator for Internal Affairs of instrumentalizing the Roma by convincing them to embark on actions such as the second occupation of Neuengamme in August 1989 in order to deliberately produce images of policemen tearing down Roma men, women and children as a means of portraying West Germany as the successor-state of the *Third Reich*.[69] The *Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti and Roma*, among others, asserted that he was only promoting himself and his career, an accusation sparked by Kawczynski's announcement in 1989 that he was running as a Green Party candidate for the European Parliament— a purely symbolic action as Kawczynski's status as a stateless *Ausländer* meant he was ineligible to vote, let alone stand for election, everywhere. With this action he had hoped to

Heeder (script and direction): Gelem Gelem—Wir gehen einen langen Weg, 1989/91, 84 min, the documentary is on YouTube (rhizomfilm), at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hr4gx-lIvXn0 (accessed on 5 September 2020); Britta Grell: Celem Celem. Heimatlose Roma kämpfen um ein Bleiberecht in der Bundesrepublik, in: ZGA 8 (1993), p. 19, at: https://anti-ziganismus.de/artikel/celem-celem/ (accessed on 14 September 2020).

66 Council of Europe (eds.): Institutionalisation and Emancipation, in: Information Fact Sheets on Roma History 6.2, Strasbourg, at: https://rm.coe.int/institutionalisation-and-emancipation-factsheets-on-romani-history/16808b1c61 (accessed on 13 September 2020).

67 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: Safe countries of origin, 28 November 2018, at: www.bamf.de/EN/Themen/AsylFluechtlingsschutz/Sonderverfahren/SichereHerkunftsstaaten/sichereherkunftsstaaten-node.html;jsessionid=A705942F291B039E7AB69F7826ED6385.internet531 (accessed on 14 September 2020).

68 Gelem Gelem—Wir gehen einen langen Weg; Daniela Gress: Biographical note on Rudko Kawczynski, at: www.romarchive.eu/de/collection/p/rudko-kawczynski/ (accessed on 13 September 2020).

69 Der Spiegel 46 (1989): Sie haben mich reingelegt, 12 November 1989, pp. 82–98, p. 95.

prompt other Sinti and Roma to apply for German citizenship as he had done and to enter politics.[70]

The dividing line between Kawczynski and Romani Rose, head of the *Zentralrat* since 1982, who was and still is the face of the German Sinti and Roma movement, was simultaneously the dividing line between the protests they led. Here too, the citizen/non-citizen divide had its own facets, as Sinti and Roma irrespective of whether they felt German or were German citizen, were still perceived as *Ausländer*, a term that traditionally embodied a racial knowledge about the German and its Other.[71] In the case of the Sinti and Roma, this designation was even more present, as they had been othered for centuries and had never been considered German (even if naturalized), except when they passed as German, broke with the traditions of their families, or concealed their heritage. This was still true in the Federal Republic of Germany, as many Sinti and Roma kept their families and family histories of genocide secret, while others fought for decades to be re-naturalized after they had lost their citizenship during the *Third Reich*. This concealing and hiding was an experience they shared with foreign Roma in Germany: many *guest workers* from Yugoslavia and some from Greece were also Roma, who never made their heritage public, or waited many years to do so.[72] The image of the group deteriorated further in the 1980s, as Eastern European Roma (first from Poland, then Yugoslavia and later Romania) began to arrive in West Germany as asylum seekers. This influx was possibly also why the officially recognized representatives of German Sinti and Roma decided not to speak up and stand behind the foreign Roma in West Germany at that time.[73]

As "worldless" people, these "illegal" Eastern European Roma—as they were most often framed—represented the non-citizens par excellence. Aside a few individual parishes that granted them church asylum or certain anti-racist initiatives, enacting a "claim to the political" for the Roma was to its core a display of precarity, which motivated the radicality of their protests and their willingness to use their own bodies and even the bodies of their children in an excessive way in kilometre-long marches, even during winter, in occupations of concentration camps under police surveillance, monthlong occupations of outdoor spaces and sit-ins at border stations. During these events, they often refused the food, water and blankets offered by charities or state representatives as they *wanted* to display how precarious and desperate their situation

70 Der Spiegel 23 (1989): Braun, rot oder grün, 4 June 1989, p. 35.

71 Maria Alexopoulou: 'Ausländer'—A Racialized Concept? 'Race' as an Analytical Concept in Contemporary German Immigration History, in: Mahmoud Arghavan et.al. (eds.): Who Can Speak and Who is Heard/Hurt?—Facing Problems of Race, Racism and Ethnic Diversity in the Humanities in Germany, Bielefeld 2019, pp. 45–67.

72 Phone Interview with Jovica Arvanitelli, counselor at the RomnoKher advice centre, Mannheim, on 31 May 2016.

73 Yaron Matras: Development of the Romani Civil Rights Movement in Germany, p. 57.

was. They were determined to find a place to live, a cohabitation that granted them membership and rights. For this, they were prepared to suffer illness for themselves and their children—as the documentary *Gelem Gelem* depicted quite authentically by letting the protesters speak for themselves and through Kawczynski, their main spokesman.

One of the editors of *Jekh Čhib*, Fatima Hartmann, who took part in several protest actions, described the Roma struggle for rights and the form of their protest as "a hard political fight, not in an aggressive, but in a human way in trying to draw attention to our situation. We did not want to fall in illegality alone. We wanted to face illegality together." In describing the Roma camp in Düsseldorf, she recounted:

> We had many illegals there at the camp. For many families this place was the last possibility to avoid detention. […] The fear of the police coming to clear the camp was there all the time. And the fear of right-wing extremists. We had guards walking around all night and watching out. But still, the morale, the solidarity, the commonality, talking to each other, gave us strength and we said, we can do it together. They cannot be so blind. Some day they will understand that they are not treating us as human beings.[74]

She also referred to the German supporters, as did a protester in *Gelem Gelem*, who pointed out that many of them were helping Roma as an act of therapy for themselves. While Hartmann appreciated the help, she simultaneously highlighted that some of these supporters, particularly the social workers, were paying their rent by dealing with the misery of the Roma. All the more, she was offended by demands from supporters not to expose their children to the cold and adverse conditions of these protests: "we had to use our kids for politics. But how perverse is this, that the same people want to expel us and force us to live this life forever, are the people we are demonstrating before right now. When I told them so, they went away, they closed their eyes and their ears." According to Hartmann, the Germans "tried to explain to the Roma families again and again, how inhumane this was" for the children, and that they should return to the *Asylantenheim*, were it was warm, just to be directly deported to a life (such as Sutka, a Roma slum in Skopje), that was as precarious—but out of sight of those people whose greatest worry was "not if they had bread to eat, but if they had a sausage to put on their buttered bread."[75]

In light of the determination and outspokenness of the protesters and taking into account the blatantly racist discourse about asylum and asylum seekers that surround-

74 Fatima Hartmann: Text (without title), in: Jekh Čhib 2 (1994), pp. 34–38, p. 35, 38, translated by the author.

75 Ibid, pp. 37f.

ed discussions of Roma during this period, Kawczynski's sharp rhetoric does not seem misguided in retrospect; his preferred Hamburg protest location, the Neuengamme concentration camp, was also well suited for his purposes: to draw as much attention as possible to the fate of the Roma by connecting their situation to German history—a deeply real connection. While Yaron Matras interprets Kawczynski's approach as Romani nationalism,[76] the right to have rights, the right to have the status of a 'non-national' citizen seems to be the prevailing aim. The writers of *Jekh Čhib* mostly spoke of the political struggle of the Roma. Indeed, this stateless and rightless group used their precarity—their precarity today (1989/93) and the Roma precarity of the Nazi past—in order to engage in an embodied, visible protest by displaying their precarity. The question remains if they even had access to any alternative "form of power" as embodiments of the 'non-citizen.'

Migrant Protests and (Democratic) Rights

Interestingly, the group of protesters who split from the Oranienburger Platz protest camp to go on hunger strike near the Brandenburg Gate on 24 October 2012 had planned a solidarity rally at the opening event for the nearby Memorial to the Murdered Sinti and Roma of Europe as a kick-off for their new protest site.[77] Although the police prevented the direct confluence of these two 'non-citizens' groups, in reality, they are part of one story—the entangled histories of racism, democracy and migration connecting the Global North and the Global South, and—in line with Walter Mignolo—the dominant heart of Europe with its colonialized peripheral parts. This story continues to be publicly displayed today, including the 'Drama of Mória' at the end of the 2020 pandemic summer, as the largest refugee camp in Europe on Lesbos, Greece, was burned to the ground possibly in protest against the horrific conditions there.

The examples of migrant protests discussed here give a hint of how essential "performative forms of power" are for individuals without those political rights that are still the prerogative of nation-bound citizens. In addition, these migrant protests help us to understand that even the citizen/non-citizen divide is not as clear as it may seem. These examples also show how migrant protests, in their respective ways, trigger discussions about rights and pose new issues into the debate. Migrant protests thus not only prompt democracy as a system by contributing more voices and greater political activity, but also contribute to democratic theory by urgently posing new (and old)

76 Yaron Matras: Development of the Romani Civil Rights Movement in Germany, p. 60.

77 Nikolai Schreiter: Sie beißen die Zähne zusammen, in: taz, 24 October 2012, at: https://taz.de/Protest/!5081028/ (accessed on 5 September 2020).

questions in need of being answered quickly and directly—depending on how radically the claim to the political is enacted. In spite of the precarity of these "claims to the political," stemming also from the fact that these actions were mostly proscribed or illegal, they had an avant-gardist touch. However, as Rudko Kawczynski pointed out in an interview in 1994, the authorities decry every act of resistance as illegal.[78] As long as Butler's dictum, "to be here means you have a right to be here"[79] is not reality and Arendt's "right to have rights" is not even true for those "others" living in Western democratic societies that still perceive themselves as models for the "Rest," proscribed and "illegal" migrant protests will be "part of the deal" either inside or outside the borders of Europe or generally the "West."

At the same time, these instances of "claiming the political" recounted in this article are part of an ongoing (migrant) civil rights movement in Germany. Even if not connected to each other and fought by different groups in different contexts, these cases expose the systemic flaw of the German democratic state and society, still dividing, ordering and hierarchizing political rights on the grounds of origin. The long duration and the persistence of this flaw—this in-built and yet ignored systemic racism of most modern Western democracies—proves that these kinds of migrant protest are not just contingent reactions, but necessary forces of change.

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78 Jekh Čhib 2 (1994): 'Was wir brauchen, sind keine Keller zum Verstecken…' (interview with Rudko Kawczynski), pp. 44–49, p. 44.

79 Ray Filar: Willing the impossible: An Interview with Judith Butler, in: openDemocracy, 23 July 2013, at: www.opendemocracy.net/en/transformation/willing-impossible-interview-with-judith-butler/ (accessed on 6 September 2020).

Yvonne Robel

"Protest? Bollocks!" On Public Perceptions of Punk in West Germany

Abstract

The article thematizes the phenomenon of punk as an example of "unconventional" and "unwelcomed" protest. It focuses on the public perception of West German punks from the late 1970s into the 1980s. In this early phase, punks caused confusion especially because of their alleged passivity. Their seeming rejection of a concept of being (politically) active was regarded as provocative, as the idea of "activity" largely dominated notions of legitimate political protest at that time. Punk was considered destructive and contentless, but non-political and as such "non-real" as a form of protest. Moreover, "experts" from the social sciences and pedagogy, politicians, and journalists interpreted the behaviour of the youth in social terms and responded to the "problem" with attempts to "understanding" and "help." From their point of view too, Punks seemed to be unable to detect any political issues of their own or to fulfil notions of meaningful forms of protest. Using the example of punk perceptions, the article examines how collective knowledge about legitimate and proper forms of protest is negotiated through demarcations.

Keywords: *political protest; youth cultures; social change; emotions; public discourse; non-work; no future; West Germany; punk*

Protest is generally understood as concerted action and the collective articulation of political demands that aim to criticize and effect change in society.[1] The descriptions of punks found in research literature appear hardly compatible with this concept of protest. Although they are sometimes characterized as the "probably most radical protest culture of the postwar period"[2], they are also considered to have employed any-

1 Paul Nolte: Formen des Protests, Muster der Moderne. Vom 18. zum 21. Jahrhundert, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64:9/10 (2013), pp. 584–599, p. 586; Sabine Mecking: Vom Protest zur Protestkultur? Träger, Formen und Ziele gesellschaftlichen Aufbegehrens, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64:9/10 (2013), pp. 517–529, p. 519.

2 Martin Büsser: If the Kids are united. Von Punk zu Hardcore und zurück, 9th revised edition, Freiburg 2013, p. 7. In this article, all quotations from the German are translated by the author.

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thing but "classical forms of protest."[3] Instead, they are said to have distinguished themselves by their absolute refusal to communicate, their lack of concepts, and radical nihilism.[4] According to research findings, punks did not formulate a message, an appeal, or a meaningful political proposal. Quite the contrary, they refused any interaction of this kind.[5] Their attitude towards life, rejecting everything, and their pointed display of deviating from societal norms aimed to provoke, but not to achieve fundamental social and political change. Accordingly, researchers held, punk should not be classified within established understandings of social movements.[6] The confusion in research about whether to consider punk a protest culture was already present at the time it emerged, and it had a major influence on public perception of punk from the late 1970s on. I assume that this primarily tells us something about the beliefs connected to the concept of protest itself. Protest may be deemed "unconventional" and "unwelcomed" if it runs afoul of these beliefs.

Taking this idea as a starting point, I show in this article that punk is a complex example of ostracized protest. Punks caused confusion and rejection mostly because of their alleged (political) passivity and their refusal to be active. Their potential to provoke, however, certainly did reach its limits against the background of the discourses of the day. I focus on the public perception of West German punks from the late 1970s into the 1980s. What was the nature of the provocation that punk represented in this period? What did it take for something to become a provocation at all? What forms did punks' actions and self-presentation have to take to be considered an ostracized protest? Which overarching discourses, for example about youth, fear, or boredom, were associated with interpretations of punk at the time? When grappling with these questions, I am not concerned with the "essence" of punk, whatever it may be. Instead, I seek to illuminate what the public response to it was in an early phase of punk in the Federal Republic.

3 Henning Wellmann: 'Let fury have the hour, anger can be power' Praktiken emotionalen Erlebens in den frühen deutschen Punkszenen, in: Bodo Mrozek/Alexa Geisthövel/Jürgen Danyel (eds.): Popgeschichte, vol. 2: Zeithistorische Fallstudien, Bielefeld 2014, pp. 291–311, p. 307.

4 Sven Reichardt: Authentizität und Gemeinschaft. Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, Berlin 2014, pp. 36–37; Salvio Incorvaia: Der klassische Punk—eine Oral History. Biografien, Netzwerke und Selbstbildnis einer Subkultur im Düsseldorfer Raum 1977–1983, Essen 2017, p. 73.

5 Hans-Georg Soeffner: Stil und Stilisierung. Punk oder die Überhöhung des Alltags, in: idem.: Die Ordnung der Rituale, Frankfurt am Main 1992, pp. 76–101, pp. 98f.

6 Heiko Geiling: Punk als politische Provokation: Mit den Chaos-Tagen in Hannover zur Politik des 'gesunden Volksempfindens,' in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Jugendkulturen, Politik und Protest. Vom Widerstand zum Kommerz?, Opladen 2000, pp. 165–182, pp. 178f. This finding corresponds to the fact that the topic of punk is hardly mentioned, or only marginally, in works reviewing social protest movements.

Punk as an Impossible to Overlook Phenomenon

Punks piqued public interest in West Germany beginning in 1976. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television first reported on U. S. and British bands such as *The Stooges*, the *Ramones*, *The Clash*, and especially the *Sex Pistols*, which attracted attention because of their fast-paced style of music, their aggressive demeanour, and their violent image. In particular, early British punk was interpreted as a reflexive reaction by youths to being left behind with no prospects for the future, especially those from socially disadvantaged industrial areas and slums.[7] From 1977 onwards, people began talking about a growing circle of German punk musicians and bands including *Hansaplast* from Hanover, *Fehlfarben* and *MALE* from Düsseldorf, *Abwärts* from Hamburg, and *Einstürzende Neubauten* from Berlin. Public attention focused less on the music itself and more on the fans and their appearance. Most researchers agree that punk is difficult to conceptualize, which makes a truly tangible definition almost impossible. Scholars point to differentiations within the scene, for example, hardcore, fun punk, dark wave, Neue Deutsche Welle, and Oi Punk. Besides, punk was not "only" a style of music, but could be considered "a fashion, an aesthetic, an attitude, a protest, a media-constructed label, an anti-social gesture, a cultural moment or a lifestyle"[8] at the same time.

Although the number of avowed punks in West Germany remained low, even according to estimates at the time,[9] they quickly caused an uproar. This was due not least to their visibility—both in public spaces and in various media. Like many youth cultures, punk was initially a phenomenon of major urban areas, especially West Berlin, Hamburg, Düsseldorf, and Hanover. Punks did not withdraw into niches or the private sphere, but instead occupied public spaces, preferably in pedestrian zones or central squares.[10] Political scientist Heiko Geiling, who has studied youth protest cul-

7 For example: Punk-Rock (Aspekte), ZDF, 21 December 1976, Unternehmensarchiv ZDF (UA ZDF), 0010713500.

8 Matthew Worley: Riotous Assembly: British Punk's Cultural Diaspora in the Summer of '81, in: Knud Andresen/Bart van der Steen (eds.): A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s, Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire 2016, pp. 217–228, p. 219.

9 On 30 October 1980 the *Tagesthemen* news analysis programme of the ARD television station spoke of 400 to 2,000 punks in West Berlin (Fernseharchiv NDR, 301080); Klaus Pokatzky: 'Null Bock auf alles,' in: Die Zeit 7/1981 reported approx. 2,000 Punks in Hamburg in 1981; Michael Sontheimer: 'Punk: Ein Phänomen in zwei Teilen (I). Es begann mit der Musik,' in: Die Zeit 36/1984 wrote about "a few thousand" across the country. Above all, this makes clear how difficult it was to put a number to the phenomenon.

10 Werner Lindner: Jugendprotest seit den fünfziger Jahren. Dissens und kultureller Eigensinn, Opladen 1996, p. 363. Even at the time, reference was made to this in: Jugendwerk der

tures in Hanover, emphasizes that punks sought public attention since their provocative actions would have gone nowhere without a reaction "from the outside."[11]

An episode in Hamburg from the early 1980s is an indicative example of the local stir punks were able to cause by occupying public space: beginning in the early summer of 1982, after being driven out of other downtown districts, a group of punks would meet on *Spritzenplatz*, a centrally located square in Hamburg-Ottensen. Students and immigrants had been moving into the neighbourhood since the 1960s, and the previously working-class/factory district was becoming increasingly hip. Films from that period show the ambivalent reactions of local residents, neighbourhood shop owners, and employees to the youths' massive presence. Whereas some had no sympathy for their appearance, "hanging around," and "sponging," and complained about littering, others tried to talk with the youths, asking what they imagined for the future or what message they were trying to convey with their colourfully dyed hair.[12] The footage clearly shows the punks' strong presence in the public space. But who else was interested in them besides irritated or angry passers-by and local residents? Harsh police measures against punks, including raids and arrests that criminalized the youths, sparked intense discussions at the time.[13] Politicians in the Altona Local Parliament as well as the Hamburg State Parliament debated whether police actions had been excessive.[14] When an "Action Concept for the Punk Problem at *Spritzenplatz*" prepared by the police entered into force in August, which increased police presence and violence, demands from politicians to reject a law-and-order approach in favour of pedagogical ones in dealing with youths became louder.[15] Even before this escalation, various parties had demanded "help," which had also resulted in the hiring of a community social

Deutschen Shell (ed.): Jugend '81. Lebensentwürfe, Alltagskulturen, Zukunftsbilder, vol. 1, Hamburg 1981, p. 533.

11 Heiko Geiling: Punk als politische Provokation, p. 171.

12 Bürger und Punks (Hamburger Journal), NDR 12 July 1982, Fernseharchiv NDR (FA NDR), 1128401; see also the undated television report of the "internal university television service" of Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaften, which was based on footage shot in Hamburg-Ottensen in September 1982: https://urbanshit.de/punks-anfang-der-1980er-jahre-hamburg-ottensen-video/ (accessed on 13 May 2020).

13 For example, Klaus Pokatzky: 'Ungeliebte Punks,' in: Die Zeit 26/1982.

14 For the first time: Minutes of the Altona Local Parliament session of 24 June 1982, in: StAHH 445-1, 130. Punk was also the subject of political discussions in other cities' local parliaments, for example in Berlin-Schöneberg. See Michael Sontheimer, 'Punk: Ein Phänomen in zwei Teilen (II). Nüchtern sieht er viel zu viel,' in: Die Zeit 37/1984.

15 Minutes of the Altona Local Parliament session of 26 August 1982, in: StAHH 445-1, 130; State Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: session of 15 September 1982, Plenarprotokoll 10/4, pp. 146B-157A; State Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: Proposal of the GAL faction, 29 September 1982, Document 10/290; Hamburger Abendblatt: Die Punks—kein Problem für den Jugendsenator?, 27 August 1982, p. 4.

worker responsible for the punks at *Spritzenplatz*.[16] Thus, attention no longer focused solely on the youth's public nuisance offences, but increasingly also on their concrete situation—including structural youth unemployment, lack of vocational training opportunities, homelessness, poorer life chances of socially disadvantaged minors, and alcoholism. In autumn 1982, the Hamburg State Parliament debated a proposal from the Altona Local Parliament to make site huts and portacabins available to the youths as a "meeting place not dependent on the weather." Besides the makeshift shelters, it ultimately also approved long-term funding for social workers and youth care workers on the ground.[17] According to the *Grün-Alternative Liste* (GAL, the Hamburg branch of the Green Party), these measures were to serve to "develop their distinctive forms of culture."[18] According to the Hamburg Senate, they were to create "opportunities for recreational activities and socio-pedagogical support in groups."[19]

What this example shows is that punks were considered a socio-political and social problem in two senses: On the one hand, the excitement about the youths entailed marking their appearance and behaviour itself as a form of problematic deviance. On the other hand, their appearance was increasingly classified as a problematic, but understandable reaction to problems caused elsewhere and interpreted as a visible expression of suffering in society. The search for solutions was increasingly directed towards the second aspect. Accordingly, residents of Hamburg-Ottensen formed a solidarity circle in 1982 that opposed the police measures and the criminalization of the youths and supported socio-pedagogical solutions, presenting a detailed documentation of police brutality against punks on *Spritzenplatz*.[20] In other words, besides police officers, politicians, and social workers, politically engaged citizens concerned themselves with punks as well. Journalists also reported on the youths on *Spritzenplatz* and on punk as a new youth phenomenon, for example in the local newspaper *Hamburger Abendblatt* or the more nationally-oriented weekly *Die Zeit* as well as on regional radio and television.

16 For discussions on the topic prior to August 1982 see: Altona Local Parliament: Proposal by the GAL faction, 24 June 1982, Document IX/No. 6 and proposal by the SPD faction, 24 June 1982, Document IX/No. 9; State Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: Written parliamentary question Rudolph (CDU) and response by the Senate, 20 July 1982, document 10/61.

17 State Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: session of 11 November 1982, Plenarprotokoll 10/9, pp. 470A–475A.

18 Altona Local Parliament: Proposal of the GAL faction, 26 August 1982, document IX/No. 46.

19 State Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: Communication of the Senate to the State Parliament, 15 October 1982, document 10/413.

20 Solidaritätskreis—Ottenser Bürger gegen Polizeiübergriffe: letter, 27 September 1982, in: StAHH 131-1 II, 4971 (vol. 2).

