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Unwelcome Participation: Ostracizing Public Protest in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Special Issue: Introduction

In recent years, public protests in the Federal Republic of Germany have been connected to two very basic, yet telling, notions: good and evil. The *Black Lives Matter* campaign was met with great approval, and the *Fridays for Future* activists have gained renown as the ostensible rescuers of the entire planet. On the other hand, those protesting against COVID-19 restrictions have been met with misgivings and distrust. While the former serve as a model of civic engagement, the latter are considered the "bad guys" of democracy. This distinction was summarized, for example, in a commentary on the resumption of the *Fridays for Future* demonstrations in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: "In view of the irresponsibility of the resistance against COVID-19 policies, one almost longs for those young people again and for next Friday."[1]

The protests against the government's preventative measures were glossed as irresponsible, because the demonstrators openly disregarded current safety rules: They neither wore face masks, nor maintained the minimum distance requirements. Such calculated taboo-breaking has been part of the protest repertoire for decades. But due to the vital importance of COVID-19 protection measures for the safety of society as a whole, these particular violations appeared to signal a revocation of the civic consensus. Similarly, the protesters were identified with violent extremists, conspiracy theorists and right-wing populists. "Germany is experiencing a new Pegida moment,"[2] commented the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, alluding to the right-wing populist and xenophobic protests of the *Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West* (PEGIDA) that briefly gained steam in 2015 in response to the European migration crisis.[3]

1 Jasper von Altenbockum: Sehnsucht der Jugend, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 26 September 2020, p. 1.

2 Antonie Rietzschel: Demos und Dämonen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 18 May 2020, p. 4.

3 Originating in Dresden in the autumn of 2014, the PEGIDA protests quickly mobilized thousands of participants. In May 2021, the state Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Saxony classified PEGIDA to be an "extremist movement." Although PEGIDA did

DOI: 10.46586/mts.66.2021.5-20 Moving the Social · 66 (2021) · p. 5–20

In sum, the protests against the pandemic containment measures were understood as harmful to society because of their stated purpose, the form they took on, and the participants who joined in.

This special issue deals with the kind of protests that do not fit the conventions of non-electoral participation in democracy and are therefore marginalized. A considerable number of protest actors are excluded from the landscape of political communication because their demands are unacceptable to the majority of society, because they are not recognized as politically equal due to social stigmatization, or because their protest behaviour blatantly violates the participation rules of the respective political order. Nevertheless, we understand these unconventional protests as part of the political communications in public spaces that convey specific messages and aim to encourage specific changes to society. Accordingly, there is no currently imaginable publicly articulated protest that would not contribute to the democratic formation of opinion and public will. Participation research, in particular, has developed various taxonomies to distinguish the various forms of political participation.[4] By differentiating between conventional and unconventional participation, it becomes possible to highlight the degree of public recognition. Whereas, in earlier classifications, conventional participation primarily comprised institutionalized forms of opinion-formation and expression (i. e., primarily through elections and membership in political parties), a wide variety of forms of articulation beyond these possibilities—as, for example, calls for boycott, forms of civil disobedience, flash mobs or social media campaigns—have gained broad acceptance since then.[5] In what follows, we define as "conventional" all forms of political participation that were accepted by the majority of political actors as a contribution to democratic decision-making. Unconventional participation, on the other hand, means that a majority of actors excluded certain expressions of opinion from political communication. The boundary between conventional and unconventional participation was notoriously blurred and contested. We conceive it to be a pattern of political culture that changed significantly in the decades after 1945.

However, as the introductory example shows, the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation is still crucial in the evaluation of protest behaviour itself. As the particularly well-researched example of the twentieth-century student movement, known colloquially as "1968" shows, this was also the case in ear-

not have a lasting impact, it was "paradigmatic for a process of political outrage, polarisation and disinhibition": Hans Voränder/Maik Herold/Steven Schäller, PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany, Basingstoke 2016, p. XIII.

4 Beate Hoecker: Politische Partizipation: systematische Einführung, in: Idem (ed.): Politische Beteiligung zwischen Konvention und Protest. Eine studienorientierte Einführung, Opladen 2006, pp. 3–20, 10–12.

