

GENDER-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO TEACHING ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Annika von Lüpke
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
vonluepke@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Received: 15 July 2020
Accepted: 6 September 2020

Abstract

The Aristotelian practical philosophy is an integral element of many school canons and also contains numerous statements which are classified as sexist from today's perspective. This raises the question of how to deal with discriminatory content in classical works of philosophy within a classroom context. In this article, I argue in favor of a critically-reflective treatment of discriminatory content in the teaching of classical works of philosophy. I propose how this can be achieved in the case of Aristotle's analysis of gender relations in the *Politics* employing a three-step model. Following a close reading of key passages, pertinent works of feminist philosophy are presented, which critically reflect upon central theorems of patriarchal views and which also put forward approaches of their own. In order to further stimulate the students' reflection, the examination of the feminist critique of Aristotle is then expanded into a debate on various forms of discourse on "gender".

Keywords: Aristotle, gender, feminism, human nature, reason, discrimination

1. The Challenge

"How to deal with racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism in classical works of philosophy?" A working group from the University of Jena funded by German federal and state governments recently put forward a valuable answer to this question, which can be seen as particularly applicable to prevailing contemporary discourse.¹ The authors see their contribution as a proposal to engender a dialogue for an unbiased discussion. They call for a differentiated *philosophical* approach in dealing with extracts of canonical works "which from a contemporary perspective at least would be classified as racist, sexist and/or anti-Semitic."² A philosophical treatment of these texts should not be engrained in a spirit of outrage nor should it seek to justify the texts by referring to the time in which they were written. Instead, the intention is for the texts to be understood and critically discussed within their own argumentative structure, context, and specific prerequisites and to translate them into contemporary contexts. Therein lies the challenge for the professional philosopher. Unless one follows the approach of close reading in this sense, only very general descriptions of racist, sexist, and/or anti-Semitic arguments and positions will result.

I am thankful to the anonymous reviewers of the *Journal of Didactics of Philosophy* for their constructive and valuable criticism and to Sadb Nic Fhionnbhairr for her assistance with the English language.

¹ <http://wieumgehenmitsa.uni-jena.de> (Last access: 24 June 2020).

² *Ibid.* (Last access: 24 June 2020). Translations of German texts are mine, unless otherwise stated.



Thus, in a highly abbreviated and generalised form, the aspiration and task of research are defined. But how can this be reconciled with a philosophical-didactic perspective? Should we focus our philosophical attention in teaching (in particular in schools), on text passages which not only trigger discomfort but also engender opposition and criticism in contemporary discourse? Why deal with the theories and positions of famous philosophers who are condemned as racist, sexist and/or anti-Semitic, where time is scarce and only a limited selection of material is possible? Does it not make more sense to concentrate on the type of material which serves to illustrate the prominence of those famous philosophers on the grounds of their paradigmatic achievements and which can offer guidance relevant to today?

Notwithstanding these considerations, there are strong grounds for a critically-reflective treatment of discriminatory content in the teaching of classic works of philosophy. To begin with, I will outline three arguments, which I perceive as particularly important within a classroom setting:³

1. The philosopher Miranda Fricker recently made the influential methodological demand that a philosophical theory should always also be considered from the perspective of those who are – usually tacitly – marginalised or disadvantaged by this theory (Fricker 2007 and 2012). The accompanying reflection on the viewpoint from which philosophers see and describe the world conveys the insight that their theories are socially situated.⁴ They are formed under concrete historical and societal conditions and express *one* point of view, usually leading to the privileging of one position. The author asserts that her approach, which considers the perspective of those on the “losing side”, leads not only to a more comprehensive understanding of the philosophical theories themselves, but, in relation to the political dimension of knowledge and understanding, leads also to a “moral posture of attention for others” (Fricker 2012: 63) – that is to say, groups marginalised in traditional philosophical discourse. A capacity for corrective virtue results from regularly practicing changing perspectives and offsetting the impact of stereotyping, marginalisation, and inequalities.⁵
2. This approach also enables us to understand our own knowledge as situated. For it goes without saying that the classical works of philosophy are tied to their specific locations in the same way our knowledge and our judgement of those works are. Should this transference occur in students then it should follow that their own philosophical practice as well as the building of a philosophical canon becomes an object of reflection and criticism (Hagengruber 2013: 24–25). Students are not merely obliged to tolerate an interim and antecedent selection of learning material.

³ My reasoning throughout this article is based on the subfield of practical philosophy.

⁴ For the standpoint theory important in feminism see especially Haraway 1988.

⁵ See Fricker 2007: ch. 4 and 7; Fricker 2012. On the fundamental question of the teachability of virtues see Gebhard, Martens and Mielke 2004. Like Fricker, the authors assume in their contribution that corrective virtues, which are about recognising injustice that has occurred and compensating for it, are reflexive abilities, which can as such be taught (Gebhard, Martens and Mielke 2004: 131–140).

Instead, they can become active participants in learning as critical interventionists, who question the canon by means of independent philosophising and debating.

3. The critical impulse with regard to both the classical works of philosophy and the students' own philosophical practice leads them to the critical self-conception of philosophy itself, as is paradigmatically expressed – albeit with a religion-critical rather than socio-political thrust – in Immanuel Kant's *Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* (1784). This corresponds to an understanding of philosophy which on the basis of carefully considered criticism calls for change with the objective of promoting freedom. The students become conscious that philosophy, in this sense, empowers them to critique power in the same way as its canonical texts are an expression of discursive power.

The close interrelationship of theory and practice expressed in these arguments correlates closely with the educational objectives of teaching philosophy. Where practical philosophy is taught, this is not done as a theory of practice for the sake of theory alone, but to enable the students to pursue the purpose of an individual and collective good life (Steenblock 2000a: 16). Values such as the capacity for democracy, freedom, ideological openness, tolerance, and humanity are deeply embedded in the curriculum.⁶ In this respect, the aims of philosophy education are closely related to the aims of the feminist philosophical project: feminist philosophy is inconceivable without the context of practical application (Nagl-Docekal 1989: 14).⁷ Works of feminist philosophy and gender studies expose structures of domination and discrimination extant in classical works of philosophy, which still persist in contemporary society. They enable a critical examination and rethinking of tradition. Considering this background, it would seem advisable not to exclude discriminatory text passages from philosophy lessons, but to deal with them by bringing answers from modern philosophy to bear, in particular from feminist philosophers.⁸

In the following, I would like to propose how this can be achieved in the case of Aristotle's practical philosophy. His works are on the one hand an integral element of many school canons (Rolf 2007; Albus 2013a) and on the other hand contain numerous statements which are classified as sexist from today's perspective (Connell 2016: 1–52). Among the three forms of discrimination mentioned by the Jena paper, I will concentrate on sexism⁹. Arguments in favor

⁶ For an overview of the German curricula see Albus 2013a: 528–532.