Whereas some older passers-by approached by the Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) in Hamburg in 1978 still presumed that the word punk signified a brand of ice cream or a term for "going bankrupt,"[21] younger people already got their information about the music and the lifestyle from magazines such as *BRAVO* or *Sounds*. The commercialization of punk, which began quite rapidly, and the emergence of fashion punk and glamour punk also contributed to it being widely known.[22] In the early 1980s, punk became even more visible to the public through media reports on violent clashes between punks and poppers, a youth culture that emerged during the same period and whose adherents presented themselves as intentionally orderly, consumption-oriented, and conformist.[23] Reports on punk vandalism against private property made headlines—for example when a number of youths toppled cars and smashed shop windows in Hamburg's well-to-do Pöseldorf neighbourhood in 1980. The local press spoke of "punk terror" as the "new big problem."[24] A new feature beginning in the early 1980s was the "chaos days." Punks in Ruhr area cities had already gathered in larger groups and made trouble in pedestrian zones between 1979 and 1982. When it became known in 1982 that the Hanover police had created a "file on punks" in which it compiled data not only on individuals who had violated public safety and order, but also on those who had stood out because of their demeanour and were considered criminally suspicious, the first "chaos days"—designated as such—took place in Hanover in 1982, 1983, and 1984, with youths from Great Britain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and other European countries participating. Punks clashed violently both with the local police and with skinheads, and the city saw enormous property damage. The chaos days culminated with roughly 2,000 participants in 1984; later meetings at irregular intervals in various West German cities attracted less attention. It was only in 1995 that the chaos days in Hanover were revived; the massive clashes between the police and 2,000 to 3,000 punks found broad media coverage.[25] The various events and the media interest in them showed that the public perception of punk increasingly focused on its violent forms in the course of the 1980s. This was

21 Punk-Rock (Nordschau Hamburg), NDR, 19 June 1978, FA NDR, 1128387.

22 Lindner commented as early as 1978 that "the speed of commercialisation" was remarkable. Rolf Lindner: Punk rules, ok!, in: Ästhetik & Kommunikation 31 (March 1978), pp. 57–63, p. 61.

23 For example: Punker gegen Popper—Klassenkampf der Teenager (Nordschau Hamburg), NDR 16 May 1980, FA NDR, 1125981; Punker—Popper (Tagesthemen), ARD 30 October 1980, FA NDR, 301080.

24 Thomas Osterkorn: Auf der Flucht krochen die Punk-Rocker unter die parkenden Autos, in: Hamburger Abendblatt, 5 May 1980, p. 3; Hamburger Abendblatt: Wieder 14 Punk-Rocker von der Polizei gefasst, 6 May 1980, p. 3.

25 Heiko Geiling: Punk als politische Provokation; Oliver Herbertz: Die Organisation von Chaostagen. Analyse zur Konstruktion von Objektivität, in: Gregor Betz (ed.): Urbane Events, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 245–60.

intensified by the youth unrest spreading across Europe from 1980 onwards, which was associated with increasing radicalization and militancy of forms of protest (e. g. by autonomists and squatters).[26] The large number of social science-based youth studies that have emerged since the beginning of the 1980s also mostly problematized the new phenomenon of punk. These studies, in turn, did not focus exclusively on the violent behaviour of young people but also tried to get to the bottom of their attitude to life and their self-identification.[27] In short: anyone seeking to find out about punks at the time could draw on many and diverse materials. But even people not actively seeking out such information could hardly avoid being confronted with deliberations on the manifestations of punk in Germany and its societal causes. Historian Knud Andresen commented that around 1980, punk was called "the youth scene attracting the longest attention span of the media […] likely not without justification"[28]; this was complemented by the interest of the political, police, and academic communities as well as the youths' visibility in (above all urban) public spaces.

Passivity as a Form of Illegitimate Protest

If we pose the question: what constituted the provocation of punk in the late 1970s? Prior to the reports about violent clashes or the chaos days, the answer might simply be looks. A 1978 cover story in the newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* that gained a great deal of attention represents the horror and dismay of the day. The cover showed various people with garish clothing and make-up underneath the title "Culture from the slums: brutal and ugly."[29] The multi-page article examined the origins of punk in England, its West German variant, the youths' demeanour and attitude towards life, and the increasing commercialization of punk with a wealth of words and images. It spoke of

26 Knud Andresen/Bart van der Steen (eds.): A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s, Houndmills 2016; Hanno Balz/Jan-Henrik Friedrichs (eds.): "All we ever wanted …." Eine Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre, Berlin 2012.

27 Especially: Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell (ed.): Jugend '81. Lebensentwürfe, Alltagskulturen, Zukunftsbilder, vol. 1 and 2, Hamburg 1981; Die verunsicherte Generation. Jugend und Wertewandel. Ein Bericht des SINUS-Instituts im Auftrag des Bundesministers für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Opladen 1983.

28 Knud Andresen: West- und ostdeutsche Jugendszenen in den 1980er-Jahren — ein Individualisierungsschub?, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 55 (2015), pp. 445–475, p. 465.

29 Der Spiegel 4/1978, cover. According to Lindner, the cover story (pp. 140–147) had an important influence on the self-image of German punk and on the image others had of it. See Rolf Lindner: Punk, in: Gerd Stein (ed.): Bohemien — Tramp — Sponti. Kulturfiguren und Sozialcharaktere des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main 1982, pp. 245–258, pp. 245–247.

"youths with ugly make-up […] wearing clothes from the rubbish, with Nazi insignia and dog chains" whose looks surpassed the ugliness of all previous outsider styles and symbolized a "change in trends towards the new ugliness."[30] The images—often portraits of individuals or groups—were captioned "offensive, obscene, and disgusting" or "masquerade for a horror show."[31] Stunned and repulsed, the journalists devised the entire presentation with the obvious goal of not only enlightening readers about a new youth phenomenon, but scandalising it. In the late 1980s, U. S. music journalist Greil Marcus stated in retrospect, given that punk had later seeped into the mainstream of young people, it was almost impossible to imagine how repugnant punks' outward appearance may have been at the time:

> To master this vision of ugliness, people acted it out. Today, after more than a decade of punk style, when a purple and green Mohawk on the head of a suburban American teenager only begs the question of how early he or she has to get up to fix his or her hair in time for school, it's hard to remember just how ugly the first punks were. They were ugly.[32]

Early media coverage emphasized the provocation that punks' outward appearance represented at the time with endlessly repeated references to razor blades, dog collars, and safety pins, but also rats as accessories.

But the look of the youth was not the only provocation in this early phase of punk. What was provocative, I want to argue in a first step, was also the rejection of a concept of being active, which had dominated conceptions of legitimate political protest at that time. The following passage from another article in *Der Spiegel* in 1980 vividly summarizes the attributions around punk as protest: "The set phrase 'I totally refuse everything.' is one of the few programmatic utterances which punks are prepared to make. […] Punk is protest of few words, speechless because in part, it really has nothing to say, but largely is simply too lazy to talk, and in a smart-alecky way—'what's the point of talking about it.'" And: "continuous work on protest, long marches through some institutions or other, cannot be discerned in this subculture, either. 'Illusions,' said punk Gerd with a gesture of refusal, 'I've had it with illusions.'"[33]

Punk was certainly considered a form of protest at the time. Yet the public debate on punk was not only about total refusal, but also about speechlessness and a lack of substance. It was not uncommon in the 1980s to ascribe both to the entire young generation. Especially in the studies on youths at the time, the dominating descriptions

30 Der Spiegel: Punk: Nadel im Ohr, Klinge am Hals, 4/1978, pp. 140–147, pp. 140, 142.
31 Ibid., pp. 141, 143.
32 Greil Marcus: Lipstick Traces. A Secret History of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 1989, pp. 73f.
33 Der Spiegel: Macht kaputt, 27/1980, pp. 92–96, p. 93, 96.

were of a deeply insecure generation that either formed a silent majority or sought to escape and drop out of society.[34] The protests of the "68ers," which had been perceived as noisy, often served as a foil for comparison.[35] Even at the time, critical authors pointed out that people tended to use the vociferous rather than the "silent majority of youths" as a yardstick for measuring the political behaviour of West German youths. Against this background, descriptions of youths as an "insecure generation" or as "speechless" should not to be taken at face value.[36] Many actors of the New Social Movements explicitly attempted to differentiate themselves from the approaches taken by the "1968ers," whom they considered overly theoretical. This did not, however, necessarily engender silence, but new forms of protest.[37] In the quote from *Der Spiegel*, the march through the institutions is expressed in the reference to the "68ers" with their more powerful voices. This makes clear that when people spoke or wrote about punk, it was not only about negotiating legitimate forms of protest. Instead, they drew on or confirmed societal knowledge about political protest on the one hand and "the young generation" on the other.

The attribution to punks of powerlessness to act based on passivity, lack of content and speechlessness, and in extreme cases leading to violence, was also partly reflected in the report of a commission set up by the German Bundestag in 1981 as a result of the massive (international) youth unrest. To examine the forms and causes of the new protest, the commission spent two years in discussions with representatives of youth federations, squatters, and various youth groups. Experts from educational and social sciences, as well as practical youth and social work, were consulted. Among the young interviewees of the *Prognos AG* (Arbeitsgruppe; Prognos working group) commissioned to carry out an empirical study were also ten Frankfurt punks, who were explicitly classified "as representatives of non-political, potentially violent groups."[38] According to the study, punks did not see any chance for social change, so they did

34 See for example: Klaus Dörre/Paul Schäfer: In den Straßen steigt das Fieber. Jugend in der Bundesrepublik, Cologne 1982, esp. pp. 87–132; Michael Haller (ed.): Aussteigen oder rebellieren. Jugendliche gegen Staat und Gesellschaft, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1981; Die verunsicherte Generation. Jugend und Wertewandel. Ein Bericht des SINUS-Instituts im Auftrag des Bundesministers für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit.

35 Hanno Balz/Jan-Henrik Friedrichs: Individualität und Revolte im neoliberalen Aufbruch. Annäherungen an eine Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte der europäischen Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre, in: idem. (eds.): 'All we ever wanted …,' pp. 13–35, p. 34.

36 Rainer Kabel/Martina Sönnichsen/Andreas Splanemann: Jugend der 80er Jahre. Im Spiegel von Umfragen, Berlin 1987, p. 8.

37 Knud Andresen/Bart van der Steen: Introduction: The Last Insurrection? Youth, Revolts and Social Movements in the 1980s, in: idem. (eds.): A European Youth Revolt, pp. 1–21, p. 7f.

38 Matthias Wissmann/Rudolf Hauck (eds.): Jugendprotest im demokratischen Staat. Enquete-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages, Stuttgart 1983, p. 128. The authors also mentioned difficulties in establishing contacts with punks, which, however, also existed among

not deal with political concerns at all. Rather, they were guided by a "vague feeling that you can never do what you feel like doing at the moment, but that you have to stick to rules and agreements all the time." Instead of developing a politically motivated, alternative way of life they mainly relied on "being different on the outside."[39] They were seen as provocative and focused entirely on appearances, but less on active, substantive protest behaviour. Consequently, the final report of the commission presented in 1983, which received a lot of public attention, did not explicitly mentioned punks. The focus of the report was on active forms of protest. It dealt mainly with squatters, environmentalists, opponents of nuclear power, and supporters of the peace movement. It also addressed youth unemployment and mentioned passive forms of withdrawal from society.[40] But it was obviously impossible to classify punks within the spectrum of legitimate forms of political protest and action based on the knowledge available at the time.

Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune, who researched protest and social movements, stated that in principle, protests might appear to be largely unpredictable, but that nonetheless, over time, "experiential knowledge [did develop] on the side of those protesting as well as on the side of others involved about how protest works, what its limits are, and how to deal with it."[41] In times with strong social movements and in light of the expansion of civil-society forms of protest in the 1970s, not only did public statements of demands increasingly become a "desired form of action" in the broad mainstream of society, as Sabine Mecking stated,[42] but concrete notions about legitimate *forms* of protest prevailed at the same time. They had little to do with passivity. Instead, they had to be active, creative, and had to have meaning. This notion was confirmed vividly by approaches of "living and working differently" in the alternative milieu as well as the protests of the new social movements.

Punks' behaviour seemed fundamentally different. In historical retrospect, numerous authors have emphasized that punk did have a "DIY philosophy"[43] that certainly involved creativity and activity. The low barriers to playing in a band, the many self-published fanzines (fan magazines whose style appeared to be conspicuously am-

squatters and supporters of the alternative cultural scene and the Ökopax movement. Ibid., pp. 130–133.

39 Ibid., p. 204; on the lack of political willingness to change, see also pp. 174–179, 211.

40 Deutscher Bundestag, Jugendprotest im demokratischen Staat (II). Schlußbericht 1983 der Enquete-Kommission des 9. Deutschen Bundestages, Bonn 1983.

41 Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einleitung: Das Protestgeschehen in der Bundesrepublik seit den 1980er Jahren zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Leviathan, 33 (2017), pp. 9–33, p. 9.

42 Sabine Mecking: Vom Protest zur Protestkultur?, p. 528.

43 Christian Schmidt: Meanings of Fanzines in the Beginning of Punk in the GDR and FRG. An Approach Towards a Medium Between Staging, Communication and the Construction of Collective Identities, in: Volume! 5:1 (2006), pp. 47–70, p. 51.

ateurish, alternating between a student newspaper and a private diary), and the effort punks put into their appearance are considered to evidence of this.[44] At the time, however, such practices were met at best with derision; they did not indicate active protest behaviour. Even the leading German-language rock and pop magazine *Sounds* had difficulty detecting political ambitions in the new music and fan scene that was considered ugly, nihilistic, and destructive.[45]

Apparently, punks' protest behaviour was difficult to grasp simply because they were associated with non-action and with total refusal, not with activity. At the very least, their passivity caused confusion especially as punks did not withdraw into the private sphere, but proceeded into the public space. Accordingly, sociologist Rainer Paris distinguishes between two types of protest forms: Common "verbal protest" aims at political change and persuasion. Certain forms of "subcultural protest" such as punk, on the other hand, can be described as "weak dissent" that does not bundle interests and does not make demands. Their "centre of meaning of action is not delegitimization or change, but unmistakable aggressive distinction."[46] However, punk could not necessarily be differentiated as clearly from other (purportedly more active) youth movements as the attribution of a non-political provocative attitude suggested. In West Germany, especially in Hamburg and West Berlin, many punks were close to the autonomous left.[47] Punks participated in anti-Nazi demonstrations, struggles for youth centres managed by the youths themselves, and squats of empty buildings in various cities, among other things.[48] Others sympathized with the peace movement or attended the 1981 *Tuwat-Kongress* (roughly: Do-Something Conference), which followed the *Tunix-Kongress* as one of the key meetings of the alternative political movement.[49] Feminist groups allied with the women's movement were important points of

44 See Karl Siebengartner: Fanzines als Jugendmedien: Die Punkszene in München von 1979–1982, in: Aline Maldener/Clemens Zimmermann (eds.): Let's historize it! Jugendmedien im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna 2018, pp. 259–282; Almut Sülzle: Forschen mit Fanzines, in: JuBri-Forschungsverbund Techniken jugendlicher Bricolage (ed.): Szenen, Artefakte und Inszenierungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Wiesbaden 2018, pp. 3–32; Hans-Georg Soeffner: Stil und Stilisierung.

45 Thomas Hecken: Punk-Rezeption in der BRD 1976/77 und ihre teilweise Auflösung 1979, in: Philipp Meinert/Martin Seeliger (eds.): Punk in Deutschland. Sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2013, pp. 247–259, p. 251.

46 Rainer Paris: Schwacher Dissens—Kultureller und politischer Protest, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Jugendkulturen, Politik und Protest. Vom Widerstand zum Kommerz?, Opladen 2000, pp. 49–62, p. 57.

47 Martin Büsser: If the kids are united. Von Punk zu Hardcore und zurück, p. 33.

48 Klaus Farin: Jugendkulturen in Deutschland 1950–1989, Bonn 2006, p. 110.

49 Salvio Incorvaia: Der klassische Punk—eine Oral History, p. 178.

reference for some female punks.[50] Despite this lack of a clear distinction from other groups and forms of protest, Punk mostly was seen as a non-real protest. This rested on the view at the time that they did not express any political goals and did not take any political action at all but rather refused any actions—in did so in public. In a certain sense, this perspective also influenced discussions about violent events, which became increasingly important from the 1980s on.

Punk as an Expression of an Emotional Overreaction

Approaches belittling or understanding punk significantly influenced its public perception and presentation. In so doing, and that is my second hypothesis, people limited the provocation from the outset, as it were. This in turn also contributed to declaring punk an unwelcome and non-real form of protest. In the public perception of punk, the most striking motifs surely were, and are, boredom and having no future. For example, the title of a feature film by Wolfgang Büld, broadcast by the ZDF TV station in 1979, is "Brennende Langeweile" (Burning boredom). It tells the story of two youths from the rural Sauerland region who hang around with an English punk band for a while, dreaming of love and a career playing in a band, but otherwise do not really know what they want. In August 1978, ZDF editorial board member Sibylle Hubatschek-Rahn explained to the programme directors why she thought the film should be made at short notice: "The subject matter is appealing, I believe, because of the topicality of the attitude towards life it conveys. It would be a shame if it could be shot only next year—posthumously, as it were—when "punk rock" and (hopefully) youth unemployment are only memories."[51] She thereby confirmed that although the portrayal of the youths in the film was bound to a particular period of time, it was representative. And others shared this view. Whereas viewers complained after the broadcast that the film was an example "of a vulgar attitude that appeared to have increasing influence within ZDF too," most film critics in the press agreed that its depiction of the young generation's attitude towards life hit its mark precisely: bored, aimless, frustrated, wistful, jaded, insecure, abandoned.[52]

50 Uta G. Poiger: Populärkultur und Geschlechternormen. Männlichkeit und Weiblichkeit in der Bonner Republik, in: Bodo Mrozek/Alexa Geisthövel (eds.): Popgeschichte, vol. 1: Konzepte und Methoden, Bielefeld 2014, pp. 57–78.

51 Sibylle Hubatschek-Rahn to Dieter Stolte, 2 August 1978, UA ZDF, 43855/584.

52 Brennende Langeweile, Produktionsunterlagen, UA ZDF, 43855/584; quote: Werner Jager to the director of ZDF, 13 January 1979.

Contrary to Sibylle Hubatschek-Rahn's expectation, youth unemployment was not a thing of the past in 1980.[53] Various actions by punks attracted even more attention from then on. However, the narrative of youths being at the mercy of themselves and society became a fixture of the discourse. They seemed to be not only be suffering under rising unemployment, but also from the limits of growth, which had been identified in the 1970s. Phenomena that were widely discussed at the time such as overpopulation, environmental pollution, and the threat of nuclear war brought a young person to ask the following sceptical question in a letter to the editor in 1978: "In this situation, when nobody knows what the future will bring, if there is one, is it even still worth doing anything productive and meaningful?"[54] Punks were considered the embodiment of being at the mercy of societal ills, which seemed to permit nothing but desperate and radical reactions, culminating in visible physical destruction. The slogan "no future," which was taken from the *Sex Pistols*, and out of context, became the key topos for describing an allegedly characteristic attitude towards life.[55]

Accordingly, punk was not perceived as a protest with its own topics outside of resignation and destruction. The media ran numerous stories about nice boys and girls next door yearning for love and merely seeking to conceal their insecurity. For example, the *NDR* broadcasting station reported the following about the punks on Spritzenplatz, a square in Hamburg-Ottensen, in 1982: "Loved by nobody, not really liked by anybody, the rubbish children who simply don't fit into a bourgeois world at all are causing a commotion."[56] The youth magazine *BRAVO* repeatedly portrayed individual youths who were likeable and "completely normal" at their core, for example fifteen year-old Christian from Munich: "There's a really nice boy inside the tough shell. His clanking chains, the brutality and apathy he flaunts—isn't that all just for show to conceal the 'real,' the insecure Christian?"[57] The description of fifteen year-old Kai from Berlin was very similar:

> He has never worn a safety pin in his cheek. He doesn't like buttons any more. Drugs are not an option. 'I've never really fucked.' Kai is actually a totally normal

53 Thomas Raithel: Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in der Bundesrepublik. Entwicklung und Auseinandersetzung während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre, München 2012.

54 Die Zeit: Hilfeschrei der Ausgeflippten. Junge Leute diskutieren über Punk-Rock, 19/1978.

55 Farin describes the ascription of a depressive "no-future" attitude as "one of the most misunderstood messages of all." Klaus Farin: Jugendkulturen in Deutschland 1950–1989, pp. 110f.

56 Bürger und Punks (Hamburger Journal), NDR 12 July 1982, FA NDR, 1128401, 10:02:12–10:02:19.

57 Sissi Tränkner: Punker Christian und seine Ratte 'Adolf,' in: Bravo 35/1983, pp. 66f., p. 66. On the portrayal of punk and punks in BRAVO, see: Andreas Kuttner: Punk und BRAVO, BRAVO und Punk, in: Archiv der Jugendkulturen e.V. (ed.): 50 Jahre BRAVO, Bad Tölz, Tilsner, 2005, pp. 123–138.

> guy. If you take a look inside his shaven head with the Mohawk, you'll see a nice and funny youngster, but he's in a dangerous situation. Sometimes it's just a single step from being a punk to an antisocial rioter or a bum.[58]

The emphasis on the strikingly young age of those interviewed corresponded with the aspiration to peek behind the shrill façade of punk and discover insecure, but otherwise fairly "normal" youths. Girls were occasionally presented in such individual portraits of punks, but much less often.[59] Against the background of the specific provocation that female punks obviously constituted in public, interviewers tried harder to generate understanding and to go into their family backgrounds, their individual feelings, and whether they were attending school or vocational training. Attempts to understand them involved engaging in conversations with young women about how they deal with violence and their roles as women within the punk scene.[60] At times the women would talk about having fun or even about political issues, which otherwise tended to be the exception in portrayals of punks. In contrast, the majority of reports were dominated by stories about lethargy, lack of purpose, lack of a future, and the feeling of being at the mercy of an era they felt was in crisis. It was not uncommon for punks to confirm these motifs when talking about themselves—e. g. in television interviews or in later attempts at self-historicization.[61] Especially in retrospect, the punks' purported no-future attitude became the symbol of a fundamental transformation from a society optimistically anticipating the future, euphoric about planning, and with an appetite for risk to widespread pessimism about the future and thus a paradigm of a new understanding of the times.[62]

58 Bravo: 'Ich ecke ständig an,' 42/1981, pp. 78f. Other media also confirmed this motif, e. g.: Peter Saalbach: Zwischendurch mampfen die Filzköpfe ihr Schulbrot, in: Hamburger Abendblatt, 30 December 1978, p. 8.

59 On the ambivalent role of women in punk, see: Uta G. Poiger: Populärkultur und Geschlechternormen, p. 69–74. The dominance of a masculine perspective in the public perception of punk at the time is reflected in the strikingly male-dominated way (popular) scholarship has dealt with the topic to this day.

60 Wir sind weder Hirn- noch Harmlos. Punkerinnen über ihre Art zu leben, NDR 3, 8 August 1984, Hörfunkarchiv NDR (HA NDR), F851753001; Punk Mädchen: Bürger erschreckt (Nordschau Hamburg), NDR 8 February 1980, FA NDR, 1125719.

61 See Punk-Rock (Nordschau Hamburg), NDR, 19 June 1978, FA NDR, 1128387; Bürger und Punks (Hamburger Journal), NDR 12 July 1982, FA NDR, 1128401. On punks' self-portrayal, viewed in retrospect: Knud Andresen: Memories of Being Punk in West Germany: Personal and Shared Recollections in Life Stories, in: Bart van der Steen/Thierry P. F. Verburgh (eds.): Researching Subcultures. Myth and Memory, Houndmills 2020, pp. 197–214.

62 Fernando Esposito: Von no future bis Posthistorie. Der Wandel des temporalen Imaginariums nach dem Boom, in: Anselm Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael/Thomas Schlemmer

If we follow the interpretations of the day, the youths' powerlessness had one cause in particular: fear. One student at the University of Hamburg stated in a sociological seminar paper on punks in 1981:

> The punk movement is to a large extent an emotionally determined movement. […] The styling of one's person, the use of certain symbols, and the stylized public behaviour bring a person to light who finds himself helpless and inferior in a society he feels is corrupt and in fear of the looming demise.[63]

At the time, it was broadly assumed that 1980s forms of protest in general—in contrast to protests of the late 1960s—were largely driven by emotions.[64] In turn, punks seemed to react especially emotionally to challenges such as the economic crisis, unemployment, and municipal austerity policy—with frustration, resignation, anger, and aggressiveness.[65] The Hamburg student's interpretation in 1981 is an example of how a quasi alarming line was drawn from emotionality, that is, the youths' fear, to their purported powerlessness to act. This also found expression in the findings of the *SINUS-Institut*, which published the results of its study commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Youth, Family Affairs, and Health on the shift in values held by the young generation. Among other things, the study stated that the rampant "potential for existential fear" was changing youths' protest behaviour—namely towards "passive forms of everyday refusal: alcoholism, drugs, suicides, youth cults, and punk and rocker groups."[66] Again, punk was not classified as a common form of protest, but as a deviant one. One could use many more examples to show that the talk about pessimism concerning the future, as initiated especially by the publication of the widely noted Shell study *Jugend '81*,[67] was increasingly tied to the concept of fear.[68] When Annette Humpe, one of the best-known representatives of the music genre *Neue Deut-*

(eds.): Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, Göttingen 2016, pp. 393–423.