5 Toralf Stark: Demokratische Bürgerbeteiligung außerhalb des Wahllokals. Umbrüche in der politischen Partizipation seit den 1970er-Jahren, Wiesbaden 2019, pp. 67–76.

lier decades: Television reports classified the student protests as "unrest"; it was highly controversial whether this unrest was beneficial or harmful to democracy.[6] These controversies continued long after the protests had ended and underpinned the perception of the era for decades, leaving deep traces in the historiographical evaluation of "1968."[7]

Other major protest waves—such as the peace movement in the early 1980s—were followed by similar controversies, as well as the subsequent re-evaluation in the historiography of contemporary scepticism and rejection.[8] Although, in retrospect, the protests against nuclear rearmament at the beginning of the 1980s, the demonstrations against § 218 StGB (which penalized abortion) and the campaigns of the gay liberation movement, can be regarded as breakthroughs toward a more liberal, open society, such a reading also conceals that part of the protest spectrum that arose from the counterculture and targeted the dominant political order. Vital currents—such as the autonomous and communist-oriented groups within the peace movement—thus disappeared from the historiography as part of the re-evaluation of protest as a whole. While the 1968 student protests now occupy an honoured place in the history of German democracy, significant segments of the peace movement, such as the women's peace movement or the transnationally organized International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), have fallen into oblivion because their demands, forms of protest or social basis did not fit the now standard interpretation of the mass protest as a "catalyst for reflecting on political and social key issues" within West German society.[9]

The approval or disapproval of particular protest behaviour has serious consequences for the later perception and historical classification of the protests themselves. Furthermore, certain social groups are dropped from the historical narrative entirely. Among the most prominent examples are migrants (both first and later-generation)

6 Meike Vogel: Unruhe im Fernsehen. Protestbewegung und öffentlich-rechtliche Berichterstattung in den 1960er Jahren, Göttingen 2010.

7 Silja Behre: Bewegte Erinnerung. Deutungskämpfe um „1968" in deutsch-französischer Perspektive, Tübingen 2016; Martin Stallmann: Die Erfindung von „1968". Der studentische Protest im bundesdeutschen Fernsehen 1977–1998, Göttingen 2017.

8 Kathrin Fahlenbrach/Laura Stapane: Mediale und visuelle Strategien der Friedensbewegung, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.): „Entrüstet Euch!" Nuklearkrise, NATO- Doppelbeschluss und Friedensbewegung, Paderborn 2012, pp. 229–246.

9 Philipp Gassert: Viel Lärm um nichts? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss als Katalysator gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung in der Bundesrepublik, in: Idem/Tim Geiger/Hermann Wentker (eds.): Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, München 2011, pp. 175–202, 176; Claudia Kemper: Medizin gegen den Kalten Krieg. Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre, Göttingen 2016; Anne Bieschke: Die unerhörte Friedensbewegung. Frauen, Krieg und Frieden in der Nuklearkrise (1979–1983), Essen 2018.

who, in the historiography of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after 1945, appear primarily as objects of political and social action instead of as politically autonomous subjects. For example, the Kurdish community's demonstrations in West Germany in the 1980s were not regarded as a self-determined political act, but as evidence of their instrumentalization by the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).[10] It is also important to rediscover forgotten protests, such as those that marked the immediate postwar period in Germany—namely the sometimes violent demonstrations engaged in by displaced persons, the protests against the agencies of the military government or against the 1948 currency reform[11]—or the xenophobic protests of the 1990s in reunified Germany. The assaults and arson attacks on asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda, the violent riots in Rostock-Lichtenhagen and the murders in Mölln and Solingen are only the most striking examples of the violent protests that marked that moment without being adequately remembered after the fact.[12]

A look at "unwelcome participation" thus reveals actors, political positions and behavioural patterns to which historiography ought to pay greater attention. While it is inherently necessary to address these blind spots, this perspective also allows for an examination of the changes in democratic culture over time. Such an analysis of the shifts in the criteria for "appropriate" protest thus highlights the rules for participation in democratic negotiation processes and, contrary to existing classifications along the lines of protest waves, reveals different caesuras in changing conditions for approval or disapproval of protests. Moreover, the notion of unwelcome participation offers the chance to contribute to a nuanced history of democracy in postwar Germany. Indeed, protest activities did not lead to a straightforward increase in democratic participation, but contributed to both increases and decreases in opportunities for participation that correspond to a history of democracy that avoids simple narratives of success and teleological accounts of a "successful democracy" or a "long road West."[13]

10 Ilja Mertens: Von einer „Inneren Angelegenheit", die auszog, Europa das Fürchten zu lehren. Transstaatliche politische Mobilisierung und das „Kurdenproblem", in: Thomas Faist (ed.): Transstaatliche Räume. Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur in und zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei, Bielefeld 2000, pp. 159–199; Alynna J. Lyon/Emek M. Uçarer: Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict. Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK, in: Rey Koslowski (ed.): International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics, London/New York 2005, pp. 62–82.

11 See Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft. Deutsche Protestgeschichte seit 1945, Stuttgart 2018, pp. 35–51.

12 Christoph Wowtscherk: Was wird, wenn die Zeitbombe hochgeht? Eine sozialgeschichtliche Analyse der fremdenfeindlichen Ausschreitungen in Hoyerswerda im September 1991, Göttingen 2014; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 259–260.