⁷ I base this on Herta Nagl-Docekal's general definition, according to which "feminism" as an umbrella term means "all efforts to overcome the discrimination or oppression of women" (Nagl-Docekal 2012: 233).

⁸ This approach corresponds to the method of gender-sensitive philosophy teaching proposed by Kinga Golus: as a first step "traditional philosophy should be examined under the aspect of gender or gender difference", as a second step "women should be made explicitly visible as philosophers in the history of philosophy and in the present" (Golus 2015: 115–116).

⁹ I base my remarks on the working definition of the term "sexism" in the Jena paper: "Sexism is a generic term for discrimination on the basis of gender, which refers to a heteronormative gender order that is usually implicitly assumed and naturalised. Sexism refers to historical and current power relations in which the (usually exclusively two) sexes are attributed an unequal (intellectual, moral, ontological) status and women* are subordinated to men*. Sexism finds its expression in explicit and implicit degradation of women* and non-binary persons, in stereotypes as well as in excluding, pejorative and oppressive cultural practices and traditions." (<http://wueumgehenmitrsa.uni-jena.de>; Last access: 24 June 2020).

of dealing with the topic of gender in the school context are its topicality and socio-political urgency (Landweer et al. 2012), the close connection it has to students' own concerns and the often-expressed assertion that philosophy education must contribute to the forging of identity in adolescents (Steenblock 2000a and 2000b; Thein 2014; Debus 2017).

2. The Methodical Approach

I propose a three-step model for teaching Aristotelian practical philosophy in a gender-sensitive way:

1. As a first step, knowledge of Book I of the *Politics* is imparted using short text passages. The initial aims are to study the underlying gender ratio in a text-hermeneutical way and to raise the students' awareness of gender asymmetries. In regards to the teachers, I am also particularly interested in rectifying the erroneous depictions of Aristotelian sexism that can be found in feminist discourse as well as in school learning materials.
2. In the second step, selected texts from pertinent works of feminist philosophy are presented. These texts critically reflect upon central theorems of patriarchal views and in addition, they put forward approaches of their own. The objectives at hand are to teach feminist philosophy topics and to train students in the skills of analysis, scrutiny, and criticism, which they themselves need as tools to join in the discourse. In addition to the aims of imparting specialist knowledge and elevating the students' general level of reflection, the intention in the selection of texts is to open up the topic, since it is one of the undisputed findings of feminist research that, together with sexism, other forms of oppression – for example, based on ethnic or religious affiliation or skin color – must also be taken into account (concept of intersectionality).
3. The third step seeks to promote the following objective – one which is central for Kant and for modern philosophical didactics – knowledgeable and reflected independence in thinking and judging (Steenblock 2000b; Martens 2003). In order to stimulate reflection, the examination of the feminist critique of Aristotle is further expanded into a classroom debate on various forms of discourse on “gender”. This is also intended to prevent the impression that feminist philosophy amounts to a simple and ideologically motivated rejection – a prejudice which often leads adolescents to develop a fundamentally negative attitude towards feminist concerns (Nagl-Docekal 2012; Haase 2014). In order to counteract these structures of prejudice, the learning process should remain open in the spirit of dialogue and attention should be drawn to the diversity and disputability of feminist research.

Methodologically, I am also guided in particular by two recommendations of recent didactic research: a) In her work on canon formation for the teaching of philosophy, Vanessa Albus calls

for the core canon to be supplemented by a multi-level fringe canon (Albus 2013b: 13).¹⁰ I propose the texts of feminist philosophy presented in this paper to be included within that canon. My objective is not to cast Aristotle out from the core canon of philosophy teaching with a verdict of sexism, but to expand the canon for the benefit of gender justice. To this end, it is necessary both to question classical texts on the gender ratio presented therein and to take into account works from feminist philosophy and gender studies (Nagl-Docekal 2012: 240–241; Golus 2015). b) Following Hannelore Faulstich-Wieland, Katharina Debus distinguishes between the didactic strategies of dramatisation, de-dramatisation, and non-dramatisation of gender (Debus 2017). While dramatising strategies explicitly address gender, de-dramatising strategies make visible “that gender is neither the only nor the most important category of individual and social difference” (Debus 2017: 31).¹¹ Since dramatising strategies are necessary on the one hand to explain gender asymmetries, but on the other hand also carry the risk of consolidating gender stereotypes, they must be supplemented by de-dramatising procedures (Faulstich-Wieland 2005). Following this recommendation, both the text passages from Aristotle’s *Politics* and the contributions of feminist philosophers were selected in such a way that they make other distinguishing characteristics between people visible thereby relativising the category of “gender”.

3. The Context: Aristotelian Practical Philosophy

The Aristotelian analysis of gender relations is decidedly diverse. Statements about the differences between the masculine and the feminine and between man and woman are found most frequently in the biological writings, in the *Metaphysics* and in the works of practical philosophy. The subject of gender is approached from very different perspectives, with Aristotle always assuming a duality and inequality of the sexes (Föllinger 1996). Before interpreting individual text passages, it is critical that we carefully reflect on their place within the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In the Corpus practical philosophy should be viewed as a project largely independent of natural philosophy. Within practical philosophy, the sphere of the ethical and the sphere of the political cannot be separated.