63 Punk—ein neuer Ansatz der Jugendrevolte? Empirische Hausarbeit FB Soziologie, Hamburg 18 June 1981, Archiv der Sozialen Bewegungen Hamburg, p. 1.

64 Jake P. Smith: Apathy, Subversion, and the Network Sublime: Envisioning Youth Unrest in West Germany 1980–87, in: Knud Andresen/Bart van der Steen (eds.): A European Youth Revolt, pp. 231–242, p. 239. As an example of this see also Deutscher Bundestag: Jugendprotest im demokratischen Staat (II). Schlußbericht 1983 der Enquete-Kommission des 9. Deutschen Bundestages, p. 29.

65 On punk viewed from the perspective of the history of emotions: Henning Wellmann: 'Let fury have the hour, anger can be power.'

66 Die verunsicherte Generation. Jugend und Wertewandel, p. 41, 59.

67 Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell: Jugend '81.

68 Also impressive, for example: Franz Pöggeler: Jugend und Zukunft. Erkenntnisse und Hoffnungen, Salzburg, 1984, esp. pp. 42–44, 70f.

sche Welle with her band *Ideal*, interviewed six punks and six police officers in training on camera about their lives, she did not only want to know what these twelve men were afraid of at all, but also to what extent they were fearful about the future.[69] Of her ten questions, two were about the aspect of fear, even if Humpe was less concerned with confirming the narrative of collective fear of the future, instead seeking to get to the bottom of individual sensitivities. Nonetheless, her documentary illustrates the extent to which the topic of fear was present in the public discourse of the day. Fear was not considered solely a problem of the young generation. On the contrary, it seemed to be rampant throughout society, conveying ideas of a hopeless future for humanity, even to the point of apocalyptic dystopias.[70] Accordingly, the *NDR* described the young generation's current emotional disposition with the following words in a television report: "The young generation's fear frightens us because it is our fear too."[71] Such a finding corresponded with warnings also circulating at the time that boredom, listlessness, and passivity rampant among youths would spread to all of West German society.[72]

As early as the early 1980s, Jörg Bopp, an avowed 68er, posed the critical question in the *Kursbuch* journal whether "pathologizing the fear of the young generation" did not mostly "infantilize their intentions and forms of action."[73] This finding certainly provides food for thought, also in hindsight. Thematising fear of the present and the future, which was allegedly particularly prevalent among youths, obscured any deeper perception of punk as a form of protest. In addition, it was emphasized time and again that German punk was an inauthentic copy, void of content, of British youths' true and authentic protest, which was rooted in social conditions.[74] When political scientist Christa Mahrad attempted an initial empirical assessment of the phenomenon of

69 Annette Humpe: Jetzt kommt die Flut: Liebe, Geld und Tod (documentary), NDR 24 September 1982, FA NDR, 1038813.

70 On the culmination of societal discourses on fear in the 1980s: Frank Biess: Republik der Angst. Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2019, pp. 361–411.

71 Kein Bock. Bericht über die Zeitkrankheit "Lustlosigkeit," NDR 3 May 1981, FA NDR, 1037233, Min. 41:27–41:33.

72 In 1978 (the same year in which *Der Spiegel* published its cover story on punks and the *ZDF* discussed the film *Brennende Langeweile*), Noelle-Neumann had diagnosed that German society was increasingly slackening and becoming passive. The massive drop in enthusiasm for working, she believed, was just as devastating for humanity as the consequences of climate change. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann: Werden wir alle Proletarier? Wertewandel in unserer Gesellschaft, Zurich 1978.

73 Jörg Bopp: Trauer-Power. Zur Jugendrevolte 1981, in: Kursbuch 65 (October 1981), pp. 151–168, p. 155.

74 On the accusation that German youths' protest lacked authenticity, see also: Jake P. Smith: Apathy, Subversion, and the Network Sublime: Envisioning Youth Unrest in West Germany 1980–87, p. 234.

punk in 1981, she concluded "that—with the exception of a small hard core—most punks in major German cities are fashion punks."[75] In light of their age (generally 15 to 19 years old) and their background (by no means from the lower social strata), punks seemed to be merely "temporary dropouts."[76] Since punk was considered partly an expression of a young generation seeking love, partly as a crucible of generally rampant resignation, boredom, and passivity, and partly as an inauthentic fad, it appeared to be one thing above all: apolitical.[77]

The depoliticization of forms of youth protest in the discourse of the 1980s was not a new phenomenon. Historian Uta G. Poiger traced a similar dynamic in the West German debates in the 1950s about so-called *Halbstarke* whose leather jackets, Elvis quiffs, and rock 'n' roll craze attracted attention, besides their brawls and riots.[78] Analogous patterns of interpretation can be observed in the debates about the *Gammler* who gathered in the plazas and parks of major German cities in the 1960s, causing uproar among the public by wearing their hair long and their clothing casual, and demonstratively doing nothing.[79] Nonetheless, designating punk as 'apolitical' also refers to notions of politics, participation, and protest prevalent at the time. Among their major features were a growing mobilization of broad segments of the population from the 1970s and the emergence of a protest culture which had bourgeois features and was increasingly professionalized and normalized.[80] This went hand in hand with new mechanisms people used to dissociate themselves from protest behaviour they perceived to be deviant. Punks were considered the epitome of such deviance, not only because of their willingness to use violence, but also because of their entire attitude.

75 Christa Mahrad: Punks. Daten aus einer Großstadt, in: deutsche jugend 8 (1981), pp. 360–364, p. 363. Mahrad used identification data collected by the Hanover police for her study.

76 Ibid.

77 Der Spiegel, for example, wrote: "Political topics and statements are alien to the punks as a matter of principle: struggles of a distant past that punk has little to do with today." Der Spiegel: Punk: Nadel im Ohr, Klinge am Hals, 4/1978, pp. 140–147, p. 144.

78 Poiger, however, interprets this depoliticisation in the context of the Cold War. Uta G. Poiger: Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany, Berkeley, CA et al. 2000, pp. 106–136.

79 Yvonne Robel: Von passiven Gammlern zu professionellen Müßiggängern? Mediale Bilder des Nichtstuns seit den 1960er Jahren, in: Petra Terhoeven/Tobias Weidner (eds.): Exit. Ausstieg und Verweigerung in 'offenen' Gesellschaften nach 1945, Göttingen 2020, pp. 290–312.

80 Sabine Mecking: Vom Protest zur Protestkultur?, pp. 517–529.

Non-Work as a Provocation Fallen Flat

People failing to perceive punks' politics—or if you will: infantilising them—also meant that the fact that punks did not work played a conspicuously minor role in the public discourse of the day. My third hypothesis: this can be explained by a different way of speaking about various forms of non-work in the 1980s, which in its own way contributed to largely depoliticising punk.

Today, people readily associate punks with hanging around, sponging, and avoiding work. Yet there is a notable research gap with respect to questions around their attitudes towards classical gainful employment or alternative concepts of labour as well as their role in criticising a society based on work and performance. If at all, punk is thematized as criticism of mass culture or rejection of pressures to consume.[81] The attitudes towards work prevailing among punks attracted little public interest in the late 1970s and the 1980s, at least much less attention than their 'ugly' appearance, their feeling of lacking a future, and their violent manner. This is astonishing in that, in Rolf Lindner's words, punk can also be described as "*an imaginary form of lumpen-proletarian self-stylisation*" in which unemployment was reinterpreted as a consciously adopted stance.[82] Youths repeatedly stated in interviews that they were unwilling to slave away like their parents at work in which they had no say, but rather desired to do what they wanted, whatever was fun.[83] What became visible was the explicit turning away from the ideal of work and achievement. By distancing themselves above all from their parents' generation, punks presented themselves as pioneers of a different attitude to life, based on a supposedly sharper view of reality.

In 1981, some punks in Hanover founded the Anarchist Pogo Party of Germany (APPD). From 1984 onwards, the party appeared in public with a clear rejection of the German labour society. The punks active in the APPD wanted to counter the prevailing work ethic. To see non-work not only as a problem but as an opportunity, they demanded the "right to be unemployed" and the "right to be lazy."[84] In the 1990s, they then explicitly went public with the slogan "work sucks," defined idleness as a cornerstone of their reform policy, and embedded this in a fundamental critique of

81 For example: Greil Marcus: Lipstick Traces, p. 70; Carl Rhodes/Robert Ian Westwood: Selling out. Authenticity, Resistance and Punk Rock, in: idem. (eds.): Critical Representations of Work and Organization in Popular Culture, London et al. 2008, pp. 151–171.

82 Rolf Lindner: Punk rules, ok!, p. 59 (italics in the original).

83 For example: Wir sind weder Hirn- noch Harmlos. Punkerinnen über ihre Art zu leben, NDR 3, 8 August 1984, HA NDR, F851753001, Min. 11:23–12:41.

84 Ute Wieners: Zum Glück gab es Punk. Autobiografische Erzählungen, Neustadt 2012, pp. 237–261, p. 243, 244.

the achievement and work society.[85] For all its political frivolity,[86] the APPD focused on emancipative ideas in dealing with non-work.

However, the politically communicated attitude of punks towards work never became the main focus of public perception in the 1980s. The APPD only gained increased media attention when it ran in the 1997 Hamburg parliamentary elections and one year later for the first time in the federal elections. Nevertheless, there were occasional sideswipes directed at punks because of their unwillingness to work. *Der Spiegel* described them as "children […] far from a job, a bank account, and intimate lotion," alluding not only to their lack of income, but also to their withdrawal from the world of consumers.[87] *BRAVO* in turn introduced a fifteen year-old punk with the following words: "Christian's motto is 'bollocks to that.' 'Work is sweet—too bad I'm diabetic' is emblazoned on the wall…."[88] And readers of the newspaper *Hamburger Abendblatt* were introduced to a punk called *Kröte* (toad) who had left school at thirteen after his parents' death and often only got out of bed in the afternoon.[89] Such passages read as if the journalists were less concerned and more amused. Some people seemed less amused when asked on camera for their opinions about the youths who were visibly doing nothing in public. Yet by no means did they all demand that punks be sent to the workhouse or that they be "gassed," as the media often problematized using somewhat sensational language.[90] Instead, many people focused more on attempts to understand them.

For one thing, these attempts to understand punks fit into a type of reporting on young people from the late 1950s on that was oriented towards understanding rather than conflict and that also took note of the differentiations of youth lifestyles.[91] Secondly, they should be viewed against the background of the discourses about the eco-

85 Klaus Farin: Die Partei hat immer Recht! Die gesammelten Schriften der *APPD*, Bad Tölz 1998.

86 The attempt to classify the appearance of the APPD within the party-political field of action of the Federal Republic is undertaken by Philipp Meinert: ‚Liebes Stimmvieh, die APPD ist eine ganz normale Partei…!' Die Anarchistische Pogo-Partei Deutschlands, in: Philipp Meinert/Martin Seeliger (eds.): Punk in Deutschland, pp. 83–105.

87 Peter Seewald: "Meine Ratte ist riesig," in: Der Spiegel 28/1983, pp. 65–71, p. 69, 71.

88 Sissi Tränkner: Punker Christian und seine Ratte "Adolf," in: Bravo, 35/1983, pp. 66f., p. 66.

89 Thomas Osterkorn: Darum bin ich Punker, in: Hamburger Abendblatt 21 May 1980, p. 4.

90 Klaus Pokatzky, "Null Bock auf alles," in: Die Zeit 7/1981. Klaus Pokatzky, Ungeliebte Punks, in: Die Zeit 26/1982; Susanne Mayer, "Punks in die Baracken und Container," in: Die Zeit 48/1982; Wir sind weder Hirn- noch Harmlos. Punkerinnen über ihre Art zu leben, NDR 3, 8 August 1984, HA NDR, F851753001, Min. 4:11–4:36.

91 Christoph Hilgert: Die unerhörte Generation. Jugend im westdeutschen und britischen Hörfunk, 1945–1963, Göttingen 2015, pp. 276–286; Bodo Mrozek: Jugend, Pop, Kultur. Eine transnationale Geschichte, Berlin 2019, pp. 33f.

nomic crisis, which in turn contributed to perceiving punk as a socially conditioned problem and a problem to be tackled through social pedagogy. Thirdly, the lack of reflection on approaches to the refusal to work among punks can also be explained by the fact that especially in the 1970s and 1980s, people placed increasing value on time for leisure activities and doing nothing. Laziness and leisure were interpreted as ways of actively rejecting pressures to consume and be productive, and not only in youthful and alternative circles. Dropping out of gainful employment became a fascinating, desirable state of being for "all" in the form of a temporary phase of life that people could plan.[92] This created a new frame of reference for the discussion about youths deviating from the "normal bourgeois biography" including gainful employment.

Against this backdrop, even if non-work took place in public spaces, as in the case of punks, its potential to provoke was cushioned, so to speak. Punk was also considered a phenomenon of youth and thus a temporary and limited state of being, which also contributed to a certain sense of public "equanimity" in this respect. The changes in how people spoke about work and non-work were also reflected in debates typical of the time about Germans' allegedly dwindling interest in working.[93] More and more voices were heard that critically questioned concepts such as work, work ethic, and enthusiasm for working or spoke out in favour of "devotion to dolce far niente."[94] Such broader debates took the edge off approaches from the alternative movement propagating voluntary unemployment as a way of life, among others.[95] In addition, the topic of unemployment and the much-discussed "crisis of the work-based society" triggered their own dynamics when people spoke about non-work in the 1980s. Rising unemployment figures as such, but also political actions centred around the topic, for example the 1982 *Kongress der Arbeitslosen* (Conference of the Unemployed), the first such event, created broader public awareness of the topic of people being forced into non-work. For one thing, it initiated a discourse that was oriented towards understanding and enriched by socio-pedagogical ideas. For another, despite all the differences of opinion, the very positions were also present in the public discourse which fundamentally questioned wage labour as a guiding value of individual lifestyles. They included, for example, Peter-Paul Zahl's affirmation of laziness, leisure, and hedonism

92 Yvonne Robel: Vom Appell zur Anleitung: Ratschläge zum Nichtstun seit den 1950er Jahren, in: Theo Jung (ed.): Zwischen Handeln und Nichthandeln. Unterlassungspraktiken in der europäischen Moderne, Frankfurt am Main 2019, pp. 129–154.

93 For example: Psychologie heute: Warum wir Arbeit auf die lange Bank schieben, 10/1983; Psychologie heute: Die Arbeitsmoral der Deutschen, 11/1984; Werden die Deutschen faul?, NDR 19 October 1984, FA NDR, 1041617.

94 Der Spiegel: Erst mal klarkommen, 26/1983 pp. 62–65, p. 63.

95 Wiebke Wiede: Die glücklichen Arbeitslosen. Zu einer paradoxen Subjektivierungsform, in: Stephanie Kleiner/Robert Suter (eds.): Stress und Unbehagen. Glücks- und Erfolgspathologien in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 2018, pp. 147–168, p. 157.

in his broadly received fictitious magazine *Der glückliche Arbeitslose* (The Happy Unemployed).[96]

In other words, punks were not the only ones to actively adopt concepts such as laziness nor the only ones to be publicly perceived to be doing so. Their presence coincided with a period that was generally marked by a broad societal discussion about the societal value of work. In this context, forms of doing nothing (in a certain way) were increasingly seen as part of a better quality of life. Non-work was certainly not propounded as a recognized way of life by the mainstream in the 1980s. But it became more visible and thereby imaginable. Over time, the notion that forms of non-work could be societally relevant and recognized ultimately prevailed. This explains why the public scandalization of punk was directed less at its potentially deviant relationship to the prevailing work ethic and the political issues it involved. Instead, it contributed to the public perception of punk circling around the accusation that it lacked any substance at all and the notion that punks were incapable of political action, mainly for emotional reasons.

Conclusion

When thinking about ostracized public protest, it makes sense to differentiate whether the reason for its ostracization is its form or its substance. In the case of West German punks in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the form of protest, in particular, was initially considered non-conventional and unwelcomed. Besides the youths' external appearance, which attracted attention, such forms encapsulated both their alleged passivity and resignation and their apparent failure to propose solutions to political problems. Punks did not fulfil notions of legitimate forms of protest: they did not collect signatures, submit petitions, organize informational events, or call for demonstrations on "serious issues." Their violent demeanour at concerts and in public were additional factors. In a time in which society was increasingly grappling with the mass crimes perpetrated by the Third Reich, their provocative use of Nazi symbols was met with incomprehension.[97] None of this corresponded to the notions of protest in the normalized sense at the time because punk did not select familiar forms of protesting that the broad public had then come to consider legitimate and legal.[98]

96 Peter-Paul Zahl, Die Glücklichen. Schelmenroman, Berlin 1979.

97 On the ambivalent relationship of German punk to the Nazi past, see: Mirko M. Hall/Seth Howes/Cyrus Shahan (eds.): Beyond No Future. Cultures of German Punk, New York 2016.

98 The fact that protest was mostly normalized in the 1970s/1980s is also established by, for example: Dieter Rucht/Roland Roth: Soziale Bewegungen und Protest—eine theoretische und empirische Bilanz, in: ibid. (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch, Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 635–668, p. 637.

The concrete (political) substance of punk was less visible. Rather, punk was explicitly classified as non-political and contentless. On the one hand, a symptomatic lack of issues and language due to emotional causes was ascribed to the youths. On the other, "experts" from the social sciences, pedagogy, or politics interpreted their behaviour in social terms and attempted to respond with pedagogical concepts to help them. Framed among other things by the sensitivity at the time for topics such as unemployment and pessimism about the future, media reporting also developed a discourse that was largely unable to recognize that punks had any political issues of their own. Punks' potential to provoke thus quickly reached its limits, as illustrated by the lack of attention on their, for example, deviant way of dealing with work and non-work.

Punk is doubtless one of the forms of protest that was ostracized by the societal mainstream in the 1970s and 1980s. Until today, the interpretive approaches at the time make it difficult to grasp punk. This may mean, however, that one objective of early punk has been fulfilled, namely to act in ways that do not fit in easily with traditional political action.

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Markus Lundström

"The Ballot Humbug": Anarchist Women and Women's Suffrage

Abstract

This article explores how anarchist women viewed the feminist struggle for suffrage in the early 1900s. By focusing on this ostensible historical anomaly—women against patriarchy refuting the call for women's suffrage—the article ventures into a plural history of feminism. The historiographic wave metaphor, typically employed to portray different stages of feminism, is here reimagined as *radio waves*. Through a variety of publications written by influential anarchist women, the article tunes into a broadcast that airs how *an*archy expels *patri*archy through a generic struggle against *hier*archy. The case of anarchist women and women's suffrage arguably signposts how to productively invoke plurality in social movement historiography.

Keywords: *Anarchism*; *Historiography*; *Temporality*; *Social Movement*; *History of Political Thought*; *Women's Suffrage*; *Suffragette*; *Emma Goldman*; *He-Yin Zhen*

Towards a Plural History of Feminism[1]

In a time when nation after nation celebrates the centenary of women's suffrage, it is indeed tempting to depict feminism as the epitome of historical, cumulative advances in emancipation. Clearly, such an endeavour obscures ideas and actions disloyal to *the* feminist movement; uniform and linear notions of feminist progression eclipse ambiguity and antagonism—the very plurality of history. A most notable historical example is how anarchist women rejected the struggle for women's suffrage, how they asserted that female participation in elections, or in the government itself, hardly advanced their struggle for emancipation. This article locates that anarchist critique of universal suffrage in a plural history of feminism.

1 Acknowledgments: I have had the privilege to receive the most helpful comments on early versions of this text by Kathy Ferguson, Nancy Hewitt, Martha Ackelsberg, Klara Arnberg, Paulina de los Reyes and Margaret Marsh, for which I am deeply grateful.

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Substantial work has been done to expose how notions of singularity and linearity haunt the art of history writing.[2] The historiographic metaphor of oceanic waves, which is still powerful for portraying the history of what is commonly referred to as *the feminist movement*, has been particularly criticised in this regard. Such a periodisation of succeeding stages tends to neglect the interface of multiple temporalities:[3] the continuity, interlinkage, and dialogue between past and present struggles.[4] As argued by Clare Hemmings,[5] if we instead seek ambiguity and antagonism, in the *plural* history of feminism, we can bridge temporal boundaries that hamper us from recognizing certain ideas and actions. For example, what is now commonly, yet debatably, called Third Wave Feminism is often declared open-ended;[6] the ontological embrace of heterogeneity challenges social ascriptions and accentuates instead the continued resistance against the logic of domination.[7] In this sense, as Claire Snyder points out, the Third Wave carries a "feminism without exclusion," a social movement invoking "the anarchic imperative of direct action."[8] Yet uniform readings of feminism become disabling when trying to situate such a tendency historically; better then to continue the critical line of the historiography that acknowledges historical multiplicity and allows for past, present, and future to coexist and inform one another. Such a view-

2 For an overview, see: Marek Tamm/Laurent Olivier: Introduction: Rethinking Historical Time, in: Marek Tamm/Laurent Olivier (eds.): Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to Presentism, London 2019.

3 Helge Jordheim: Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities, in: History and Theory 51:2 (2012), pp. 151–171.

4 Kathleen Laughlin/Julie Gallagher/Dorothy Sue Cobble/Eileen Boris/Premilla Nadasen/Stephanie Gilmore/Leandra Zarnow: Is It Time to Jump Ship? Historians Rethink the Waves Metaphor, in: Feminist Formations 22:1 (2010), pp. 76–135; Nancy Hewitt: Introduction, in: Nancy Hewitt (ed.): No Permanent Waves: Recasting Histories of U. S. Feminism, New Brunswick 2010; Jo Reger: Introduction, in: Jo Reger (ed.): Different Wavelengths: Studies of the Contemporary Women's Movement, New York 2014.

5 Clare Hemmings: Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive, Durham 2018; Clare Hemmings: Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory, Durham 2011.

6 Jonathan Dean: Who's Afraid of Third Wave Feminism? On the Uses of the 'Third Wave' in British Feminist Politics, in: International Feminist Journal of Politics 11:3 (2009), pp. 334–352; Stacy Gillis/Gillian Howie/Rebecca Munford: Introduction, in: Stacy Gillis/Gillian Howie/Rebecca Munford (eds.): Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Exploration, New York 2004.

7 Rebecca Clark Mane: Transmuting Grammars of Whiteness in Third-Wave Feminism: Interrogating Postrace Histories, Postmodern Abstraction, and the Proliferation of Difference in Third-Wave Texts, in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 38:1 (2012), pp. 71–98, pp.75f.; Shelley Budgeon: Third-Wave Feminism and the Politics of Gender in Late Modernity, New York 2011, p. 21.

8 Claire Snyder: What Is Third-Wave Feminism? A New Directions Essay, in: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 34:1 (2008), pp. 175–196, p. 188.

point enables us to recognize how a "feminism without exclusion" airs an anarchist sentiment that has actually surged and surfaced across history.

This article documents how anarchist women have attacked *patri*archy in their struggle against *hier*archy and for *an*archy. It builds on a textual analysis of select movement publications, written by anarchist women who were active around the turn of the twentieth century, to exhibit how these dissident voices add plurality to feminist historiography. This abductive reasoning is much indebted to Clare Hemmings' polytemporal approach to anarchist/feminist historiography.[9] In *Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive*, Hemmings demonstrates how the ambiguity and antagonism of political thought, instead of being interpreted as mere incoherence, invite us into an "understanding of the present as always containing multiple histories."[10]

In this historiographic vein, which also includes Reinhart Koselleck's broader project to "pluralize the temporalities"[11] and to create a *history in the plural*,[12] this article seeks out misfit or silenced voices, in a plural history of feminism, through Nancy Hewitt's restoration of the wave metaphor. In her renouncement of the notion of oceanic waves, Hewitt suggests a regeneration in terms of *radio waves* "of different lengths and frequencies that occur simultaneously; movements that grow louder or fade out, reach vast audiences across oceans or only a few listeners in a local area."[13] Hewitt's reconceptualization offers new avenues to capture the plurality of feminist historiography; by tuning in to dissident radio waves we detect ideas and actions that would have been eclipsed by a unilineal history writing—such as anarchist women renouncing the ballot box when the struggle for suffrage was uniting feminists worldwide. This article tunes in to that broadcast of anarchist women and women's suffrage.

9 Clare Hemmings: Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory; Clare Hemmings: Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive.

10 Clare Hemmings: Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive, p. 27.

11 Reinhart Koselleck [2006], quoted in: Helge Jordheim: Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities, p. 156.