13 Edgar Wolfrum: Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2006; Heinrich August Winkler: The Long Road West. Vol. 2: Germany 1933–1990, Oxford/New York 2000.

Unwelcome Participation and the Research on Protest

How do the phenomena discussed in this special issue relate to theories that explain protest? Considering the three "classic" strains of movement research—rational choice, resource mobilization, and collective identity—the latter are certainly the most suitable for explaining inclusion and exclusion through protest activities.[14] Approaches aimed at analyzing the process of collective identity construction, in the sense of "shared meanings, experiences and reciprocal emotional ties as experienced by movement actors themselves through their interaction with each other,"[15] are particularly vital to explaining how the demands, forms and actors embedded in contentious politics shift the dynamics of belonging and othering. The main focus of such approaches is to model the mobilization, cohesion, and demobilization of protest movements. A major advantage of these approaches is that they attach great importance to emotional bonding. Protest thus appears as a collective experience that evokes strong feelings among the participants. Protest groups can thus be described as emotional communities which regulate affiliation by having their members all acknowledge a common set of emotional rules and express the "right" feelings. Emotional expressiveness thus becomes the yardstick for experiencing and enacting protest in the correct way.

Nonetheless, researchers of social movements have questioned the theoretical assumptions of identity and community constructions, in particular the notion of multiple and fluid identities, which poses a challenge to older models based on a coherent set of shared values and worldviews.[16] Newer approaches therefore attempt to explain protest movements not through a static commonality, but by tracing their logics of difference.[17] In this respect, a look at unconventional protest can help to illuminate the mechanisms through which difference becomes visible.

14 As an overview: see Cristina Flesher Fominaya: Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates, in: Sociology Compass 4 (2010), pp. 393–404; Stephan Wulf/Mary Bernstein/Verta Taylor: New Directions from the Study of Gender and Sexuality Movements: Collective Identity, Multi-Institutional Politics, and Emotions, in: Donatella Della Porta/Mario Diani (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, Oxford 2015, pp. 108–130, esp. pp. 108–113.

15 Cristina Flesher Fominaya: Collective Identity in Social Movements, p. 397.

16 See Donatella della Porta/Mario Diani: Social Movements: An Introduction (third edition), Oxford 2020, pp. 90–112.

17 Johanna Leinius/Judith Vey/Ingmar Hagemann: Poststrukturalistische Perspektiven auf soziale Bewegungen. Plädoyer für eine notwendige Blickverschiebung, in: FJSB 30:4 (2017), pp. 6–20; Sabrina Schenk: Das „Wir" der Proteste. Zum Verhältnis von Identität und Differenz in einer poststrukturalistischen Empirie, in: Alfred Schäfer/Christiane Thompson (eds.): Gemeinschaft, Paderborn 2018, pp. 149–171.

A re-orientation towards "unwelcome" participation not only allows for an analysis of the formation or maintenance of social movements, but also for a historicization of the shifts in the perception of protest behaviour and the consequences thereof on the development of democratic culture in the Federal Republic since 1945. Such a re-evaluation is necessary for two reasons: Firstly, the force of the mobilization, forms of action and repercussions of right-wing populist movements such as PEGIDA fundamentally call into question some of the most basic assumptions of movement research. In particular, the assumption that protest movements in postwar West Germany generally sought to advance democratization seems obsolete.[18] Since the 1960s, scholars have credited protest movements—not least because of their transatlantic ties—with the ability to drive forward the political and cultural modernization of the Federal Republic. In contrast, contemporary protest activities are interpreted as indicators of "post-democratic" decay. Secondly, and relatedly, the long dominant master narratives about the Federal Republic after 1945 as a "successful democracy," emphasizing the achievements of West German democracy and postulating a steady upward trend, have lost much of their credibility as certain blind spots—ongoing gender inequality, xenophobia, and racism, as well as the effects of immigration on German society—have become exposed. For these (and other) reasons, historians in and outside the Federal Republic of Germany have put the quest for alternative explanatory models on the agenda. From a historical perspective, these necessary irritations are an invitation to look for developments that go back further in time, in the sense of a "historical genealogy of contemporary problems" (Hans Günter Hockerts) designed to circumvent an uncritical view of the past.[19]

In this regard, the articles in this special issue take up this invitation by examining inclusion and exclusion processes within social movements and by analyzing the changing circumstances under which protest was deemed legitimate from the outside. On the one hand, our view on unconventional protest demands a consideration of the behaviours, issues and features of actors that led to their exclusion from protest communities, while also centring the communalising power of the unconventional itself. Disassociation from a widely accepted protest style or a political majority consensus can serve as a strategy of exclusivity that strengthens internal cohesion. On the other

18 Roland Roth: Neue soziale Bewegungen und liberale Demokratie. Herausforderungen, Innovationen und paradoxe Konsequenzen, in: Ansgar Klein/Hans-Josef Legrand/Thomas Leif (eds.): Neue soziale Bewegungen. Impulse, Bilanzen und Perspektiven, Opladen 1999, pp. 47–63. Much more sceptical now: Dieter Rucht: Demokratisierung durch Bewegungen? Demokratisierung der Bewegungen?, in: FJSB 31 (2018), pp. 40–51.