3.1 The Distinction between Practical Philosophy and Natural Philosophy

Often ignored in didactic and feminist literature on Aristotle is the distinction between practical philosophy and philosophy of nature (Connell 2016: 1–52). It may at first seem obvious to treat statements about the nature of women in the *Politics* and the *Ethics* against a background of natural philosophy because of the numerous references to “nature” and natural conditions in Aristotle’s practical philosophy. However, such an approach contradicts the Aristotelian understanding of science and the philosopher’s high methodological reflexivity and flexibility (Corcilius 2011). According to Aristotle, the individual sciences must not make use of the

¹⁰ On the terminology: “The core canon represents [...] the very long-lasting and powerful tradition of exemplary works. It is constant and normative.” “The fringe canon is, in comparison to the core canon, a canon with smaller range of validity and power.” (Albus 2013a: 30)

¹¹ Katharina Debus introduces non-dramatising approaches as an “alternative to the strategy of dramatisation with subsequent de-dramatisation” (Debus 2017: 33). They do not explicitly make gender an issue, but are intended to “enable experiences, promote competences and discuss issues” that generally “promote acceptance of the diversity of lifestyles” (Debus 2017: 27).

contents of other subjects in an unreflective way. Each discipline has its specific subject area, its own principles, evidence, and procedures. Applying a common measure in different genres or compiling and making use of arguments gathered from different disciplines is not permitted.¹² As is well known, Aristotle calls this methodological error *metabasis eis allos genos* (A.Po. I 7, 75^a38–39). The philosopher expressly demands – and certainly with didactic intent – that the practical disciplines must be understood in and of themselves. He advocates the principle of prioritisation in accordance with the subject matter, so that secondary matters do not become the main concern and the scope of the investigation shifts from the political to the biological, for example. Even if recourse to the content of other disciplines were possible and our knowledge of a thing would be increased by the addition of further perspectives, Aristotle’s systematic interest is in the specific subject area that constitutes a single science as such – in the case of practical philosophy the essence of man in the context of the *polis* (EN X 8, 1178^b5–7). Biological and ethical perspectives are therefore strictly separated in his work.¹³

Practical philosophy is concerned with actions and the good life. Actions, in turn, are the result of considerations that focus on those things that are in the power of the actor and that can be seen as ways and means to achieve an end that is judged as good (EN III 5, 1112^a31). Aristotle considers further elaborations that distract from this guiding question and practical objective to be methodologically mistaken and subsequently excludes the area of the natural in the sense of things that take place regularly or irregularly without human intervention (EN III 5, 1112^a19–27; Flashar 1971; Bien 1985; Scott 2015: 105–122). Correspondingly, the notoriously difficult concept of nature, which is indispensable in both natural and practical philosophy, is shaped quite differently in the two fields (v. Lüpke 2019: 114–140). In principle, neither Aristotelian philosophy as a whole nor Aristotelian *Politics*, from which the text passages discussed below are taken, can be assumed to have a clear and uniform understanding of “nature”. On the basis of the distinctions that Aristotle himself makes in the fifth book of *Metaphysics* (Metaph. Δ 4, 1014^b16–1015^a19), it is necessary instead to work with a range of possible meanings. Central to Aristotelian practical philosophy is the meaning of “essence” (cf. Rapp 2016). In this sense, the philosopher uses the noun *physis* and the forms derived from it to speak of individual and species forms, first and foremost about human nature. This consists of the ability to develop and exercise practical reason. Therefore, *physis* can mean both the ability to reason as a presupposed basis of human development and the use of reason as the goal and norm of human education.

The consequences of these scientific-theoretical reflections for teaching are far-reaching. An interpretation of passages from works of Aristotle’s natural philosophy *and* practical philosophy, for example, demands a high level of knowledge and reflection on the part of both teachers and students. Anyone wishing to discuss the relationship between the sexes in the biological writings will have to deal with the theories of procreation and heredity *before*

¹² Except in those exceptional cases where one science is subordinate to the other (such as the subordination of optics to geometry), cf. Primavesi/Rapp 2016: 52–55. See Aristotle, A. Po. I 7, 75^b12–15.

¹³ Sabine Föllinger names Aristotle, EN VII 6, 1148^b31–33 (Föllinger 1996: 203) as a singular exception. I do not mean to say that biological and ethical views do not influence each other and cannot be compiled as a comprehensive Aristotelian anthropology (Müller 2019).

Aristotle (especially in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*) and with the contrast between the warm and the cold, the four-cause doctrine, and hylemorphism, all of which are central tenets of his work. In the case of the treatment of man and woman in practical philosophy, as will be outlined in detail below (4.1), the relations of domination in the soul are decisive (see especially Pol. I 13, 1259^b21–1260^a24; Föllinger 1996). Considering this background, I regard assignments linking Aristotle's biological and ethical views, for example, by asking students about the consequences of biology for his concept of political order, to be misguided.

3.2 Aristotle's *Politics* as Part of his Practical Philosophy

While practical philosophy is determined as a project largely independent of natural philosophy, the field of the ethical and the political cannot be separated in the Aristotelian theoretical framework: Both areas are interdependent and together form “the philosophy of human affairs” (EN X 10, 1181^b15; Flashar 1971; Bien 1985; Höffe 1995; Schofield 2006; Frede 2013). This discipline examines the good and just conduct of man, who as a human being cannot exist without connection to others. If the primary focus of the *Ethics* is on the pursuit of happiness and the actions of the individual human being, the only way for an individual to live well is in the *polis* – and thus in a community which somehow needs to be organised and administered (Pol. I 2, 1252^b27–30). For the realisation of his highest end, *eudaimonia*, man is dependent on the community and has always been conceived of as an actor in the state association, as a *zoon politikon*. Even though the *Ethics* deal primarily with the general development of abilities inherent in human nature, Aristotle strongly emphasises the differences between people in the *Politics* and takes into account constitutional and role-specific differences. As a result, the books of the Aristotelian *Politics* not only complement the *Ethics*, but also challenge them: For it becomes clear that *eudaimonia* is open to only a few people, namely the free and prosperous Greek men, while the roles of many other people, such as slaves and wives, are to provide for the necessities of life and to maintain the household (Pol. I 5, 1254^b24–31; 13, 1260^a25–36; III 4, 1277^a33–37; ^b24–25; 5, 1278^a10–11; VII 8, 1328^a21–40). The close relationship between political philosophy and ethics thus does not exclude the possibility that there is also a strong contrast between an empirically-based sociological model, in which the different roles of men and women are sharply emphasised in a discriminatory way, and a general philosophical model, which refers to reason as an essential characteristic of human beings. While the model of the *Politics* provides the basis for the socialisation of the sexes, the *Ethics* go beyond a mere reflection of social conditions. They contain a normative surplus, which makes it possible to challenge the model of the *Politics*.