12 Niklas Olsen: History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck, New York 2012.

13 Nancy Hewitt: Feminist Frequencies: Regenerating the Wave Metaphor, in: Feminist Studies 38:3 (2012), pp. 658–680, p. 668.

*An*archy ≠ *Patri*archy

There is little dispute that the massive women's movement that shook the world around the turn of the past century orbited one political issue above all: "the gain of the Parliamentary vote" as Christabel Pankhurst put it, "the symbol of freedom and equality."[14] However, in this historical moment, we also find anarchist women who diligently accentuated the dangers of state power. *Anarchism*, as a political ideology,[15] is generally understood to have originated in the 1840s following the publication of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's *What is Property*? (1840).[16] Whereas this text articulated anarchy as a political ideal, the anarchist *movement* took off in the 1870s, following a strident break with the state-oriented faction of the First International. The anarchist movement peaked in the early 1900s, but was broken apart after the severe state suppression of the *en masse* anarchist experiment during the Spanish Civil War. Although anarchism continues to infuse political thinking well into the present,[17] this article will focus on its classic highpoint.

The critique of male domination, or *patriarchy*,[18] found fertile ground in the anarchist movement. This line of thought resembled a centennial legacy of Mary Wollstonecraft's thoughts on women in power: "I do not wish them to have power over men, but over themselves."[19] It is precisely this anti-authoritarian notion that became the leitmotif of anarchist women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Anarchism here distinguished itself from other forms of international socialism through an uncompromising critique of *all* forms of domination (including the "people's state"). Hence, the struggle against male domination was soon adopted by the anarchist movement—and this despite the grave misogyny advanced by, ironically enough, anarchism's "founding father." Proudhon understood patriarchy to denote the one legitimate social hierarchy, and his infamous stance has haunted the anarchist

14 Christabel Pankhurst: The Great Scourge and How to End It, in: Jane Marcus (ed.): Suffrage and the Pankhursts, London 2013 [1913], p. 228.

15 Randall Amster: Anti-Hierarchy, in: Benjamin Franks/Nathan Jun/Leonard Williams (eds.): Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach, New York 2018.

16 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: What Is Property?: An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government, New York 1970 [1840].

17 See for instance: Iwona Janicka: Theorizing Contemporary Anarchism: Solidarity, Mimesis and Radical Social Change, London 2017; Jesse Cohn: Underground Passages: Anarchist Resistance Culture, 1848–2011, Edinburgh 2015.

18 Gerda Lerner: The Creation of Patriarchy, Oxford 1986.

19 Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects, Cambridge 2010 [1792], p. 134.

movement ever since.[20] But it also invoked critical thought: "Before me, the star of my ideal. Behind me, men," wrote Blanca de Moncaleano, editor of the anarchist-feminist journal *Pluma Roja* in early twentieth-century Mexico.[21] Proudhon's and other male anarchists' failure to acknowledge the syllogism of *an*archy denouncing *patri*archy was indeed challenged due to its logical incoherence. The editors of *La Voz de la Mujer*, an anarchist journal circulating in late nineteenth-century Argentina, explicitly spoke out against "false anarchists," those who failed to see "one of anarchism's most beautiful ideals—the emancipation of women."[22] This incongruity was also pointed out by Proudhon's contemporaries. "Speak out against man's exploitation of woman," wrote anarchist Joseph Déjacque in an open letter to Proudhon, "do not describe yourself as an anarchist, or be an anarchist through and through."[23] The French writer and women's activist Jenny d'Hericourt similarly pleaded: "You contradict your own principles."[24]

This invigorating idea, *an*archy ≠ *patri*archy, was articulated in various places across the globe. Although anarchism as an ideology emerged from the European Enlightenment, not least through the joint political thought of Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin,[25] it grew in the late eighteenth century into an ardent social movement, a rhizome of resistance communities sprouting in each and every corner of the world.[26] Historical records suggest that women were particularly active in

20 Sharif Gemie: Anarchism and Feminism: A Historical Survey, in: Women's History Review 5:3 (1996), pp. 417–444; Mary Nash: Mujeres Libres: España 1936–1939, Barcelona 1975, pp. 8–11.

21 Blanca de Moncaleano [1915], in: Clara Lomas: Transborder Discourse: The Articulation of Gender in the Borderlands in the Early Twentieth Century, in: Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 24:2 (2003), pp. 51–74, p. 62. Anarchist-feminism was at this time well-articulated all across Latin America, with key figures such as María Lacerca de Moura, Luisa Rojas, Salvadora Medina Onrrubia and María Álvarez. Colección Libertarias: La Idea. Perspectivas De Mujeres Anarquistas, Santiago de Chile 2016.

22 Editorial [1896], in: Maxine Molyneux: Women's Movements in International Perspective, Houndmills 2001, p. 22.

23 Joseph Déjacque: On Being Human, in: Robert Graham (ed.): Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas. Vol. 1, from Anarchy to Anarchism (300ce to 1939), Montreal 2005 [1857], p. 71.

24 Jenny d'Hericourt: A Woman's Philosophy of Woman; or, Woman Affranchised: An Answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and Other Modern Innovators, New York 1864, p. 117.

25 Peter Marshall: Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism, London 2008 [1992], pp. 196–200; Alice Wexler: Emma Goldman on Mary Wollstonecraft, in: Penny Weiss/Loretta Kensinger (eds.): Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman, Pennsylvania 2007.

26 Benedict Anderson: Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, London 2005, pp. 1–8; Kathy Ferguson: Emma Goldman: Political Thinking in the Streets,

this movement.[27] At the heart of the political ideology advocating anarchy, anarchist women seem to have found a most simple yet difficult idea. Akin to Wollstonecraft's aphorism above, this idea was pointedly summarized by anarchist campaigner Lucy Parsons, who ingenuously declared that "the principle of rulership is in itself wrong; no man has any right to rule another."[28]

This line of thought follows from anarchism's generic, anti-authoritarian orientation, employed to navigate various strains of domination: economic, political, and social. As formulated by Charlotte Wilson, one of England's most prominent late nineteenth century organizers, anarchism targets the sheer logic of domination: "The leading manifestations of this obstructive tendency," Wilson declared, "are Property, or domination over things, the denial of the claim of others to their use; and Authority, the government of man by man, embodied in majority rule."[29] Voltairine de Cleyre similarly defined anarchism as the unpretentious "belief that all forms of external authority must disappear to be replaced by self-control only."[30] Emma Goldman likewise depicted anarchy as nothing less than "the negation of all forms of authority."[31] For these anarchist women, the course toward abolishing authority seems to have translated into a struggle against male domination; they began to target—alongside the powers of capital, state, and church—the institution of patriarchy.

Anarchists and Feminists

The anarchists typically positioned themselves *against* the feminism of their day. As part of the international labour movement, with its distinct class orientation, many anarchists seem to have found it difficult to join a cross-class struggle for mere female

Lanham 2011, pp. 229–237; Clare Hemmings: Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive, pp. 80–86.

27 Kathy Ferguson suggests that "the anarchist's groups during Goldman's time and place were roughly one-third or even one-half women". A list of these anarchist feminists is continuously updated on Ferguson's website: www.politicalscience.hawaii.edu/emmagoldman/index.html.

28 Lucy Parsons: The Ballot Humbug. A Delusion and a Snare; a Mere Veil Behind Which Politics Is Played, in: Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (ed.): Lucy Parsons: Freedom, Equality & Solidarity: Writings & Speeches, 1878–1937, Chicago 2004 [1905], pp. 96f.

29 Charlotte Wilson: Anarchism, in: Dark Star Collective (ed.): Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader (third edition), Edinburgh 2012 [1886], p. 90.

30 Voltairine De Cleyre: The Making of an Anarchist, in: A. J. Brigati (ed.): The Voltairine De Cleyre Reader, London 2004 [1903], p. 106.

31 Emma Goldman: Some More Observations (Published in Free Society, 29 April 1900), in: Candace Falk (ed.): Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years. Volume 1: Made for America, 1890–1901, Berkeley 2003 [1900], p. 402.

inclusion in corporate and governmental realms.[32] In the twentieth-century United States, deep concerns emerged among many immigrant and working-class women that feminism in general, and the struggle for suffrage in particular, was little more than a deceptive fabrication of the bourgeoisie.[33] This notion was most pointedly voiced by the Russian-Jewish immigrant Emma Goldman. Despite her fierce attacks on male domination, she could not embrace mainstream feminism for these specific reasons.[34] While suffragist-feminists viewed women's exclusion from governmental power as the most significant burden on women's full equality, Goldman and her anarchist comrades understood governmental power itself to be deeply problematic. This type of dis-identification from early twentieth-century feminism also appeared among anarchist women in Chile,[35] Argentina,[36] Italy,[37] and Spain.[38] Federica Montseny, a key figure in the Spanish Revolution and Civil War, declared polemically: "Feminism? Never! Humanism? Always!"[39] This anarchist rejection of feminism was ideologically grounded; the emblematic critique of domination spurred anarchist women to denounce what they saw as mainstream feminism's chief, political objective: the ballot.

32 Linda Lumsden: Anarchy Meets Feminism: A Gender Analysis of Emma Goldman's Mother Earth, 1906–1917, in: American Journalism 24:3 (2007), pp. 31–54.

33 Jennifer Guglielmo: Transnational Feminism's Radical Past: Lessons from Italian Immigrant Women Anarchists in Industrializing America, in: Journal of Women's History 22:1 (2010), pp. 10–33.

34 Vivian Gornick: Emma Goldman: Revolution as a Way of Life, New Haven 2011, p. 75; Candace Falk: Forging Her Place: An Introduction, in: Candace Falk (ed.): Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years, pp. 42–45; Alice Wexler: Emma Goldman: An Intimate Life, London 1984, pp. 194–197.

35 Elizabeth Hutchison: From 'La Mujer Esclava' to 'La Mujer Limón': Anarchism and the Politics of Sexuality in Early-Twentieth-Century Chile, in: Hispanic American Historical Review 81:3/4 (2001), p. 519.

36 Maxine Molyneux: Women's Movements in International Perspective.

37 Andrea Pakieser: I Belong Only to Myself: The Life and Writings of Leda Rafanelli, Edinburgh 2014.

38 Martha Ackelsberg: Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women, Oakland 2005 [1991], p. 23; Temma Kaplan: Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868–1903, Princeton 1977, pp. 86f.

39 [1924], in Shirley Fredricks: Feminism: The Essential Ingredient in Federica Montseny's Anarchist Theory, in: Jane Slaughter/Robert Kern (ed.): European Women on the Left: Socialism, Feminism, and the Problems Faced by Political Women, 1880 to the Present, Westport 1981, p. 133.

"The Ballot Humbug"

As the broader feminist movement became increasingly articulated in the Global North, with a unifying demand for women's suffrage, many anarchist women voiced another type of critique, distinguishing themselves from suffragist-feminists by not seeking inclusion in governmental affairs.[40] These ideas were also articulated in early twentieth-century China, where the anarchist movement was particularly strong.[41] Here, He-Yin Zhen asserted that women's participation in government would only allow a small minority to access "positions of domination."[42] She argued that women in power "would rule the majority of powerless women and not only would the disparity between men and women continue, a disparity among the different classes would also emerge."[43] Zhen's argument—that government power reinforces social hierarchies—has deep roots in anarchist thought, and it is from that ideological starting point anarchists renounced the struggle for women's suffrage. He-Yin Zhen broadcasted this precise idea: "The ultimate goal of women's liberation is to free the world from the rule of men and the rule of women."[44]

The anarchists aired a profound disbelief in the supposed emancipatory outcomes of universal suffrage: "Of all the modern delusions," Lucy Parsons scorned, "the ballot has certainly been the greatest."[45] Parson's essay—"The Ballot Humbug"—was distributed in the United States, where anarchism grew particularly influential in the early twentieth century. Here, women's groups formed the very backbone of anarchist organizing among the immigrant working class.[46] The single most important theorist and organizer among them, Emma Goldman, offered this sharp critique: "Our modern fetich [sic] is universal suffrage," Goldman wrote in her essay "Woman Suffrage," a fetish concealing "what people of intellect perceived fifty years ago: that suffrage is an evil, that it has only helped to enslave people, that it has but closed their eyes that

40 Jennifer Guglielmo: Transnational Feminism's Radical Past: Lessons from Italian Immigrant Women Anarchists in Industrializing America; Martha Ackelsberg: Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women, p. 177.

41 Peter Zarrow: Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture, New York 1990.

42 He-Yin Zhen: On the Question of Women's Liberation, in: Lydia H. Liu/Rebecca E. Karl/Dorothy Ko (eds.): The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory, New York 2013 [1907], p. 70.

43 He-Yin Zhen: On the Question of Women's Liberation, p. 70.

44 He-Yin Zhen: On the Question of Women's Liberation, p. 70.

45 Lucy Parsons: The Ballot Humbug. A Delusion and a Snare; a Mere Veil Behind Which Politics Is Played, p. 95.

46 Jennifer Guglielmo: Living the Revolution: Italian Women's Resistance and Radicalism in New York City, 1880–1945, Chapel Hill 2010.

they may not see how craftily they were made to submit."[47] Goldman situates her categorical understanding of democratic elections as "an evil" in the history of anarchist thought; in this passage, she most probably was referring to Mikhail Bakunin's notion of universal suffrage as an illusory, viscous route to emancipation.

As anarchism became articulated as a political movement, the critique of representative government—construed as democracy—formed a keystone in its thought. Bakunin in particular voiced this critique: "If there is a State," he declared in *Statism and Anarchy*, "there must be domination of one class by another. […] The question arises, if the proletariat is to be the ruling class, over whom is it to rule?" Bakunin further argued that this "ruling class" would "no longer represent the people, but only themselves and their claims to rulership over the people."[48] For Bakunin, this critical forecast—that states not only maintain, but also produce, social hierarchies—translated into a thorough critique of universal suffrage and the election of governmental representatives:

> It was generally expected that once universal suffrage was established, the political liberty of the people would be assured. This turned out to be a great illusion. […] The whole system of representative government is an immense fraud resting on this fiction: that the executive and legislative bodies elected by universal suffrage of the people must or even can possibly represent the will of the people. […] Political power means domination. And where there is domination, there must be a substantial part of the population who remain subjected to the domination of their rulers.[49]

This notion would be aired again half a century later, when Emma Goldman, too, declared that domination cannot be cured by inverting social hierarchies. As Bakunin spoke out against the working class overtaking the state, Goldman criticized women's desire to take part in governmental elections. She disputed the ostensible emancipatory outcomes of women's suffrage:

> I see neither physical, psychological, nor mental reasons why woman should not have the equal right to vote with man. But that cannot possibly blind me to the absurd notion that woman will accomplish that wherein man has failed. If she would not make things worse, she certainly could not make them better. [She] can give suffrage or the ballot no new quality, nor can she receive anything from it that

47 Emma Goldman: Woman Suffrage, in: Alix Kates Schulman (ed.): Red Emma Speaks, Amherst 1998 [1911], p. 190, p. 92.

48 Michail Bakunin: Statism and Anarchy, in: Sam Dolgoff (ed.): Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism, London 2013 [1873], pp. 330f.

49 Michail Bakunin: On Representative Government and Universal Suffrage, pp. 220f.

> will enhance her own quality. Her development, her freedom, her independence, must come from and through herself.[50]

Goldman fiercely disdained the notion of alleged female superiority, also rejecting the notion that women are better rulers than men. In the same vein, Federica Montseny declared that "it is authority and domination that produce the evils in men in government and it will do the same to women. The answer to a better society is not female rulers, but a new society."[51] He-Yin Zhen put it quite similarly in her essay "On the Question of Women's Liberation,": "I would be gratified to see women renounce their desire to mobilize with the objective of governmental rule and begin to look toward the eventual abolition of government."[52] These anarchist women demanded no inclusion in government; they wanted to abolish state power altogether. An important aspect of their distrust in the state, and in the struggle to overtake it, was the blatant dismissal of the majority's right to rule over disagreeing individuals and minority groups.

Against Majority Rule

Goldman's critique of electoral democracy, and of women's suffrage, was strongly rooted in egoist anarchism, a line of thought carefully advanced and incorporated into her political theory. In "The Individual, Society and the State," Goldman rejected "individualism," defined as "the social and economic laissez-faire," as a "straitjacket of individuality."[53] She scolded liberal individualism for being dependent on policed private property, which anarchists found to be the ultimate factory for social inequality. At the same time, Goldman also stressed the notion of individuality and personal autonomy. This eventually led her to assert that "more pernicious than the power of a dictator is that of a class; the most terrible—the tyranny of a majority." She argued that the very foundation of democracy, majority rule, could only restrain power, including the individual's power to act according to her needs and desires:

> Real freedom, true liberty is positive: it is freedom to something; it is the liberty to be, to do; in short, the liberty of actual and active opportunity […] It cannot be given: it cannot be conferred by any law or government. The need of it, the longing for it, is inherent in the individual.[54]

50 Emma Goldman: Woman Suffrage, pp. 192f., p. 202.
51 Federica Montseny [1924], in: Shirley Fredricks: Feminism: The Essential Ingredient in Federica Montseny's Anarchist Theory, p. 130.
52 He-Yin Zhen: On the Question of Women's Liberation, p. 70.
53 Emma Goldman: The Individual, Society and the State, p. 112.
54 Emma Goldman: The Individual, Society and the State, p. 121.

Goldman expressed this position most notably in her essay "Majorities Versus Minorities": "the majority, that compact, immobile, drowsy mass […] will always be the annihilator of individuality, of free initiative, of originality."[55] Here Goldman tuned into, as she often did, the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.[56] But this scepticism of electoral democracy also resembled the ideas of yet another adversary to majority rule, the German philosopher Max Stirner. Though his work was first published in 1844, Stirner became known to English-speaking anarchists, Goldman among them, through Benjamin Tucker's translation of *The Ego and Its Own* at the turn of the century.[57] In this book, Stirner aired his "egoist" analysis, which highlighted individual autonomy and exposed the confinements of both state and society. Stirner targeted not only people in power, the established, but "establishment itself, the state, not a particular state, not any such thing as the mere condition of the state at the time; it is not another state (such as a 'people's state') that men aim at, but their union, uniting, this ever-fluid uniting of everything standing."[58]

Goldman's row against majority rule thus had ideological roots that sprouted in the historical context of suffragist-feminism. She linked Stirner's thinking to the critique of morality outlined in Nietzsche's book *Beyond Good and Evil*.[59] Her belief in individual autonomy, which indeed was a linchpin to her political theory,[60] led Goldman to reject "the clumsy attempt of democracy to regulate the complexities of human character by means of external equality." She pursued a polity "'beyond good and evil' [that] points to the right to oneself, to one's personality."[61] Following this firm critique of majority rule, Goldman declared that she did "not believe in the power of the ballot, either for man or women."[62] However, many anarchist women were not as dogmatic when discussing the tactics used to eradicate male domination.

55 Emma Goldman: Minorities Versus Majorities, p. 83, p. 85.
56 Kathy Ferguson: Religion, Faith, and Politics: Reading Goldman through Nietzsche, in: Penny Weiss/Loretta Kensinger (eds.): Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman, Pennsylvania 2007.
57 Saul Newman: Introduction: Re-Encountering Stirner's Ghosts, in: Saul Newman (ed.): Max Stirner, Basingstoke 2011; David Leopold: A Solitary Life, in: Saul Newman (ed.): Max Stirner, Basingstoke 2011.
58 Max Stirner: The Ego and Its Own, Cambridge 1995 [1870], pp. 198f.
59 Kathy Ferguson: Emma Goldman: Political Thinking in the Streets, pp. 161f.
60 Janet Day: The "Individual" in Goldman's Anarchist Theory, in: Penny Weiss/Loretta Kensinger (eds.): Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman, Pennsylvania 2007.
61 Emma Goldman: Jealousy: Causes and a Possible Cure, p. 215.
62 Emma Goldman [1916], quoted in: Clare Hemmings: Considering Emma Goldman: Feminist Political Ambivalence and the Imaginative Archive, p. 44.

Diversity of Tactics

As we have seen, the anarchist women of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century typically rejected the feminist call for universal suffrage and electoral democracy. They wanted no rulers at all, neither male nor female. Yet many of them embraced a diversity of tactics to abolish patriarchy. While anarchists like Goldman ferociously rejected any emancipatory potential of the ballot box, other anarchist women saw suffrage as a useful tactic in their struggle.[63] The early twentieth-century Puerto Rican anarchist Luisa Capetillo is one example;[64] another is the influential UK anarchist Charlotte Wilson who eventually came to join forces with suffragettes in the early twentieth century.[65] We can also recognize such a diversity of tactics among the anarchist in 1930s Spain, where Federica Montseny herself took part in the government.[66] However, in this tactical understanding, the ballot, this absolute symbol of electoral democracy, was hardly perceived as a political goal in itself but rather as a pragmatic manoeuvre to abolish male domination once and for all.

Here, we encounter a view of democracy as a route toward anarchy. In the 1980s, that notion was aired by Uruguayan anarchist Luce Fabbri, who understood anarchism precisely as an urge to move *beyond* democracy. "Democracy and anarchy are not mutually contradictory but the one represents an advance upon the other," wrote Fabbri, "the difference is, instead, a difference of degree."[67] She understood democracy as incompatible with, but a step toward, anarchy. In the history of anarchist thought, we find something similar in Errico Malatesta's understanding view of anarchism as a route rather than a destination. Malatesta declared, in the late 1890s, that what matters for the anarchists "is not whether we accomplish Anarchy today, tomorrow, or within ten centuries, but that we walk toward anarchy today, tomorrow, and always."[68] Malatesta, while spending his final years in house arrest under Italian Fascism, notoriously stressed that the anarchist struggle actually had little to do with building democracy; it was all about "seeking to reduce the power of the State and of privilege,

63 Margaret Marsh: Anarchist Women, 1870–1920, Philadelphia 1981, p. 58.

64 Nancy Hewitt: Southern Discomfort: Women's Activism in Tampa, Florida, 1880s–1920s, Urbana 2001, p. 216.

65 Susan Hinely: Charlotte Wilson, the "Woman Question", and the Meanings of Anarchist Socialism in Late Victorian Radicalism, in: International Review of Social History 57:1 (2012), pp. 3–36, pp. 32–26.

66 Shirley Fredricks: Feminism: The Essential Ingredient in Federica Montseny's Anarchist Theory.

67 Luce Fabbri: From Democracy to Anarchy, in: Robert Graham (ed.): Anarchy & Democracy: Bookchin, Malatesta & Fabbri, 2012 [1983].

68 Errico Malatesta: Toward Anarchy, in: Davide Turcato (ed.): The Method of Freedom: An Errico Malatesta Reader, London 2014 [1899], p. 300.

and by demanding always greater freedom, greater justice."[69] Six decades later, Luce Fabbri transmitted, while suppressed by the military government in Uruguay, a modified version of Malatesta's idea; she held that democracy could be a useful experience on the path toward anarchy.

Despite the diversity of tactics employed by anarchist women to abolish male domination, they forcefully aired that the struggle against patriarchy is part of a more generic effort: the struggle against all hierarchy, a struggle for anarchy. And tuning in to these anarchist waves arguably comes with the promising potential to enrich feminist historiography.

Anarchist Waves

As we now celebrate the centenary of women's suffrage, there is arguably much to gain by also tuning in to assorted feminist frequencies to receive distant broadcasts.[70] Listening to various wavelengths would arguably limit a uniform and linear historiography of unfolding advancements where one tidal wave of social progression exceeds the other. Instead, we would hear Emma Goldman, He-Yin Zhen, Lucy Parsons, and other anarchist women renouncing the struggle for women's suffrage, how they did not settle for mere female inclusion in government and corporate affairs, but opted for no less than the end of *all* domination. Tuning in to these anarchist waves makes also audible the voice of Molly Steimer, one of many anarchist women who endured imprisonment, torture, and exile: "I hold fast to my convictions," an aged Steimer declared when reflecting back on her political life, "only in a society where no human being will rule over another, there can be true freedom."[71]

Anarchist waves—metaphorically understood in terms of radio waves—broadcast that male domination cannot be fought without simultaneously addressing the parallel and interlinked workings of domination. This uncompromising idea sparks boundless political engagement; anarchism's black star guides indefinite struggles against the very *logic* of domination. By tuning in to these anarchist waves, our now centennial celebrations of feminist achievements could perhaps better acknowledge the unruly contributions of anarchist women. "You poor judges, poor slaves of the government," wrote Kanno Sugako from her prison cell, charged with high treason for plotting against the Japanese Emperor. On the eve of her execution in January 1911, Sugako

69 Errico Malatesta: Article Excerpt from *Pensiero E Volantà*, May 16, 1925, in: Vernon Richards (ed.): Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas, London 1965 [1925], p. 23.