19 See Andreas Wirsching: Von der Lügenpresse zur Lügenwissenschaft? Zur Relevanz der Zeitgeschichte als Wissenschaft heute, Zeitgeschichte-online, April 2018, https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/geschichtskultur/von-der-luegenpresse-zur-luegenwissenschaft (accessed on 1 October 2021).

hand, in line with Judith Butler's performative theory of assemblance, protest actions must be regarded as acts of media production, because the visual communication of protest movements goes beyond their representation.[20] Butler does not relate protest actions primarily to processes of identity construction, but focuses entirely on the fact that bodies gather together. In her understanding, the messages of demonstrations are not first discursively produced and then "translated," but the protest action as a staged arrangement of bodies in public space is the message in and of itself. The central question of this special issue is thus: Who gains access to public space as a medium for protest actions, and who is prevented from doing so, and why? If it is true that protest movements become visible through performance and media, then the act of producing and sharing the imaginary of a movement is a powerful way of modelling the political. In that sense, Michaele Ferguson interprets protest itself as "democratic imaginary."[21] Accordingly, inclusion and containment through unconventional protest behaviour can be understood as negotiations over democracy as a whole.

Drawing Boundaries Between and Within Protest Movements

Protest is invariably directed against something or someone. All protest actions draw a line between the protesters and some more or less defined "other." The differences in protest movements arise through their varying political demands, cultural practices, and models of democratic participation. A symbolically expressed opposition is therefore a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of any protest, since, as a form of political communication, protest always needs a counterpart.[22] Challenge and transgression are thus an inherent characteristic of protest behaviour.

Public protests as a form of antagonistic political communication developed on the basis of inherited patterns.[23] Although the long tradition of protest forms such as demonstrations or strikes, as well as the longstanding recognition of protest demands within mainstream political discourses and the integration of protest events into na-

20 See Kathrin Fahlenbrach: Protest-Inszenierungen: Visuelle Kommunikation und kollektive Identitäten in Protestbewegungen, Wiesbaden 2002; Nicole Doerr/Alice Mattoni/Simon Teune: Visuals in Social Movements, in: Donatella della Porta/Mario Diani (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, Oxford 2015, pp. 557–566.

21 Michaele Ferguson: Sharing Democracy, Oxford/New York 2012, p. 154.

22 See Kathrin Fahlenbrach et. al. (eds.): The Establishment Responds: Power, Politics, and Protest since 1945, New York 2012; Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren. Staatliches Handeln, Neue Soziale Bewegungen und linke Organisationen in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, Essen 2017.

23 See Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, p. 16.

tional cultures of remembrance in functional democracies have all normalized the act of protest as part of a wider catalogue of democratic articulation, street protests could nonetheless stir up offence and mistrust. In the 1950s and 1960s, a period during which the Cold War, a conservative government and a formal understanding of democracy dominated political culture, street protests were "synonymous with tumult, riot and uproar; it was considered a manifestation of the mob, the troublemakers, the notoriously dissatisfied and unrestrained."[24] Indeed, a general appreciation and recognition of public protest has not made discursive techniques of exclusion and devaluation disappear, in so far as the label "chaotic" continues to be an established means of denying protesters their legitimacy and branding them as a threat to the social order.[25] Other terms, such as "extremists" and "radicals," also mark those who act beyond accepted boundaries.[26]

While such exclusionary semantics primarily refer to certain groups of actors, they can also target protest demands themselves. One example of a permanent exclusion from the landscape of legitimate protest is the sexual abuse of children. After the uncovering of child abuse in the Catholic Church and various educational institutions, the advocates of sexual contact between adults and young people that had sprung up in the left-wing alternative milieu of the 1960s and 1970s began to be viewed in a different light—a rejection that quickly manifested itself on a semantic level. Researchers use the terminology of criminal law or speak of the so-called paedophile movement.[27]

24 Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einleitung: Das Protestgeschehen in der Bundesrepublik seit den 1980er Jahren zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Leviathan 45 (2017), Sonderband 33, pp. 9–33, p. 9.