This too has consequences for teaching, wherefrom the whole of Aristotelian philosophy today above all ethics is taught (Rolf 2007: 44): If we take up Miranda Fricker's methodological demand and look at the Aristotelian theory from the side of the marginalised – those who are excluded from happiness and political participation – it becomes apparent that the inequality existing among people (which is particularly emphasised in the *Politics*) calls into question central theses of Aristotle's general anthropology. How does Aristotle justify the exclusion of the many from happiness and political participation? According to Aristotle, happiness lies in the activity of reason as the best part of the soul (EN I 6, 1098^a16–18). Is it only the few who

can realise this? Do they only succeed at the expense of other people? Are not all human beings endowed with reason? On the one hand, Aristotelian ethics proves in this regard to be elitist; on the other hand, the interpreter's gaze is directed to the conditions necessary for the development of a virtuous character in the sense of *eudaimonia*. These exceed the natural predispositions in the biological sense. They are by no means immutable, but they make it necessary to enter into reflections on legal provisions and on questions of education when teaching Aristotle.

4. Texts for Teaching Practice

I am to further substantiate my proposal to teach Aristotle's practical philosophy in a gender-sensitive way by use of selected short text passages. As outlined in section 2 above, by applying the didactic strategy of dramatising gender, central theses on gender relations in Aristotle's ethical and political writings can be initially developed (4.1). As the next step, two key texts of feminist philosophy will be presented that critically review Aristotle (4.2). Making use of de-dramatising strategies, the texts are chosen with the intention of relativising the topic of gender by drawing attention to other forms of discrimination (4.2.1) and by drawing out the question of human nature and thus the fundamental question of anthropology (4.2.2). Anthropology is to be extended to include its gender dimension (Thein 2014; Golus 2015: 117).

4.1 Aristotle's Thesis of the Legitimacy of Man's Rule over Woman

In the first book of the *Politics*, from which our text passages have been taken, Aristotle is primarily concerned with examining different communities in order to determine which form of rule is to be considered as good in each of them. For unlike Plato,¹⁴ from whom Aristotle here distances himself (Pol. I 1, 1252^a7–16), he assumes that the individual communities presided over by the free Greek man in his various functions (as for example statesman or head of the household) differ in their nature. In each community, the man rules over people with different qualities and therefore they must be ruled in their own way (EN VIII 12, 1160^b31–32). Each community demands its own form of rule, whether it is made up of husband and wife, of master and slaves, of father and children within the house, or it is a community of rulers and the ruled in differently-ordered states. What might be appropriate for a tyrant is not suitable for ensuring the stability of an oligarchy; what seems appropriate to do to a slave is misplaced where citizens alternate between ruling and being ruled as equals, as in a democracy.

This in itself is an important observation about gender relations in the ethical and political writings of Aristotle: The relationship between man and woman is seen here as a relationship of domination and the sphere of control is attributed to man, in the same way as the perspective of the lord and citizen is the guiding principle in the *Politics*. The dominion of the man, as we will see in the following passage, is regarded as justified, because he is superior to the woman. The statements are therefore not based on a common human nature, but instead on the assumption that man and woman are fundamentally different in a manner to be specified here.

These interrelationships can be summed up in two basic claims:

¹⁴ Plato, *Statesman* 258^a8–259^c4.

- a) It is the man who rules the woman.
- b) The dominion of the man is justified because the man is superior to the woman.

These claims can be developed in the classroom on the basis of the following passage:

[T1] For ruling and being ruled come not only under essentials but also under benefits; [...]. For wherever there is a combination of elements, continuous or discontinuous, and something in common results, in all cases the ruler and the ruled appear; and living creatures acquire this feature from nature as a whole. [...] First, the living creature consists of soul and body; and of these the former is ruler by nature, the latter ruled. [...] Again, the relationship of male to female is that the one is by nature superior, the other inferior, and the one is ruler, the other ruled. (Aristotle, *Pol. I* 5, 1254^a21–^b14; translation: Saunders 1995)

Here, Aristotle introduces the principle of universal nature, which always serves to bring together a ruling and a dominated part within communities. He characterises this structure as “necessary” and “useful”. The association of man and woman is also an expression of nature conceived as a differentiated and ordered whole. The order of nature is teleological. Its hierarchical character not only allows us to differentiate between those who rule and those who are ruled, but also demands that the better part rules in each case. The position of the better is attributed to the man. This raises the question of how Aristotle justifies the superiority of man. The indication that it is natural leaves open the question as to what man’s superiority consists of. The following widely-received and controversial passage can be consulted to answer this question:

[T2] We have an immediate guide in the position in the case of the soul, where we find natural ruler and natural subject, whose virtues we say are different – that is, one belongs to the rational element, the other to the non-rational. Well then, it is clear that the same applies in the other cases too, so that most instances of ruling and being ruled are natural. For rule of free over slave, male over female, man over child, is exercised in different ways, because, while the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in them in different ways. The slave is completely without the deliberative element (*to bouleutikon*); the female has it, but it has no authority (*akyron*); the child has it, but underdeveloped (*atelês*). (Aristotle, *Pol. I* 13, 1260^a4–14; translation: Saunders 1995)

Crucial to the understanding of gender relations in Aristotelian practical philosophy is that man’s claim to dominance is based on his superiority in qualities of the soul – and not on the different contributions of males and females to procreation or other propositions from the biological writings (Föllinger 1996: 184). Human nature is in itself differentiated and hierarchically organised. Reason, as a specifically human capability, is superior to the physical and as the highest human capability represents the best for man and his highest possible purpose (*Pol. I* 2, 1252^b32–34; 5, 1254^b2–14). Man gains his specific form only with reason, his perfect

form however with virtue. Whereas the slave's soul lacks the *bouleutikon*¹⁵, an important rational faculty, the woman possesses practical reason, but it is not effective (*akyron*). Dorothea Frede has shown that the Greek *akyros/n*, with which the woman's reason is in this case restrictively characterised, is a term used in legal and political contexts and is used by Aristotle in this same sense (Frede 2018). Laws and political decisions can become *akyros*, i.e. invalid, due to adverse or changing circumstances. The institute of *kyrieia* ensures that the father, husband, or other close male relatives are the guardians of women. Women are represented by others in all public matters and are not allowed to administer their own property. In this sense, the practical reason of women has no authority. Aristotle does not justify the inferiority of women on the basis of biological characteristics. Is it that the philosopher is simply giving an account of prevailing social conditions? If this were the case, he would still be obliged to provide *an explanation* for the inferiority of women, a status he in fact does not question.