70 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Can the Subaltern Speak?, in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (eds.): Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Chicago 1988.

71 Molly Steimer, quoted in: Margaret Marsh: Anarchist Women, 1870–1920, p. 39.

aired a most memorable allegation. "You may live for *a hundred years*," she informed her executors, "but what is a life without freedom, a life of slavery, worth?"[72]

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72 Kanno Sugako, in: Mikiso Hane (ed.): Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan, Berkeley 1988 [1911], pp. 67f., my italics.

Michael Antolović

The History of Historiography as a Form of Disciplinary Self-Reflection

In Memoriam: Georg G. Iggers (1926–2017)

Abstract

This article addresses the theoretical and methodological conceptions of Georg G. Iggers (1926–2017) in the context of his work on the history of historiography. In addition to the autobiography written by Wilma and George Iggers, the present study focuses on the main subjects of his research: the emergence and development of German historical scholarship (*Geschichtswissenschaft*) from Leopold Ranke to the present, the role of the Enlightenment in the constitution of "scientific historiography," different forms of New History in the twentieth century, the relationship between Marxism and historiography, and the challenge to historical writing posed by postmodernism and globalization. Moreover, special attention is given to Iggers' ideas as one of the foremost engaged public intellectuals.

Keywords: *Georg G. Iggers*; *History of historiography*; *German historiography*; *Enlightenment*; *New History*; *Marxism*; *postmodernism*; *globalization*; *public intellectual*

The dynamic and exceptionally powerful development of historiography in the twentieth century was marked not only by the appearance of new directions of historical thinking, but also by the (re)emergence of certain historical disciplines. It seems that this was also the case with the history of historiography—after the fundamental works of Eduard Fueter and G. P. Gooch published on the eve of the First World War, which established this sub-discipline of historical studies, it ceased to attract the interest of historians in the following decades.[1] The situation only changed in the last third of the twentieth century, when a critical evaluation of historiography and its heritage began as a part of a wider re-examination of the theoretical and methodological assumptions within historical studies. Numerous historiographical works by the American historian Georg G. Iggers played a vital role in this process of research-

1 Eduard Fueter: Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, München 1911; G. P. Gooch: History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, New York 1913.

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ing the history of modern historiography, its epistemic possibilities, the character of historical knowledge, and its function in modern societies. Originally published in English and/or German and then translated into several Middle Eastern and Asian languages (Turkish, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Korean) in addition to European languages, his works had a profound influence on the major trends in contemporary historical thought. For decades, Iggers enjoyed the reputation of a leading authority on the history of historiography, and his scholarly work received global recognition in the "ecumene of historians."

Iggers' life journey began in Hamburg, where he was born on 7 December 1926 as Georg Gerson Iggersheimer to a Jewish merchant family that belonged culturally to the German *Mittelstand* but preserved its religious identity. Having spent his childhood in Germany, he immigrated with his family to the United States in autumn 1938. Evading a *pogrom* carried out by Nazi authorities, his family found refuge in Richmond, Virginia. After his family name was shortened and americanized to make his socialization in this new environment easier, young Georg continued his education, studying philosophy, French and Spanish at the University of Richmond. He took only one history course, attending Samuel Chiles Mitchell's lectures on Europe in the nineteenth century. It is worth mentioning that Mitchell exercised a strong influence on Iggers, not so much as a historian but through his lifelong struggle against racial inequality.[2] During his graduate studies at the University of Chicago, Iggers met Arnold Bergstraesser, a political scientist, who was forced to leave his chair at the University of Heidelberg and emigrate to the United States. The cooperation with Bergstraesser resulted in Iggers' enduring interest in the history of ideas (*Ideengeschichte*) and, more generally, in the legacy of European intellectual history.[3] At less than 20 years of age, he earned his master's degree, with a thesis on the relationship between Heinrich Heine and the supporters of the social doctrine of Saint-Simon. The following year (1945/46), Iggers studied philosophy and sociology at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at the New School for Social Research in New York. This institution, where many émigré scholars from enslaved Europe (mostly Germany, Italy, Spain and France) lectured, embodied the highest achievements of European scholarship and culture for Iggers; the time he spent there was, in his opinion, "the most valuable" time of his entire student career.[4] Such an appraisal is quite understandable considering that Iggers, along with other courses at the New School, also attended lectures by the leading protestant theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, as well as Erich Fromm, a respected sociologist and psychoanalyst of the

2 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times. Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as Scholars and Citizens, New York/Oxford 2006, pp. 40f.

3 Ibid., pp. 50–52.

4 Ibid., p. 54.

time.[5] Upon his return to Chicago, Iggers continued his studies, devoting himself to the research of European intellectual history—he directed the focus of his interest to the cultural, political and social history of France and Germany during the age of revolution (1789–1848/49). Supervised by prominent historian Louis Gottschalk, Iggers defended his doctoral dissertation on the "Saint-Simonian Critique of Modern Civilization" in 1951 before a doctoral committee that also included Arnold Bergstraesser and theologian James Luther Adams. It was published as a book entitled *The Cult of Authority. Political Philosophy of the Saint-Simonians: a Chapter of the Intellectual History of Totalitarianism* a few years later.[6] Iggers was attracted to the political ideas of French utopian socialists, not because of his own leanings towards socialism but, quite the contrary, because he recognized the roots of twentieth century totalitarian systems in their doctrine. In spite of the fact that Gottschalk was one of the rare historians to show an interest in the theory of history at that time,[7] Iggers was much more influenced by Bergstraesser and Adams with their lectures about German philosophy, literature and protestant theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[8]

Deeply interested not only in current Anglo-American, French and German historiography but also in philosophical and sociological scholarship, Iggers drastically redirected his research by the end of the 1950s to the theory of historical studies and the history of historiography. This turn from the history of political ideas to the theoretical and methodological issues of historical scholarship is testified by his article on the idea of progress in recent philosophies of history.[9] In this sense, Iggers' stay in Europe (1960–1962) was an important turning point toward reaching intellectual maturity. Owing to fellowships from the American Philosophical Society and the Guggenheim Foundation, Iggers had the opportunity to visit France, Great Britain and West Germany, and to meet some of the most significant philosophical, sociological and historical thinkers of that time. Bearing in mind that Iggers was then still "a totally unknown historian at a totally unknown Black college," the cordiality with which he was greeted by the "great names" of English and French scholarship is a testimony to their intellectual openness and curiosity.[10] Sharing a belief in the necessity of upholding human rights and liberties in an age increasingly characterized by the intensifying

5 Ibid., pp. 54f.

6 Georg G. Iggers: The Cult of Authority. Political Philosophy of the Saint-Simonians: a Chapter of the Intellectual History of Totalitarianism, The Hague 1958.

7 See Louis Gottschalk: Understanding of History. A Primer of Historical Method, New York 1950.

8 Franz Fillafer: Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, in: Sozial.Geschichte. Zeitschrift für historische Analyse des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts 19:1 (2004), pp. 84–99, here p. 93.

9 Georg G. Iggers: The Idea of Progress in Recent Philosophies of History, in: The Journal of Modern History 30:3 (1958), pp. 215–226.

10 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 90.

conflict between two ideologically opposed superpowers, Iggers was in contact with philosophers Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper as well as historians Herbert Butterfield and Geoffrey Barraclough. Butterfield's works on the Whig interpretation of history and the role of Göttingen School of History would become of "critical importance" for Iggers' future research on the history of historiography. In Paris, he attended seminars by Fernand Braudel, the most prominent representative of the *Annales School*, discussing his ideas with him and one of his closest associates, Robert Mandrou.[11]

During his stay in West Germany, Iggers made the acquaintance of archconservative historian Gerhard Ritter, the "Nestor of West German Historiography" after the Second World War.[12] Establishing contacts with the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen, West Germany, which he would maintain over the following decades, Iggers began to cooperate in the early 1970s with the new Bielefeld School of Social History, which was critical of the traditions of German historiography. Iggers developed a fruitful lifelong cooperation with some of its leading proponents, including Jürgen Kocka and Jörn Rüsen. Iggers' stay in Göttingen in 1961, coincided with the trial of Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem and the publication of Fritz Fischer's ground-breaking study of Germany's aims in the First World War. Both events marked a turning point in the manner in which the Holocaust and the responsibility for starting both World Wars were dealt with not only in the German historiography, but also in German collective memory, leading to a re-examination of modern German history in the years that followed.[13]

In addition to his close relationship with historians in West Germany during the Cold War years, Iggers also made contact with colleagues from the other side of the Iron Curtain, primarily those in East Germany and later in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As "the first non-Communist American historian," he visited East Germany in 1966 and began to cooperate with leading representatives of East German historiography, maintaining friendly relations with some of them, such as Hans Schleier and Werner Berthold, for decades. In spite of the fact that the majority of East German historians who maintained an orthodox Marxist stance opposed a "bourgeois interpretation of history," Iggers had the opportunity to exchange ideas with Fritz Klein, a non-dogmatic Marxist historian who drew the same conclusions about the causes of the First World War as Fritz Fischer, Walter Markov, one of the leading Marxist historians of the French Revolution and Jürgen Kuczynski, the most

11 Ibid., pp. 89f.

12 Ibid., p. 90.

13 Compare Chris Lorenz: Der Nationalsozialismus, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung nach 1945, in: Friso Wielenga (ed.): 60 Jahre Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Deutschland und die Niederlande—Historiographie und Forschungsperspektiven, Münster 2006, pp. 159–171; Norbert Frei: Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit, München 1996.

renowned East German historian.[14] Iggers' contact with historians in the socialist world was not limited to East Germany, but included close professional ties with colleagues in Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Among others, he met Jerzy Topolski, the most influential Polish specialist in the theory of history as well as Russian historian Aaron Gurevich, certainly one of the most important medievalist of the second half of the twentieth century (although they only met after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s).[15] From the 1980s onwards, Iggers began an intellectual exchange on a global level, giving lectures at universities in China, Japan and South Korea. The fact that Iggers' home in Buffalo, New York, was for many years a meeting point for historians from all around the world (from America and Europe to India and China) confirms his lifelong commitment to dialogue among different (historiographical) cultures.

It should also be noted that Iggers worked on the institutionalization of the theory of history and the history of historiography as sub-disciplines of historical studies. With French historian Charles-Olivier Carbonell and Rumanian historian Lucian Boia, he established the International Commission on the History of Historiography at the International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Bucharest in 1980. As a part of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, the Commission began to publish its specialized journal *Storia della Storiografia* in 1982 which became the leading forum for this sub-discipline of historical studies. Iggers was not only a member of its editorial board for many years, but also the president of the Commission on the History of Historiography (1995–2000).[16]

In addition to his work on the history of historiography, one of the distinctive features of Iggers' extremely rich biography is his exemplary dedication to social activism, primarily as part of the movement against racial segregation in the American South during the 1950s and 1960s, and later his opposition to the Vietnam War. The fact that Iggers was the first white man to become a member of a Black fraternity confirms that he was in many ways an extraordinary person whose activities transcended the usual *habitus* of university professors. Finally, Iggers spent most of his fruitful academic career as a Professor of Intellectual History at Canisius College in Buffalo (New York), where he taught from 1965 until his retirement in 1991. Iggers was married to Germanist Wilma Abeles, a Jewish émigré from former Czechoslovakia. Their personal experiences in the "Age of Extremes" as well as their mutual commitment to the values of freedom and human rights was presented in their jointly written autobiography *Zwei Seiten der Geschichte. Lebensbericht aus unruhigen Zeiten* (Two Lives in Uncertain Times. Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as Scholars and Citizens). Trans-

14 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, pp. 143–156.
15 Ibid., pp. 189f.
16 Ibid., p. 142 and p. 190.

lated into English, Czech, Spanish and Chinese, it testifies not only to their lives in uncertain times, but acts as an invigorating documentary on intellectual history from a transnational and transatlantic perspective.[17] Georg G. Iggers died on 26 November 2017 at his home in Buffalo, just a few days before his ninety-first birthday; he was survived by his wife and three sons.

Considering the respect Iggers enjoyed within the global community of historians, it seems surprising that he neither gained the usual historical education nor became a historian in the usual sense of the word: He dealt with source critique and the establishment of the historical record only as a doctoral student in Chicago, and very rarely did any archival research during his subsequent scholarly career.[18] Across his lifelong scholarly work, Iggers was interested in various subjects—the development and structure of modern German historiography (*Geschichtswissenschaft*) from Leopold Ranke to the present, the role of the Enlightenment in the constitution of "scientific historiography," different forms of New History (which developed as an effort to transcend, at the theoretical and methodological level, the traditional paradigm of the historical discipline from the middle of the twentieth century onwards), the relationship between Marxism and historiography, and the challenge posed by postmodernism and globalization to historical writing.

While conducting research on the "decline of the idea of progress in the nineteenth century," as well as the reception of Ranke's work within the American historiography, Iggers was attracted by historism, a distinctive German understanding of history and historical scholarship that characterized German historiography from the early nineteenth century until the 1960s.[19] As a theoretical concept, German historism "from Ranke and Droysen to Meinecke, rejected the idea of progress as schematic and emphasized the uniqueness or individuality of every epoch" while also being "based on a powerful optimism regarding history that saw in every period *moral energies* (Ranke) and *moral forces* (Droysen) at work, and saw the European world of the nineteenth century as the climax of historical development."[20] Iggers published his critique of the

17 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Zwei Seiten der Geschichte. Lebensbericht aus unruhigen Zeiten, Göttingen 2002. Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times. Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as Scholars and Citizens, New York/Oxford 2006.

18 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 57.

19 See Iggers' early papers devoted to this subject Georg G. Iggers: The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought, in: History and Theory 2:1 (1962), pp. 17–40; Georg G. Iggers: German Historical Thought and the Idea of Natural Law, in: Cahiers d'histoire mondiale 8 (1964), pp. 565–575; Georg G. Iggers: The Idea of Progress: A Critical Reassessment, in: The American Historical Review 71:1 (1965), pp. 1–17; Georg G. Iggers: The Decline of the Classical National Tradition of German Historiography, in: History and Theory 6:3 (1967), pp. 382–412.

20 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 97.

main theoretical premises of modern German historiography under the title *German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present* (1968), dedicating the book to James Luther Adams.[21] With a strong interest in the political and ideological consequences of historism, Iggers accepted a critical interpretation of modern German history in the form of a "special German path" into modernity (*der deutsche Sonderweg*).[22] Like many authors who wrote after the Second World War (among them Helmuth Plessner, Fritz Stern, Ernst Fraenkel, Hans Rosenberg, Kurt Sontheimer, Hans-Ulrich Wehler), Iggers believed that the modernization of German society during the nineteenth century was not accompanied by a democratization of the political order. Quite the contrary, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, a political reaction came in the form of a rejection of the Enlightenment, natural law and political liberalism. antidemocratic and antirationalistic thought was thus an outstanding feature not only of the *Weltanschauung* of German scholars, including historians analyzed by Iggers in his book, but also German political culture as a whole.[23] Having shown that an ethical conception of the state that embodies moral values had had a pivotal role in the understanding of German historians, he tried to show in his book "that the ultra-nationalistic ideology of German historicism with its emphasis on political power outlined a road which did not predetermine the rise of the Nazis, but did make it more acceptable for many Germans."[24]

Considering the book's main thesis, the reception of this unconventional history of modern German historiography was much broader in West Germany. Iggers' critical re-examination of historism's latent ideological background was a methodological novelty in the scholarship on the history of historical writing at that time. Challenging previously unquestionable assumptions about the German historiography and analyzing its ideological anti-liberalism, the book (whose publication coincided with the "paradigm shift" within German historiography) demonstrated the sharpest critique of the German historiographical tradition and "prepared an excellent funeral for historism."[25] Since historism was discredited by its anti-liberal ideology as well as its identification with the aims of the German "power state" (*Machtstaat*), it was replaced at the beginning of the 1970s with the "history as a social science," whose proponents

21 Georg G. Iggers: The German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present, Middletown CT 1968.

22 Compare Jürgen Kocka: German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German *Sonderweg*, in: Journal of Contemporary History 23:1 (1988), pp. 3–16.

23 Franz Fillafer: Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, pp. 89f.

24 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 97.

25 Georg G. Iggers: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Kritik der traditionellen Geschichtsauffassung, Munich 1971. See Franz L. Fillafer: Geschichte als Aufklärung. In Memoriam Georg G. Iggers (1926–2017), in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 44:4 (2018), pp. 643–659, quotation on 646.

were a new generation of historians, with the newly founded University of Bielefeld as their institutional centre.[26] Highly praised by the Bielefeld school,[27] Iggers' critique of German historiography also provoked disputes and rejections. Having found Iggers' conclusions as well as his entire method totally unacceptable, the future doyen of West German historiography Thomas Nipperdey exposed Iggers' work to severe criticism. His main objection referred to the method with which Iggers engaged in his research: first and foremost, Nipperdey argued that it was impossible to write the history of any scholarly discipline, including historiography, from the standpoint of its ideological premises while neglecting its scholarly results. Accepting Nipperdey's viewpoint that the history of historiography (*Wissenschaftsgeschichte*) could not be written solely as a history of ideology (*Ideologiegeschichte*), Iggers emphasized that he was interested in "the ideological element in German historical scholarship in so far as this ideological element seriously narrowed and distorted scholarship."[28] Focusing on the close ties between German historiography and conservative ideology, Iggers showed that much of German historical writing had an ideological purpose. He therefore continued to insist that the works of historians "could not be separated from their specific political opinions."[29]

Sharing the conviction that the development of modern historiography and its professionalization (i. e. the constitution of this particular academic discipline, which first emerged in Prussia, was an integral part of "global process of modernization"[30]), Iggers devoted his attention to Leopold Ranke in the following years. In collaboration with Konrad von Moltke, he edited Ranke's theoretical writings under the title *Leopold von Ranke. The Theory and Practice of History* (1973),[31] convincingly testifying to Ranke's idealistic understanding of both history and the state as a central point

26 For the new paradigm of West German historiography, which had constituted itself in the early 1970s, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen: Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus, Düsseldorf 1972; Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Geschichte als historische Sozialwissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1973; Lutz Raphael: Bielefeld School of History, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam 2015, pp. 553–558.

27 Compare the comprehensive review by Jörn Rüsen: Georg G. Iggers: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Kritik der traditionellen Geschichtsauffassung, in: Philosophische Rundschau 20:3/4 (1974), pp. 269–286.

28 Correspondance between Georg G. Iggers and Thomas Nipperdey: University at Buffalo, University Archives, Iggers (Georg G.) Papers.

29 Georg G. Iggers/Albert Müller: … oder wir entwickeln uns weiter: ein Gespräch zwischen Georg G. Iggers und Albert Müller, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 13:3 (2002), pp. 135–144, here pp. 135f.

30 Compare Polat Safi: An Interview with Prof. Georg G. Iggers: Every history can only present a partial reconstruction of the past, in: Kılavuz 52 (2014), pp. 36–49, here p. 38.

31 Leopold von Ranke (ed.): The Theory and Practice of History (edited with an introduction by Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke/new translations by Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke), Indianapolis 1973.

within the historical being. In addition, the editors wanted to show that it was false to exclusively consider Ranke as a traditionalist historian focused on the establishment of individual facts without any inclination to theoretical reflections—a picture that still dominates many histories of historical writing.[32] Iggers devoted a volume to the founder of modern historiography in which some of the most characteristic features of Ranke's historical thought were analyzed.[33]

In the middle of 1970s, Iggers directed his interest towards two issues—historical thought in the Age of Enlightenment, particularly in the German lands "but placing the German Enlightenment in the broader context of the European Enlightenment,"[34] as well as the main currents in contemporary historical writings. Iggers presented the results of his examination of the Enlightenment historiography and its relevance for the former emergence of "scientific historiography" in several articles and an edited volume entitled *Aufklärung und Geschichte. Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Enlightenment and History. Studies in German Eighteenth-Century Historiography, 1986).[35] The result of a workshop held at the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen in 1981, the edited volume emphasized the importance of the Enlightenment in the development of modern historiography. In this sense, it is typical of Iggers' judgement that historiography in the Age of Enlightenment—with its broad approach including cultural and social history, history of everyday life as well as "universal" and world history—had considerable advantages for the "scientific historiography" to come. With their focus on politics, the state and the nation, German historians in the nineteenth century were, according to Iggers, "much more provincial and one-sided than a good deal of historiography of the eighteenth century and of historical writing in Western Europe and America in nineteenth century."[36]

From the middle of the 1970s onwards, Iggers remained occupied with different directions in contemporary historical thought. Several the books resulted from these efforts, including *New Directions in European Historiography* (1975),[37] *International Handbook of Historical Studies. Contemporary Research and Theory* (1979), *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang* (1993) and an edited volume of theoretical papers by West German

32 Compare Iggers' Foreword and Introduction to the second edition of The Theory and Practice of History: Leopold von Ranke, London 2011, pp. ix–lii.

33 Georg G. Iggers/James M. Powell (eds.): Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline, Syracuse 1990.

34 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 138.

35 Hans Erich Bödeker et al. (ed.): Aufklärung und Geschichte. Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1986.

36 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 138.

37 Georg G. Iggers: New Directions in European Historiography (with a Contribution by Norman Baker), Middletown 1975.

historians entitled *The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing Since 1945* (1986).[38] In *New Directions in European Historiography*, Iggers departs from "the crisis of the conventional conception of 'scientific' history" to analyze four lines of thought characteristic of European historiography in the 1960s and 1970s—the French Annales school, West German Bielefeld school, Marxist historiography (especially in Poland and its ties with French *annalistes*) and Marxist historiography in Great Britain (with a contribution by Norman Baker). Highly appraised in professional circles, the book was soon translated into German, Italian, Danish, Greek, Japanese and Korean, bringing Iggers recognition as the leading historian of historiography.[39] At the same time, he edited (together with Harold T. Parker) the *International Handbook of Historical Studies. Contemporary Research and Theory*—the first of its kind to move beyond Western Europe and the United States to include chapters about historical writing in Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.[40] Finally, conversation Iggers had with Leszek Kołakowski in 1990 stimulated the emergence of the book *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang* (1993, 1996).[41] Dividing it into two segments, Iggers re-examined the legacy of "classical historism" as well as the various forms of New History which had replaced it as a paradigm of historical studies from a critical standpoint. He paid special attention to the challenges historical writing faced in the last third of the twentieth century, analyzing in particular the widespread denial of the possibility of objectivity within historical knowledge. Iggers concluded his "critical overview in an international context" with a warning about the "persistence of nationalisms" and their influence on the research and writing of history. He also emphasized the rise of global and world history (immediately encouraged by the all-encompassing process of globalization) as the most significant feature of historiography at the beginning of the new millennium. Translated into numerous languages, Iggers' *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert* has acquired global renown as one of the major surveys of modern historical thought; it is probably his most-read work.[42]

38 Georg G. Iggers (ed.): The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing Since 1945, London/New York 1986.

39 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 138. Compare Leonard Krieger: Georg G. Iggers: New Directions in European Historiography, in: The American Historical Review 81:4 (1976), p. 851.

40 Georg G. Iggers/Harold T. Parker (eds.): International Handbook of Historical Studies. Contemporary Research and Theory, Westport 1979.

41 Georg G. Iggers: Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang, Göttingen 1993.

42 Except two English translations (*Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Hanover/London 1997, 2005) and new expanded German edition (*Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang*, Göttingen 2007) the book was also translated in various

Unlike many left-wing intellectuals of European origin, Iggers was not a Marxist nor did he accept a Marxist interpretation of history. He deemed it "speculative and schematic" and that its economic determinism neglected other conditions of social development, first and foremost the role of culture:

> Even before I knew of cultural Marxism, I held that cultural factors played an important role in the shaping of societies. I also felt that the definitions of class, even by so-called Western Marxists like Lukács and E. P. Thompson, were too simplistic and neglected the impact of religion and ethnicity as well as of traditional conceptions of status, gender, and morality in society. And, of course, the Leninist formulation of Marxism with its authoritarian and terroristic aspects was totally abhorrent to me.[43]

Iggers' very critical attitude towards Marxism and its effort to determine the "objective laws of human history" did not however keep him from accepting the positive aspects of the Marxist theory of society. First and foremost, Marxist critiques of existing economic, social and cultural relations within capitalist and bourgeois society emphasized alternative perspectives as well as the possibility of establishing more humane social relationships. Iggers considered these two concepts in particular—a humanistic critique of modern society and the demand for the emancipation of human beings from the 'alienation' inherent to capitalist society—to be Marx's most valuable theoretical contributions.[44]

Since Karl Marx authored the most encompassing analysis of the capitalist economy and the bourgeois society resulting from it, Iggers' considered him the most important thinker of the nineteenth century. Marxism, with its critique of the exploitation inherent to capitalism and the creation of possibilities for social change, represented for Iggers (similar to many left-wing intellectuals), "an important intellectual tradition that is still alive and useful in contemporary society."[45] Differentiating between dogmatic Marxist ideology, the obligatory scholarly method in the former USSR and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe after the Second World War, on the one hand, and the humanistic motives of Marx's thought expressed in his critique of capitalist society, on the other hand, Iggers emphasized strong and fruitful influence of Marxism on the historiography in Western Europe.