25 Dolores L. Augustine: Whyl, Brokdorf, Seabrook. Die Bekämpfung von Anti-AKW-Protesten zwischen Reform und Remilitarisierung der Polizei, in: Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren, pp. 155–179, p. 173; Reinhild Kreis: Handwerken als Protest. Instandbesetzer und Wohnungsbaupolitik in West-Berlin während der 1980er-Jahre, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 14 (2017), pp. 41–67, p. 57; Janine Gaumer: Wackersdorf: Atomkraft und Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik 1980–1989, München 2018, p. 183; Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einführung, in: Ibid. (eds.): Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2008, p. 7–14, p. 10; Moritz Sommer/Simon Teune: Sichtweisen auf Protest—Die Demonstrationen gegen den G20-Gipfel in Hamburg 2017 im Spiegel der Medienöffentlichkeit, in: FJSB 32 (2019), pp. 149–162, p. 160.

26 Alexandra Jaeger: Auf der Suche nach „Verfassungsfeinden". Der Radikalenbeschluss in Hamburg 1971–1987, Göttingen 2019; Janine Gaumer: Wackersdorf, p. 181.

27 Claudia Buntschuh: Die sogenannte Pädophilenbewegung in Deutschland, in: Meike Sophia Baader et al. (eds.): Tabubruch und Entgrenzung. Kindheit und Sexualität nach 1968, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2017, pp. 85–100. Another author consistently speaks of "pederasts" and "child pornography": Christian Füller: Die Revolution missbraucht ihre Kinder. Sexuelle Gewalt in deutschen Protestbewegungen, München 2015. Regarding the turnaround of

In a similar way, Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune distinguish between a "progressive movement spectrum" consisting of "left-wing groups" and a "right-wing protest spectrum" to which only "right-wing extremist actors" belong.[28] Although other authors affirm that right-wing groups form a full-fledged movement regardless of their goals,[29] many refuse to include the demands of right-wing actors within categories that are fundamentally linked to a liberal understandings of democracy. Nonetheless, diversity and plurality are hallmarks of social movements. In this special issue, we argue that social movements are

> inherently contested: their boundaries, identities, languages, frames, theories, issues, philosophies, purposes, strategies, goals, tactics, allies, participants and so on, are always to some degree the subject of arguments—in fact it is often these kinds of complex, internal struggles that define different behavioural tendencies, factions, parties, and coalitions within a movement.[30]

It is for this reason that "infighting" is not an accidental, but necessary process within all social movements. "Infighting" involves "the expression of a dissenting opinion, a discrepant view, or a debate among activists that attempts to redefine past struggles, frame the present movement, or shape future trajectories of activism," concerning "political ethos, collective identity, perceived moral order, strategy and tactics, or leadership."[31]

"Unwelcome participation" can thus also refer to processes within protest groups, making mechanisms of integration and exclusion relevant to a specific milieu visible. The contributions in this special issue also shed light on the demarcation strate-

public opinion, see Ulrike Heider: Sexueller Missbrauch, Pädophilie und die Unschuld der Kinder, in: Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung 29 (2016), pp. 255–265. The reference handbook for Germany does not contain a chapter on paedophiles as a "movement": Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch, Frankfurt/New York 2008.

28 Dieter Rucht/Simon Teune: Einleitung, p. 18, p. 22.

29 Thomas Grumke: Die rechtsextremistische Bewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht: Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 475–491; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 263–268; John D. Kincaid: Theorizing the Radical Right: Directions for Social Movements Research on the Right-Wing Social Movements, in: Sociology Compass 11:5 (2017), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12469.

30 Cal Andrews/Laurence Cox/Lesley Wood: Movement Practice(s): How Do We "do" Social Movements?, in: Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 7 (2015), pp. 1–7, p. 1; Janet M. Conway: Identity, Place, Knowledge: Social Movements Contesting Globalization, Winnipeg 2004.

31 Amin Ghazani/Kelsy Kretschmer: Infighting and Insurrection, in: David A. Snow et al. (ed.): The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (second edition), Hoboken 2019, pp. 220–235, p. 221.

gies that strengthened the cohesion of countercultural groups, an aspect of particular importance within the spectrum of right-wing protests. By considering the ways in which protests in the public sphere and within protest groups are recognized, the significance of the "connectivity" of protests to prevailing mainstream conventions becomes visible, and a further facet of the interaction between protest and the public can be grasped: Beyond provocation and confrontation, protesters participate in shaping political culture in the public sphere—even in their partial adaptation and deliberate infringement of the democratic rules of engagement.

Too Bad for Participation?