In order to be able to explain *why* the practical reason of women holds no authority, it is important to look at the context of the much-quoted and much-discussed *akyron*-passage. Aristotle is by no means simply concerned with the description of the social status quo here, but rather deals with the quality of character of all those involved. Immediately following the previous passage is stated:

[T3] Well then, we should take it that a similar situation inevitably prevails in regard to the moral virtues also, namely that all must participate in them, but not in the same fashion, but only so far as suffices for each for his own function. That is why the ruler must have moral virtue complete; for his function is without qualification that of a master-craftsman, and reason is a master-craftsman; and each of the others ought to have as much as pertains to them. So it is evident that all those mentioned have moral virtue, and that the same moderation does not belong to a man, and to a woman, nor justice and courage, as Socrates used to think; the one courage is that of a ruler, the other that of a servant, and likewise with the other virtues too. (Aristotle, Pol. I 13, 1260^a14–24; translation: Saunders 1995)

The different conditions in the souls of the people in the household correspond to character virtues of differing quality (Lienemann forthcoming). The different character virtues, in turn, correspond to different activities and also correspond to the goods desired by these activities, which as we know can be arranged hierarchically. As Aristotle repeatedly points out using the example of master and slave, the rank of the activity combined with the good striven for by carrying out this activity reveals the rank of the person who carries it out. In the same way, the housewife who works within the house and whose virtue is related to the best possible fulfillment of precisely those tasks required for a well-ordered house, while the free Greek man strives for higher things as a member of the superior *polis*. It is the *function* which women and slaves perform within the house – to provide all the necessities of life – which in turn liberates the free Greek men to participate in politics and philosophy and is constitutive of Aristotle's practical philosophy.

¹⁵ The achievement of the *bouleutikon* must be thought of as a process. Its focus is on the individual steps and the choice of means to achieve an end which is considered good.

We may now add to the two initial theses elaborated above two further claims, which are central to the topic of gender in the ethical and political writings of Aristotle:

- c) Man's superiority is a superiority of the qualities of the soul: whereas the woman's assigned role in the household only enables her to develop subservient virtues, man has "virtue in completeness" (Pol. I 13, 1260^a17–18).
- d) The man's superiority qualifies him to strive for higher things. While the woman's place is in the house, the man is politically and philosophically active.

Aristotle characterises as natural a political order which is directed towards the purpose of liberating free Greek men for politics and philosophy. It is necessary in so far as the political and philosophical activity of the one cannot be realised without the participation of the other. But these conditions are by no means necessary in the sense of general principles of natural law. If we focus on the *genesis* of the inferiority of women, it becomes clear that it is not correct to simply assume a reduced ability in the sense of a natural disposition. Rather, the virtue of the woman, which is directed towards the good fulfillment of the tasks in the house, is acquired and it is by no means the case, as is often asserted in research literature, that nature simply makes woman and slave available (see for example Schütrumpf 1991: 373). The suitability of women for their special tasks in the *oikos* is not determined by Aristotle in terms of biological characteristics (Spelman 1994: 105–107). As far as virtues are concerned, which have been learned through education and habituation, the question of a biological basis remains open at the very least.

4.2 Critical Feminist Readings in Aristotle

4.2.1 Elizabeth V. Spelman

Different members of the household need to be ruled differently, so the guiding principle of the first book of the *Politics*. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to distinguish the study of the nature of women from the study of the nature of the slave – as indeed was Aristotle's plan, albeit uncompleted.¹⁶ In her book *Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought*, Elizabeth V. Spelman draws attention to the fact that these two partial-studies really belong together in the context of studying women. Indeed, the group of slaves always included women. But Aristotle is not interested in female slaves as a distinct group (Spelman 1994: 104–105). In this regard, Spelman continues, research has followed his lead, although a more comprehensive picture of gender relations in Aristotle's political theory can be drawn if we take into account that the philosopher always speaks of "woman" in a certain respect:

[T4] I take a different track in trying to get at Aristotle's views about women. Instead of focusing simply on his discussions of the differences between men and women, I begin by asking about another and very closely related distinction he makes: the distinction between women and slaves. This distinction cuts across that between male and female, since slaves can be either male or female. The importance Aristotle attaches to the difference between 'women' and 'slaves' raises

¹⁶ In Book I of the *Politics* only the relationship between master and slave is treated in detail.

serious difficulties for any readings of his views about ‘woman’s nature’ based only on the distinction he draws between ‘men’ and ‘women’. For in Aristotle, the significance of the distinction between men and women varies according to whether the men and women we are talking about are free or slave. There is no simple distinction in Aristotle between men and women. (Spelman 1994: 99–100)

Aristotle clearly distinguishes the group of free Greek housewives from the group of those who are biologically women but belong to a different “class” as slaves. The philosopher speaks – quite differently than the many naturalisms in this context seem to suggest – about social roles:

[T5] Aristotle does not allow for the possibility of slaves who are women, but only for slaves who are female – for he draws a distinction between woman and slave in such a way that ‘women’ can only mean free woman, not slave woman. When Aristotle talks about women, he doesn’t mean us to be thinking about slave women. (Spelman 1994: 104)

At this point, some particularly persistent stereotypes in the perception of Aristotle can be refuted: for the inferiority of the woman does not derive from the fact that it is she who bears the children, nor even from her specific contribution to reproduction, nor does the superiority of the man derive from his physical strength. It is the task of slaves to work with the body. Not all biological men are competent to rule, as the slaves lack the quality which “naturally” exerts power. And in the domestic relationship between the wife and the slaves, it is the wife’s corresponding task to rule.