European languages (including Icelandic and Serbian) as well as Turkish, Japanese, Chinese and Korean.

43 Compare Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 124.

44 Ibid., p. 125.

45 Yongmei Gong: Historians Should not only Bend over Old Books: an Interview with Professor Georg G. Iggers, in: Historiografias 5 (2013), pp. 94–106, here p. 102.

Prominent champions of historical writing such as the British Marxist historians (Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, Edward P. Thompson, Georges Rudé) and French historians of the French Revolution (from Albert Mathiez and Georges Lefebvre to Albert Soboul and Michel Vovelle) were directly influenced by a non-dogmatic reading of Marx's work. Marxism had also contributed to the theoretical constitution of major directions in contemporary historical thought such as New Cultural History, gender history and microhistory. Finally, unlike most Western historians, Iggers took not only the limitations of Marxist historiography in Eastern Europe into consideration, but also its valuable (and often neglected) achievements, emphasizing, first and foremost, the results of the historiography inspired by a non-dogmatic understanding of Marxism among prominent historians in Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

Due to his familiarity with the East German historiography, Iggers edited a volume in the late 1980s, authored mostly by the younger generation of East German historians who practiced a kind of social history based on Marxist theoretical grounds. It was published in English (and in German too) only after the fall of communism under the title *Marxist Historiography in Transformation. East German Social History in the 1980s*.[46] In this critical appraisal of East German historiography, Iggers pointed out its limitations as well as its important methodological achievements, such as the merging of social history with economic history and ethnology.[47] However, the methodological innovation of the historians represented in the book (Jürgen Kuczynski, Hartmut Zwahr, Helga Schulz and Jan Peters, among others) was an exception to the *mainstream* of East German historiography, which remained confined to prescribed schemes of dogmatic Marxism. Besides a negative review by West German historian Alexander Fischer, who was (unpleasantly) "surprised that 'North American historians' are still able to see anything worthy in a historiography that was itself identified a long time ago as one of the main defenders of totalitarian system,"[48] the volume was for the most part well received in academic circles as an important contribution to the history of historiography in East Germany.[49]

46 Georg G. Iggers (ed.): Marxist Historiography in Transformation. East German Social History in the 1980s, New York 1991. Compare the German edition Georg G. Iggers (ed.): Ein anderer historischer Blick. Beispiele ostdeutscher Sozialgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main 1991.

47 Compare Georg G. Iggers/Albert Müller: … oder wir entwickeln uns weiter: ein Gespräch zwischen Georg G. Iggers und Albert Müller, p. 140.

48 Alexander Fischer: Georg G. Iggers (ed.): Marxist Historiography in Transformation. East German Social History in the 1980s, in: Historische Zeitschrift 260:1 (1995), p. 131.

49 Compare Eve Rosenhaft: Georg G. Iggers (ed.): Marxist Historiography in Transformation. East German Social History in the 1980s, in: Labour History Review 62:1 (1997), p. 75. The legacy of Marxist historiography in the former East Germany is dealt with by Stefan Berger: GDR Historiography after the End of the GDR: Debates, Renewals, and the Ques-

Iggers also edited *Marxismus und Geschichtswissenschaft heute* (1996), which was devoted to the legacy of Marxism in the contemporary historiography,[50] as well as a special thematic issue (with Konrad Jarausch, Matthias Middell and Martin Sabrow) of *Historische Zeitschrift* on *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem* (1998).[51] Fischer's general rejection of the entirety of the East German historiography as pure ideology gave impetus to a critical appraisal of historical writing in the former German Democratic Republic. Trying "to spark understanding of the deeper contradictions of East German historical studies on the basis of new sources and innovative approaches,"[52] this comprehensive volume analyzed four important series of questions concerning the conception of scholarship on the historiography in the East Germany, the development of East German historiography, its "linguistic styles and forms of communication," and the peculiarities of its research subjects and methodological approaches. Finally, in the recently published *Marxist Historiographies. A Global Perspective* (2016)—edited with Q. Edward Wang, an American historian—Iggers tried to show, depending on their specific political and cultural context, the different ways Marxism influenced the historiography and its legacy in contemporary historical thought.[53] In response to the fall of the communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990/91, Marxism was discredited as a theoretical approach in the last three decades while, simultaneously, the Marxist theory of class and class struggle was no longer appropriate as a model for the interpretation of historical development. In this sense, the book presents a kind of recapitulation of Marxism's contribution to the historiography, the focus of which was not limited to European historiographies, but has a global approach.

In the early 1990s, Iggers became deeply interested in the implications of postmodern thought on historical writing as well as the overcoming of Eurocentric perspective in the history of historiography by means of some kind of transnational and global approach. Iggers devoted several polemical articles examining the particularities of the postmodern conception of history, in which the denial of the possibility of objective historical knowledge played a central role.[54] In his attempt to demonstrate

tion of What Remains?, in: Nick Hodgin/Caroline Pearce: The GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State since 1989, New York 2011, pp. 266–285.

50 Georg G. Iggers (ed.): Marxismus und Geschichtswissenschaft heute, Velten 1996.

51 Georg G. Iggers et al. (ed.): Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, München 1998.

52 Georg G. Iggers/Konrad H. Jarausch: Vorwort, in: Georg G. Iggers et al. (ed.): Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, pp. vii–viii.

53 Q. Edvard Wang/Georg G. Iggers (eds.): Marxist Historiographies. A Global Perspective, London 2016.

54 See Iggers' articles devoted to this subject: Zur 'Linguistischen Wende' im Geschichtsdenken und in der Geschichtsschreibung, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21:4 (1995), pp. 557–570; Historiography and the Challenge of Postmodernism, in: Bo Stråth/Nina Witoszek

the insubstantiality of the postmodern critique of historical writing, Iggers directed his attention—along with thinkers such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, philosophers who laid the groundwork for poststructuralist and postmodern thought—to Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit, the most prominent proponents of the postmodern theory of history. Denying the possibility of history as a scholarly discipline and pointing out its epistemological limitations, resulting from the fact that historians are not able to access the past directly but only narratives about it, White and Ankersmit (along with many other authors) emphasized the literary character of historiography, understanding it as "verbal fictions" without any reference to truth and objectivity. As a form of literature, historical narratives could not be judged from a scholarly perspective—only from an aesthetic one. Both thinkers thus refute the objectivity of historical narratives, not only because of the fictitious elements they contain, but primarily because their purpose was to legitimate power relationships and specific ideological goals in the societies in which they act.[55]

Iggers took a moderate line between the radical denial of the possibility of objective historical knowledge and the 'noble dream' of value-free and completely objective historical knowledge. Although he did not contest the links between historiography and literature, he underlined that historiography was able to establish objective knowledge of the past despite its narrative form. Accepting certain elements of fiction in historical narratives, Iggers drew the line between relatively objective scholarly historiography and, more or less fictitious, literary narratives. He thus considered White's identification of historiography as literature to be completely unacceptable. Similarly, Iggers argued that—even if it was true that the experience of cultures in the past could not be understood in its entirety—it is nonetheless possible to approach it through scholarly methods. Accepting the idea that history was not a hard science and that it was impossible to separate value-based personal convictions (*Weltanschauungen*), interests, political goals from scholarly rationality in research, Iggers believed that it was even more important for historiography to cultivate the awareness of its own ideological basis in order to check its conceptions in reality. Only in this way, Iggers argued, was it "possible, even partially, to transcend its ideological limitations."[56] In

(eds.): The Postmodern Challenge: Perspectives East and West, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 281–301; Geschichtstheorie zwischen postmoderner Philosophie und geschichtswissenschaftlicher Praxis, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26:2 (2000), pp. 335–346; Historiographie zwischen Forschung und Dichtung. Gedanken über Hayden Whites Behandlung der Historiographie, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27:2 (2001), pp. 327–340.

55 On Hayden White and Frank Ankermsit, see Herman Paul: Hayden White: The Historical Imagination, Cambridge 2011; Callum G. Brown: Postmodernism for Historians, London 2005.

56 Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, p. 97.

this sense, it is his belief that "perhaps it would be more honest to admit that no history can escape the limitations of ideological perspective, but that every perspective, because it is a perspective, also raises new questions which permit new insights into historical reality."[57] Finally, considering that the "pluralism of research strategies" was a distinctive characteristic of contemporary historiography, Iggers emphasized that they were not "creations of poetical imagination" (as was argued by proponents of the postmodern conception of history) and insisted that "they should be conducted by standards of rational inquiry allowing re-examination of their validity."[58] Although he did not dispute the existence of fictitious and/or ideological elements in historical narratives, Iggers (similarly to Jörn Rüsen) believed that historiography, following the principles of methodological rationalism, met the standards of scholarly discourse and provided a relatively reliable, verifiable and objective knowledge of past.[59] In other words, with its truthfulness, historiography presents a distinctive form of knowledge that is different from rival discourses about the past. Hence, in spite of its inherent epistemic limitations, Iggers drew a clear line between "scientific historiography" and other historical narratives.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Iggers' scholarly interest was drawn to the influence of processes of political, economic and cultural globalization on historical thinking, which resulted in a further volume, edited with Q. Edward Wang, *Turning Points in Historiography. A Cross Cultural Perspective* (2002).[60] The leitmotif of the volume is the conviction that the approach that prevailed (and still prevails) in the research on the history of historiography, limited regularly to the development of (Western) European historical thought, was completely insufficient. Quite the contrary, it is also necessary to include non-European traditions of historical writing in the research on the history of historiography. *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (2008)[61] is one result of this effort to overcome the usual eurocentrism. Co-authored with Q. Edward Wang and Indian historian Supriya Mukherjee, this volume is characterized by a unique approach to the history of historiography in so far as it situates the development of modern historical thinking in a global context. According to Stefan Berger, one of the leading specialists in the history of historiography, it is "the

57 Georg G. Iggers: Comments on F. R. Ankersmit's Paper, Historicism: An Attempt at Synthesis, in: History and Theory 34:3 (1995), pp. 162–167, here p. 167.

58 Georg G. Iggers: Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang, Göttingen 2007, p. 144.

59 Compare Jörn Rüsen: Evidence and Meaning. A Theory of Historical Studies, New York/Oxford 2013.

60 Q. Edward Wang/Georg G. Iggers: Turning Points in Historiography. A Cross Cultural Perspective, New York 2002.

61 Georg G. Iggers/Q. Edward Wang/Supriya Mukherjee: A Global History of Modern Historiography, London 2008.

first attempt to provide a global synthesis of the history of historiography from the late eighteenth century to the present."[62] In addition to its global approach, which encompasses the development of historical thought in Europe, the Islamic Middle East, India, China, and Japan, the distinctive feature of this outstanding synthesis is its focus on the process of modernization. The authors attempted not only to present the making and development of scholarly historiography as part of the process of modernization, but also to point out that it was resisted by powerful indigenous traditions of historical writing in non-European cultures. The authors paid special attention to the interrelatedness of historiography and modern ideologies, particularly nationalism, which substantially influenced the physiognomy of modern historiography at a global level. The revised German edition was published under the title *Geschichtskulturen. Weltgeschichte der Historiografie von 1750 bis heute* (2013).[63]

Insight into the main subjects of Iggers' scholarly work (emphasized in a lapidary manner) reveals the distinctive methodology that characterizes his research on modern historiography and makes him different among older as well as contemporary historians of historiography.[64] In his own words, his approach to the study of historiography can mostly be compared to the relationship between literary critics and literature: "I am interested in fundamental theoretical assumptions of historical works and their transposition in the historiography. I begin always with asking a question and with a concept which is always changing during my examination of that subject matter."[65] Since writing of history for Iggers was "inseparable from the political and intellectual context in which it is pursued,"[66] the focus in his approach to the history of historiography was on establishing the scholarly paradigms (understood as the leading theoretical and methodological concepts), the institutional frameworks of historical research, and last but not the least, the analysis of the cultural, social and political contexts in which historiography constitutes itself and performs its primarily cultural function. Iggers' methodological approach can therefore not be reduced to traditional history of ideas, but represents a kind of intellectual history that analyzes and evaluates certain historiographical concepts within the broadest social *milieu*.[67] Except for the social

62 Stefan Berger: A Global History of Modern Historiography. By Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang with the assistance of Supriya Mukherjee, in: German History 27:1 (2009), pp. 174–176, here 174.

63 Georg G. Iggers/Q. Edward Wang/Supriya Mukherjee: Geschichtskulturen. Weltgeschichte der Historiografie von 1750 bis heute, Göttingen 2013. It was followed by a new English edition in 2016.

64 On different approaches to the history of historiography, see Horst Walter Blanke: Towards a New Theory-Based History of Historiography, in: Peter Koslowski (ed.): The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historism, Berlin 2005, pp. 223–267.

65 Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, p. 85.

66 Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, p. 122.

67 Ibid., p. 56.

conditions of the production of historical knowledge, he pays particular attention to the relationship between historiography and other social sciences and humanities, its social function and the influence of various ideologies on the research and writing of history. The significance of Iggers' approach can only truly be understood when taking into account both the widespread scepticism regarding the possibility of objective historical knowledge and the—more or less visible but constant—attempts to transform historiography into *ancilla politicae*, a suitable tool for the legitimization of political goals. The history of historiography (alongside the theory of history) as a distinctive form of disciplinary self-reflection therefore represents the necessary precondition for the theoretical and methodological advancement of historical scholarship. This is made possible by strengthening its rational core and the awareness of its possibilities, functions and inherent limitations in contemporary societies. The scholarly work of the late Professor Iggers should be appraised exactly in this sense—in view of the fact that his peculiar approach to the history of historiography a new impetus to the theoretical and methodological development of the discipline.

Iggers understood historiography and its history as an ongoing dialogue between different epochs and cultures. As a second-generation émigré historian in the United States,[68] Iggers played an intermediary role between different historiographical traditions—American, European and the historical cultures of the Far East. Especially important was Iggers' role in the "transatlantic historiographical dialogue" established after the end of the Second World War, which, according to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, heavily influenced the postwar generation of West German historians.[69] As a leading researcher of the history of modern historiography, Iggers managed to demonstrate that the dialogue between different historiographical traditions was not only possible but also necessary.

Finally, it would be quite appropriate to ask oneself which set of values Iggers was committed to, not only as a historian of historiography, but also as an engaged intellectual.[70] The answer to this question can be summarized in several basic ideas. First, he shared a belief in the possibility of the continuous progress of humanity grounded in human reason. In contrast to the critique of Enlightenment coming from the left

68 On the first generation of émigré historians who fled Nazi Germany and found refuge in the USA, see Hartmut Lehman/James J. Sheehan (eds.): An Interrupted Past. German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933, Washington DC/Cambridge 1991; Axel Fair-Schulz/Mario Kessler (eds.): German Scholars in Exile. New Studies in Intellectual History, Lanham 2011.

69 Andreas Daum: German Historiography in Transatlantic Perspective: Interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, in: GHI Bulletin 26 (2000), at: www.ghi-dc.org/publication/bulletin-26-spring-2000 (accessed on 29 October 2021).

70 See Stefan Berger: Historical Writing and Civic Engagement, in: Stefan Berger (ed.): The Engaged Historian. Perspectives on the Intersections of Politics, Activism and the Historical Profession, New York/Oxford 2019, pp. 17f.

in the second half of the twentieth century (Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault) or the understanding of the Enlightenment project as purely the mastery over the world and human beings through science and technology, Iggers believed in its emancipatory potentials. Therefore, the "dialectic of the Enlightenment"—Horkheimer and Adorno—that insisted on arguing that the Enlightenment contained within itself the elements of its own self-destruction, was alien to Iggers. Quite the opposite, the leitmotif in his understanding of the Enlightenment was the fact that its humanistic potential should not be abandoned because (or in spite) of its internal contradictions. Deeply rooted in the Enlightenment conception of human progress (although it is neither linear nor guaranteed), Iggers was convinced of the idea of human freedom and equality, finding the essence of the Enlightenment in the "emancipation of the human being from tyranny, ignorance, and misfortune." In spite of the large-scale violence and mass destruction of the "short twentieth century," Iggers still shared a moderate optimism arguing that "limited advances are possible in many fields."[71] From this standpoint, he appraised international relations in the contemporary world as well as its future perspectives. Upset about the direction of political development in the United States after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Iggers believed that contemporary global terrorism and its hostility to the United States and Western European countries should be contextualized within the end of the unipolar world and the rising dominance of globalised capitalism. At the same time, he critically appraised the existing political order of the United States as undemocratic and dominated by the interests of big business and various pressure groups.[72] In the age of growing suspicion towards modernity (conceived as yet another *grand narrative*), Georg G. Iggers consistently insisted on the fundamental values of the Enlightenment—freedom, equality and human rights. Firmly attached to these values, Iggers, through his social activism, confirmed the need for a struggle for a fairer and more humane society. Considering that human rights and liberties were not given forever, but always endangered by new forms of manipulation and subjugation, this was the *credo* Professor Iggers followed, as a historian and engaged intellectual, until the very end of his long and fruitful life.

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71 Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, p. 92. Compare Wilma A. Iggers/Georg G. Iggers: Two Lives in Uncertain Times, pp. 203f.

72 Franz Fillafer im Gespräch mit Georg Iggers, p. 87.

Stefan Berger

What's New in the History of Social Movements: a Review Article

Lutz Raphael: *Jenseits von Kohle und Stahl. Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte Westeuropas nach dem Boom*. Frankfurter Adorno-Vorlesungen 2018, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2019, 525 pp., ISBN: 978-3-518-58735-5.

Thomas Lahusen and Schamma Schahadat (eds.): *Postsocialist Landscapes. Real and Imaginary Spaces from Stalinstadt to Pyongyang*, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2020, 328 pp., ISBN: 978-3-8376-5124-9.

Alina-Sandra Cucu: *Planning Labour. Time and the Foundations of Industrial Socialism in Romania*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019, 266 pp., ISBN: 978-1-78920-185-7.

Marsha Siefert (ed.): *Labor in State-Socialist Europe, 1945–1989. Contributions to a History of Work*, Budapest: CEU Press, 2020, 484 pp., ISBN: 978-963-386-337-4.

Carl Levy and Saul Newman (eds.): *The Anarchist Imagination. Anarchism Encounters the Humanities and the Social Sciences*, London: Routledge, 2019, 278 pp., ISBN: 978-1-138-78276-1.

Natalie Pohl: *Atomprotest am Oberrhein. Die Auseinandersetzung um den Bau von Atomkraftwerken in Baden und im Elsass (1970–1985)*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2019, 443 pp., ISBN: 978-3-515-12401-0.

Astrid Mignon Kirchhof (ed.): *Pathways into and out of Nuclear Power in Western Europe. Austria, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Sweden*, Munich: Deutsches Museum, 2020, 299 pp., ISBN: 978-3-940396-92-1.

Maarten van Ginderachter: *The Everyday Nationalism of Workers. A Social History of Modern Belgium*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019, 265 pp., ISBN: 978-1-5036-0969-3.

Sebastian Elsbach, Ronny Noak and Andreas Braune (eds.): *Konsens und Konflikt. Demokratische Transformation in der Weimarer und Bonner Republik*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2019, 354 pp., ISBN: 978-3-515-12448-5.

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Wolfgang Schmale: *For a Democratic 'United States of Europe' (1918–1951). Freemasons — Human Rights Leagues — Winston S. Churchill — Individual Citizens*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2019, 195 pp., ISBN: 978-3-515-12464-5.

Siegfried Mielke and Stefan Heinz: *Alwin Brandes (1866–1949). Oppositioneller — Reformer — Widerstandskämpfer*, Berlin: Metropol, 2019, 566 pp., ISBN: 978-3-86331-486-6.

Stefan Müller: *Die Ostkontakte der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften. Entspannungspolitik zwischen Zivilgesellschaft und internationaler Politik, 1969–1989*, Bonn: J.W.H. Dietz, 2020, 429 pp., ISBN: 978-3-8012-4271-8.

Social movements, especially trade unions, have been fighting processes of deindustrialization everywhere in the global North since the Second World War. There are many excellent local studies on the effects of deindustrialization, on particular companies, industries and urban fabrics. However, there are relatively few international *comparative* studies on the impact of deindustrialization.[1] Lutz Raphael's analysis of deindustrialization in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany is an exception to this, and it demonstrates the enormous value of such comparative perspectives on almost every page of this outstanding book that really needs an English translation, for it is of major interest to scholars working on deindustrialization outside of the German-language world. In line with other deindustrialization studies the book has a certain bias towards industrial workers and how they were affected by deindustrialization processes. It narrows the period of examination from around 1970 to 2000 and justifies this with the alleged break in contemporary history that Raphael, together with Anselm Döring-Manteuffel, has identified in a much-discussed German-language book, *After the Boom*.[2] The thesis posits that a fundamental break occurred in the social structure and self-understanding of West German society around 1970. Here Raphael extends this idea to the social history of Britain and France. What emerges clearly from Raphael's analysis is how fundamental the break with industrial society was. Hundreds of thousands of industrial jobs were lost, whole industries vanished, and the industrial worker, the archetypal proletarian that had inspired a range of social movements since the nineteenth century, was increasingly a marginal phenomenon. The comparison is particularly illuminating in that it highlights the very

1 There is, however, a major network of scholars in deindustrialization studies that is working on establishing more comparative perspectives among core countries of the global north. See the website of the 'Deindustralization and the Politics of our Time' (DePoT) project: https://deindustrialization.org/ [accessed on 18 August 2021].

2 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael: Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970 (third edition), Göttingen 2012 [first published in 2008].

different responses of the British, French and West German states to the challenges of deindustrialization. The market radicalism of Margaret Thatcher's governments in the UK stood in maximum contrast to the welfare statism and the embedded capitalism of the Federal Republic, with France occupying a middle position. Citizenship in the Federal Republic, Raphael argues, contained a strong social element that strengthened the practice of co-determination and underpinned a generous system of welfare which together cushioned the outcomes of deindustrialiszation processes. Despite significant differences, especially in relation to wage bargaining procedures, the industrial workers, or what is left of them, have become politically homeless—a situation that prepared the ground for the rise of right-wing populist movements in all three countries under discussion here. Even where older workers could count on generous early retirement schemes, the question of what to do with the young and those who left school early has become a major challenge for regions where industrial employment used to offer relatively high wages and good jobs even for the unskilled and those without training. These groups now suffer from a lack of job prospects and often face long-term unemployment, or precarious forms of employment in the new service industries. Precarious employment, as Raphael shows, has become the new hallmark of society in all three countries, and this despite the fact than none of them can be properly described as post-industrial, as they still have a significant percentage of industrial employment. The service sector has no doubt increased, but one of the many strengths of this book is that it is never satisfied with monocausal explanations and linear developments. The full complexity of often ambiguous and contradictory developments is laid out before the reader. The survival of company paternalism stands next to decreasing welfare measures, and unstable jobs for marginal workers go hand in hand with secure jobs for core workers. Globalization is also not a one-size-fits-all development. The big automobile companies in Germany, for example, are beneficiaries of globalization as is its workforce, whereas the many workers in the industries supplying automobile companies have born the brunt of increased competition and cut-throat price wars. Almost constant retraining of the workforce went hand in hand in many companies with increased automation and digitization. Raphael makes excellent use of sociological studies, especially from labour and industrial sociology, to shine a light onto changes at the workplace. These have much to say on the nature of deindustrialization processes, on forms of reindustrialization, on changes in the world of work, on trade union struggles, labour relations and working-class political parties as well as biographical experiences that differed widely not only from nation to nation but also from region to region. Raphael has written an inspiring work of comparative history that deserves a wide readership not only in Germany, which has the ability of generating new research on working-class history from the 1970s onwards.