Discussions about riots, "angry citizens," (Wutbürger) and security measures at major events, point to a continuing concern that the functioning and integrative power of democracy can be damaged by "false" protest. This ambivalence characterized participation and protest actions in the Federal Republic of Germany throughout the second half of the twentieth century. While participation and protest manifest in numerous ways and must be considered in their respective temporal and spatial contexts, there do seem to be acts of protest in public spaces that are classified as "bad" and rejected by large segments of the population, raising the question of what characterises these protests. In the search for answers, the focus in the following will be on the forms, supporters, and demands of unwelcome protest.

Obviously, the question of the use of force is of crucial importance here. A look at the history of protest in the Federal Republic of Germany reveals that there has always been violent protest action. In addition to the peaceful engagement within the "Außerparlamentarische Opposition" (APO, extra-parliamentary opposition), an integral component of the 1960s West German student movement, there was also a radicalization of individual splinter groups up to and including left-wing terrorism. Although the majority of the demonstrators within the environmental and anti-nuclear power movement distanced themselves from the exercise of violence, violent riots repeatedly occurred at the fences surrounding nuclear power plants, nuclear reprocessing plants and storage sites.[32] Against the backdrop of anticommunism and the Cold War, violent acts up to and including terrorism were ideologically or politically associated with left-wing protest movements. The clashes over squatters and the annual May

32 See Philipp Gassert: Die Bewegte Gesellschaft; Alexandra Jaeger/Julia Kleinschmidt/David Templin (eds.): Den Protest regieren; Sabine Mecking: Vom Protest zur Protestkultur? Träger, Formen und Ziele gesellschaftlichen Aufbegehrens, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64:9/10 (2013), pp. 517–529.

Day riots underscored the potential for violence in the "scene."[33] Yet, protest from the right could also lead to violence—such as during the open outbreaks of racist violence in the early 1990s.[34] In the more recent past, the "*Hooligans gegen Salafisten*" (HoGeSa) brawls in Bonn in 2015 or the G20 riots in Hamburg in 2017 also showed how protest events by different groups could reflect militancy, violence, and terror.

Ascribed or perceived violence functions as a distinguishing feature of the limits of acceptable political participation. The use of violence as part of civil disobedience acts as a polarizing force not only within society, but within protest movements themselves. For example, members of the peace, environmental, and anti-nuclear movements all intensely discussed whether violent acts were compatible with the basic demands of their movement, and if so against what or whom it should be directed—for example, against objects or individuals. The controversial issue marked the dividing line, not least for the police and security authorities, between political extremes on the one hand and angry citizens and the political system on the other. On the whole, it seems fundamental to the increasingly positive reception of protest in the second half of the twentieth century that aggression and violence were rejected by participants. Unlike the "radicals" and "anarchists," for example, who sought subcultural spaces of action beyond the state and mass society, the new social movements generally distanced themselves from violent actions. They emphasized not only the legitimacy, but above all the legality of their protest.[35]

In general, taboo breaches were met with disapproval. The use of symbols and gestures hostile to democracy—such as demonstrations and events with speakers who made use of National Socialist and racist vocabulary, or the Hitler or German salute—usually triggered wider outrage.[36] In a more limited fashion, other forbidden

33 See Swen Hutter/Simon Teune: Politik auf der Straße: Deutschlands Protestprofil im Wandel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 62:25-26 (2012), pp. 9–17; Hanno Balz/Jan-Henrik Friedrichs (eds.): "All We ever Wanted…": Eine Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre, Berlin 2012. See also Sven Reichardt: Authentizität und Gemeinschaft: Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, Frankfurt/Main 2014; Klaus Weinhauer/Jörg Requate/Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.): Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik: Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren, Frankfurt/New York 2006.

34 See more Gideon Botsch: ‚Nationale Opposition' in der demokratischen Gesellschaft: Zur Geschichte der extremen Rechten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusler (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 43–83; Philipp Gassert: Bewegte Gesellschaft, pp. 257–263.

35 See also Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945; Sabine Mecking (ed.): Polizei und Protest in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden 2020.

36 See Hans-Gerd Jaschke: Strategien der extremen Rechten in Deutschland nach 1945, in: Fabian Virchow/Martin Langebach/Alexander Häusle (eds.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus,

symbols, such as the PKK flag, classified as a terrorist group, at Kurdish demonstrations have also engendered a public outcry.[37] Since these radical provocations stood out from the moderate programme of standard participation, they did increase the news value of the protest and led to greater media attention. At the same time, however, political and social taboo breaks, such as the strict rejection of the so-called paedophile movement, deterred the majority of the population from participating in these protest movements.