In the classroom setting, these dependencies can be captured in the following overview:

woman (free female): female body/deliberative capacity without authority
slave (female): female body/no deliberative capacity
man (male citizen): male body/deliberative capacity with authority
slave (male): male body/no deliberative capacity

(Spelman 1994: 108; slightly modified)

In light of this, it would seem that to be characterised by Aristotle as a “woman” is almost a privilege, and class membership¹⁷ emerges as a second important category of difference and oppression. The degradation of slaves, regardless of their sex, is based on their status, while the oppression of free Greek wives is based on the comparatively higher status associated with their

¹⁷ Elizabeth V. Spelman rightly points out that both the category of “class” and the category of “race” are problematic when it comes to describing the characteristics by which the group of slaves in ancient Greece is oppressed: “Slaves in ancient Greece can’t be said to constitute a class in terms of their position in relations of production or in terms of shared consciousness. [...] Moreover, reference to ‘racial’ differences is likely to lead to misunderstanding as well, because [...] Aristotle did not think the distinction between master and slave or between free and slave corresponded to a difference in skin color or any other physical difference.” Unlike Spelman, who because of the Aristotelian phrase “slaves by nature” chooses to speak of discrimination on the basis of “race”, I choose to speak of “class”. For Aristotle, there may well be a difference between the quantity of people who are de facto slaves in a *polis* and the group of people who, by their nature, are predisposed to slavery. The decisive point is that slaves are not free and therefore must not determine the purpose of their actions themselves (Aristotle, Pol. VI 2, 1317^b10–13).

gender:

[T6] So it can never be the case that the treatment of a woman has only to do with her gender and nothing to do with her class or race. That she is subject only to sexism tells us a lot about her race and class identity, her being free or slave, and so on. For her, being subject only to sexism is made possible by these other facts about her identity. So rather than saying she is oppressed ‘as a woman’, we might more accurately say she is oppressed as a citizen-class woman is oppressed. (Spelman 1994: 116)

In the classroom, these observations, in turn, should lead to the concept of intersectionality, which is fundamental to feminist philosophy. It refers to the overlapping of gender discrimination with other forms of oppression. It is the low status of female slaves that makes their gender insignificant. Different forms of discrimination do not exist in isolation from one another but instead, interact with one another (Chodura et. al. 2019).

4.2.2 Genevieve Lloyd

In Aristotle’s *Politics*, as we have seen, rule is by no means for all those who are biologically male. It is reserved for those who are free and who are head of a household. The philosopher attributes the ability to rule in the texts T2 and T3 to superiority of the free man in qualities of the soul: he alone possesses practical reason. Thus, the possibility of achieving full character virtue, and in this way human *eudaimonia*, is bound to the perspective of the householder and citizen. Happiness is not equally shared among all men, but getting a share of happiness is the exclusive purview of men (Spelman 1994: 117).

In her influential work *The Man of Reason. ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy* (1984), Genevieve Lloyd skilfully draws attention to the close connection between reason, masculinity, and domination. She shows how a relationship, which Plato conceived as a relationship within man, is transferred to social and legal structures over the course of the history of philosophy and seems to legitimise the subordination of women (Lloyd 1993: 7). Just as the soul rules the body and reason rules over passions within the soul, Aristotle says that man rules over woman (Pol. I 5, 1254^b2–14). If a rational person is male and reason legitimises dominion, then the rule of man over woman appears to be justified.

[T7] The associations between ‘male’ and ‘rational’ and between ‘female’ and ‘non-rational’ have, of course, a very long history. The idea that the rational is somehow specially associated with masculinity goes back to the Greek founding fathers of rationality as we know it. [...] [Aristotle’s, AvL] claim is not of course that women do not have rationality, but they have it in an inferior, fainter way. They have rationality; they are distinguished from the animals by being rational. Yet they are not equal to men. They are somehow *lesser* men, lesser in respect of the all important thing: rationality. (Lloyd 1979: 18–19)

The concept of reason, however, is used by Aristotle not only in the sense of it being a specific innate characteristic of mankind, but also in the sense that this characteristic needs to be perfected in order to achieve the higher purpose of human life. Man’s striving for *eudaimonia* is fulfilled by exercising reason in the best possible way. Only through the activity of the

rational part of the soul does man gain his essence. In the Aristotelian theory, the full realization of human nature is reserved for the group of free men. Thus, the supposedly gender-neutral definition of human proves to be masculine.

[T8] When the Man of Reason is extolled, philosophers are not talking about idealizations of human beings. They are talking about ideals of manhood. (Lloyd 1979: 18)

One of the methods of feminist philosophy, which students using Lloyd's example learn, is to examine general statements about humans to see whether women are included or explicitly excluded. Existing knowledge can be used in that, for example, in many languages the words for "man" and "human being" coincide (man, homme, uomo). The contradiction inherent in the exclusion of women from the *Declaration of Human and Civil Rights* in France in 1789 is also a connection familiar to many students from history lessons (Nagl-Docekal 2010: 123).

4.3 Suggestions for in-Class Discussions

The two influential texts of feminist philosophy presented here were and still are controversially discussed in research. Due to their topicality, differentiatedness and openness, these debates offer ample inspiration for discussion in the classroom. Based on short quotations, the final section of this article will introduce controversial core questions from recent debates.

4.3.1 The Question of Equality and Difference between Women in its Political Dimension

[T9] [T]he paradox at the heart of feminism: Any attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk about the differences among us, and vice versa. (Spelman 1988: 3)

While Spelman leads us to the concept of intersectionality, the number of intersections to be considered in research is controversial. Besides the three "classical" forms of oppression "class", "race" and "gender", other categories of difference such as "body", "sexuality" or "age" are discussed. Thus, the group of women becomes increasingly diversified. This is on the one hand advantageous for avoiding essentialist definitions and stereotyping of "woman", which lead to exclusion. On the other hand, the focus on differences makes political representation more difficult, because a common basic experience of discrimination, which motivates the feminist project and which it aims to overcome, appears questionable from this standpoint. The increasing differentiation of feminist theory threatens to paralyse political practice (cf. Klinger 2003). Fundamental questions arise as a result, such as the relationship between science and politics and the possibilities for philosophy to contribute to overcoming structures of discrimination.