Deindustrialization hit the global capitalist North after the Second World War and with increasing ferocity from the 1970s onwards, but it, by and large, escaped the communist world, which followed its own logic and economic system until

around 1990. Hence it was only under post-communism that deindustrialization left its mark, and it is a kind of unseen shadow in the essays populating Thomas Lahusen's and Schamma Schahadat's collection on *Postsocialist Landscapes*. The book is the outcome of a research project entitled '(Post)Socialist Spaces' funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), and it amounts to a truly multidisciplinary exploration of post-communist landscapes from Europe to Africa and further to Asia. Cultural anthropologists, geographers, historians, literary scholars and photographers are all present here, but the project's clear bias towards culture also means that social and economic developments and their impact on the analyzed cultural products are often insufficiently taken into account. Nevertheless, many of the essays that are assembled here in four parts are truly impressive. They virtually all take seriously the 'emotional turn' in the human sciences[3] asking about what kinds of emotional identification with place one can find in diverse postsocialist scenarios. A concern with topophilia is made concrete in relation to realms of memory such as monuments, museums but also everyday objects and living spaces. A sensibility for the emotions produced by places and constructed through places is weaving itself through the pages of this volume as leading theme for the entire collection. Another leading theme is that of hybridity. The spaces that have transitioned from communism to post-communism often have a hybrid quality, with remnants of communism still present and having the power to influence post-communist experiences and identifications. Several parallel temporalities are in operation in those spaces leading to fractures, disjointed and contested interpretations and representations of place. Seen from the vantage point of post-communism, communism may be viewed with ridicule and irony, but also with nostalgia. It may evoke feelings of negativity and oppression but also a sense of hope and solidarity amidst landscapes of economic destruction under post-communism. Another leading theme is the exploration of borders drawn between and within post-communist states leading to the construction of centres and peripheries, where visions of the future stand next to failures of the past and the emptiness and abandonment of today is juxtaposed with the dreamworlds of yesterday. The planned economies of communist states led to their own environmental and economic disasters, but the market radicalism of some post-communist countries still created a nostalgic longing for an allegedly more secure past—at least economically and socially.[4]

The book is divided into four parts. 'History's playground' (part 1) explores the political landscape of the Tsar's Garden in Kyiv and its many meanings from the 1980s onwards (Serhy Yekelchyk). Kate Brown looks at the promises and failure of the

3 On the history of emotions, see: Ute Frevert: Emotions in History—Lost and Found, Budapest 2013; Jan Plamper: The History of Emotions: an Introduction, Oxford 2015.

4 Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille (eds.): Post-Communist Nostalgia, New York 2010.

planned city of Slavutych that was constructed by the Soviet authorities after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster to rehouse some of the people from the Chernobyl region. Serguei Oushakine analyses the postcolonial spaces created by the Khatyn memorial near Minsk and the theme park 'Stalin's Line.' 'Friendship of the Peoples?' (part 2) looks at the legacy of multinational communist ventures, focusing especially on literary landscapes. Susi Frank's explorations into contemporary Ukranian-Russian poetry stand next to Schamma Schahadar's analysis of the literary and cultural landscape of East Central Europe. Gulzat Egemberdieva and Thomas Lahusen investigate the presence of notions of the friendship of peoples in Kyrgiz literature, and Davor Beganovič analyses literary texts dealing with Sarajevo's city planning from the Ottoman period to the Yugoslav civil wars. 'Minus Stalin' (part 3) examines what happened in post-communist regimes to the centre of power that had vanished and was still curiously present in many cultural representations. Mark László-Herbert compares two former 'Stalin cities' in East Germany and Hungary, whilst Ivaylo Ditchev explores changes in a specific neighbourhood in Sofia and Ekaterina Mizrohkhi confronts her childhood memories of living in a Moscow suburb with the changes she observes in the post-communist space. Finally, Daniela Koleva looks at continuities and discontinuities in promoting nationalism through tourist sites in Bulgaria both under communism and in post-communist times. 'Travelling Boundaries' (part 4) looks at what happened to communist aesthetics in post-communist times. Gesine Drews-Sylla examines the creation of a monument to the African Renaissance constructed in Senegal by a North Korean company in 2010. Andre Schmid examines the restructuring of living space in North Korean cities in the 1950s and early 1960s. Tong Lam's photo-essay on the 'urban village' of Xiancun in the southern province of Guangzhou (China) reveals the dark side of an urban turbo-capitalism unleashed by a system still nominally communist. Although many of the articles in this thought-provoking collection evade a straightforward argument, this seems to be in line with the meandering forms of knowledge, including emotional knowledge, explored through cultural studies approaches. It makes for intriguing and insightful reading even if it can be a bit frustrating for those readers intent on finding in these articles clear and unidirectional arguments.

If Lahusen's and Schahadat's volume explores the diverse facets of the unmaking of communism,[5] Alina-Sandra Cucu's monograph entitled *Planning Labour* is a path-breaking study in the making of communism in Eastern Europe after the end of the Second World War. The published version of her Central European University PhD in Sociology and Social Anthropology, it is a highly innovative re-reading of the socialist transformation in Romania between 1945 and 1955. Making good use of extensive archival holdings as well as interviews, Cucu focusses her analysis on two factories

5 On the economic and social consequences of the unmaking of communism, see also: Philipp Ther: Europe Since 1989, Princeton 2018.

and their neighbourhoods in the Romanian city of Cluj that was ethnically mixed between Hungarians and Romanians, after the German population had been purged in the post-war years and the Jewish population had largely vanished in the Shoah. At the centre of her attention is the effect of socialist planning on the forging of an industrial working class. Making good use of Ernst Bloch's notion of non-synchronicity, Cucu explores how the future-oriented vision of a modern communist society tallied with the life-worlds and experiences of a nascent working class that still had a strong background in rural agricultural worlds. Paying close attention to the local practices of working people, she traces their reactions to the attempts of communist elites to implement the economic plan aimed at forms of socialist accumulation that restricted the consumption of workers and ensured economic growth through the appropriation of the agricultural surplus. Focusing closely on the labour regimes in two factories, she sheds light on what the central plan actually meant for the everyday work practices on the shop floor. She shows how the plan was performed by the workers on the ground and how this created multiple tensions between the better life that workers envisioned for themselves and the lofty ideals of Communist leaders wanting to create the 'new society.' Being so close to the workers in the factories allows Cucu to show how new solidarities were forged but also how new inequalities and hierarchies were produced. Her micro-ethnographic investigation into the making of a new working class is alert to power-relationships, including those between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians, and those between men and women. She also emphasizes the net effects of a massive labour turnover that remained characteristic for the world of industrial work in Cluj during the ten years after the Second World War. Cucu is extraordinarily adept at showing us who the workers employed in the factories in Cluj were and how the socialist state sought to keep labour costs low. She describes the intricate relationship between the industrial town and its agricultural surroundings. The economic plan introduced a whole set of new labour regulations that did not always meet with enthusiasm on the shop floor, where workers had their own ideas based on highly gendered, classed and ethnicized moral universes. Cucu's story is one of struggle over the control of workers as well as their mobilization. It is admirable how she manages to unearth the day-to-day practices of workers who were confronted with the ideals and norms of 'the plan.' On the pages of her book labour becomes far more than a mere resource for the realization of economic planning. Its actions and articulations impacted massively on the ultimate failures of economic planning. Their voices and their rationality are highlighted in this book to understand how the planning of labour under early communism was entirely different from the actually existing labour relations. The contradictions produced by the plan and lived reality were ultimately too big to be squared and led to a situation where the promises of welfare, social mobility, access to education and full employment could not be met. The stories that Cucu tells of industrial workers are incredibly rich and capture their life-worlds with a clarity that is truly insightful. It is social history from below at its very best.

Cucu's work is representative of a larger trend in Eastern European labour history that has seen a remarkable renaissance over recent years. Marsha Siefert's edited collection on *Labor in State-Socialist Europe, 1945–1989* brings together many of the outstanding historians that have been at the forefront of these developments over recent years. If Stephen Kotkin could still ask somewhat anxiously in 1996 whether there was a future for labour history in post-communist Eastern Europe,[6] the special issue edited by Mark Pittaway ten years later on workers in Central and Eastern Europe answered that question with an emphatic yes.[7] Pittaway, who died tragically young at the age of 39, has certainly been an inspiration for many of those who have since emerged as central in the revival of Central and Eastern European labour history. Of course, there have been others, among them Susan Zimmermann and Marsha Siefert, both at the Central European University, who started a long-term initiative in 2012 to stimulate research in Central and Eastern European labour history that would make it part and parcel of the rising trend in global labour history. Many of the articles in this present collection have their origins in panels and workshops organized by this initiative. The revival of labour history in the West since the 1990s has been characterized not only by global perspectives but also by a move away from organized labour and towards the history of workers and their everyday life-worlds, a tendency that is also characteristic of the present volume. However, the volume under review here manages to explore the interaction between organized labour, in this case ruling communist parties, and the life-worlds of ordinary workers. In addition, it pays due attention to the repercussions of the interactions between a transnational capitalism and a transnational communism during the Cold War. What therefore can be seen as characteristic of many of the contributions in this excellent book is the combination of micro-perspectives with large-scale questions, onto which those micro-perspectives often throw a revealing light.

Furthermore, the new labour history of Central and Eastern Europe shows a number of fascinating parallels with labour history in Western Europe underlining how, despite the division of the continent, many of the challenges emerging between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War were actually rather similar. This allows for intriguing comparisons between the communist East and the capitalist West—a trend in labour scholarship that is only beginning.[8] Not only do

6 Stephen Kotkin: Introduction: a Future for Labor under Communism?, in: International Labor and Working-Class History 50 (1996), pp. 1–8.

7 Mark Pittaway: Introduction: Workers and Socialist States in Postwar Centreal and Eastern Europe, in: International Labor and Working-Class History 68 (2005), pp. 1–8.

8 Jan de Graaf is currently leading a research group at the Institute for Social Movements, Ruhr-University Bochum, exploring the ways in which the post-war histories of Eastern and Western Europe coalesce: 'Europe's Postwar Consensus: a Golden Age of Social Cohesion and Social Mobility?' See also some of his published work like Jan de Graaf: Euro-

the new studies pave the way for East-West European comparisons, they also highlight the global entanglements in the world of labour between Communist Eastern Europe and the wider Communist world outside of Europe, in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[9] Transfers and dialogues impacted significantly on workers both in the European metropole and the non-European periphery. In the discussions on communist Eastern European labour, the Soviet Union as the motherland of communism and a global model casts a long shadow. However, many contributions in this volume, by focusing on the everyday negotiations of workers, also show the limits of the official communist discourse that often referenced the Soviet Union but incorporated a multitude of ambiguous and contradictory practices, for which Soviet communism cannot serve as the only explanatory model.[10]

The articles assembled here are of a very high quality throughout. They are organized into five sections which correspond to areas of research on Central and Eastern European labour that have been particularly prominent in recent years. The first section is about the recruitment and the making of workers in an area of the global North that certainly, with some exceptions, such as Czechoslovakia, did not belong to the most industrialized regions. Industrialization thus became a central challenge for the Communist regimes. Analyzing Romanian factory newspapers Cucu demonstrates how the official Communist discourse attempted to socialize workers but effectively only divided the emerging working-class fracturing their solidarity and introducing animosities between different types of workers. Tensions between established industrial workers and new recruits, commuting from the agrarian countryside to their new industrial employment, is also at the centre of Ulf Brunnbauer's and Visar Nonaj's account of the situation in new steel factories in Bulgaria and Albania. Labour shortages were often encountered in the communist economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and Alena K. Almagir shows how Polish workers were central to the Czechoslovak economy in the 1960s and 1970s. Later, Cuban and Vietnamese workers took their places and were often developing a strong militant culture fighting for better working conditions and wages. Not only chronic labour shortages, but at times and places also unemployment became a problem under state socialism, as Natalia Jarska shows in relation to 1950s Poland, where it led to attempts to exclude women from the job

pean Socialism Between Militant and Parliamentary Democracy: a Pan-European Debate 1945–1948, in: European Review of History 26:2 (2019), pp. 331–352. Idem: Socialism Across the Iron Curtain. Socialist Parties in East and West and the Reconstruction of Europe after 1945, Cambridge 2019.

9 See, for example: Anne Dietrich, Eric Burton, Immanuel Harisch and Marcia Schenck (eds.): Navigating Socialist Encounters: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements Between Africa and East Germany During the Cold War, Berlin 2021.

10 For a good survey, see: Ben Fowkes: The Rise and Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, London 1995.

market in order to avoid what was a morally unacceptable and embarrassing form of social reality for a Communist state.

The second section of the book examines how the communist regimes tried to control and discipline labour. Małgorzata Mazurek discusses campaigns in Communist Poland to discipline dissatisfied consumers aiming at diverting attention from the systemic economic mismanagement. Ulrike Schult underlines how workers in Slovenia and Serbia, who often had agricultural backgrounds, sought to pursue their interests through absences from the workplace and other forms of lack of discipline. Eszter Bartha explores dissatisfaction of East German and Hungarian workers vis-à-vis the workers' hostels in both countries. Chiara Bonfiglioli looks at how Yugoslav women found themselves unhappy under a triple burden of paid work, housework and the demands of political participation in factory committees. Overall, the contributions in this section show how working-class dissatisfaction at the workplace contributed to strong feelings of disillusionment of workers with their Communist governments.

The third section of the book discusses questions of workers' safety. Thomas Lindenberger examines practices of safety self-regulation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and discusses large-scale industrial disasters as a means of the state to take control of industrial relations by declaring a limited state of emergency. Adrian Grama interprets workers' disability claims in Romania as attempts to demand greater social justice. Marko Miljković puts forward an argument how work safety measures in factories in Yugoslavia drew a clear line between an essential core workforce and those deemed more expendable.

The fourth part of the book focusses on forms of protest under communism. Peter Heumos sees the emergence of factory councils and strikes in Czechoslovakia as a means to counter centralized party control. These practices should be seen, he argues, as an important part of the factory cultures of resistance that ultimately was to bring down communism in Czechoslovakia. Susan Zimmermann recounts the unsuccessful campaign for equal pay undertaken by a trade union women's committee in Hungary underlining how the gender pay gap also became an increasingly contested issue in Communist Eastern Europe in the 1970s. Sabine Rutar examines workers' strikes in the shipping and port industries of Rijeka and Koper that were heavily affected by processes of deindustrialization that spanned the capitalist West and the communist East and even produced similar strike action across the Cold War divide. Rory Archer and Goran Musić present a fascinating account of how workers in late Yugoslav socialism responded to the deepening economic crisis by demanding more market reforms. This, the authors argue, should not, however, be understood as demands to move to a capitalist system but rather as reforms meant to strengthen socialism. In the last section of the book we find just one article by Anca Glont who examines the global entanglements of the miners of the Jiu valley in Romania who trained miners from Vietnam, Cuba, Zambia, the Dominican Republic and Kenya—giving the remote Jiu valley a global significance that is often forgotten today but can be reconstructed

through labour history. Overall this is an outstanding collection assembling some of the truly remarkable work in labour history that has been coming out of Central and Eastern Europe for some time now.

Among the fiercest critics of the Communist regimes in the east and the capitalist regimes in the West were anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists. During the Cold War, research on anarchism was a niche concern, as the overwhelming interest and funding was for communism in the east and for social democracy in the West.[11] However, anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism always had a range of dedicated followers, and, as the edited volume by Carl Levy and Saul Newman entitled *The Anarchist Imagination* underlines, they had a considerable influence on a great variety of disciplines within the humanities and social sciences, which increased substantially after the end of the Cold War. It is well-known that anarchist thought had a deep influence on a range of social movements from 1968 to the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s and the more contemporary anti-globalist and environmentalist movements. Much less discussed has been the intellectual influence of anarchist though in the academic world, which is where this pioneering and eye-opening book comes into play, breaking new ground in the study of anarchism. The lucid introduction by Carl Levy sets out the issues at stake and already provides tantalizing glimpses into the meeting of academic and anarchist worlds. He highlights Colin Ward's *Anarchy* magazine in the 1960s as a central platform of an ongoing dialogue between humanities and social science disciplines and anarchist thought. Classic scholars, including Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, the theorists of elites, such as Robert Michels, pragmatists such as C. Wright Mills, Green thinking, second and third wave feminists, theorists of intersectionality, social movement scholars, theorists of social capital, transnational labour historians, network analysts, the scholarship on altruism, the critique of ideology, postcolonial thought—they all engaged with anarchist thought and vice versa, leading to often extremely constructive and productive dialogues, but also occasional spats and violent disagreements. The following chapters are brimming with insights related to sociology, international relations, security studies, political theory, political science, feminist studies, geography, postcolonial studies, legal studies, educational studies, religious studies, art, anthropology and linguistics. Furthermore, there are fleeting references to history, psychology, criminology and organization studies.

As I cannot do justice to the complexity and richness of the arguments presented in these chapters, let me just pick out a few highlights. Mohammed Bamyeh provides a fascinating analysis of how anarchist-inspired sociologists have attempted to

11 For a good survey of the state-of-the-art in the history of anarchism and anarchist studies, see: Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams (eds.): The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism, Basingstoke 2019.

make sense of the Arab spring in ways that can be developed also for other sociologies of revolt and protest. Saul Newman suggests tantalizing ways of renewing anarchist thought in political theory by incorporating ideas from poststructuralism, especially Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Sandra Jeppesen's chapter underlines the importance of anarcha-feminists in providing a deeper understanding of male forms of power and oppression over a wide range of topics and themes. Anthony Ince demonstrates how anarchist geography has reconceptualized space as networked and rhizomatic patterns of autonomy. Maia Ramnath shows how postcolonial studies has benefitted from the insight of anarchists on a range of topics including nationalism, cultural hybridity, and diasporic experiences. Allan Antliff highlights the integral role of aesthetics in the politics of anarchism and goes on to show, largely with reference to Canadian conceptual artists, how conceptual art in the twentieth century has been picking up many of the concerns championed by anarchists. In his compelling conclusion, Carl Levy describes the academic universe of the humanities and social sciences as 'a hall of mirrors' through which anarchists wandered. Exploring the long-lasting and deep relationship with anthropology, Levy provides a defence of anarchist anthropologists and he goes on to do the same for anarchist linguistics, the best-known representative of which was Noam Chomsky. Overall the reader of this volume will emerge from this book entirely convinced that anarchist ways of seeing have had a long-term and deep impact on how humanities and social science disciplines developed from the nineteenth century through to the present day.

Anarchism was a self-consciously transnational movement that forged many alliances across national borders.[12] The same is true for the protest movements against nuclear energy that were often inspired by anarchist thought. At the centre of attention in Natalie Pohl's superbly researched book entitled *Atomprotest am Oberrhein* stand the citizens' movements against nuclear energy that emerged on both sides of the French-German border in Baden and the Alsace in the 1970s and early 1980s. Pohl analyses the many innovative forms of protest championed by these movements and traces their significant impact on a variety of new social movements in both France and Germany.[13] The Baden-Alsatian Citizen Initiatives protested against the planned construction of nuclear power plants in Wyhl and Fessenheim, Breisach. Pohl narrates an intriguing story of trans-border cooperation to mobilize the wider public against political decisions taken by elected representatives. She is particularly good in

12 On transnational activism, see the more recent perspectives in: Donatella della Porta and Sydney Tarrow (eds.): Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power, Lanham 2005, and for more historical perspectives, see: Stefan Berger and Sean Scalmer (eds.): The Transnational Activist. Transformations and Comparisons from the Anglo-World since the Nineteenth Century, London 2018.

13 See also: Hans Peter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni (eds.): Social Movements in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis, London 2015.

highlighting to what extent a shared dialect and the construction of a shared regional past boosted the attempts of the protest movement and was an important resource for their struggle. The book has its origins in a cotutelle dissertation defended both at the universities of Paris and Saarbrücken. Making good use of a wealth of archival written and audiovisual sources, Pohl, who visited no fewer than 13 archives, gives many fascinating examples of the ways in which ordinary citizens on both sides of the border came to cooperate and champion innovative protest cultures that in turn were to have a huge influence on other protest movements. The background and development of the movement is accounted for in great detail. Thus, for example, she highlights the success of the illegal radio broadcaster Radio Verte Fessenheim that kept moving in order to escape the police and continue operating an independent communication and information platform. The ultimate success of the movement and its ability to get heard in local and regional politics was due not least to the fact that it commanded significant support among farmers and local people who tended to be far more conservative than the radical students who also were a prominent presence in the protests.

The first three chapters of her more than 400-page book comprehensively introduce the citizens' initiatives that formed in the region during the 1970s. Her comparison of the French and German initiatives shows that these were far more organized and associational on the French side, whereas on the German side they were more informal, spontaneous and unstable. By contrast, within the transregional umbrella organization, the Badisch-Elsässische Bürgerinitiative, representatives from Baden far outnumbered representatives from the Alsace. Particularly prominent individuals who played a leading role in the protests get a lot of space. Their rich ego-documents are mined thoroughly to show how the opponents of nuclear power saw the epic battle that was unfolding on the Upper Rhine in those crucial years for the formation of anti-nuclear protests in Germany and France. In particular, the singer songwriter Walter Mossmann, the priest Günter Richter, the peace activist Wolfgang Sternstein and the teacher Jean-Jacques Rettig are prominently represented here. A particular strength of Pohl's study is the analysis of the reaction of local politicians and the government of Baden-Württemberg to the protests, much of which is new and directly taken from the archives.

The last two chapters of Pohl's book extends the historical analysis of the protest movement to a media and memory analysis that also makes for intriguing reading. The author can show how the *Badische Zeitung* on the German side viewed the protesters far more favourably than the *Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace* on the other side of the border. Furthermore, Pohl provides an excellent analysis of the counter-media shaped by the protesters themselves, including the radio station mentioned above. Memory also became a crucial resource for the protesters that was actualized in publications and songs. Thus, the protest movement discovered and celebrated a long tradition of protest in the region ranging back to peasant wars of the sixteenth century, eighteenth and nineteenth-century riots and the 1848 revolution. Recalling past

struggles against governments allowed the anti-nuclear activists to put themselves in a long line of a politics from below directed against official political representatives. Overall, Pohl's study is the definitive work on the iconic protests in Baden and the Alsace that have drawn attention from other scholars but have never been examined in such detail to date.[14]

Women played a major role in the protests on the Upper Rhine. That this was no exception is underlined by the outstanding comparative exploration of the fortunes of nuclear power in five West European nation states that is edited by Astrid Mignon Kirchhof under the title *Pathways into and out of Nuclear Power in Western Europe*. As the editor herself highlights in her superb introduction, difference-based feminists were particularly prominent in the protest movements of the five countries who argued that as women they had a higher rationality and morality that was both biologically and ecologically rooted. Individual physicists like Berta Karlik in Austria also had a prominent place in opposing nuclear energy. As all chapters in this highly informative volume underline the pioneering role of anti-nuclear protests in championing strategies and practices of resistance, they emerge here as important inspiration for cross-movement mobilization from the 1970s onwards.[15]

The book is organized into five separate national chapters that follow a similar grid of questions to be addressed which makes for good comparability of the country case studies. They all follow a 'rise and fall' narrative which starts with high hopes and ends with disillusionment. Christian Forstner writes on Austria's Nuclear Energy Programme, Jan-Henrik Meyer on the refusal of Denmark to introduce commercial nuclear power plants, Astrid Mignon Kirchhof and Helmuth Trischler on (West-) Germany's Nuclear Phase-Out, Matteo Gerlini on Italy and Arne Kaijser on a kind of Swedish exception which does not quite fit the narrative arc of 'rise and fall.' One might add that in global perspective this narrative arc is entirely unconvincing, as nuclear energy is far from a spent force. The climate crisis and the search for ways out of it has actually given nuclear energy a new lease of life in many parts of the world

14 See also: Dieter Rucht: Von Whyl nach Gorleben: Bürger gegen Atomprogramm und nukleare Entsorgung, Munich, 1980; Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollack: The Atom Besieged: Anti-Nuclear Movements in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA, 1982; Michael Schüring: ‚Bekennen gegen den Atomstaat': die Evangelischen Kirchen in der Bundesrepublik und die Konflikte um die Atomenergie, 1970–1990, Göttingen 2015; Andrew Tompkins: Better Active than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protests in 1970s France and West Germany, Oxford, 2016; Stephen Milder: Greening Democracy: the Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968–1983, Cambridge 2017; Dolores L. Augustine: Taking On Technocracy: Nuclear Power in Germany, 1945 to the Present, New York, 2018.

15 See also the special issue on cross-movement mobilizations guest edited by Sabrina Zajak, in: Moving the Social: Journal of Social History and the History of Social Movements 63 (2020) entitled *Cross-Movement Mobilization: Perspectives from the Global North and South*.

and one can speak with some confidence of a renaissance of nuclear energy in recent years.[16] Some of the West European states discussed here would then be seen almost as exceptions to the rule.