The general reception of a given protest seemingly depends on an assessment of who is involved and who already supports the protest. The history of protest reveals that societies are not uniformly affected by political mobilization, and that the demand for direct participation is often highly socially segmented. However, by the "1968s" at the latest, protest initiatives related less and less to individual social or political interest groups or specific social strata,[38] reducing the publicly demonstrated will to have a say in society to a more and more limited protest milieu. Nevertheless, it was (still) often members of the bourgeois middle class who made their voices heard through unconventional in addition to conventional forms of expression—even if they were not always able to assert their demands. While the bourgeoisie as a social group with its own living environment had also weakened considerably, this was less true of the associated value horizon and habitus.[39]

Thus, while inappropriate or rebellious behaviour in society and in political decision-making processes seems to have gained new acceptance in the second half of the

pp. 115–134; Heiko Klare/Michael Sturm: Aktionsformen und Handlungsangebote der extremen Rechten, in: Ibid., pp. 181–203.

37 See Ilja Mertens: Von einer "Inneren Angelegenheit," pp. 159–199; Alynna J. Lyon/Emek M. Uçarer: Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict, pp. 62–82.

38 See Wolfgang Kraushaar: Die 68er-Bewegung: Eine illustrierte Chronik 1960–1969 (4 volumes), Stuttgart 2018; Detlef Siegfried: 1968: Protest, Revolte, Gegenkultur, Ditzingen 2018; Christina von Hodenberg: Das andere Achtundsechzig: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Revolte, München 2018; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.): "1968"—eine Wahrnehmungsrevolution, München 2013; Martin Klimke/Joachim Scharloth (eds.): 1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977, Houndmills/Basingstoke 2008.

39 See Klaus Tenfelde: Stadt und Bürgertum im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Idem./Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.): Stadt und Bürgertum im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1994, pp. 317–353, p. 327, pp. 331–335; see Jürgen Kocka: Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im Wandel, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 58:9-10 (2008), pp. 3–9; Manfred Hettling: Bürgerlichkeit im Nachkriegsdeutschland, in: Idem./Bernd Ulrich (eds.): Bürgertum nach 1945, Hamburg 2005, pp. 7–37; Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik? Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2004), pp. 527–542. See, for example, Wolfgang Kraushaar: Der Aufruhr der Ausgebildeten: Vom Arabischen Frühling zu den weltweiten Anti-Banken-Protesten, Hamburg 2012; Holger Nehring: Anti-Atomwaffenproteste und Nachkrieg in der frühen Bundesrepublik, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 64 (2013), pp. 555–570, p. 562.

twentieth century, this did not imply that every protester and every protest demand was equally welcome. The reservations towards and rejection of the political and social "fringes" associated with "bourgeois ways of life and behaviour"[40] were also reflected in discussions within protest initiatives themselves. Both within the protest groups against municipal amalgamations (Gebietsreform) in the 1970s and the 1980s peace movement, the question of whether communist-oriented groups should be tolerated within their ranks was divisive.[41] As a rule, certain political and social groups were, from the outset, not accorded a voice of their own, as evinced by the fading out of protests organized by the unemployed or the stigmatization and criminalization of protests staged by migrant workers and asylum seekers.[42]

In response to a society increasingly perceived as pluralistic, the decriminalization of certain ways of life, such as the abolishment of the so-called "gay" paragraph (§ 175 StGB), took place. At the same time, the growing acceptance within society of the gay and lesbian movement was likely also encouraged by the fact that, in addition to its growing visibility through the so-called Berlin queer dispute and the annual Christopher Street Day parades, it also oriented its demands more strongly toward civic values such as marriage and family.[43] Ultimately, there is some indication that gaining widespread acceptance for concrete demands or for the rejection of individual state interventions in traditional or socially bound (bourgeois) life worlds was much easier than for abstract conflicts of values between individuals and state. "Radical" protests that fundamentally questioned the social order and its normative values instead of merely criticizing existing political or social forms and airing grievances through dialogue, were almost inevitably meet with criticism in the "bourgeois republic."[44] Only with the de-ideologization and abandonment of politically revolutionary goals did

40 Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik?, p. 542.

41 See Anne Bieschke: Die unerhörte Friedensbewegung; Andreas Buro: Friedensbewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 267–291; Sabine Mecking: Bürgerwille und Gebietsreform: Demokratieentwicklung und Reform von Staat und Gesellschaft in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1965–2000, München 2012.

42 See here Harald Rein (ed.): Dreißig Jahre Erwerbslosenprotest 1982–2013: Dokumentation, Analyse und Perspektive (second edition), Neu-Ulm 2014; Dieter Rucht/Wilhelm Heitmeyer: Mobilisierung von und für Migranten, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht (eds.): Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 573–592; Jörg Huwer: "Gastarbeiter" im Streik: Die spontane Arbeitsniederlegung bei Ford Köln im August 1973, in: Geschichte im Westen 22 (2007), pp. 223–249.