4.3.2 The Complexity of Womanness

[T10] Individual women are *particular*, not the same. (Stoljar 1995: 262; quoted from Mikkola 2006: 78)

If, as in Spelman, we emphasise the differences between women due to very different experiences in very different realities of life, then the question also arises as to whether we can still speak meaningfully of “woman” philosophically and which form that should take. Here, the positions of “gender realism” and “gender nominalism” are opposed to each other:

Gender Realism	Gender Nominalism
[W]omen have some feature (definitive of ‘womanness’) in common and this feature is what makes them women. (Mikkola 2006: 77)	[A]lthough a range of features are associated with women (such as certain social roles, psychological dispositions, experiences, and expectations), there is no single feature or set of features that women as women have in common that makes them women. (Mikkola 2006: 78)

The position of “gender realism” raises the question of what the common necessary characteristic – in the terminology of metaphysics: the universal property – of all women is. Thereby, the distinction between sex and gender is presupposed so that biological characteristics are excluded (Mikkola 2006: 94). Is it a shared experience, social role, or disposition? Representatives of “gender nominalism”, on the other hand, who like Spelman deny the existence of a common necessary characteristic, point to the many differences between women. The category “woman” as such seems questionable to them. This debate enables reference to be made to the classical essentialist substance theory, which distinguishes between necessary and accidental properties. Furthermore, it is particularly productive for teaching in so far as it allows a distinction to be made between semantic and ontological perspectives (Mikkola 2016: 1–6). This distinction in turn leads to the very controversial basic question of the relationship between properties and concepts, which is relevant in metaphysics.

4.3.3 Humanist Feminism

[T11] [W]e should stop taking *woman* as the organizing notion of feminist philosophy and reframe our analyses of injustice in humanist terms. (Mikkola 2016: 2)

While the example of Genevieve Lloyd presented above (4.2.2) makes references to human nature appear problematic from a feminist point of view, Mari Mikkola emphasises in her more recent works (2012 and 2016) the potential of a reference to human nature for feminist discourse. She proposes to describe discrimination of women as dehumanising and to rehabilitate humanism as the basis of feminism. In this context, human nature is, as it is in Aristotle, both descriptive and normative: On the one hand, it is the presupposed basis, on the other hand, it is the end and norm towards which human education is to be directed. The success of the feminist project is ultimately measured here by women’s capability to freely develop the possibilities inherent in their nature as human beings.

Outlook

The study of Aristotle could indeed prove to enhance the program of humanistic feminism, for in his practical philosophy the question of the essence of man is combined with considerations of the social and political order on which this essence is to be realised. The theses of man's gift of reason and his striving for *eudaimonia*, which is fulfilled precisely in the activity of reason, retain their validity even where people are unjustly excluded from participation in the *polis* and thus from the chance of a happy life. From here, the question of what a legal and political order could look like that would allow all people to participate politically and strive for happiness seems topical. It can be assumed that this also represents a compelling question for students. Aristotle himself would have no doubt that teaching is needed to establish fair and unbiased political structures. For reason, which by nature belongs to man, requires education.

References

Abbreviations: Aristotle's works

A. Po. – *Posterior Analytics*

EN – *Nicomachean Ethics*

Metaph. – *Metaphysics*

Pol. – *Politics*

Albus, Vanessa (2013a), *Kanonbildung im Philosophieunterricht. Lösungsmöglichkeiten und Aporien*, Dresden: Thelem.

Albus, Vanessa (2013b), "Kanonbildungsprozesse im Philosophieunterricht. Deskriptive, evaluative und präskriptive Betrachtungen", *Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik* 3/2013, 7–14.

Bien, Günther (1985), *Die Grundlegung der politischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles*, Freiburg / München: Alber.

Chodura, Hannah / Gajić, Danilo / Gleis, Lisa / Peaceman, Hannah (2019), *Wie umgehen mit Rassismus, Sexismus und Antisemitismus in klassischen Werken der Philosophie?* URL: <http://wieumgehenmitrsa.uni-jena.de>. Last access: 24 June 2020.

Connell, Sophia M. (2016), *Aristotle on Female Animals. A Study of the Generation of Animals*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Corcilus, Klaus (2011), "Methode", Corcilus, Klaus / Rapp, Christof (eds.), *Aristoteles-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Stuttgart / Weimar: Metzler, 266–271.

Debus, Katharina (2017), "Dramatisierung, Entdramatisierung und Nicht-Dramatisierung von Geschlecht und sexueller Orientierung in der geschlechterreflektierten Bildung. Oder: (Wie) Kann ich geschlechterreflektiert arbeiten, ohne Stereotype zu verstärken?", Glockentöger, Ilke / Adelt, Eva (eds.), *Gendersensible Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule. Grundlagen – Handlungsfelder – Praxis*, Münster/New York: Waxmann, 25–41.

Faulstich-Wieland, Hannelore (2005), "Spielt das Geschlecht (k)eine Rolle im Schulalltag? Plädoyer für eine Entdramatisierung von Geschlecht." Vortrag in der Reihe *Gender Lectures* an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin am 11.07.2005. URL: http://www.genderkompetenz.info/veranstaltungen_publications_und_news_archiv/genderlectures/faulstichwieland_manuskript_genderlecture.pdf. Last access: 24 June 2020.

Flashar, Hellmut (1971), "Ethik und Politik in der Philosophie des Aristoteles", *Gymnasium* 78, 278–293.