Yet, sticking with the West European comparative perspective, the volume is utterly convincing in tracing the critical discourses on nuclear energy in the five countries under discussion here. The transnational similarities as well as the national peculiarities emerge clearly from the pages of this extremely readable and insightful book. It is particularly fascinating to observe how all five chapters identify Social Democratic parties as the most enthusiastic in demanding the development of nuclear energy in the early days of the nuclear power industry. Only over the course of the 1970s and 1980s did they change tack. The increased greening of the Social Democratic parties meant that earlier hopes for an abundant energy resource gave way to ecological concerns and gloomy narratives of pending atomic disasters that were powerfully underlined by the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. Social Democratic parties therefore had to look for alternative ways of powering economies that continue to be dependant on energy-intensive industries employing millions of workers seeking to participate in the growing consumption, who are classic Social Democratic voters. After the red received some green shades from the 1980s onwards, Social Democrats are currently seeking to put the red back into the green.

Sweden and Germany mark two different pathways of how to deal with nuclear energy. Whereas a Christian Democrat-led government in Germany, under the influence of yet another nuclear disaster, Fukushima in Japan, decided to phase out nuclear energy altogether after a red-green government had already taken the decision to abandon nuclear energy in 1998, Sweden has retained nuclear energy as one energy resource among others following a referendum on the issue as early as 1981. It is also interesting to observe that in those countries who opted for nuclear energy, the energy companies were often among the least fascinated by this prospect as it was far easier for them to stick to fossil fuels with which they were making very healthy profits. The exception to the rule here is Italy, where energy companies promoted the use of nuclear. In Germany and Austria, it was the advances of research on the potential of nuclear energy that led to a veritable euphoria in the 1950s about the possibilities of nuclear power production. In Denmark a strong anti-nuclear protest movement not only prevented the development of a separate Danish programme for the use of nuclear energy, it also campaigned vigorously against nuclear plants just beyond the borders of Denmark, both in Sweden and in the GDR. It is impossible to do full justice to this superbly informative edited collection that succeeds admirably as an exercise in

16 Ekaterina Tarasova: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Discursive and Political Contexts: Between Expert Voices and Local Protests, Stockholm, 2017, which I reviewed in: Moving the Social: Journal of Social History and the History of Social Movements 62 (2019), p. 85f.

comparative history despite being written by an authors' collective rather than an individual. As such, it also demonstrates how fruitful it can be to bring authors together on a specific theme and give them a structure that allows for comparison across the national case studies that are being examined.

The anti-nuclear protest movement is an intriguing social movement in that it used feelings of regional identity and belonging to a specific place—a sense of Heimat —to good effect.[17] Heimat sentiments were often linked to local or regional places, but in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalism adapted these feelings of smaller Heimats to develop the larger Heimat, i. e. the nation. National identity has no doubt been one of the most powerful collective identity markers in the modern world, partly because nation states provided a forum for entitlements and rights. Even critics of dominant nationalisms could often not but formulate alternative visions of the nation, promoting nationalisms that were different to those that were dominant. This was, by and large, the case for the nineteenth-century labour movements in Europe that were internationalist in their emphasis on common forms of exploitation of workers across nation states, but at the same time, the nation-state was increasingly the frame in which labour parties and trade unions operated and hence a forum in which concreted social reforms could be obtained.[18] Thus we can observe a creeping nationalization of labour, the more it was possible for labour movements to be accepted by employers and the state.

Martin van Ginderachter's brilliant study entitled *The Everyday Nationalism of Workers* provides a detailed case study of the Belgian Workers Party (BWP) and its attempt to forge a sense of national identity that appealed to their core constituency, i. e. industrial workers, but that was still capable of differentiating the BWP's vision of nation from that of its bourgeois rivals. After setting out his own understanding of nationalism that emphasizes the role of states and their elites in promoting nationalism as a form of state building and pays special attention to symbols and cultural practices of the everyday to trace how those elite-driven processes are adapted 'from below,' Ginderachter introduces the reader to the special context of the Belgium nation-state as it emerged out of international diplomatic initiatives in the nineteenth century. He emphasizes the strong liberal frame of the Belgian state which set significant limits to its willingness to interfere with the lives of its citizens. Institutions that were vitally important for the building of nations elsewhere, such as schools, the military, colonialism and welfare states all remained somewhat deficient and underdeveloped.

17 On the concept of Heimat, compare: Bernhard Schlink: Heimat als Utopie, Frankfurt am Main 2000. On its origins in nineteenth century Germany, see also: Celia Applegate: A Nation of Provincials: the German Idea of Heimat, Berkeley 1990.

18 John J. Schwarzmantel: Socialism and the Idea of the Nation, London 1991.

Society was heavily pillarized and divided along liberal versus Catholic lines, to which the socialists added a third pillar in the late nineteenth century.

The BWP was founded in 1885 and from its inception it sought to square a pronounced internationalism with an oppositional nationalism that emphasized the democratization of politics and other spheres of life, including the economy. Indeed, the 1893 general strike brought an extensive expansion of voting rights that now incorporated large sections of the working class for the first time, but the proportional voting system that was introduced also highlighted ethnic cleavages between Walloons and the Flemish. In particular, the attempts of the BWP to associate the founding of Belgium in 1830 with the revolutionary ideals of the French revolution of 1789 met with hostility or, at best, indifference, by Flemish workers many of whom remained hostile to what they saw as an elite Francophone culture. Another difficult terrain for the BWP was republicanism, as many workers remained loyal to the monarchy—a trend that was exacerbated after the unpopular Leopold was succeeded by Albert. The third pillar of the BWP's programme, anti-militarism, was arguably, according to Ginderachter, the most popular, as the army remained unpopular with many workers—increasingly so after conscription was introduced relatively late in the day in 1913.

Socialist workers remained distinctly distrustful of the national flag and the national anthem, which they rejected as a symbol of the clerical and bourgeois nature of official nationalism. Making good use of so-called 'propaganda pence,' i. e. short messages in the socialist newspapers *Vorruit*, penned by supporters of the BWP, Ginderachter can show how Flemish workers in particular championed the Flemish language and Flemish history. Despite the fact that a clerical Catholic Flemish movement dented the socialist workers' enthusiasm for Flemishness, Ginderachter argues that Flemish socialist workers remained receptive to the tropes of Flemish 'banal nationalism.'[19] Yet Flemish nationalism did not prove all that divisive for the BWP before 1914, as the pillarization of the country along class lines remained strong. Where the party struggled significantly more was in squaring the circle between its professed internationalism and its championing of a democratic nationalism—but that was a fate that the BWP shared with all socialist parties in the Second International.[20]

Socialists were, throughout the long nineteenth century, among the political forces most intent on democratizing nation states.[21] In Germany they were at the heart of

19 For the concept of ‚banal nationalism', see: Michael Billig: Banal Nationalism, London 1995.

20 Patrizia Dogliani: ‚The Fate of Socialist Internationalism', in: Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (eds.): Internationalisms. A Twentieth-Century History, Cambridge 2017, pp. 38–60.

21 That socialism was, above all, a movement for greater democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and is underlined by Geoff Eley: Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000, Oxford 2000.

transforming an authoritarian Imperial German state into a parliamentary and social democracy after the revolution of 1918.[22] In German historiography there has been a long-standing debate to what extent this democratic transformation has been successful. Historians have asked whether socialists did not push democratization far enough in 1918/9 when they still had the power to do so, and whether this failure sealed the fate of the Weimar Republic almost from its beginning.[23] To what extent this question of democratic transformation is still at the heart of much recent scholarship on Weimar democracy is underlined by the collection of essays edited by Sebastian Elsbach, Ronny Noak and Andreas Braune, which emerged out of a conference organized by the research centre on the Weimar Republic at the University of Jena in conjunction with the Weimar Republic Association in Weimar. The central concern of many of the contributions assembled here is with the history of democracy and the collection as a whole seeks to answer the question to what degree the Weimar Republic was a hinge connecting the histories of Imperial Germany before 1918 and the Federal Republic after 1949. It draws attention to a range of conflicts that characterized Weimar politics, but far from arguing that Weimar politics were too conflictual, many articles stress how the republic was relatively successful in dealing politically with such conflicts. As political and social conflict is at the heart of modern democracy, the successful mediation of such conflicts via democratic procedures is central to working democracies. How did the Weimar Republic fare with this stress test for democracies? Were there indeed too many who refused to accept conflict as the basis of modern democratic societies? Was there an overwhelming longing to return to an alleged social harmony and a consensual politics that was anti-pluralist and ultimately anti-democratic?

In sum, the contributions to this extremely readable collection give a highly differentiated answer to these questions in a wide variety of different societal fields. Thus, Angela Schuberth points out that the concept of 'people's community' (Volksgemeinschaft) was by no means a concept used exclusively by an antidemocratic right. It was widely used among democrats signalling a democratic people's consensus—a meaning that has been completely lost through the dominance of National Socialist concepts of *Volksgemeinschaft*. The anti-revolutionary mobilization of students and staff at the universities at the beginning of the republic (Florian Schreiner) and the widespread use of political violence, including killings (Sebastian Elsbach), just as the overwhelming scepticism towards parliamentarism among many political parties

22 Much of the recent literature on the German revolution of 1918 has emphasized its role in establishing the first German democracy. See: Reinhard Rürup: Revolution und Demokratiegründung. Studien zur deutschen Geschichte, 1918/19, Göttingen 2020. See also: Stefan Berger, Wolgang Jäger and Anja Kruke (eds.): Gewerkschaften in revolutionären Zeiten. Deutschland in Europa 1917–1923, Essen 2020.

23 Wolfgang Niess: Die Revolution von 1918/19 in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. Deutungen von der Weimarer Republik bis ins 21. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2013.

not just on the political right but also within the ranks of democratic parties (Jörn Retterath), and the widespread militarization of the political language towards the end of the Weimar Republic (Sebastian Gräb) all point to the strong forces critical of the conflictual set-up of the new democracy. The failure of the left-liberal DDP to make its attempts to form a bridge to reformist social democracy attractive to its overwhelmingly bourgeois voters (Alex Burkhardt) can also be seen as a sign of the unwillingness of large swathes of the German middle classes to accept a conflictual form of consensus-building as the basis of the new polity. The championing of anti-liberalism by intellectuals such as Carl Schmitt formed a bridgehead to fascism already during the Weimar Republic (Ludwig Decke). Especially for German Jews, the increasing threat posed by the Nazis led to a situation where Jewish publications endorsed political candidates on the basis of who was most likely to defeat the Nazi candidate in the early 1930s (Simon Sax).

On the other hand, the increasing democratization of the stock corporation law (Felix Selgert) and the extension of the welfare state (Oliver Gaida) just as the attempt to build a more republican school culture (Anne Otto), the successful feminization of the Protestant churches (Michaela Bräuninger) and the resilience of democratic institutions in Thuringia (Timo Leinbach) show how the forces of democratization were successfully reforming aspects of political culture in the Weimar Republic. Birgit Bublies-Godau's contribution on the Venedey family as a democratic family dynasty is a particularly intriguing chapter as it points to the potential of using a transgenerational family history in order to build democratic memory traditions. Whilst conservative intellectuals could make their peace with democracy in the 1920s (Andreas Behnke), republicans, like Hans Kelsen were more than capable of countering critiques of democracy (Helene Eggersdorfer). Several contributions pick up on specific continuities between Weimar and the early Federal Republic, which are very visible in the schools for party officials (Ronny Noak). Intellectual patterns of conflict that had already been forged during the Weimar Republic remained alive and important in the early years of the Federal Republic as Frank Schale underlines in his discussions of the political conflicts surrounding re-armament. Sarah Langwald can show how the persecution of communists in the early Federal Republic owed much to the continuities, both personal and intellectual, in the German legal system before and after 1945. Thomas Schubert even sees an intellectual civil war raging in Germany from the Weimar Republic to the end of the old Federal Republic, in which liberals, conservatives, fascists and communists struggled for intellectual hegemony. On balance, the volume underlines that the 1918 revolution was followed by a wave of democratizations in different spheres of public life in Germany, thus refuting earlier notions that Weimar had already failed before it had properly begun.

Democratizing the nation-state did not only become a huge challenge in Germany and, one might add, in many other European nation states after the First World

War.[24] As Wolfgang Schmale shows in his fascinating book on a variety of different organizations and individuals championing notions of a more united Europe, ideas of democratization also very much came to the fore among those seeking to build a united Europe from the interwar period to the early 1950s. Schmale focusses on three groups in particular, the Freemasons, the Human Rights' Leagues, and what he terms individual citizens who had been inspired by Winston Churchill's various speeches on Europe between the end of the Second World War and the early 1950s. Making good use of archival material and printed newspapers and bulletins, Schmale sees a direct relation between the idea of building a united states of Europe and some of the key values of Freemasonry, among which Schmale counts democracy, human rights, peace and civilization. He upholds a very rosy-eyed and positive perception of Freemasonry that informs his explanations for the Masons' commitment to Europe. An analysis less rooted in a history of ideas and more in social history might have been able to unmask much of the 'ideas' of Freemasonry as ideology, but it is nevertheless highly interesting to read about primarily French Masons committing themselves to the idea of building a united Europe in the interwar period. The Masons were, however, part of a social, political, and economic elite that were motivated by plans to stabilize and extend that elite's position in the world. Hence, time and again, they refer to the economic and military benefits that would be derived from a united states of Europe. Their commitment went hand in hand with a commitment to colonialism and imperialism and should be read, more than Schmale gives credit to, not as the outcome of a human rights and democracy discourse, but more a discourse of global power constellations.

Schmale's second case study is based on the European Human Rights' Leagues, in particular the French Ligue Internationale des Droits de l'Homme. Again, the discourse on human rights, human dignity and democracy is very much to the fore in the publications of the leagues that are analyzed by Schmale. They put particular trust in the League of Nations and argued that under the umbrella of the League, larger territorial federations should emerge, including a European, an American, an Asian and an African federation. Their thinking in continental federations points to a global political frame for the ideas of Europe that were championed by the leagues. In fact, Schmale observes a considerable overlap of activists between the Masons and the leagues. The leagues also emphasized the economic benefits of European unity and, like the Masons, they intended to build a colonialist and imperialist Europe where Europe would keep its colonies and continue with an alleged civilizational mission in the non-European world.

24 See the contributions by Ralph White, Stefan Berger and Angel Smith, in: John Garrard, Vera Tolz and Ralph White (eds.): European Democratization since 1800, Basingstoke 2000, pp. 77–140. See also, more generally: Kari Palonen, Tuija Pulkkinen and José Maria Rosales (eds.): The Ashgate Research Companion to the Politics of Democratization in Europe. Concepts and Histories, Avebury 2016.

If the Masons' and the leagues' understanding of democracy and human rights was therefore quite limited and certainly not in line with mainstream understandings of democracy and human rights today, the same is true for the reaction of individual citizens to Churchill's speeches that Schmale has dug up from the Archives of the European Union in Florence. Here it is crystal clear that many of the admirers of Churchill had little to do with either democracy or human rights. Anti-communism, occidentalism, imperialism, white supremacism, the idea of the civilizational superiority of Europe—they all feature much more strongly than any convictions that the supporters of the EU might want to align with its present-day incarnation. It would have been interesting to see whether more letters are contained in the Churchill Archives in Cambridge, but Schmale has apparently not explored this avenue further. Overall Schmale's insightful book is part and parcel of a growing literature on the antecedents of the European Union, among which were many whose democratic credentials were rather dubious, like those of Count Koudenhove-Kalergi.[25] Once again it was the socialist labour movement that was amongst the most democratic stalwarts of the idea of European unity, even if also here we find notions of racism and colonialism present.[26] But internationalism, however problematic, was part of the DNA of the socialist labour movement.

This is also true for Alwin Brandes, the subject of an exemplary biography of Siegfried Mielke and Stefan Heinz. Brandes headed the most influential member union of the Social Democratic trade union federation, the ADGB, namely the metalworkers' federation, in the Weimar Republic. Coming from an artisan background, his father was a master locksmith, Brandes joined the Social Democrats at 24 years of age. His harsh experiences as an apprentice brought him into the metalworkers' union, where he quickly rose through the ranks to become a full-time union official organizing metalworkers in Magdeburg. At the same time, he sat for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the city council of Magdeburg, where, on the one hand, he experienced first-hand how the conservative and liberal parties shunned Social Democrats. Yet he also saw how political work was not in vain, as he was one of the driving forces behind the creation of a city housing office working towards improving the dreadful housing conditions of many workers. Municipal social reforms in many parts of Imperial Germany could count on the support of Social Democrats everywhere. Brandes opposed the First World War and when German social democracy split, he joined the Independent Socialists (USPD): his union in Magdeburg supported mass strikes of metalworkers against the war.

25 Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler: Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreissiger Jahren, Vienna, 2004; more generally, compare: Rüdiger Hohls and Hartmut Kaelble (eds.): Geschichte der europäischen Integration bis 1989, Stuttgart 2016.

26 Willy Buschak: Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa sind unser Ziel. Arbeiterbewegung und Europa im frühen 20. Jahrhundert, Essen 2014; Idem: Arbeiterbewegung und Europa im frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Dokumentenband, Essen 2018.

During the revolution he was an advocate of a council republic and wanted to push economic, social and political reform further than the Majority Social Democrats under Friedrich Ebert. However, he also opposed Bolshevism and was sceptical about post-revolutionary developments in Russia. Hence, when the left wing of the USPD joined the German Communist Party in 1920, Brandes, alongside many others, rejoined the Social Democrats. Between 1919 and 1933 he was chairman of the metalworkers' union, one of the most left-wing unions in the ADGB. Yet he also was a strong anti-communist and categorically ruled out any united front between social democratic and communist unions. As Reichstag deputy for the SPD he was strictly against any cooperation with the Communist Party (KPD). As a trade unionist he was active in the international secretariat of the metalworkers and knew many of the leading metalworkers' unionists in Britain, France and many other European nations. He was also committed to the cause of women's rights. Mielke and Heinz underline how the world economic crisis after 1929 left the union incapable of fighting the employers on the factory floor and the SPD incapable of fighting the rise of the Nazis. The toleration of the chancellorship of Brüning cost the party dearly at the ballot box. As a prominent Social Democrat and trade unionist Brandes was persecuted by the Nazis—twice he had to serve time in a concentration camp. Despite these experiences he remained active in the resistance against the Nazis commanding over an expansive network of contacts ranging throughout Germany and to comrades in exile. After the end of the Second World War Brandes stayed in the Soviet zone of occupation and fought hard as a Social Democrat to prevent the take-over of the rebuilt metalworkers' union by the communists. Given the power constellations in the Soviet zone this was an impossible task and had he lived longer, he would probably have had to leave or face renewed persecution—this time by the communists. Brandes was representative of a type of socialist labour movement official who struggled on behalf of the collective advancement of his class towards greater opportunities in politics, the economy and in society. Although it is by no means a hagiography and written in the sober scientific ductus that befits a scholarly work, one cannot put this book down without feeling great admiration for Alwin Brandes, whose idealism and practical politics still shine as a major example to everyone fighting for greater social justice and democracy today.

Although there remain many blind spots, the history of trade unionism is a rather well-researched field in German history. This is partly thanks to the Cold War, when Communist East Germany sponsored labour history written in a Communist mould and capitalist West Germany sponsored, through Social Democracy, a labour history broadly written in a Social Democratic mould.[27] After 1990 the latter tradition

27 On the trajectory of German labour history, see: Stefan Berger: 'Writing the Comparative History of Social Democracy: a Comparative Look at Britain and Germany', in: John Callaghan and Ilaria Favretto (eds.): Transitions in Social Democracy: Cultural and Ideological

remained strong, not the least through the efforts of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, close to the SPD, and the Hans-Böckler Foundation, close to the trade union confederation, the DGB. The last book to be discussed in this review deals with the contacts of the West German trade unions with Communist Eastern Europe during the period of détente between 1969 and 1989. What emerges clearly from yet another impeccably researched work of labour history, based on stupendous archival research and a masterly knowledge of the substantial secondary literature, is how much these contacts were part and parcel of West German foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s, in particular during a time of Social Democratic governments between 1969 and 1982. But Stefan Müller has interesting things to say even in his brief survey of the pre-history from the Weimar Republic through to the 1960s. Thus, it is intriguing that already from the mid-1950s the trade union movement took steps to work more productively with the de facto division of Germany and the European continent. Especially Heinz Kluncker, who was elected chairman of the influential public services union (ÖTV), was one of the key people behind the strategy to seek contacts behind the Iron Curtain, as early as 1964. The youth movement of the DGB supported these moves energetically.

Throughout the two decades that are examined in great depth here, i.e the 1970s and 1980s, these contacts were extended substantially: the aspiration of leading trade unionists oscillated between euphoria that it might be possible to overcome the East-West division of the Cold War and the realization that it might at best be possible to stabilize the bipolar world order of the Cold War and prevent renewed tensions between East and West. In 1969, the DGB congress formulated its own positions vis-à-vis *Ostpolitk*, which were broadly in line with the incoming Social Democratic government under Willy Brandt. In particular, Heinz-Oskar Vetter, chairman of the DGB between 1969 and 1982, played a significant role in preparing the ground for the success of the Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* through his travelling diplomacy between Warsaw and Moscow. As with *Ostpolitik* more generally, the contacts with Poland and the Soviet Union were far easier to develop than the contacts with the other Germany, the GDR, and its trade union movement, the FDGB. But here West German trade unionists were also ultimately successful in forging ties, many of which stayed intact for the remainder of the Cold War division of the European continent. Throughout, trade union leaders coordinated their activities very closely with the Social Democratic government, and they became a vital instrument for Brandt's foreign-policy initiatives vis-à-vis Communist Eastern Europe in the early 1970s.

Problems of the Golden Age, Manchester 2006, pp. 59–74; Stefan Berger: 'Introduction: the Revival of German Labour History', in: special issue 'German Labour History' guest-edited by Stefan Berger, German History 37:3 (2019), pp. 277–294.

It makes for intriguing reading to follow Müller through the analysis of the many differences that characterized the positions of different West German unions in relation to their attitudes to Communist Eastern Europe, ranging from crypto-communist positions to stark anti-communist positions. It is all the more surprising that Vetter and the DGB could keep the ship on course and play a constructive role in preparing the Berlin Treaty of 1972. Following the peak of *Ostpolitik*, the DGB and many of its unions initiated, during the second half of the 1970s, an intensive schedule of mutual visits of delegations discussing a variety of different topics, from détente to practical issues of ensuring better work safety, better working conditions, better pay, trade union education and other trade union related matters. Whilst these exchanges could be more or less intense at certain times, they left an overall somewhat stale and disillusioned feeling among many West German trade unionists, as they felt that no real dialogue with their counterparts was possible. Müller's analysis shows clearly how the emergence of the independent Polish trade union *Solidarność* marked a decisive caesura and made it difficult to continue with an increasingly routinized and cosy travel arrangement between West German and Eastern European trade unionists.[28] He shows how, for a long time, the West German unions attempted to position themselves as mediators between the official communist unions and *Solidarność*. That, however, satisfied no one and left German unionists in an extremely uncomfortable position. Ultimately, the DGB lent its support to the Polish dissident unionists, but unofficially they were often frustrated about the inability to enter into a constructive dialogue in a situation of rising tensions within Poland. Yet Müller is also extremely astute in working out that the responses to and the lessons learnt from *Solidarność* were by no means the same among West German trade unionists. Whilst for some it led to a break with Communist unions, others attempted to continue a dialogue with the official union movements which brought them harsh criticism from representatives of *Solidarność* and dissidents more generally across Eastern Europe.

During the Second Cold War in the 1980s, the unions lent support to all foreign-policy initiatives of the SPD that sought to rescue détente from the increasingly polarized and hostile noises coming in particular from Washington and London. German-German trade union contacts especially thrived in the 1980s around issues of peace and ongoing dialogue between the different systems. Most West German unionists, with some exceptions, accepted the existence of a second German state and sought to work not for a unified Germany, but for a liberalized GDR. Müller argues convincingly that ultimately the dense network of contacts did not only lead to a diminished notion of enmity but also to forms of mutual understanding that worked

28 This is also true for other West-European union movements—to varying degrees. See: Idesbald Goddeeris (ed.): Solidarity with Solidarity. Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982, Lanham 2010.

towards undermining a hardline communism in the GDR. Throughout the 1980s the unions continued to operate as quasi-state institutions, coordinating their activities behind the Iron Curtain closely with West German governments, regardless of whether they were headed by the SPD or the CDU.

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

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