43 See Craig Griffiths: Konkurrierende Pfade der Emanzipation: Der Tuntenstreit (1973–1975) und die Frage des "respektablen Auftretens," in: Andreas Pretzel/Volker Weiß (eds.): Rosa Radikale: Die Schwulenbewegung der 1970er Jahre, Hamburg 2012, pp. 143–159; Jens Dobler/Harald Rimmele: Schwulenbewegung, in: Roland Roth/Dieter Rucht: Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945, pp. 541–556.

44 Eckart Conze: Eine bürgerliche Republik?, pp. 541f.

the new forms of protest tested by the "68ers" become acceptable to larger segments of the population in the decades that followed, as a distinction was increasingly being made—at least in written policies—between "good" and "bad" protest initiatives. Political engagement that drew attention to shortcomings in the public sphere and seemed concerned with constructively solving problems was generally welcomed by society at large, whereas the ostensibly destructive initiatives of the "chaots" (anarchists) or troublemakers were rejected and excluded from compromise.[45]

In conclusion, the more a given protest presented its demands and supporters as bourgeois, the more it could expect widespread acceptance. Actors and groups that did not sufficiently distance themselves from acts of violence or political extremism, and continued to engage in taboo breaks had—at least during the second half of the twentieth century—no chance of being accepted or even tolerated by the majority—although this certainty seems to be increasingly softening in the twenty-first century.

The Examples[46]

This special issue aims not only to identify groups, forms of action, and issues that have been excluded from the political communication landscape in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also to shed light on the processes of fraternization and solidarity in the groups associated with them. In the assembled articles, protest actions are understood as demarcations. These are snapshots that will be examined in their historical dynamics. Two articles of this special issue treat protest practices as a distinguishing feature of acceptable political participation. Through the themes of "violence" and "doing nothing," they expand the performative spectrum of protest actions as broadly as possible to determine the limits of tolerable political communication. The other two essays, on right-wing extremists and migrant protesters, look at social groups and demands that were perceived as minoritarian and marginal in the Federal Republic for decades. Within these intersections, this issue is dedicated to unwelcome protest in contemporary German history from a comparative perspective.

First, Jacco Pekelder examines the violent protest of the left in the long 1960s, which was identified, performatively staged and communicated in the media as an in-

45 See Martin Löhnig/Mareike Preisner/Thomas Schlemmer (eds.): Ordnung und Protest: Gesamtdeutsche Protestgeschichte von 1949 bis heute, Tübingen 2015.

46 The articles in this special issue were originally presented as part of a panel on "Unwelcome Participation: Exclusion and Containment through Unconventional Protest Behavior" at the 52nd Historikertag in Münster, Germany, on 28 September 2018. See www.historikertag.de/Muenster2018/sektionen/verpoente-partizipation-aus-und-eingrenzungen-durch-unkonventionelles-protestverhalten-in-der-zweiten-haelfte-des-20-jahrhunderts/index.html (accessed on 3 October 2020).

strument of political-social struggle. As positions hardened and a struggle between the "left" and established, state-sponsored politics was born (alongside the rise of leftist terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF)), the article asks to what extent the violent quality of the protests influenced the reactions to the protest movement and its further development. How did these developments promote or weaken the function of violence as a means of distinction within the neo-left "movement family"? And what role did media representations of the protests play in this process? To discuss right-wing extremist protest movements from the perspective of unwelcome participation is a delicate undertaking. Gideon Botsch asks to what extent can and do extreme right-wing forces (namely forces opposed to democracy that reject a culturally diverse society) "participate" in the political system and in a plural society, through a discussion of the historical development of anti-immigration and anti-refugee protest events and movements in Germany. At a bare minimum, these protest activities have an effect, and they are designed to have an effect. Right-wing extremist protest actors engage in political life and in society in many different ways. In doing so, they are influenced by social developments as much as they react to them. In Maria Alexopoulou's essay, migrant protests are addressed as a protest of non-citizens, namely those individuals whose status does not include any right to vote or official representation within society and political decision-making. For a long time, asylum seekers, but also migrant workers, were not considered part of the public sphere. Of interest here are protests that address the spatial level, which ranges from a demand to improve housing conditions, to the right to be present at all, to the right to move freely in space. In her essay, Yvonne Robel uses the catchwords "*Tunix*," "*sick leave*" and "*Null Bock*" to consider the increasing public declarations of inactivity in the 1970s and 1980s. As different as their relationship to practices of doing nothing is, these terms refer quite fundamentally to forms of political protest. Based on this, the article discusses the extent to which practices of inaction had a provocative potential around 1980.

Through these articles, this special issue underscores the meaningful and communalising power of performative protest actions. It shows how the value horizons of protest actors are integrated into the convictions of their protest communities and explains how and why a common orientation is formed and maintained in contrast to the norms binding wider society.

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