- Föllinger, Sabine (1996), *Differenz und Gleichheit. Das Geschlechterverhältnis in der Sicht griechischer Philosophen des 4. bis 1. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- Frede, Dorothea (2013), “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics”, Deslauriers, Marguerite / Destrée, Pierre (eds.): *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14–37.
- Frede, Dorothea (2018), “Equal but Not Equal: Plato and Aristotle on Women as Citizens”, Anagnostopoulos, Georgios / Santas, Gerasimos (eds.), *Democracy, Justice, and Equality in Ancient Greece. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*, Cham: Springer, 287–306.
- Fricker, Miranda (2007), *Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fricker, Miranda (2012), “Schweigen und institutionelle Vorurteile”, Landweer, Hilge / Newmark, Catherine / Kley, Christine / Miller, Simone (eds.), *Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies. Peripherie und Zentrum im Feld der Theorie*, Bielefeld: transcript, 63–86.
- Gebhard, Ulrich / Martens, Ekkehard / Mielke, Rosemarie (2004), “‘Ist Tugend lehrbar?’ – Zum Zusammenspiel von Intuition und Reflexion beim moralischen Urteilen”, Rohbeck, Johannes (ed.), *Ethisch-philosophische Basiskompetenz*, Dresden: Thelem, 131–164.
- Golus, Kinga (2015), “Genderperspektive”, Nida-Rümelin, Julian / Spiegel, Irina / Tiedemann, Markus (ed.), *Handbuch Philosophie und Ethik. Band 1: Didaktik und Methodik*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 114–118.
- Haase, Volker (2014), “‘Unfreundlich, Gleichstellungsbeauftragte, kurze Haare’. Eine explorative Untersuchung der Vorurteilsstrukturen Jugendlicher am Beispiel des Wortfeldes ‘Feminismus’”, *Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik* 3/2014, 3–13.
- Hagengruber, Ruth (2013), “2600 Jahre Philosophiegeschichte mit Philosophinnen. Herausforderungen oder Vervollständigung des philosophischen Kanons. Ergebnisse der Forschung und ihre Auswirkungen auf Rahmenrichtlinien und Schulpraxis”, *Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik* 3/2013, 15–27.
- Haraway, Donna (1988), “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective”, *Feminist Studies* 14/3, 575–599.
- Höffe, Otfried (1995), “Ethik als praktische Philosophie – Methodische Überlegungen (I 1, 1094^a22–1095^a13)”, Höffe, Otfried (ed.): *Die Nikomachische Ethik*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 13–38.
- Klinger, Cornelia (2003), “Ungleichheit in den Verhältnissen von Klasse, Rasse und Geschlecht”, Knapp, Gudrun-Axeli / Wetterer, Angelika (ed.), *Achsen der Differenz. Gesellschaftstheorie und feministische Kritik II*, Münster: Westfäl. Dampfboot, 14–48.
- Landweer, Hilge / Newmark, Catherine / Kley, Christine / Miller, Simone (eds.) (2012), *Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies. Peripherie und Zentrum im Feld der Theorie*, Bielefeld: transcript.
- Lienemann, Béatrice (forthcoming), *Aristotle on the Rationality of Women: Consequences for Virtue and Practical Accountability*.
- Lloyd, Genevieve (1979), “The Man of Reason”, *Metaphilosophy* 10/1, 18–37.
- Lloyd, Genevieve (1993), *The Man of Reason. ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy*, London: Routledge.
- Lüpke, Annika von (2019), *Sklavennatur und Menschennatur im politischen Denken des Aristoteles*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter.
- Martens, Ekkehard (2003), *Methodik des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts. Philosophieren als elementare Kulturtechnik*, Hannover: Siebert.
- Mikkola, Mari (2006), “Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women”, *Hypatia* 21/4, 77–96.

- Mikkola, Mari (2012), “Der Begriff der Entmenschlichung und seine Rolle in der feministischen Philosophie”, Landweer, Hilge / Newmark, Catherine / Kley, Christine / Miller, Simone (eds.), *Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies. Peripherie und Zentrum im Feld der Theorie*, Bielefeld: transcript, 87–115.
- Mikkola, Mari (2016), *The Wrong of Injustice. Dehumanization and its Role in Feminist Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, Jörn (2019), “Spot the Differences! The Hidden Philosophical Anthropology in Aristotle’s Biological Writings”, Keil, Geert / Kreft, Nora (eds.), *Aristotle’s Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 118–139.
- Nagl-Docekal, Herta (1989), “Feministische Philosophie: Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung”, Deuber-Mankowsky, Astrid / Ramming, Ulrike / Tielsch, E. Walesca (eds.), *1789 / 1989 Die Revolution hat nicht stattgefunden*, Tübingen: edition deskord, 13–18.
- Nagl-Docekal, Herta (2010), “Was ist Feministische Philosophie?”, Peña Aguado, María Isabel / Schmitz, Bettina (eds.), *Klassikerinnen des modernen Feminismus*, Aachen: ein-Fach-verlag, 117–149.
- Nagl-Docekal, Herta (2012), “Feministische Philosophie im post-feministischen Kontext”, Landweer, Hilge / Newmark, Catherine / Kley, Christine / Miller, Simone (eds.), *Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies. Peripherie und Zentrum im Feld der Theorie*, Bielefeld: transcript, 231–254.
- Primavesi, Oliver / Rapp, Christof (2016), *Aristoteles*. München: C.H. Beck.
- Rapp, Christof (2016), “‘Der Staat existiert von Natur aus’ – Über eine befremdliche These im ersten Buch der Aristotelischen *Politik*”, Höfele, Andreas / Kellner, Beate (eds.), *Menschennatur und politische Ordnung*, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 45–78.
- Rolf, Bernd (2007), “Platon, Aristoteles & Co. Welche Rolle spielen sie heute noch im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht?”, Reis, Burkhard (ed.), *Zwischen PISA und Athen – Antike Philosophie im Schulunterricht*, Göttingen: V & R unipress, 27–48.
- Saunders, Trevor J. (1995), *Aristotle. Politics. Books I and II. Translated with a Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Schofield, Malcolm (2006), “Aristotle’s Political Ethics”, Kraut, Richard (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 305–322.
- Schütrumpf, Eckart (1991), *Aristoteles. Politik. Buch I. Über die Hausverwaltung und die Herrschaft des Herrn über Sklaven. Übersetzt und erläutert*, Darmstadt: WBG.
- Scott, Dominic (2015), *Levels of Argument. A Comparative Study of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spelman, Elizabeth V. (1988), *Inessential Woman. Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought*. London: The Women’s Press.
- Spelman, Elizabeth V. (1994), “Who’s Who in the Polis”, Bar On, Bat-Ami (ed.), *Engendering Origins. Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle*, New York: State University of New York Press, 99–125.
- Steenblock, Volker (2000a), “Philosophische Bildung als ‘Arbeit am Logos’”, Rohbeck, Johannes (ed.), *Methoden des Philosophierens*, Dresden: Thelem, 13–29
- Steenblock, Volker (2000b), *Philosophische Bildung. Einführung in die Philosophiedidaktik und Handbuch: Praktische Philosophie/Ethik*. Münster: LIT-Verlag.
- Thein, Christian (2014): “Ist Geschlecht Kultur oder Natur? Die Gender-Debatte als anthropologisches Thema im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht”, *Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik* 3/2014, 27–38.

How to cite this article

Lüpke, Annika von (2020): Gender-Sensitive Approaches to Teaching Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy, *Journal of Didactics of Philosophy* 4 (2), 53–70. DOI: 10.46586/JDPH.2020.9576.